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ABSTRACT
This t h e s i s  i s  aimed a t  f u r t he r i ng  the e f f e c t i v en e s s  of  
b e n e f i t - c o s t  analyses  of  preserved na tura l  ecosystem provi s ion ,by  
cons ider ing  the eva lua t ion  of  the b e ne f i t s  which a r i s e  from t h i s  
type o f  land use.
Par t  I cons iders  the t h e o r e t i c a l  aspect s  of  measuring the 
fu l l  range of  p re se rva t i on  b e n e f i t s .  An ana l ys i s  of  the wel fare  
change measures r evea l s  t h a t  in most cases the p r a c t i c a b l e  Marshal l ian 
consumer' s surplus  measure,  based on the  ordinary  demand curve for  the good 
under c on s i de ra t i on ,  i s  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  adequate.  However, i t  is  
concluded t h a t  when a b e n e f i t  i s  not  marketed,  and hence when an 
ord inary  demand curve is  not  d i r e c t l y  observable ,  a common ci rcumstance in 
the p rese r va t i on  case ,  two a l t e r n a t i v e  b e n e f i t  measures can be pursued:  
the Marshal l ian consumer ' s s u r p l us ,  der ived from the market  for  a 
r e l a t e d  good, and the Hicksian income equ i va l en t  measure.  A review 
of the va lua t ion  techniques  which are based on these a l t e n a t i v e  
measures,  reveals  t h a t  under s p e c i f i c  condi t ions  the r e l a t e d  market  
t echniques  are capable of  providing accura te  measurements and have 
been widely used,  but  t h a t  the acceptance of  the income equivalent  
or  hypothet ical  valuat ion t e ch n i q u e s , has been hampered by the 
suspected presence of  several  types of  b i a s ,  notably " s t r a t e g i c  b i a s " .
A number of  s t ud i e s  are reviewed which ques t ion the s e v e r i t y  of  
the s t r a t e g i c  bias  problem,but  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  respondents  choosing 
to behave s t r a t e g i c a l l y  cannot  be dismissed.  I d e a l l y , t h e  so lu t i on  to 
the problem would be the i ncorpora t i on  of  a demand r evea l i ng  process  
into a l l  hypothe t i ca l  va luat ion t echniques ,  but  the problems involved
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in achieving this ideal are found to be such that the best available 
alternative is the use of a Smith Auction Process,over a sub-sample 
of respondents providing hypothetical valuations,to indicate the 
extent of strategic bias in the main sample. Given this background, 
techniques appropriate to the tasks of measuring individual and grouped 
preservation benefits are suggested. It becomes clear that the 
main problem in measuring the benefits of natural ecosystem preservation 
is the assertion of existence demand: not only has confusion arisen
regarding i ts exact definition, but l i t t l e  has been done to establish 
i ts magnitude.
Part II considers the problems of measuring existence values, by 
addressing the task of assessing the value, held by a sample of Canberra 
residents, of the knowledge of existence of a particular preserved natural 
ecosystem, Nadgee Nature Reserve»using the technique recommended in 
Part I for such an exercise - the direct questioning method used in 
conjunction with a Smith Auction Process sub-sample experiment to 
establish the extent of strategic behaviour present in the main sample 
responses. Two issues are addressed concurrently: is the measurement
methodology capable of producing useful results,  and i f  so, what is 
the magnitude of the existence benefits of Nadgee? Following a description 
of the benefits which are to be measured, and a general overview of 
Nadgee, the questionnaire designed to implement the direct questioning, 
"willingness to pay" approach, is detailed. Special features of the 
questionnaire include its provision of information to minimize 
"hypothetical bias", i ts use of optional modes of payment to reduce the 
possibility of "payment mode bias",and i ts  use of a context for 
questioning which separates the respondents' willingness to pay for the 
existence benefits of Nadgee from their valuations of all the other
via
benefits the area provides. The role of the Survey Research Centre,
ANU, in carrying out the sampling and surveying of the Canberra 
population is then reported, and as an introduction to the main 
presentation of results,  some characteristics of the sample, are 
provided together with an analysis of the representativeness of the 
sample. Five assumptions are made for the analysis of the distribution 
of bids: only existence benefits are measured ; existence benefits
are always "goods"; there is no hypothetical bias, payment mode bias 
or strategic bias. Linder these assumptions, the willingness to pay 
bids can be treated as equivalent surpluses resulting from the 
continued provision of Nadgee's existence benefits. The bids are 
found to have a large range with a lumpy distribution. The modal 
score is zero (25% of respondents) and the population mean is estimated 
to lie approximately between $20 and $30. The effects on willingness to 
pay of changing information provision and the level of species rarity 
are found to be insignificant,  but differences across the distribution 
of bids made by the respondents choosing the alternative payment modes 
are detected. Various hypotheses to explain these two results are 
formulated, but none can be substantiated. Two analyses are undertaken 
to explain the magnitude of respondents' willingness to pay: the f i r s t
considers the distinctions between respondents who indicated a positive 
willingness to pay and those who hypothetically bid zero, using 
crosstabulation and discriminant analyses; and the second examines 
only those respondents who offered positive bids using crosstabulation 
and multiple regression analyses. Young, wealthy people who 
support conservation and read books on nature study are found to be more
+o
likely^bid for Nadgee's existence values, and the highest bidders are 
found to be young or old, but not middle-aged, wealthy people who 
read about nature and who would prefer the government to collect
i x
additional taxes to finance the preservation proposal.
The ab i l i ty  of the discriminant and regression analyses 
to explain the bid variance is only poor, and this is hypothesized 
to indicate the presence of either strategic or hypothetical bias.
The analysis of strategic bias indicates that both under- and over­
stating strategic bias is l ike ly  to be present in direct questioning 
responses but that truth-stating is predominant and under-stating 
w i l l  tend to compensate for the over-stating behaviour. Given that 
the strategic bias assumption is the only one l ike ly  to be proved 
invalid and have a signif icant affect on the interpretation of the 
bids, i t  is concluded that the existence benefits of Nadgee, which 
are enjoyed by the Canberra population, form a substantial proportion 
of the area's contribution to social well-being. In a more general 
context, this conclusion implies that decision makers must recognize 
the presence of existence values in the l i s t  of benefits which must 
be considered in the evaluation of any proposal involving a preserved
natural area.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with the analysis of the provision 
of preserved natural ecosystems - areas of land or water which have 
been largely undisturbed by people,or which have been managed by 
people so that the effects of any past human presence on the area 
have been removed or substantially reduced.^ Preserved natural 
ecosystems provide a-wide range of benefits for the community. Production 
benefits are derived from a preserved natural ecosytem when either 
an input to the production process of a marketed good, such as silt- 
free water run-off used by a farmer to water his stock, or a marketed 
good itself, such as migratory fish, is derived from the area.
Recreation benefits are enjoyed by those participating in both active 
and passive use of natural areas,and include a range of activities 
from skiing and surfing through to picnicing and wilderness exploration. 
Health benefits are derived usually through recreation in terms of 
physical well-being, but mental well-being also may be improved by 
the whole range of participatory uses. Similarly, aesthetic benefits 
are enjoyed by users and passers-by who delight in the natural 
beauty of a preserved area, but the same type of benefit may also be
1 Often, preserved natural areas are provided in association 
with developed facilities such as access roads, picnic sites 
and camping amenities - the comp!ementary relationship 
between preserved areas and associated facilities is 
recognized in this thesis by its consideration of a wide range of 
preservation benefits. Examples of preserved natural areas are 
National Parks, Nature Reserves, State Recreation Areas and 
State Forestry Commission Reserves.
xxii
enjoyed by readers of books and pamphlets devoted to photographic 
representation of the area. These same readers and participatory 
users may enjoy ed u ca tio n a l b e n e f i t s  from learning about the 
natural ecosystem. Closely related to this type of benefit are the 
s c i e n t i f i c  b e n e f i t s  which may be gained by carrying out research 
in areas largely untouched by people,to determine the effects of human 
inhabitance ,and to learn how to improve the environment which is 
inhabited by people. Natural areas also provide people with gene- 
pool m aintenance b e n e f i t s :  by storing genetic material, such areas
provide a reservoir from which people can draw to help satisfy future 
demands. Finally, people can benefit from the knowledge that natural 
ecosystems, and the individual species which make up those ecosystems, 
survive in a natural state - these benefits are known as e x is te n c e  
b e n e f i t s .
As an alternative to preservation, natural areas can be 
developed to produce timber, agricultural products, home sites,  
etc. However, the amount of natural ecosystem is clearly f in i te ,  
whereas the aggregated wants of the community for such areas are 
both varied and insatiable. In other words, the stock of natural 
ecosystems available would never be able to create sufficient benefits 
to satisfy all the demands placed upon i t .  This is one way of 
stating the problem of s c a r c ity :  because of scarcity, competition
between the infinite wants for, and hence uses of, natural ecosystems 
develops and bi t ter  conflict is often the outward manifestation of 
this competition. For instance, in October 1979 groups of 
environmentalists ( i .e .  individuals with a high preference for preservation 
benefits) attempted to prevent bulldozers from clearing logging 
t ra i l s  in the Terrania Creek rainforests on the North Coast of N.S.W.
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In another c o n f l i c t ,  supporters of the preservation of the south­
west Tasmanian wilderness marched in s t reet  r a l l i e s  in June 1980, 
whi le supporters of the Tasmanian Hydro-E lectr ic i ty  Commission, 
the organization planning to generate e l e c t r i c i t y  by damming several 
wi ld and scenic r ivers  in the area, attempted to shout down th e i r  
opposi t ion's speakers.
Ul t imate ly , a choice between a l te rna t ive  uses, and that implies 
a choice between the sa t is fac t ion  of  competing wants, must be 
made, and v i t a l  to such a choice is the underlying approach, or 
ra t ioning device, on which the decision is based. In the Austral ian 
economy, the most common rat ioning devices are pr ices, determined 
by the in te ract ion of  market and p o l i t i c a l  forces: where governments
consider that the operation of  market forces alone does not provide 
an a l locat ion of resources which sa t is f ie s  th e i r  goals, intervention 
in the market, through price contro ls , taxat ion ,  subsidizat ion, 
entry  l im i ta t io ns  e tc . ,  or a programme of  publ ic provision, may be 
used to ensure a more suitable a l loca t ion .  In the case of the 
a l locat ion of  natural ecosystems between preservation and development 
a l te rna t ives ,  i t  is clear from the actions of  State and Federal 
Governments in Austra l ia ,that intervention ,to the extent of publ ic 
provision of  areas of preserved natural ecosystem,has been considered 
necessary.
To implement a pol icy of publ ic prov is ion,  governments face the 
problem of determining the "appropriate" level of provis ion.
Che method of achieving such an assessment i.s through the use of 
benef i t -cost analysis, a process which weighs the advantages and 
disadvantages of  a change in resource a l loca t ion ,  considered from the
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2viewpoint of society as a whole. However, while the costs of 
providing a preserved natural area can generally be ascertained 
from market information, many of the benefits of provision are more 
diff icult  to quantify in comparable units.
It is the purpose of this thesis to further the effectiveness 
of benefit-cost analyses of preserved natural ecosystem provision 
by considering the evaluation of the benefits which arise from this 
type of land use. Two major aims are addressed:
(i) the consideration of the theoretical aspects of measuring 
the value which the community places on the benefits of preserving 
areas of natural ecosystems; and,
(i i )  the application of the relevant theory to the measurement 
of one of those benefits - the existence benefits of a particular 
area of preserved natural ecosystem, Nadgee Nature Reserve, on the 
far South Coast of New South Wales.
2 Benefit-cost analysis is based on a specific definition of 
what is "appropriate": the Hicks-Kaldor hypothetical 
compensation cri terion,  which accepts changes in resource 
allocation as being desirable if  at least one person can be 
made better-off without making anyone worse-off after the 
payment of costless lump sum compensation. This criterion 
is essentially a practical version of the Pareto efficiency 
criterion and i t  is important to recognise that the 
achievement of Pareto efficiency does not imply any satisfaction 
of distribution goals - every different distribution of resources 
between individuals in society yields a unique allocation which 
is Pareto eff icient,  and to choose between the myriad of Pareto 
efficient allocations requires knowledge of society's social 
welfare function. The problems associated with defining a 
social welfare function - see Winch (1971), pp. 95-100 - lead 
to the assumption, made for this thesis,  that the present 
distribution of resources is "satisfactory" and the goal of 
Pareto efficiency,made operational by the Hicks-Kaldor criterion, 
is sufficient to ensure the maximization of social welfare.
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The purpose of this Introduction is to provide a setting for 
the main body of the thesis by considering two broad issues: f i r s t ,  the 
failure of markets to provide "appropriate" levels of preserved natural
areas; and secondly, the suitabil i ty of benefit-cost analysis as an
analytical tool used by governments in the process of assessing
3
the "appropriate" level of public provision. It is important to 
consider the characteristics of the benefits of preserved natural 
areas which would cause the failure of a hypothetical market for 
such areas, in order to understand the reasons why government provision, 
and hence benefit measurement, is undertaken. In addition, the 
close relationship that exists between benefit-cost analysis and 
the market process - just as the market will fail to provide 
appropriate valuations of non-marketed benefits of preservation, so 
will the benefit-cost analyst have problems in determining the 
magnitude of the same benefits - enables a consideration of the causes 
of market failure to provide information useful to the formulation 
and assessment of techniques designed to value non-marketed benefits 
for a benefit-cost analysis. While Section 1 of this Introduction 
indicates that the extent of market failure is considerable, the 
second issue, the caveats associated with the use of benefit- 
cost analysis, considered in Section 2,places the thesis in perspective 
by enabling a comparison of the problems of public provision with 
those created by a reliance on market forces.
3 Again, "appropriate" is defined purely in terms of 
Pareto efficiency.
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Despite the essentially non-analytical character of this 
In t roduct ion^  is concluded that the results of benefit-cost analyses 
of public provision of preserved natural areas can given pragmatic 
guidance for governments deciding levels of supply, given the 
assumption that all  the benefits and costs of the proposals being 
considered are measured accurately: i t  is the fulfi l lment of this
condition which is the major concern of the main body of the thesis. 
The final task of the Introduction therefore is to provide an 
outline of how this concern is addressed, with specific reference 
to the dual aims of the thesis.
I .  MARKET FAILURES
There are four basic characteristics of the benefits of natural 
ecosystem preservation which create problems for the operation of 
hypothetical markets for such areas: ra r i ty ,  jointness and non­
excludability, i r revers ib i l i ty  and merit.^ This section considers how 
these characteristics create market failure and the extent to which 
the operation of a market will  distort the allocation of natural 
ecosystems away from Pareto efficiency: the allocation from which
no person can be made better-off without adversely affecting other 
people.
4 Of course, not all  the benefit classifications exhibit 
all of these characteristics.
xxv a
1.1 Ecosystem Rarity
' Many natural ecosystems possessfeatures which e f fe c t ive ly
d i f fe re n t ia te  those areas from th e i r  surrounding d i s t r i c t s :  the
r a r i t y  o f  the ecosystem i t s e l f ,  a species inhabi t ing the ecosystem,
or perhaps a geological feature contained wi th in the area. However,
the r a r i t y  charac te r is t ic  is a fac tor  which may contr ibute to the
under-supply of preserved natural areas: as Tisdel l  (1972) points
out, the ' ind iv idua l  who owns a natural feature and has no competitors
in the immediate neighbourhood . . .  has a monopoly which may arise
from the d i f fe re n t ia t io n  of his product as well as from spatial
e f fec ts '  (p. 155). The e f fec t  o f  monopoly ownership of preserved
natural areas is a contract ion of supply away from the Pareto
e f f i c i e n t  level of provision which equates supply and demand, to the
5 6level which equates supply and marginal revenue. *
1.2 Jointness and Non-Excludabi l ity
Many o f  the benefi ts of preserved natural areas embody the 
publ ic good characte r is t ics  of jointness and non-exc ludabi l i ty .^
5 In th is  context, the level of provision refers to both the 
a v a i la b i l i t y  of access to preserved natural areas and the 
quant i ty  o f  areas to which access is granted.
6 This resu l t  is not true when the monopolist is able to practice 
perfect price d iscr im inat ion,  as is noted by Tisdel l  (1972).
7 Samuelson (1954), (1955), (1958) recognized the d is t in c t ion  
between pr ivate and publ ic goods - the publ ic good 'd i f f e r s  
from a private consumption good in that each man's consumption 
of i t  . . .  is related to the to ta l  . . .  by a condition of equal i ty  
rather than summation' (p .350 (1955)) and proved that Pareto e f f ic iency  
was achieved when the summation of a l l  ind iv iduals '  marginal rates
of subst i tu t ion equalled the marginal rate of  transformat ion; 
that i t  was necessary to aggregate v e r t i c a l l y  ind iv idua ls '  
public good demands;and consequently, that a non-uniform set 
of prices would be necessary to achieve op t ima l i ty .  A detailed 
analysis o f  the theory of publ ic goods can be found in Head (1974).
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Jointness is  an extension of  the case of  decreasing costs in that 
once the j o i n t  good is provided the marginal cost of allowing 
fu r the r  use of the good is close to ,o r  equal to ,zero , and non­
exc ludab i l i ty  is an extreme case of the neo-classical de f in i t ion
o
of external ( dis)economies in that once the non-excludable good
is prov ided, i t  is impossible to prevent benef ic iaries from using
the good. To examine the occurrence o f  jointness and non-excludabi l i ty ,
and hence to determine the posit ion on the "continuum" of goods
types which exists  between the polar cases of pure private and pure
public goods, each category of  preservation benefi t  w i l l  be
considered.
General ly, the production benefi ts of natural ecosystem 
preservation are private goods because they are defined in terms 
of  p r iva te ly  marketed products. For instance, the commercially caught 
f ish  which were spawned in an area o f  preserved natural ecosystem 
cannot be eaten more than once and i t  is possible to exclude a 
potentia l  consumer who has not paid fo r  the meal.
Recreation benefi ts are often j o i n t  in supply - that i s ,  an 
area of preserved natural ecosystem is avai lable to addit ional 
recreational users at zero marginal cost • However the jointness 
cha rac te r is t ic  may not be appl icable at a l l  levels of recreational 
use - fo r  instance, an addit ional sk ier on the slopes may reduce 
the benefi ts o f  establ ished skiers because of increased queueing
8 Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962) define an external (d is) 
economy or e x te rn a l i ty  as being present when ' the u t i l i t y  of 
an ind iv idual is dependent on a c t i v i t i e s  . . .  that are 
exc lusive ly under his own control or au thor i ty  but also 
upon another single a c t i v i t y  which is ,  by d e f in i t io n ,  under 
the control of a second in d iv id u a l1 (p. 372).
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times on fa c i l i t ie s  and increased danger of collisions, thus creating 
a situation where congestion causes non-zero marginal costs. Areas 
of preserved natural ecosystem may be non-excludable to recreational 
users, or at least i t  may be too expensive to prevent non-paying 
use5relative to the revenue which would be gained from policing entry. 
For example, many preserved natural areas frequented by bushwalkers 
have extensive boundaries with any number of easy access points, 
and even though i t  may be possible,physically, to build a boundary 
fence and employ suffic ient rangers to patrol for non-paying users, 
the expense would be prohibitive, thus effective ly creating a non­
excludable good. However, excludability may be possible and 
feasible for spatially compact recreation areas, particularly i f  
the recreation is car based and there are only a small number of 
roads entering the area - th is is the case for boating at Kurringai 
National Park, near Sydney, and snow skiing at Kosciusko National 
Park.
Health benefits are usually enjoyed in association with 
recreation benefits and so the occurrence of the public good 
characteristics within health benefits can be regarded as the same 
as that which has been described for recreation benefits. A similar 
pattern of occurrence for jointness and non-excludability could also 
be expected for educational and aesthetic benefits which are enjoyed 
by individuals who v is i t  the preserved natural area. However both 
the aesthetic and educational benefits of a natural ecosystem can 
be enjoyed by non-participatory users: publications
featuring preserved natural ecosystems provide readers with information 
on nature in addition to allowing the enjoyment of beautiful 
scenery; education benefits may be gained by students whose teachers
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use material based on natural areas; and, people passing-by a 
preserved natural area or neighbouring residents may enjoy the 
scenic beauty of an adjacent park. The benefits enjoyed by people 
reading books on preserved natural areas must be considered to be 
private,as i t  is the book which is the relevant good rather than 
the goods which i t  is portraying - the marginal cost of supplying 
the information contained in the book is the cost of producing an 
extra book, and despite the poss ib ility  of book borrowing and 
photocopying,the material is essentially excludable. The case of 
educational benefits,derived by the non-user student,is similar to the 
book example in that i t  is the education rather than the ecosystem 
i t s e l f  which is relevant, but here, the education is not a private 
good because even though i t  is excludable i t  is jo in t  in supply. 
Finally, the non-visiting aesthetic beneficiary enjoys a good which 
is jo in t  in supply and is non-excludable when viewing a natural 
area from outside its  boundaries.
The occurrence of the public good characterisecs in gene - 
pool maintenance and sc ien tif ic  research benefits depends on the 
type of good which is derived eventually from these two uses of 
preserved natural ecosystems . When the genes stored in 
a natural area are used by scientists to develop a cure for cancer, 
the resultant good is essentially private,but when natural ecosystem 
research develops a more effective method of bushfly control, then
9 As is the case for recreational benefits, non-excludability 
may depend on the expense of erecting a su ff ic ien tly  high fence 
(and roof, for those fly ing overhead) to exclude non-payers.
I t  may be noted that the property values of residences 
surrounding a park are higher, but this premium is not a method 
of price exclusion but rather an internalisation into the 
property market of the aesthetic externality generated by 
the natural area.
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the decrease in bushfly population which results is jo in t  and non­
excludable. In both cases however, the informational aspects of 
the research may have public good characteristics: 
even i f  the cancer cure was patented, the information provided 
by the discovery which is both jo in t  and non-excludable,may be 
suffic ient to enable the discovery of substitute cures, thus 
circumventing the patent.
The existence benefits of preserved’ natural ecosystems have 
strong public good characteristics: once an area is preserved,
the knowledge thatthe particular ecosystem, or species within 
that ecosystem,is preserved,is available at zero marginal c o s t ,^  
and i t  is almost impossible to prevent the transmission of the 
information on the existence of the area or species.
This brief review of the occurrence of jointness and non­
excludability in the benefits of preserving natural areas has shown 
clearly that a range of goods between the polar cases of pure private 
and pure public goods result from the preservation of natural 
ecosystems. Those benefits which do have public good characteristics 
can be grouped into two broad categories: those which exhibit
jointness but which can be price excluded (recreation, 
health, participatory aesthetic,and participatory and teacher- 
based education benefits );and, those which exhibit both jointness 
and non excludability ("passer-by" aesthetic, and existence
10 Even congestion does not give rise to positive marginal costs 
as i t  is unlikely that an additional person knowing about 
the preservation of a species w ill detract from the existence 
benefits of those already with that knowledge,irrespective 
of how many they number.
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benefits).^ To consider the effect on the level of provision of 
preserved natural areas of these characteristics,  two groups- 
joint/excludable and joint/non-excludable - will be examined 
separately.
The market situation for a good which is joint in supply
but excludable was analysed by Samuelson (1954). He argued that
the optimal provision price set,  consisting of prices equal to
each individual's marginal valuation for the total quantity of the
joint good provided, would not be achieved by market forces because
an individual with a high marginal valuation for the joint good
would turn to alternative low cost suppliers when asked to pay a
relatively high price. The resulting allocation of resources would
be an underprovision of preserved natural areas offering joint  but
12excludable benefits.
The divergence from optimality is lessened somewhat when 
production is carried out by a perfectly discriminating monopolist - 
if i t  is assumed that the monopolist has full information on all
11 The classification of scientific research and gene-pool 
maintenance benefits depends on the characteristics of the 
good which is derived and the type of information which
is associated with the good.
12 Subsequent analyses of joint  good provision by Thompson 
(1968) and Oakland (1974) change the assumptions used 
by Samuelson. Their results suggest that market forces 
are unlikely to produce an optimal quantity of a joint 
good but are equally unlikely to produce a zero output.
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users' marginal valuations to enable the correct setting of prices,
and the abil i ty to prevent retrading of the joint good, then optimal
13provision will result.  However, the practical problem of
determining consumers' preferences in the large numbers case - where
individuals perceive that their  actions have a minimal effect on the
level of output, the incentive is for them to state their preferences
for the joint good, when questioned by the monopolist, as zero, in
the hope that they will be able to use the good without paying^ -
will result ,  in general, in the monopolist under-providing preserved
15natural ecosystems yielding joint/excludable goods.
One final point must be made concerning the optimality of 
private provision of joint supply goods in terms of the optimality 
of consumption. Consumption optimality occurs when only those 
individuals whose marginal value is below the marginal cost are 
excluded from using the good,and in the case of joint goods,this 
implies that no one with a positive marginal value should be excluded 
Clearly, any form of provision of preserved natural ecosystems is sub
13 See Head (1974) pp. 79-80 for a more detailed consideration 
of monopolistic provision of a jointly supplied good.
14 If all consumers adopt this "free-riding" behaviour, zero 
output will result.
15 Coase (1974) uses lighthouses in seventeenth 
century England as examples of private provision of a 
joint/excludable good,but does not suggest that the level 
of provision was optimal.
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optimal for the consumer if  positive prices are charged: under­
provision is again the result.
The second category of benefits of preserved natural 
ecosystems to be considered in terms of the optimality of private 
provision ,are the benefits which are both joint in supply and 
non excludable. The addition of the problem of non-excludability 
to the situation of a jointly supplied good,leads to a far more 
severe level of underprovision of preserved natural ecosystems: 
producers can no longer collect fees for the use of such areas,and 
any previously accepted set of optimal prices cannot be used 
to create production efficiency. The incentive for production is 
eliminated and i t  would be expected that a zero level of provision 
of preserved natural areas,which provide only joint/non-excludable 
benefits ,would result from the operation of market forces alone.
It appears therefore, that private provision of 
the jointly supplied,but excludable benefits of natural ecosystem 
preservation will result in a sub-optimal, but positive supply 
of such areas. However, there seems l i t t l e  possibility of preserved 
natural areas being supplied by the open market i f  they provide only 
joint and non-excludable benefits. Clearly, most preserved natural 
areas provide a mixture of most, i f  not all of the benefits of 
preservation ,so as a general conclusion i t  can be expected that 
the community will be under-suppl ied with such areas i f  reliance is 
placed only on market forces.
I .3 irreversibi1ity
A characteristic of natural ecosystems which has been suggested, 
notably by Krutilla (1967),as a reason for the sub-optimal provision
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of preserved natural areas by market forces is irreversibi1ity - once
a natural ecosystem is developed, i t  may be either impossible or
prohibitively expensive to return all the area to its  preserved
natural state, whereas i f  preservation is undertaken, i t  remains
possible for the development to take place at any time in the
future. An example of irreversibil i ty is the case of a development
project which causes the extinction of an animal species - an
action which can not be reversed. The characteristic of irreversibi1ity
is not a problem to the optimal provision of preserved natural
ecosystems by private enterprise under conditions of certainty,
so long as the private investor uses a sufficiently long time
period of project appraisal,or includes in the decision calculus
all asset values at the end of the project appraisal period i f  this
16period is based on the development projects l ife span.
However, when uncertainty is introduced, the optimality of 
the private provision of preserved natural ecosystem becomes less 
clear, with two main issues being raised: f i r s t»  will private
investors account correctly for the incidence of risk - that is,  will 
the correct interest rate be used for private investment decisions 
involving natural ecosystems ; and secondly, will private investors 
account correctly for the uncertainty involved in future events - 
that is,  is the use of the expected value technique applicable to 
decisions involving natural ecosystems?
A private investor faced with the choice of developing or
16 Long time horizons or the inclusion of terminal asset
values overcome the myopic decision making problems raised 
by Tisde11 (1972).
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preserving an area of natural ecosystem will incorporate any risk 
component into the decision making framework by adding a premium 
to the discount rate used to calculate the net present values of 
the streams of net earnings to be gained from each alternative.
Tisdell (1972) notes that 'the addition of the premium increases 
the probability that the present discounted value of the plan for . . .  
(development) . . .  exceeds that for . . .  (preservation)' (p. 159) 
because the benefits of preservation generally occur further into 
the future. Using the Arrow and Lind r e s u l t , ^  Tisdell argues 
that the appropriate discount rate for the evaluation of natural 
ecosystem allocations is the risk-free rate,and hence that private 
investors, who use the risk-inclusive rate, may underprovide preserved 
natural a r e a s .^
The second issue concerning the characteristic of 
irreversibi 1ity under uncertainty,is the acceptability of the use
17 Arrow and Lind (1970) show that the risk associated 
with government provision is extremely small because 
any losses incurred could be spread across the whole 
tax base.
18 The severity of under-provisicn may be moderated by the 
public-good characteristics of the benefits of preservation: 
Fisher (1973) points out that the conditions underlying 
the Arrow and Lind (1970) result do not hold for public
goods because the risk associated with the loss of the benefits 
to the community is the same risk of loss to each individual. 
Ulph (1979) suggests that the Arrow and Lind result is 
inappropriate in the public goods case because of the non­
excludability characteristic rather than the jointness 
aspect, as suggested by Fisher.
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of expected values to re flect the value of the benefits/costs which
accrue to an investment involving natural ecosystems. A private
investor considering the development/preservation choice would
multiply each revenue and cost by the probability of i ts  occurrence
before incorporating i t  into the decision calculus - this process
is regarded by some economists as being inadequate because
of the fa ilu re  to add an "option value" premium to the benefits
of preservation. Option value was introduced by Weisbrod (1964)
to describe the difference between the price a person was w ill ing
to pay to ensure the continued a va ilab il i ty  of a good which is
subject to irreversible ity,and the expected value of actual use.
Both Weisbrod and Cicchetti and Freeman (1971) argued that option
value would be positive because of the need for a risk premium to
be applied to an irreversible outcome when i t  is assumed that society
is made up of predominantly risk averse individuals. However,
Henry (1974b) proved that option value can take any sign and
hence that the use of expected values, although almost certainly
inaccurate for the individual,may be accurate for a community made
up of a large number of people. To dispute this conclusion would
19require empirical analysis of a type not yet undertaken.
While the concept of "option value" has been found to 
provide no reason for the mi sal location of resources by private 
entrepreneurs i t  led to a more complete analysis of irreversible 
decisions overtime under uncertainty,and in particular, to the
19 A more extensive explanation of the concept of option 
value is carried out in the appendix to Chapter 4.
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20 21 concept of "quasi-option value" or the " i r r e v e r s ib i1i t y  e f fec t " .
I f  the i r revers ib le  development option is chosen, the opportunity
to benefi t  from new information which indicates that the preservation
option has become the preferred op t ion , is  los t  because the
opportunity to reverse the past decision is lo s t :  the resultant
bias toward development must be counteracted by the
addit ion of a quasi-option value premium to the benefits o f  preservation.
However Ulph (1979) demonstrates that even the quasi-option value
may be taken into account by pr ivate owners of natural ecosystems:
while 'a simple comparison of the choice between development and
preservation using expected net benefits as a c r i te r io n  neglects
(the quasi-option value) aspect and so creates a bias in favour
of development', Ulph (1979) suggests that 'w i th  any decision under
uncertainty (the pr ivate  owner) should always consider not ju s t
the immediate decision but also decisions about whether to obtain
addit ional information' (p. 67).
The fa i lu res  of a hypothetical market may lead,therefore,to 
an under-provisionof preserved natural areas,not because of the use 
by pr ivate investors of expected values to account fo r  the uncertainty 
of future outcomes ,but rather by th e i r  incorporation of  a premium 
fo r  r isk  in the discount rate used to calculate the present value 
of  investment projects,when i t  is Pareto e f f i c i e n t  to use a r isk less 
rate.
I .4 Merit
A number of  the benefi ts of preserved natural ecosystems are 
argued to possess the character is t ics  of a "meri t  good": that i s ,
20 A name coined by Arrow and Fisher (1974).
21 A name coined by Henry (1974a).
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the aggregate of the revealed preferences for preserved natural
ecosystems of the individuals comprising society does not represent
the preference of society as a whole for such areas. Two reasons
are advanced by Head (1974) for the classification of a good as a -
"merit good": a lack of information concerning the good, resulting
in individuals revealing preferences which are not indicative of their
true demand; and, the " ir ra t io n a l i ty "  of minors, again resulting
in an inaccurate revelation of true preferences. Boyden and Harris
(1978) argue, by implication, that the health benefits of preserved
natural areas are not widely known, and this ju s t i f ie s  the intervention
of governments to ensure adequate provision. Similarly, Costin
and Marples (1971) and Dasmann (1975) stress the ecological concept
that people and nature are so closely interrelated that any
substantial deterioration in the v ia b i l i ty  of the gene-pool w il l
cause the eventual downfall of the human species, with the implication
that, because most people are unaware of this interrelationship,
the gene-pool maintenance benefits of preservation must be viewed 
22 23as merit goods. *
22 Even i f  the whole community is perfectly informed regarding 
the relationship between man and nature, the jointness and 
non-excludability character!*sties of the gene-pool in this 
respect would almost certainly result in sub-optimal provision 
of preserved natural areas.
23 A somewhat d ifferent argument is advanced by Godfrey-Smith 
(1980),who suggests that society should consider the preferences 
of plant and animal species in addition to human preferences 
when deciding between preservation and development options.
The d i f f ic u l ty  of achieving such a policy is obvious but i t  
should also be realized that human preferences often include 
the well being of other species - this is the basis of the 
existence benefits of preservation.
xl
The divergence from Pareto efficiency which is caused by 
the merit good aspects of the preservation of natural  areas 
is d i f f i c u l t  to assesses i t  is dependent primarily on the amount of 
information ava i lab le  t o , and used by individuals. Perhaps a more 
acceptable method of overcoming the sub-optimality of provision of 
preserved areas due to merit good aspects is for governments to 
intervene in the provision of information regarding the benefits of 
preservation.
1.5 Conclusions
The characteristics of the benefits of preserved natural 
ecosystems - r a r i t y ,  jointness and non-excludability, i r reve rs ib i l i ty  
and merit -a l l  contribute to the fai lure of a hypothetical market 
to achieve a Pareto e f f ic ien t  level of provision of such areas: 
specif ically,  under-provision would result from the operation of market 
forces alone. The extent of under-provision has been shown to be 
dependent on the mix of benefit characteristics provided by each 
different area: while areas providing benefits which are rare, jo in t ,  
meritorious and irreversible but price excludable may be operated 
by private enterprise (particular ly i f  price discrimination can 
be practiced) at levels which are not substantially different from 
Pareto e f f ic ien t  levels, areas involving non-excludable benefits wi l l  
be s ignif icantly under-supplied, i f  indeed they are supplied at a l l ,  
by private operators.
While not al l economists agree that public provision of preserved 
natural areas w i l l  create a Pareto improvement in the allocation of
x l i
the resource i t  is clear that government action has the potential 
to provide such improvements, particularly when non-excludable 
benefits are involved. It is the purpose of the next section of the 
Introduction to consider the abili ty of governments to maximize their 
potential for the achievement of Pareto improvements in the supply 
of preserved natural areas.
II. PUBLIC PROVISION
Governments have two basic options to consider as methods for
attempting to improve the market allocation of preserved natural
ecosystems - the payment of a subsidy to owners of natural ecosystems
who decide to preserve their area,or the purchasing and operation of
areas suitable for incorporation into a network of National Parks
and Nature Reserves. Because the payment of a subsidy implies that
25the private owner will continue to charge an entry fee, a situation
24
24 Scott (1979) argues that the short term of office facing most 
governments creates a situation in which the benefits accruing 
to future generations are not incorporated adequately into the 
decision framework and concludes that private enterprise can 
provide optimal levels of goods such as preserved natural ecosystems 
if  the property rights for such areas are established so that 
residents close to a preserved area operate i t  commercially.
Clearly this argument ignores the inability of the residents
group to charge for the non-excludable benefits provided. Dolan 
(1971) believes that governments will over-supply wilderness areas 
because of the strength of preservation lobby groups and suggests 
that optimal provision can be achieved by allowing all National 
Parks to be auctioned so that conservation organisations could 
purchase them. While i t  is not clear that preservation lobby 
groups in Australia have a political advantage over their development 
counterparts, Dolan's auction suggestion also ignores the occurrence 
of non-excludable benefits.
25 If no fee was charged, the preserved natural area would be 
subsidised fully by the government - a situation which is 
equivalent to absolute public provision.
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which is sub-optimal in consumption when the good is joint in 
production, the option providing the maximum opportunity for Pareto 
improvement is public provision. The most extensively used economic 
technique for determining the level of provision which the government 
should attempt to achieve, is benefit-cost analysis (BCA), a process 
which weighs the advantages and disadvantages of a change in resource 
allocation, considered from the viewpoint of society as a whole.
This section of the Introduction considers the ability of BCA to 
provide governments with information sufficient to ensure an 
allocation of natural ecosystems which is a Pareto improvement over 
private provision,by analysing the problems which confront BCA: the
problems associated with the transformation of theoretical welfare 
economic considerations into the practical context of BCA; the use 
of BCA, which is a partial equilibrium technique, in a general 
equilibrium context; and finally, the practical implementation of 
BCA.
11.1 Welfare Economics and the Limitations of BCA
A change in resource allocation is Pareto efficient if and only 
if at least one individual is made better-off without making any other 
individuals worse off. Clearly, the Pareto criterion is excessively 
restrictive in a real world context where almost any change in resource 
allocation will result in a net cost to some people. While the
26 The question of the level of public provision is answered 
by BCA by assessing the viability of the marginal area of 
preserved natural ecosystem.
Xllll
application of the Pareto cr iter ion could be achieved i f  costless 
lump-sum compensation payments were made by the beneficiaries 
of a resource allocation change to those who bear the costs, the 
possib i l i ty  of such costless comepens'ations being paid is small 
and the problem of practical application remains. BCA overcomes 
the problem by using the Kaldor-Hicks concept of hypothetical 
compensation: a change in resource allocation satisfies the Kaldor-
Hicks cr iter ion i f  the beneficiaries of the change can compensate 
those bearing the costs (with the compensation being in the form 
of a "batch" of goods) even though the compensation payments are 
not necessarily made. The benefit-cost analyst interprets the Kaldor- 
Hicks cr iter ion as requiring the measured benefits to. society of 
the allocation change to be greater than the associated measured 
costs.
The use of the hypothetical compensation cri terion as a 
practical version of the Pareto criterion produces fundamental 
weaknesses in the theoretical oase of BCA. F i rs t ,  Scitovsky noted 
that i t  was possible for an e x -a n te  analysis of a resource 
allocation change to indicate that a change from alternative A to 
alternative B satisfied the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and for an 
e x -p o s t  analysis to indicate that B was superior to A by the same 
cr i ter ion.  Secondly, Boadway (1974) showed that the method used 
in BCA to determine whether benefits exceed costs (that the absolute 
value of the positive compensating variation in income to gainers
27 The Scitovsky "reversal paradox" is outlined by Dasgupta and 
Pearce (1974) pp. 59-60 - they note that the explanation of 
the paradox l ies in ' the change in income distribution between 
(A) and (B) alters the set of re lat ive prices which rule in 
those states' , p. 59.
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be g r e a t e r  than the absolu t e  value of  the negat ive  compensating
v a r i a t i o ns  in income to the  l oser s  ) provides  a necessary but
no t  s u f f i c i e n t  condi t ion  for  the s a t i s f a c t i o n  of  the Kaldor-Hicks 
29c r i t e r i o n .  BCA, because of  i t s  r e l i an ce  on the Kaldor-Hicks 
c r i t e r i o n  via the compensating v a r i a t i o n  measurement t echnique ,  
i s  weakened cons ide rably  as a means by which governments can recognize
28 The use of  the  compensating v a r i a t i o n  in income is  
considered in d e t a i l  by Chapter  1 of  t h i s  t h e s i s .
29 Boadway's argument i s  c l a r i f i e d  and g ene r a l i s ed  by Smith 
and Stephen (1975) who presen t  the fol lowing diagram as 
a case in which a p o s i t i v e  net  compensating v a r i a t i o n  
(CV) i s  c a l c u l a t e d  when the re  is  an ambiguous movement 
between community i n d i f f e r en c e  curves (CIC-j to CIC2 ) - 
i . e .  i t  is  not  pos s i b l e  to s t a t e  t h a t  the movement 
r ep resen t s  an improvement or a d e t e r i o r a t i o n  in community 
well being.
CIC2
good Y
good X
x lv
30Pareto improvements resul t ing from a programme o f  preserved 
natural ecosystem provision.
I I .2 BCA and the Theory of  the Second Best
BCA is essent ia l ly  a par t ia l  analysis - only the d i rec t
effects  of a resource a l locat ion change are considered rather than
establ ishing a general equi l ibr ium context in which a l l  effects
across an economy are involved - and is subject therefore to the
31Lipsey-Lancaster "theory o f  the second-best" so that even i f
30 As was pointed out in Footnote 2 o f  th is  Introduction, the Pareto 
c r i te r io n  relates only to the e f f ic iency  of resource a l location 
and makes no allowance fo r  d is t r ib u t io na l  goals. Benefi t-cost 
analysis must address d is t r ib u t io na l  issues because of  the 
interpersonal comparison of  wel l-being carr ied out when benefits 
and costs,are added together. To compare the value of each 
individual 's compensating var ia t ion ,a  value judgement must be 
made by the benef i t -cost analyst or the government,as to the 
weights which are assigned to each in d iv id ua l 's  benefi ts or 
costs. While some economists ( fo r  example, Weisbrod (1968)) 
recommend the use of a weighting structure which re f lec ts  soc iety 's  
d is t r ib u t io n a l  goals, others ( including K ru t i l l a  (1961), Parish 
(1976), and Winch (1971))be i ieve that  un ity  weights - which 
re f le c t  the ex is t ing  d is t r ib u t io n a l  structure of the economy -
are appropriate in a democracy in which the r .ta h jn -q u o  can 
be "overthrown" i f  i t  is not acceptable to the majori ty .
There is obvious scope fo r  the benef i t -cost analyst to present 
a select range of d is t r ib u t io na l  value judgements to enable 
the decision maker to examine the predicted consequences of 
each and choose an a l te rna t ive  with f u l l  knowledge of the 
type of  value judgement he is im p l i c i t l y  favouring.
31 The theory of the second best shows that ' the marginal 
condit ions of the Paretian optimum are not va l id  c r i t e r ia
of an increase in welfare in a context where they are not a l l  
simultaneously s a t is f ie d '  (Winch (1971) p. 110).
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BCA were able to detect the Pareto optimal a l location of  a resource
in one sector of the economy, that a l locat ion may well be sub-
optimal i f  a l l  other resources are not allocated optimally.
The approach to the problem of the second-best ranges from
32the use of shadow prices, to correct fo r  sub-optimal a l locations 
in other sectors of  the economy (see McKean (1968)),to the reliance 
on market pr ices, large ly  because of the p robab i l i ty  o f  making an 
er ro r  in calcu la t ing shadow prices (see Brennan and McGuire (1975)). 
However, as Mishan (1969) suggests, the contr ibution made by the 
theory o f  the second best ' i s  that o f  serving notice tha t ,  in the 
presence o f  constra ints , slap dash optimising, whether one can, 
may not improve matters: one has, in that case, to proceed cautiously
which is rather d i f fe re n t  from not proceeding at a l l '  (p. 156).
The resu l t  of Mishan's approach , applied to BCA, is to attempt 
to o f fe r  a pract ical  solut ion or a kind of " th i r d  best" ,but i t  
remains clear that the par t ia l  nature of BCA,limits i t s  usefulness 
to governments wishing to achieve Pareto e f f i c i e n t  al locations of 
natural ecosystems.
11.3 Practical Limitat ions
The previous two sub-sections have been concerned with the 
theore tical l im i ta t io ns  of BCA as a technique fo r  ind icating the 
Pareto e f f ic iency  of  a government provided preserved natural ecosystem. 
This sub-section concentrates on the problems confronting the benefi t-
32 Shadow prices are the prices ' im p l i c i t  in exchanges that 
should be made to maximize a pa r t icu la r  object ive function '
(McKean (1968) p. 119).
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cost analyst who is attempting the practical application of the 
technique. Two major problems are considered - the choice of a 
discount rate to enable the effective comparison of benefit and cost 
streams occurring over time, and the choice of an appropriate decision 
criterion to implement the concept of a potential Pareto improvement.
While i t  is possible, theoretically, to determine a single 
discount rate - where the social opportunity cost of capital (SOC) 
is equal to the social time preference rate (STP) - market failure, 
or institutional constraints usually result in the STP being lower 
than the SOC.33 If the STP is used, then publicly financed projects 
yielding the lower STP will use resources which could have been 
used to earn the higher SOC in the private sector,and i f  the SOC 
is used, an inadequate level of investment would be achieved, as 
judged by the preferences of society and indicated by the STP. To 
overcome the problem, Marglin (1963) suggests the use of a weighted 
average of the STP and SOC, and Dasgupta and Pearce (1974) also 
conclude that 'some combination of the two rates is required1 (p. 155) 
Arriving at the appropriate weights necessarily involves a value 
judgement being made by the benefit-cost analyst, and i t  is advisable 
therefore that a sensitivity analysis of the effects of changes in 
the discount rate on the outcome of the BCA be incorporated in the 
analysis.
The second problem of practical implementation associated with 
BCA is the choice of a decision rule,as there are a number of ways
33 For instance, interest rates are often controlled by governments 
as part of monetary policy, the interest rate dictated by 
individuals in the market may reflect an excessively myopic 
view - perhaps as a result of a rational fear of death which 
is not applicable to society as a whole-and the amount of 
capital available may be controlled a r t i f ic ia l ly .  A detailed 
description of the difficult ies  involved in choosing from the 
many interest rates visible in the market place is contained in 
Layard (1972).
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of  i n t e r p r e t i n g  the  bas ic  c r i t e r i o n  of  b e ne f i t s  exceeding cos t s .
The f i r s t  c r i t e r i o n  is  t h a t  changes in resource a l l o c a t i o n  which
34y i e l d  p os i t i ve  ne t  presen t  values  are considered to be worthwhile
from the viewpoint  of  s oc i e t y .  However the  NPV does not  provide the
c o r re c t  ranking of  p r o j e c t s  when a f ixed budget i s  to be a l l oc a t e d
35between several  d i f f e r e n t  p r o j ec t s  and i t  i s  necessary to choose 
a s p e c i f i c  di scount  r a t e  - a problem which was discussed e a r l i e r  
in t h i s  sub- sec t ion .  The second c r i t e r i o n  is  the b e n e f i t - c o s t  
r a t i o ,  and while i t  overcomes the problem of  ranking p r o j e c t s ,
34 The net  p resen t  value involves  the  present  value of  cos t s  
being subs t r ac t ed  from the  p resen t  value of  b e n e f i t s ,  as 
represented by the fol lowing formulae:
NPV Bn + B1
(1+i)
(  B_
B? + 
( 1 + i ) 2 (1 + i )n-
( 1 + i ) n ( 1 + i ) n
+ Cl + C2 +
(1+i)  ( 1+ i ) 2 (1+i)
where B0 . . .  Bn are the b e ne f i t s  from year  0 to  year  n,
C0 . . .  Cn are  the cos t s  from year  0 to year  n,
i i s  the d i scount  r a t e ,  and,
n i s  the dec i s ion  time hor izon.
35 See Dasgupta and Pearce (1974) p. 161, f o r  a d e t a i l ed  explanat ion 
of  the ranking problem.
36 The b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  (BCR) i s  the p resen t  value of  b e ne f i t s  
divided by the p resen t  value of  c os t s :
and the deci s ion r u l e  i s  to accept  p r o j ec t s  y i e l d i ng  a b e n e f i t  
cos t  r a t i o  in excess of uni ty .
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i t  is sensitive to the classification of benefits and costs - 
the ratio can be changed if  a benefit is treated as a negative 
cost - and is insensitive to the overall scale of benefits and 
costs when two mutually exclusive projects are being compared. The 
third criterion, the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), avoids the 
need to select a particular discount rate but is subject to a 
number of faults:  f i r s t ,  i f  the equation formed to solve for the
IRR (see Footnote 37) is a quadratic i t  may yield multiple solutions; 
and secondly, the IRR tends to favour short l ife projects with 
smaller capital gains,again because of the form of the equation 
used to solve for the IRR. In addition, the problem of choosing a 
discount rate is not overcome altogether because i t  remains necessary 
for the analyst or the decision maker to determine the "break-even" 
IRR above which projects will be accepted as being worthwhile 
socially.
Of the three alternatives considered, the NPV appears to 
be the most robust,and logically correct decision criterion.
However, all three criterion are subject to limitations which must 
be considered as disadvantages of benefit-cost analysis.
11.4 Conclusions
It is clear from the brief discussion of benefit-cost analysis 
undertaken in this section of the Introduction that a programme of
37 The internal rate of return (IRR) is the discount rate which 
would give the project under consideration, a NPV of zero - 
that is ,  the IRR is the discount rate,i,which would solve the 
equation:
E Bn = E cn n ----- - n -------
(1+i)n (1+i)n
Igovernment provision of preserved natural ecosystems, which is based 
on the information supplied by benefit-cost analyses, is unlikely 
to yield a level of provision which is Pareto efficient. However, 
given that private enterprise would clearly produce grossly 
sub-optimal quantities of preserved natural area - and possibly zero 
quantities when the principle benefits of the area are non-excludable - i t  
remains possible for public provision, based on the results of 
benefit cost analyses, appropriately adjusted to account for 
the limitations of the technique, to yield an allocation which is 
a Pareto improvement over the allocation provided by private enterprise. 
Benefit-cost analysis therefore can be a key component in a government's 
consideration of the amount of preserved natural area i t  should 
provide - as Prest and Turvey (1965) put i t ,  'the truth of the 
matter is that whatever one does, one is trying to unscramble an 
omlette, and no one has yet invented a uniquely superior way of 
doing this '  (p. 92). The importance of BCA is substantiated further 
by Dasgupta and Pearce (1974) who argue that 'cost-benefit analysis 
does at least make the attempt to refer to individuals' preferences 
and to place them on a comparable basis for measurement . . .  (rather 
than relying on the) . . .  paternalistic preferences . . .  (of the 
planner) (p. 15). So while i t  is true that BCA cannot integrate, 
as Parish (1976) puts it,'economic and other social-political 
considerations into some grand optimising framework' (p. 314), i t  
is capable of providing important information on some aspects of the 
efficiency of a government proposal to preserve an area of natural 
ecosystem.
One practical limitation of BCA which has not been considered 
by this section, is the problem of accurate measurement of
li
the benefits and costs of a project - the relevance of a BCA lies 
pa rt ia l ly  in i ts  success in measuring the benefits and costs,and 
clearly, i f  measurement techniques can be refined to provide more 
accurate estimates of benefits and costs then the usefulness of BCA 
must be improved. The issue of measurement is particularly 
important in the case of governments considering the optimal level 
of preserved natural ecosystem provision, because while i t  is 
possible to use market prices as the basis for the measurement of 
benefits and costs for marketed goods, many of the benefits of 
preserved natural ecosystems are not marketed - for the reasons 
outlined in Section 1.1 of this Introduction - and must be measured 
using alternative techniques. In addressing the issue of measuring 
the benefits of preserved natural areas,this thesis is aimed at 
improving the a b i l i ty  of benefit-cost analyses to assist governments 
in determining the appropriate level of provision.
I I I .  THESIS OUTLINE
This Introduction has served to provide the background to the 
issues addressed by the thesis: i t  has been shown that the character!’ sties
of the benefits of preserved natural ecosystems create a situation in 
which i t  is unlikely that a Pareto e ff ic ien t allocation w il l  result 
from the operation of market forces alone, and that public provision, 
using benefit-cost analysis as a basis for deciding how much natural 
ecosystem to preserve, also w il l  f a i l ,  almost certainly, to result 
in a Pareto e ff ic ie n t allocation. However i t  was concluded that 
benefit-cost analysis based public provision has the a b i l i ty  to provide 
a Pareto improvement over private provision, particularly when non-
Ui
excludable benefits are important components of the preserved area 
"good", and when the benefits of preservation are measured accurately. 
The aims of this thesis are to consider the theoretical aspects 
of measuring the benefits of preserved natural ecosystems and to 
apply the relevant theory to the measurement of one of those benefits - 
the existence values - in a particular case study: both of these
aims are directed at the improvement of the performance of benefit- 
cost studies of the preservation of natural areas which are used 
as informational inputs into the government decision making framework.
The thesis is structured in two parts consistent with the 
dual aims which are being addressed. Part I is concerned with the 
theoretical concepts of measuring a ll of the benefits of preserved 
natural areas. I t  begins, in Chapter l,by analysing the theoretical 
basis of measuring benefits in general, introducing the Marshallian 
concept of consumer's surplus and the four Hicksian alternative 
consumer surplus c r ite r ia  of welfare change. The more specialised 
task of measuring benefits which are not marketed is undertaken 
in Chapter 2 by introducing a range of techniques which are available 
and the circumstances in which they are useful. I t  is noted in 
Chapter 2 that one of the most important restrictions on the use of 
the hypothetical valuation techniques of measuring non-marketed 
benefits,is the suspected presence of strategic behaviour among 
respondents providing the ir hypothetical valuation of the non-marketed 
good under consideration. Chapter 3 pursues the poss ib ility  of 
strategic bias by reviewing a number of studies aimed specifically 
at detecting strategic bias,and by analysing techniques which have been 
suggested as methods of overcoming the incentive to behave 
strategically. Chapter 4 provides the focal point of Part I as i t
uses the information compiled in the f i r s t  three chapters to suggest 
possible techniques for the measurement of all the categories of 
benefits of preserved natural areas.
From the observations made in Chapter 4 i t  is clear that while 
the benefits of participating users of preserved natural ecosystems 
are well defined both in theoretical and empirical analysis, non- 
participatory values have received only passing mention in the 
l i terature. This conclusion applies particularly to the concept of 
existence values: various economists have used this concept to
enhance the l i s t  of benefits of preservation, but minimal empirical 
observation has been undertaken to substantiate this useage. Because 
existence values may constitute a large proportion of the benefits 
of preserved areas where visitation is low - for example, wilderness 
areas - i t  is considered important to analyse the assertion of existence 
demand. The analysis of existence demand undertaken in Part I I  of 
this thesis therefore addresses two issues: f i r s t ,  is i t  possible to
measure existence benefits using direct questioning techniques; 
and secondly, is direct questioning l ikely to reveal a significantly 
positive value. Clearly, i f  the f i r s t  issue cannot be satisfactorily  
resolved in the affirmative, then the second issue cannot be addressed. 
The case study area used for the consideration of these issues is 
Nadgee Nature Reserve on the far South Coast of N.S.W.
To place the consideration of existence benefits in perspective 
and to provide a base for the separation of existence values from the 
other benefits of preservation, Chapter 5 details the full  range of 
preservation benefits supplied by Nadgee Nature Reserve. The 
questionnaire which was designed to estimate the Canberra community's
Uv
valuation of the existence benefits of Nadgee, using a direct willingness 
to pay procedure, is described in Chapter 6, and the following chapter 
details the logistics of carrying out the survey, and presents an 
analysis of the sample which was selected to answer the questionnaire.
The analysis of the survey results is undertaken in Chapters 8 and 
9: Chapter 8 provides basic information on the distribution of
willingness to pay bids, while Chapter 9 considers in detail the 
relationships between respondents' characteristics,  and their willingness 
to pay for the existence benefits of Nadgee. However a crucial 
assumption is made for the analyses outlined in Chapter 8 and 9 - 
that respondents do not behave strategically when providing their 
willingness to pay bids. Chapter 10 considers the validity of the 
zero strategic bias assumption using two techniques: the f i r s t  involves
the analysis of the questionnaire data, particularly in terms of the 
internal consistency of the individuals' bids; and the second uses 
the results of a follow-up study to the main questionnaire which was 
designed to provide a comparison between individuals' bids, made 
in a similar context to the questionnaire, and their  true valuations, 
revealed using a process outlined in Chapter 3.
Finally, a summary of the implications and conclusions, 
which can be drawn from the empirical study of existence benefits, 
is provided. While a separate summary is provided at the end of Part 
I, to consolidate the conclusions drawn from the theoretical study 
of preservation benefits, many of the points from that earl ier  summary 
are reiterated, in a practical context, in the Part II summary.
P A R T  I
CHAPTER I
THE THEORY OF MEASURING BENEFITS
1.1 INTRODUCTION
As in d ic a te d  in the I n t r o d u c t i o n ,  an im por tan t  f a c to r  in 
the success o f  governments' at tempts  to  provide app rop r ia te  le ve ls  
o f  preserved na tu ra l  ecosystems using the in fo rm a t ion  generated 
by b e n e f i t - c o s t  analyses o f  p u b l i c  a c q u is i t i o n s  o f  such areas, 
i s  the accuracy o f  the b e n e f i t  measurements incorpora ted  in these 
analyses. Part  I ' s  ana lys is  o f  the t h e o r e t i c a l  and p r a c t i c a l  
problems o f  measuring the community's v a lua t ion s  o f  p rese rva t ion  
b e n e f i t s ,  f o r  use in b e n e f i t - c o s t  ana lyses , begins in  t h i s  chapter 
w i th  a c ons ide ra t ion  o f  the general concept o f  b e n e f i t s  as i t  
app l ies  to  each i n d iv i d u a l  w i t h in  the community - g iven t h a t  b e n e f i t -  
cos t  ana lys is  requ i res  the use o f  the sum o f  a l l  the b e n e f i t  va lua t ions  
o f  the in d i v i d u a l s  compris ing the community,as the community v a lu a t io n .  
Such a general examinat ion is  impor tan t  to  the c om p i la t ion  o f  a 
l i s t  o f  techniques s u i ta b le  to  the task  o f  measuring each type 
o f  b e n e f i t ,  as i t  prov ides  a base f o r  the assessment o f  the var ious 
techniques in terms o f  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  r e la te  c o n s i s t e n t l y  w i th  
the t h e o r e t i c a l  concept o f  a b e n e f i t  so es tab l ishe d .
Sect ion 1.2 begins w i th  a bas ic  in t r o d u c t i o n  to  the b e n e f i t  
concept,  using the Marsha l l ian  consumer's surp lus  measure o f  
we l fa re  change f o r  the example o f  a movement in  the p r i c e  o f  a good. 
The Hicks ian compensating v a r i a t i o n  measure is  then shown to  be 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  more app rop r ia te  in the same circumstance.  Sect ion 
1.3 examines the M arsha l l ian  and H icks ian measures f o r  the s i t u a t i o n
3of a change in the quantity of the good being considered: clearly,
where governments elect to provide the benefits of natural 
ecosystem preservation at zero cost, i t  is a change in quantity 
provided rather than a change in price which must be considered.
It is noted in Section 1.4 that where property rights are adequately 
defined, the distinction between individuals who benefit and those 
who lose from a change in resource allocation is clear, and the 
benefit-cost analyst is able to proceed to implement the Kaldor- 
Hicks criterion with an unambiguous definition of benefits and costs. 
However, the section points out the difficult ies involved in 
situations where property rights are not defined or are in conflict, 
and introduces the Hicksian equivalent variation and surplus 
measures as possible alternatives to the compensating measures.
Sections 1.2 to 1.4 are essentially concerned with the 
theoretical aspects of the Marshallian and Hicksian benefit measures - 
Section 1.5 seeks to place these considerations in perspective by 
analysing some of the implications of practical use. The chapter 
concludes, in Section 1.6, that while the Marshallian consumer's 
surplus is generally the most practical measurement concept, i t  
may not be applied easily when the ordinary demand curve is not 
observable directly from a market - the situation applying to many 
of the benefits of natural ecosystem preservation. The measurement 
al ternatives, in the case of non-marketed goods, are concluded to be 
the Marshallian consumer's surplus based on the inference of the 
demands for related goods, and the Hicksian concepts based on 
individuals' income equivalents of welfare changes - these alternatives
4are the bases fo r  the pract ical measurement techniques reviewed 
in Chapter 2.
1.2 CONSUMER’ S SURPLUS AND COMPENSATING VARIATION
I t  is possible to derive a measure of the benefi t  an 
ind iv idual gains from the provision of  a good, through an examination 
of the ind iv id ua l 's  ordinary demand curve fo r  that good: the
ordinary demand curve represents the functional re la t ionship between 
the quant i ty of a good,X, the ind iv idual demands,and i t s  pr ice, 
p, given his level o f  income, 3. The ind iv idua l ,  whose ordinary 
demand curve fo r  good X is i l l u s t ra te d  in Figure 1.1, when deciding 
i f  i t  is  worthwhile to pay P fo r  one un i t  of X, compares that price 
with P^, the price which he is w i l l i n g  to pay. Because P^ is 
greater than P , the ind iv idual w i l l  purchase the un i t  of X and w i l l  
receive a surplus from consumption amounting to the dif ference 
between the amount ac tua l ly  spent, P , and the amount which the
X
ind iv idual would have been w i l l  inging to spend, P  ^ - that i s ,  the 
area PwcePx in Figure 1.1. I f  X is  per fec t ly  d iv i s ib le ,  consumption 
w i l l  expand to XD,where demand equals price,and the to ta l  welfare
D
gain or benef i t  enjoyed by the consumer, is the area to the l e f t  
o f  the ordinary demand curve and above the pr ice ,  dbP : th is  is the
X
consumer's surp lus . The welfare gain, or benef i t ,  associated with 
a decrease in price from P to P 1 is the dif ference between the
X X
consumer's surplus before the change, dbP , and the consumer's
X
surplus a f te r  the change, daP ' :  i . e .  P baP ' .
X X X
5-------1------
•d : Ordinary
Figure 1 .1 : The Ordinary Demand Curve and Consumer's Surplus.
The consumer's surplus measures welfare changes in re la t ion 
to the overal l  change in quant i ty demanded, and th is  is  made up of 
two components: the subst i tu t ion e f fec t  - the change in quanti ty
demanded resu l t ing  from the subst i tu t ion of  r e la t i v e ly  higher priced 
goods to the re la t i v e ly  lower priced good when i t s  price f a l l s ;  and 
the income e f fec t  - the change in quanti ty  demanded which results 
from the change in real income, or purchasing power, caused by the 
price change. The subst i tu t ion and income ef fec ts  can be i l lu s t ra te d  
using indif ference curve analysis,^ as in Figure 1.2, which
1 An analysis of  the income and subst i tu t ion e f fec ts  in Marshallian 
geometry can be found in Hicks (1943).
6d : O rdina r y
d :Compensated
Figure 1.2: Subs t i tu t ion  and Income E f fe c ts ,  the Compensated
Demand Curve and the Compensating Var ia t ion  fo r  a 
Price Fa l1.
7i l lustrates the individual who is faced with a choice between good
X and a numeraire good Y. Consumption equilibrium ini t ial ly
occurs at point A where the individual maximises his u t i l i ty ,  U-| ,
given the constraint of the budget line ß 3 . When the price
P P
of X fal ls from P to P ' , the budget line faced by the individual
X X
pivots around the point ß to become _ß___ß and the individual
P y  P y  P 7  2
is able to achieve a higher level of u t i l i ty ,  l^. The substitution
effect of the price fall can be isolated from the income effect
by reducing the individuals budget to ß1 so that he is returned to
his original level of u t i l i ty ,  U-|, but at the new price ratio
Py:Px' . In Figure 1.2, this "compensation" results in a shifting
of the budget line, parallel to ß ß , so that i t  becomes
Py Px'
tangential to the indifference curve at point C: the movement
from A to C, along the indifference curve U-| is the substitution 
effect. The income effect is therefore the movement across indifference 
curves from point C to point B. Now i t  is clear that the substitution 
effect has no welfare significance, as i t  results in a movement along 
an indifference curve with no change in the consumer's u t i l i ty ,  
and that i t  is the effective change in real income which affects the 
individual's well being. The consumer's surplus method of welfare 
measurement, because i t  reflects both the substitution and income 
effects,will not always provide an accurate indication of a change 
in welfare, with the more appropriate method being the measurement 
of the amount of numeraire needed to return the consumer to his 
original level of ut i l i ty .  In Figure 1.2, this compensating variation
is ß -ß' , the vertical difference between the parallel budget
pL _
2 The two points A and B and their respective prices, Px and P ' 
enables the construction of the ordinary demand curvexfor the 
good X.
8l ines ,  or the amount the ind iv idual is w i l l in g  to pay to enjoy
the decrease in the price of X.
To compare the consumer's surplus and compensating var ia t ion
concepts, i t  is useful to construct a Hicksian compensated demand
curve - a demand re la t ionship  which holds u t i l i t y  constant rather
than maintaining a f ixed budget, as is the case with the Marshallian
demand function. By the ind iv idual paying the compensating var ia t ion
in Figure 1.2, u t i l i t y  is kept constant and the two points of
relevance to the compensated demand curve are A and C fo r  the
3
respective prices P and P '. The area to the l e f t  o f  the compensatedx x
demand curve d* between the prices Px and Px', P acP ' can be shown
X A
to be the same as the compensating va r ia t ion ,  ß - g1derived from
4 PY
the ind if ference curve analysis. For the case of a price f a l l ,  
i t  is clear that the compensating var ia t ion  is less than the consumer's 
surplus (P abP ' ) ,  however fo r  the case of  a price rise, a s im i la r  analysis 
would show that the compensating va r ia t ion ,  or the in d iv id ua l 's  
wi l l ingness to accept compensation to ensure that the price r ise does
3 The mathematical formulat ion of the derivat ion of  the ordinary 
demand curve X.=X-(P,ß) is based on the problem of maximizing 
u t i l i t y ,  subject to a budget constra in t ,  that is :
Max U = U(X) 
s . t .  Zp-jX. = ß
The compensated demand function X-*=X^*(P,U) is based on the 
solut ion of  the dual to the u t i l  icy maximization problem, the 
minimization of expenditure, subject to a u t i l i t y  constra in t:  
MinE = Zp-X- 
s . t .  U(X) = V
A more complete ou t l ine  of these solut ions and th e i r  associated 
f i r s t  and second order assumptions can be found in Henderson and 
Quandt (1971), p. 23 and p. 25.
4 See Freeman (1979), p. 41.
9not take place, is greater  than the consumer's surplus measure for 
the same price change.
Two measurement a l ternat ives  therefore ar i se  from the
consideration of the compensating variat ion cr i ter ion of welfare
change: the measurement of the area under the compensated demand ,
and the measurement of the individual ' s  income, or numeraire,
equivalent  of the change which is proposed. While these two
measurements are equivalent ,  both will d i f fe r  from the consumer's
surplus measurement (the area under the ordinary demand curve),  unless the
5
income e l a s t i c i t y  of demand for the good is zero.
1.3 THE BENEFIT MEASURES OF QUANTITY CHANGES
The analysis of measuring benefi ts  has concentrated so far  
on the consequences of price changes. In the case of preserved 
natural ecosystems,which is being addressed by this  t hes i s ,  price 
changes may resul t  from public provision,  especial ly when 
marketed goods are derived from the preserved area,  but 
often the effects  of quanti ty changes where the good is supplied 
at  zero cost to the consumer, must be considered. While i t  is possible,  
theore t i ca l ly ,  to measure welfare changes resul t ing from quantity 
changes in a zero priced good using the areas under ordinary and
5 When the income e l a s t i c i t y  of good X, in Figure 1.2, is zero, 
point C in the indifference curve analysis l ies  d i rec t ly  
below point B and hence point c is the same as point b in 
the demand analysis - because the compensated demand curve 
is then equivalent to the ordinary demand curve, the consumer's 
surplus is equal to the compensating variat ion.
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compensated demand curves, the non-marketed nature of many of the 
benefits of preservation results in a significant reliance on the 
income equivalent of the quantity change - the Compensating Surplus. 
The compensating surplus measurement of the welfare change 
associated with an increase in the supply of a zero priced, joint 
in supply, non-excludable preserved natural area, X, from X1 to 
X" is i l lustrated in Figure 1.3.
0
6 For an increase in the quantity of the good X provided at 
zero price, from Xn to Xß in Figure 1.2, the consumer's 
surplus change or Benef it  which results is the area below 
the ordinary demand curve between X^  and Xß,(abXßXn). The 
Hicksian measure of the same change in quantity (tne Compensating 
Surplus) is the area under the compensated demand curve:
(adXJ(^). Clearly the consumer's surplus for a rise in quantity 
is greater than the compensating surplus and a similar analysis 
for a quantity fall would demonstrate that the compensating 
surplus is greater than the consumer's surplus.
1 1
Figure 1.3: Compensating Surplus for an Increase in Quantity.
Because X is not priced, i t  is not possible to construct actual 
budget constraints, however i t  can be assumed that the individual 
is at an ini t ial  equilibrium at point A consuming the good X at 
the current level of supply X', and the numeraire Y at Y.
Following the increase in supply of X from X' to X", the individual 
moves to point B on a higher indifference curve l^, and to return
12
him to his original level of u t i l i t y ,  U-j, would require the
7 8individual to pay YYß = BD. ' I f  the individual began at position 
B and the government chose to decrease the provision of X from X" 
to X'then the individual would require compensation of AC as the 
compensating surplus to suffer the loss of X'X" units of X.
7 I f  the quantity of good X cannot be adjusted by the individual 
as is the case with a jo in t  in supply, non-excludable good, then 
the compensated surplus is identical to the compensating 
variat ion.  Consider the following case which is structured, 
for convenience, so that the price change Px to P 1 would result  
in a quantity change from X' to X".
The compensating variation_woul d normally be BE = YYq and the 
compensating surplus BD = YYq but i f  the quantity of X is fixed 
at X", the compensating variation, the payment made by the 
individual to return him to his original indifference curve,
U ] , is BD = YYq which is equal to the compensating surplus. The 
same result also occurs i f  the income e la s t ic i ty  of demand for  
good X is zero: point C wi l l  then always l i e  d irect ly  below point
B and the ordinary and the compensating variation surplus and 
consumers wi l l  a l l  be equivalent.
8 Randall and Brookshire's (1978) analysis also uses quasi-budget 
l ines but to i l lu s t ra te  the effect  on compensating surplus i f  the 
good X can be divided and traded:
(Cont. on next page) . . .
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1.4 PROPERTY RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS
The Hicksian welfare change measures reviewed in the previous 
two sect ions require payment from those individuals who benefi t  
from price f a l l s  or quanti ty increases,  and compensation to be 
paid to those individuals who lose from price r i ses or quantity 
f a l l s .  Clearly th i s  st ructure is in accordance with the Hicks- 
Kaldor hypothetical compensation cri terion which requiresthe beneficiar ies 
of a change in resource al locat ion to be able to compensate the 
losers,even though actual .payments are not required. However both 
the compensating variat ion and surplus imply that  that  the property 
r ight  to the good under examination is vested in the sta tu s quo 
s i tuat ion:  for instance,  i f  an increase in the area of preserved
8 (Cont.)Y
Following the movement from A to B , the individual is able to trade 
along the "budget" l ine passing through B to maximize his u t i l i t y ,  
U*, at  point C. The compensating surplus (the vert ical  distances 
between the budget 1ines ) ,?Y^,is greater  than the non-divisible 
compensating surplus,  YY^ , - the individual being able to 
capi ta l ize  on his ab i l i ty  to trade some of good X for more units 
of good Y.
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natural ecosystem available to bushwalkers is proposed, the compensating 
surplus measure requires that the bushwalkers pay 
to enjoy the movement away from the current allocation of resources, 
with the implication that their  rights are vested in the current level of 
available preserved areas. Alternatively, i f  supply is reduced, 
the bushwalkers require compensation, under the compensating surplus 
measure, for the shift away from the s ta tu s  quo allocation. Where 
property rights are adequately defined in the s ta tu s  quo allocation, 
the benefit-cost analyst is able, unambiguously, to use the 
compensating measures as the bases for benefit measurement. For 
instance, for a proposal to increase supply, the benefit-cost analyst 
would endeavour to determine the willingness to pay of bushwalkers 
as the appropriate measure of benefits,whereas if  the proposal was 
to decrease supply, the benefit would accrue to the development 
users, and the willingness to accept compensation of the bushwalkers r 
would be the appropriate measure of costs.
However an adequate definition of property rights in the 
s ta tu s  quo allocation does not always occur. Often the property 
rights to a resource are not clearly defined in any allocation. For 
instance, when there is no immediate scarcity of some type of natural 
ecosystem, there may be no firm assignment of property rights, with 
development uses having an equal right to the area as preservation.
If conflict over the use of the area arises - perhaps as other 
similar areas are allocated to either of the uses - the benefit-cost 
analyst has no firm guideline on the classification of benefits 
and costs: for a decrease in the supply of preserved ecosystem,
should the preservationists be asked for their willingness to receive 
compensation (and hence provide an estimate of the costs of reducing
15
supply, on the basis that they have a property right to the status
quo) or their willingness to pay (and hence provide an estimate
of the benefits of not reducing supply, on the basis that they have
a property right to the level of preserved natural ecosystem
which results after the reduction in supply)?^
Where uncertainty exists as to the type of question to be
asked of affected individuals by the benefit-cost analyst, it is
important to understand the implications of using the alternative
questions: to do this it is useful to consider the welfare measures
which ask questions opposite to the compensating measures'
questions,and which, by implication,assume the individual's property
right is vested in the allocation of resources which eventuates
after the proposed reallocation occurs. These measures are the
Hicksian equivalent variation and surplus.
For a price change the measure of welfare change which
involves the property rights being vested in the ex post resource
allocation is the equivalent variation. The price increase
equivalent variation is depicted in Figure 1.4.
The individual, originally at point A would be move to point B
following the price increase, Px to Px * , but a payment of y- = (ß- ß ')V Y Py
would be sufficient to return him to his original level of utility,
9 The same quandary arises if property rights are defined in 
conflict - where both preservationists and developers have 
a legal right to use the particular area - or if the current use 
of the area is in contravention of the legal property right - 
for instance, if bushwalkers currently use a State Forest, which 
the State Forestry Commission has a legal right to clear fell 
for woodchips, the status quo is not the use defined by the 
property right.
C
O
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Figure 1.4: The Equivalent Variation for a Price Increase.
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U^, noting that  the s h i f t  in income is calculated using the or ig inal  
price ra t io  PyiPy. As with the compensating va r ia t ion ,  the equivalent 
var ia t ion can be measured using e i ther  the income equivalent of
I
the change, ß-ß , or the area under the compensated demand curve 
PY
derived from the ind if ference curve analysis of equivalent 
var ia t ion .  The compensated demand curve (equivalent var ia t ion) 
d i f fe rs  from the compensated demand curve (compensating var ia t ion) 
in that the former passes through the f in a l  po int,  "b",  on the 
ordinary demand curve while the l a t t e r  has point "a" in common with 
the ordinary demand curve. Clear ly, fo r  a price r i s e ,  the 
compensating var ia t ion  is greater than the consumer's surplus which 
is greater than the equivalent va r ia t ion ,  unless the income e la s t i c i t y  
of demand is zero, when a l l  three curves coincide and the three 
measures of welfare are equal. A converse analysis would i l l u s t r a te  
that a price f a l l  w i l l  require compensation being paid to the 
ind iv idual to return him to his or ig ina l  level o f  u t i l i t y  and that 
the equivalent var ia t ion is greater than the consumer's surplus which 
is greater than the compensating var ia t ion - unless, of course, 
the income e la s t i c i t y  of  demand is zero.
For a quant i ty  change, the measure of welfare change which 
accounts fo r  property r igh ts  being vested in the post-change 
s i tua t ion  is called the equivalent surplus and can be demonstrated 
graphical ly  using Figure 1.3. When the quant i ty of X is decreased 
from X" to X ' , the equivalent surplus is measured not from the 
new posit ion to the old as with the compensating surplus, AC, but 
from the old to the new in which the indiv idual has a r ig h t ,
BD (=Y-Y°) - the amount the indiv idual would be prepared to pay to
18
ensure that the decrease in quantity did not take place.^ 
Similarly, the equivalent variation for a quantity increase from 
X' to X" is the willingness to accept compensation, AC (=YC-Y).
It is clear that the compensating surplus, (Yc-Y), for the quantity 
decrease is greater than the equivalent surplus, (Y-Y^), for 
the same change,and that the equivalent surplus, (Y -Y), for 
the quantity increase is greater than the compensating surplus, 
(Y-Y°), for the same change for the case i l lustrated by Figure 1.3. 
However, as with the variation measures,the surplus measures (and 
the consumer's surplus) are equal when the income elast ici ty of 
demand is zero.
As a summary, Table 1.1 presents- the four Hicksian measures 
of welfare change in terms of the situations to which they apply» 
and the type of question which the benefit cost analyst must use.
10 The equivalent surplus (willingness to pay) for the quantity 
decrease X" to X', is equal to the compensating surplus 
(willingness to pay) for the quantity increase X' to X"
(V-Y .). Similarly the equivalent surplus (willingness to 
accept) from the quantity increase X1 to X", is equal to the 
compensating surplus (willingness to accept) for the quantity 
decrease X" to X' (Yc-Y).
19
where:
Table
Wei fare 
Measure
Price Increase Price Decrease
C.V. WTA WTP
E.V. WTP WTA
Quantity Increase Quantity Decrease
C.S. WTP WTA
E.S. WTA WTP
C.V. is compensating variation;
E.V. is equivalent variation;
C.S. is compensating surplus;
E.S. is equivalent surplus;
WTA is willingness to accept; and, 
WTP is willingness to pay.
1: Hicksian Welfare Measures.
Figure 1.5 summarizes the differences between the four Hicksian 
measures and the consumer's surplus(s) for a price fall and an 
equivalent quantity rise.
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Price F a l l :
(CV = PxadPx ' )  < (S = PxabPx ' )  < (EV = PxcbPx ' )
Quantity Rise:
(CS = X'aeX") < (S = X'abX") < (ES = X'fbX") 
where: d°~ ordinary demand curve, de~ equivalent demand curve,
dc~ compensating demand curve, S~ Marshallian Consumer's Surplus.
Figure 1 .5 : A Comparison of the Hicksian Measures and Consumer's
Surplus.
A converse analysis appl ies to the cases of price r ises and quanti ty 
f a l l s ,  with the d and d compensated demand curves being interchanged 
in Figure 1.5 - a reversal of the rankings of the measures resul ts .
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From this brief analysis of the Hicksian, equivalent 
measures and the comparison between the compensating, equivalent 
and consumer's surplus measures,it is clear that the framing 
of a benefit-cost analysis, in a situation where property rights 
are not adequately defined to the sta tu s quo allocation of 
resources, in terms of the type of question asked - WTP or WTA - 
has an effect on the magnitude of the benefits and costs,and 
hence a possible effect on the outcome of the decision making 
process. It is also clear that the divergence between the alternative 
measurement concepts is dependent on the income elastici ty  of 
demand for the good being examined - with the two compensated 
demand curves becoming equivalent to the ordinary demand curve, and 
hence the variation measures,becoming equal to the consumer's 
surplus for a price change,and the surplus measures equating the 
consumer's surplus for a quantity change, when the income elasticity 
of demand is zero.  ^^
In a theoretical sense, i t  is important therefore ,for the 
benefit-cost analyst to be aware of the income elasticity of 
demand for the good being considered and the effect of a positive 
elastici ty  on the divergence between the alternative measures, when 
he makes the decision between using the compensating or equivalent 
measures. Just how to make this decision remains unanswered - 
clearly, in a theoretical sense, the decision can have important
11 Note,however,that if  there is a positive income elasticity 
of demand, the divergence of the CS and ES measures from the 
appropriate S is relatively larger than the divergence of 
the CV and EV measures from the comparable S. For instance, 
in Figure 1.5, for the quantity rise, X'X", which is equivalent 
to the price fall PxPx' ,  the divergence of CV from the price 
fall S is abd, whereas the CS is different from the quantity 
rise S by abe.
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impl icat ions on resource al locations and an a rb i t ra ry  choice may
consequently be inappropriate. Because the decision between
alternate measures involves an ethical  choice between the property
r igh ts  of affected p a r t i e s , i t  can be argued that the decision
should be made in a p o l i t i c a l  or legal context - in th is  case the
benef i t -cost analyst must seek a solut ion to the choice which he
12must make, outside the sphere of  economics.
The importance of  the decision between question types,and 
hence property r ights  assignments, whi le clear in the theoretical 
context, has been subject to some debate in terms of pract ical  
appl icat ion. W i l l ig  (1976) in price space, and Randall and Stol l  
(1980a) in quant i ty  space demonstrate that fo r  most goods, the 
dif ferences between the equivalent, compensating,and consumer's surplus
12 I t  is important fo r  the p o l i t i c a l  or legal decision makers to 
have appropriate economic information on the e f fec t  o f  th e i r  
decision but the proposit ion advanced by Randall (1980) that 
'Hicksian compensating measures are consistent with the 
Pareto-unimprovement c r i t e r io n ,  whi le Hicksian equivalent 
measures are not' (p. 13) cannot be used as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
fo r  the re ject ion of the equivalent measures. Consider the 
case of a proposal to reduce the level of supply of bushwalking 
land - i f  the problem facing the benef i t -cost analyst is "should the 
land be developed", then the bushwalkers w i l l  accept compensation 
and the developers w i l l  pay and the compensating surplus 
measure is consistent with the Pareto improvement c r i t e r io n ,  
but i f  the problem is framed as "should the land NOT be developed" 
or "should the land be continued to be preserved for  bushwalking", 
then the equivalent surplus measure involving developers being 
compensated and bushwalkers paying is consistent with the Pareto 
improvement c r i t e r io n .
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1 3measures are in s ig n i f i c a n t .  Under th is  resu l t ,  the importance 
of the eth ical  judgement between implied property r ights  a l location 
is i r re levan t  and the benef i t -cost analyst is free to choose 
whichever measure is most convenient in the case under examinationJ
13 The analyses of W i l l ig  and Randall and Stol l  fol low s im i la r  
l ines:  conditions are establ ished which set l im i ts  on the
size of  the consumer's surplus (S) re la t ive  to income (Y) and 
the income e la s t i c i t y  of demand (e) (the price f l e x i b i l i t y  
of income, 3p . Y , which allows no adjustment in the numeraire 
9Y p
in Randall and S to l l ' s  analysis) - fo r  example,
«.05 - and under these condit ions, rules of thumb are
good,
S £_
Y 2
calculated which estimate the maximum error  which could be 
expected from the use of  consumer's surplus measurements as 
approximations fo r  equivalent and compensating measures.
14 In the quanti ty space case, i l l u s t ra te d  in Figure 1.3, CA=BD 
given Randall and S to l l ' s  resu l t  - under most circumstances - 
and so the compensating surplus and equivalent surplus for  
increases and decreases of  X are a l l  equal.
15 There is evidence however which suggests that the Wi11ig/Randal1 
and Stol l  resu l t  is not correct - several studies, summarized
by Meyer (1979) have shown divergences between the responses 
to wi l l ingness to pay and wil l ingness to accept questions which 
are fa r  in excess of  those predicted by the theoretica l studies. 
I t  is not clear that these observed divergences are due 
sole ly to the income e la s t i c i t y  of demand fo r  the goods studied, 
and other factors, such as s tra teg ic  behaviour, which may 
explain the apparent contradict ion between predicted and 
observed differences are considered in some deta i l  in Section 
2.5.3 of the fol lowing chapter.
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1.5 PRACTICABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES
Which of  the welfare measurement concepts is most convenient
fo r  the benef i t -cost analyst to use is la rgely  a question of the
16p r a c t i c a b i l i t y  of each a l te rna t ive .
When the ordinary demand curve fo r  a good is d i re c t ly
observable from market data, the measurement of  consumer's surplus
is s t ra igh t fo rward .^7 However, because the compensated demand curve
is not observable d i r e c t l y ,  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in the pract ical determination
of the Hicksian measures may ar ise. There are a number of possible
methods of  deriving compensated demand curves. I f  demand functions
have been estimated econometr ical ly, i t  is usual fo r  an income
variable to be included - in th is  case, the resultant re lat ionship
18between price and quant i ty  is a compensated demand curve.
A l te rn a t ive ly ,  i t  is possible th e o re t ic a l l y ,  to integrate an 
ind iv id ua l 's  complete set of  ordinary demand curves to obtain an 
estimation of his u t i l i t y  function,which can then be used in conjunction 
with his expenditure function to estimate the ind iv idua l 's  set of
16 The addit ional theore tical problems raised by Mohring (1971) 
and Hause (1975) have been dismissed by Mishan (1977) and 
Randall and Stol l  (1980b).
17 Assuming, o f  course, that the good is traded in a perfec t ly  
competi tive market. Even when th is  is not the case, shadow 
pr ic ing to account fo r  market imperfections may be re la t i v e ly  
stra ightforward where d is to r t ions  are not severe.
18 See H i rsch le i fe r  (1976 ) , pp. 150.
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compensated demand curves. Econometrical ly, the detai l  required 
by the estimation of  a l l  ind iv idua ls '  f u l l  sets of ordinary demand 
curves is p a r t i c u la r ly  l im i t in g .  A fu r the r  p o s s ib i l i t y  fo r  obtaining 
information on compensated demand curves is through the use of  the 
SIutsky-Hicks equation,
8X
9p
a x
9p
- x 9X , 
S 96
which e f fe c t i v e ly  divides the change in quant i ty demanded of X, 
9 X ,  as detai led by the ordinary demand re la t ionsh ip ,  in to the
9P
subst i tu t ion e f fe c t , 9_X
U p J
and the income e f fe c t ,  -X _9X.
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Clear ly , the process of deriv ing compensated demand curves through 
the segmentation of the pa r t ia l  derivat ives of  the ordinary demand 
curve does not o f fe r  a very useful a l te rna t ive .  Ulph and Reynolds 
(1979) conclude that another method fo r  deriving compensated demand 
curves, the use of an assumed form of the u t i l i t y  function in 
conjunction with observed expenditure functions, is also unsatis factory. 
The example they construct uses a Cobb-Douglas u t i l i t y  function, 
and although complicated yet manageable compensated demand curve 
forms are derived, they express concern that more r e a l i s t i c  u t i l i t y  
function assumptions w i l l  not y ie ld  'a n a ly t i c a l l y  tractable demand 
curves' (p. 56).
A l l  methods fo r  deriving compensated demand curves, except 
econometric estimation including an income term, appear to have 
severe pract ica l  l im i ta t io n s .  However, as was pointed out in the
19 This notat ion is a f te r  Green (1976) who explains that the 
subst i tu t ion e f fec t  is not a true pa r t ia l  derivat ive because 
6 ' i s  adjusted so as to keep the ind iv idual in the same 
ind if ference class as before the price change' (p. 65).
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previous section, the Hicksian measures can also be derived by 
asking ind iv iduals fo r  th e i r  income equivalent - wi l l ingness to 
pay or wi l l ingness to accept compensation - of the i r  change in 
u t i l i t y .  The problem then encountered is that indiv iduals may 
attempt to behave s t ra te g ica l ly  and not answer honestly - but th is  
problem w i l l  be treated in greater depth la te r  in the thesis , 
p a r t i c u la r ly  in Chapter 3.
One addit ional point in favour of income equivalent 
measurement, is that ind iv idua ls '  welfare changes are measured 
separately. One of  the major problems involved in using the ordinary 
or compensated demand curve approaches to measuring welfare changes 
is tha t ,  in pract ice,  the demand curves estimated are the 
aggregate functions across the whole economy (or large community), 
rather than the indiv idual functions described in the previous section 
The use of aggregate functions involves two problems: f i r s t ,  a
unique aggregate demand curve may not e x is t ;  and secondly, the 
welfare changes of a l l  ind iv iduals are weighted evenly. Mult ip le 
aggregate demand curves eventuate i f  income d is t r ib u t io n  changes 
occur during the estimation of the market demand curve, or i f  the 
po l icy being considered changes the d is t r ib u t io n  of income - any 
transfers of income between ind iv iduals  may resu l t  in sh i f ts  in 
ind iv idual demand curves which do not sum to zero. A single aggregate 
demand curve w i l l  eventuate only i f  no changes in income 
d is t r ib u t io n  occur (or have occurred during the estimation of demand), 
or i f  the income e la s t i c i t y  fo r  demand is the same fo r  a l l  indiv iduals 
Equal weighting of  a l l  ind iv idua ls '  welfare changes is only a 
problem i f  the income d is t r ib u t io n  observed in the community is 
regarded as being unjust.
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By avoiding the problems of aggregation, the use of income 
equivalent measurement of the Hicks concepts provides a unique 
aggregated welfare change measurement - the problem of  mult ip le  
aggregate demand curves being overcome - and enables the weighting 
of ind iv idua ls '  welfare changes to re f le c t  some re -d is t r ib u t io n  
goal - the assumption of equal weights no longer being necessary.
An addit ional advantage of  the income equivalent measures, 
is that they can be used when the good under consideration is 
not marketed,or when the market fo r  the good suffers from severe 
d is to r t ion .  In such cases of market fa i lu re  i t  may not be possible 
to observe d i re c t l y  pr ice-quant i ty  re la t ionships,  and the use of 
demand curves derived from the observed demands fo r  other goods 
to measure welfare changes - discussed in deta i l  in the fol lowing 
chapter - re l ies  on the existence of special re lat ionships between 
marketed and non-marketed goods which are not always present.
Clear ly , the problems of  aggregation apply equal ly to the 
consumer's surplus measure of welfare change as they do to the 
Hicksian measures based on areas under compensated demand curves.
However, the addit ional problems associated with estimating the 
Hicksian measures both in terms of estimating compensated demand 
curves or s t ra teg ic  behaviour in income equivalent estimation (and 
the re la t i v e ly  high cost of approaching even a sample of  ind iv iduals  
in the economy to obtain th is  information) lead to the conclusion 
that the consumer's surplus is the most pract icable measure of welfare 
change in most s i tua t ions.  Two caveats apply to th is  conclusion: 
f i r s t ,  i f  the good being considered has a high income e la s t i c i t y  
of demand,the consumer's surplus measure w i l l  be the o re t ica l ly  
inappropr iate; and secondly, i f  the market fo r  the good being considered
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is, severely distorted, or i f  no market operates and there is no 
poss ib ility  of inferring an ordinary demand relationship from 
the markets for other goods, then the Hicksian income equivalent 
measures are l ike ly  to be the most convenient measures of welfare 
change available to the benefit-cost analyst.
1.6 CONCLUSIONS
I t  has been the purpose of this chapter to provide a 
theoretical basis for the consideration of techniques designed to 
measure the benefits of preserved natural ecosystem. The f i r s t  
task performed in addressing this purpose was to establish the 
nature of a benefit in terms of an individual's ordinary demand 
relationship - for the case of a good whose price has fa llen, the 
consumer's surplus was defined and then compared with the theoretically 
more appropriate compensating variation measure of benefit. Noting 
that many benefits of preserved natural ecosystems are provided 
by governments at a zero price, Section 1.3 introduced the compensating 
surplus as the appropriate measure for the benefits accruing to 
an individual who enjoys an increase in government provision. The 
d i f f ic u l t ie s  faced by the benefit-cost analyst in the situation 
where property rights are not adequately defined in the existing 
allocation of resources are discussed in Section 1.4. I t  was concluded 
that i f  no property right assignment exists,then the analyst must 
seek an answer to the essentially po lit ica l or legal question - 
for instance, should a proposal to reduce the supply of preserved 
natural area be viewed as a proposal which harms preservationists by
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reducing the good they enjoy, or one which harms developers who 
forego the opportunity to p r o f i t  from the development - from 
p o l i t i c a l  or legal sources. To ass is t in determining the effects  
the answer to th is  question would have onresource a l loca t ion ,  the 
concepts of equivalent var ia t ion  and surplus were reviewed. The 
theore tical divergences between the equivalent, compensating 
and comparable consumer's surplus measures were concluded to be 
in s ig n i f i c a n t  in most pract ical  cases - thus lessening the importance 
of  the property r ights  issue. Further pract ical  issues were discussed 
in Section 1.5 with the major conclusion being that the consumer's 
surplus is ,  in general, the most pract icable measure of  benefi ts.
However, several s i tuations were noted in which the use of 
a l te rna t ive  measures would be advantageous. F i r s t ,  i f  the divergence 
between consumer's surplus and the corresponding Hicksian measure was 
predicted to be large - p r im ar i ly ,  i f  the income e la s t i c i t y  of 
demand fo r  the good under consideration was large - then the 
the o re t ica l ly  more correct Hicksian measure would be appropriate.
Second, where no ordinary demand re la t ionship can be observed - given 
conditions where the Hicksian and the appropriate consumer's surplus 
measures are approximately equivalent - two a l te rnat ives can be 
pursued: i f  a useful re la t ionship  between the non-marketed good
and a marketed good can be observed,i t  may be possible to in fe r  an 
ordinary demand curve fo r  the non-marketed good and thus enable 
the calcu la t ion of the consumer's surplus; or, i f  no rela t ionships ex is t ,  
the income equivalent approach to measuring the Hicksian concepts 
may be used - with the important caveat that the problem of s tra teg ic  
behaviour amongst ind iv iduals responding to questioning is not 
s ig n i f ica n t .
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The case where no ordinary demand relationships can be 
observed is of particular relevance to this thesis. As was 
pointed out in the Introduction, many of the benefits of preserved 
natural ecosystems are subject to some form of market failure,to 
the extent that market information on the demand for preservation 
goods may not be accurate or may not be observable directly through 
a market. Techniques designed to measure many of the preservation 
benefits therefore, must be based on the use of data from related 
marketSsor the income equivalent questioning approach. It is 
the purpose of the following chapter to review some of these 
techniques.
CHAPTER 2
MEASURING NON-MARKETED BENEFITS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The conclusions drawn from the ana lys is  o f  Chapter 1 
regarding  the s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  the f i v e  we l fa re  change measures - the 
consumer's su rp lu s ,  the compensating v a r i a t i o n  and surp lus ,and the 
e qu iva len t  v a r i a t i o n  and surplus - to  va ry ing  ci rcumstances, ind ica ted  
t h a t  where a good is  marketed and an o rd in a ry  demand r e la t i o n s h ip  
can be observed r e a d i l y ,  the consumer's surplus is  a t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
s a t i s f a c t o r y  and p ra c t i c a b le  measure o f  we l fa re  change,but t h a t  in o the r  
s i t u a t i o n s ,  a l t e r n a t i v e  measures may be more app rop r ia te .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  
when markets are not ope ra t ing ,  we l fa re  changes assoc ia ted w i th  a good 
can be assessed using the consumer's surp lus  measure based on an 
o rd in a ry  demand fu n c t io n  der ived from the markets f o r  re la te d  goods, 
or  by using i n d i v i d u a l s '  income equ iva len ts  f o r  the we l fa re  change.
The va lu a t io n  o f  we l fa re  changes using the consumer's surplus techn ique,  
based on observed market data is  we l l  es tab l ished  and w i l l  not  be 
discussed a t  any g rea te r  depth in t h i s  t h e s is .  Rather,  the emphasis 
is  to  be placed on the measurement o f  b e n e f i t s  a r i s i n g  from non-marketed 
goods, the p reva len t  s i t u a t i o n  in  the case o f  preserved na tu ra l  
ecosystems. Hence i t  is  the aim o f  t h i s  chapter to  examine the var ious 
techniques economists have used to  implement the two we lfa re  change 
measurement a l t e r n a t i v e s  -  va lua t ion  through r e la te d  markets and 
income equ iva len t  assessment.
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However, before considering the benefit measurement 
techniques involving related markets and income equivalents, i t  
is useful to survey the less rigorous,yet practically more 
convenient methods of considering the benefits of non-marketed 
goods and services,noting the inconsistencies between these 
methods and the theoretical considerations discussed in Chapter 1.
Section 2.2 begins by reviewing b r ie f ly  some of the more widely used 
non-monetary methods, notably the qualitative/quantitative indices 
and consumer preference rankings. Section 2.3 outlines the 
opportunity cost c r ite r ion , which although not s t r ic t ly  a measurement 
technique, provides the decision maker with a bench mark against 
which a subjective valuation can be compared - for instance, are the 
benefits of preservation more or less than the $lm calculated as 
the net welfare gain to the community which would result from 
development. I t  is in Section 2.4 that the measurement techniques 
which seek to use information provided by the markets for goods 
which are related in a number of specific ways to the non-marketed 
good to establish a consumer's surplus measure for the non-marketed 
benefit,are discussed. Finally, in Section 2.5 a detailed review of some 
valuation processes which use the concept of income equivalence 
in the setting of a "contingent market" for the non-marketed good 
to obtain benefit measurements - the hypothetical valuation techniques - 
is undertaken. Included are the methods of u t i l i t y  analysis, the 
p r io r ity  evaluator technique, the itera tive bidding method and 
direct questioning.
The chapter concludes that when the good being valued has 
a specific relationship with a good or service which has an 
e ff ic ien t market, the techniques available to use the information
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generated by this market are theoretically sound and in most cases, 
sufficiently practical to enable the accurate measurement of the 
welfare changes of consumers of the non-marketed good. However, where 
no such relationship exists,  or i f  the market to which the good 
is related is significantly distorted, hypothetical valuation 
techniques can provide useful information on welfare changes. The 
problem which limits the hypothetical valuation techniques, and 
direct questioning in particular,  to the role of being used only 
when other techniques are unsuitable,is the possibility of strategic 
behaviour.' Because of the complexity of the problem and its 
proposed solutions, the consideration of strategic behaviour carried 
out in this chapter is supplemented by a more detailed examination 
of the problem set out in the following chapter.
2.2 NON-MONETARY MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES
It has been common practice to measure the value of non- 
marketed benefits in non-monetary units. Valuation techniques which 
use non-monetary units can be divided into two classes: the physical
evaluation methods which involve the measurement or classification 
of the non-marketed benefits; and,consumer preference evaluation 
methods which attempt to estimate the total well-being or ut i l i ty  
gained by individuals from non-marketed goods.
Physical evaluation can be either qualitative or quantitive. 
Qualitative evaluation is usually restricted to non-marketed benefits, 
such as the aesthetic quality of a native forest,which are too 
difficult  to measure in the precise units - for instance, kilometres 
of roads or mi l l i l i t res  of dissolved oxygen per l i t re  of river 
water - which are used in quantitative evaluation. Such precise
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physical measurement is perhaps the most widely used form of 
analysis of non-marketed goods,and is the basis o f  the environmental 
impact statement (EIS) procedure. Some extensions have been 
made to th is  technique fo r  the s i tua t ion  where many d i f fe r in g  
characteris t ics combine to produce a to ta l  non-marketed benef i t  such as 
water qua l i ty  or the qua l i ty  o f  l i f e :  Dinius (1972), Dee et a l .
(1973), He11iwe11 (1969), (1974a), (1974b), Sinden (1979),and 
Leopold and Marchand (1968) have used d i f fe r in g  methods of combining 
and weighting measured charac te r is t ics  into an index of  "worth".
The McHarg (1969) overlay method seeks to use quant i t ive data as 
the basis fo r determining optimal land use.
Overall ,  the physical methods have rather l im i ted  appl icat ion - 
they are only successful when appl ied to ranking a l te rna t ive  
resource al locations to provide a subject ive choice base where a l l  
other factors are equal. I t  is not possible to compare worth 
indices with other measurements ,uni ess a subject ive weighting system 
is involved.
The same problems are experienced by non-monetary consumer 
preference evaluation but in add i t ion ,  the problem of accurate 
response - whether stated preferences can be expected to be 
accompanied by corresponding behaviour - is encountered. Most well 
known of the preference evaluation techniques are the Check L is t  of 
Adject ives, used by Craik (1972) to investigate perception problems 
in the context of landscape management and, in a s l i g h t l y  d i f fe re n t  
form, by McKenry (1974), to analyse respondents' images of the 
Baw Baw wilderness in V ic tor ia . ;  the Semantic D i f f e r e n t ia l ,  used 
by Moeller e t  a l .  (1974) to study the differences in perception of 
the natural environment between d i f fe r in g  types of  recreat ion is ts  ;
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and the Simple Likert Scale which was used by Michalson (1972) to 
assess the visual impact on respondents who had been on trips 
down scenic rivers in Idaho.
2.3 THE OPPORTUNITY COST CRITERION
Clearly, the non-comparability problems of the non­
monetary measurement techniques place severe restrictions on the 
type of resource allocation issues to which they can be applied.
In addition, these techniques do not provide any information, 
relative or absolute, as to the value the community places on the 
physical phenomena which they measure. To gain some perspective 
of value for the non-monetary measurements, decision makers have 
relied on the opportunity cost criterion, a technique which rephrases 
the decision problem into a form which stresses the relative values 
of monetary and non-monetary benefits and costs. For instance, 
consider a decision maker who must choose between preserving a 
natural ecosystem anddeveloping the area for mineral production: 
there is an environmental impact statement prepared which outlines 
the physical dimensions of the benefits to be gained from 
preservation,and there is an estimate of the benefits, in consumer's 
surplus terms, which would be gained from the extraction of the 
minerals in the area. Rather than forcing the decision maker to estimate 
directly the value to the community of the preservation benefits, 
the opportunity cost criterion rephrases the decision problem so 
that the decision maker can consider his assessment of the magnitude 
of the preservation benefits relative to the o p p o rtu n ity  c o s t  of 
preserving the area, that is, the largely quantifiable benefits of
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mineral production. The question becomes: are the benefits of
preservation worth more than the $x which would be gained from 
mineral production? If so, the appropriate decision is to preserve; 
i f  not,mineral development should proceed.
From this example,it is clear that decision subjectivity 
is present to a large extent in the opportunity cost method, and 
decision makers frequently resort to using physical and preference 
valuations as aids to arriving at a decision. While assessment 
by opportunity cost supplemented with non-monetary valuation methods, 
is not regarded as satisfactory, i t  is clear that the combination 
of techniques is well accepted and widely used in the Australian 
context. The N.S.W. Pollution Control Commission (1975) used an 
opportunity cost framework to reject a proposal to plant coniferous 
forest on the Boyd Plateau in N.S.W. It was decided that the 
opportunity cost of preserving the Plateau (in that case, the cost 
of locating the forest elsewhere)»was less than the subjective 
evaluation of the preserved environment. The Federal Government 
used the same framework as one reason for refusing to grant export 
licences for mineral sands to miners on Fraser Island (Commonwealth 
of Australia (1976)),and the Working Group on the Export Woodchip 
Industry (Commonwealth of Australia (1975)) calculated the opportunity 
cost of reserving land within woodchip concession areas for 
preservation purposes. Saddler et  al .  (1980),in their consideration 
of the Tasmanian Hydro Electricity Commission's proposal to generate 
power by flooding the Lower Gordon and Franklin Rivers in South 
West Tasmania»calculated the difference in cost between this scheme 
and a coal fired thermal station, which would produce the same amount 
of power without destroying the preservation values of the
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Frankl in-Gordon wilderness. The study presented this cost difference 
as a "threshold value" against which the Tasmanian Government 
would have to judge the value of the wilderness. Extensions to 
the opportunity cost framework have been made by Hitchens e t  a t .
(1978) who introduced linear programming to incorporate uncertainty 
and to generate land use plans which meet specified objectives.
Very similar in concept to the opportunity cost concept is 
the method of evaluation by analogy, which attempts to correlate 
past managerial or po lit ica l decisions into a systematic set of 
monetary values. Cannegeiter (1964) attempts to quantify the 
"p o li t ic a l"  value of the Ord River scheme on this basis. However, . 
i f  there is a lack of consistency in po li t ica l decisions the analogy 
method breaks down. In addition, i t  is important to note that the 
range of past decisions w il l  l im it  the range of proposals which can 
be considered using analogy valuation: circumstances may change and
the marginal value of preserved natural areas may change as the 
result of past decisions which have altered the available quantity 
of such areas. I f  values are determined from an in i t ia l  decision 
to develop an area of natural ecosystem, an undersupply of preserved 
natural area could result from the fa ilure to recognize the increased 
scarcity,and hence value,of the preservation benefits.
These same criticisms can be made of valuations which use 
past voting trends. However in addition, voting suffers from the 
problem of multiple issue elections - single issue referendums are 
rare because of the expense involved and hence i t  is unusual to 
be able to analyse median voter preference for single benefits.
A valuation technique which follows similar lines, is 
that of using past legal decisions to value untraded benefits.
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The courts can award monetary damages to individuals who have 
their property rights infringed,and so i f  the property right to a 
non-marketed preservation benefit is well defined a valuation of 
that benefit can be obtained directly from a court decision. However, 
the legal inference method suffers from the same problems as 
valuation by analogy - values and circumstances change over time - 
but in addition, i t  is unlikely that legal decisions would be made 
on the full range of non-marketed benefits, primarily because of the 
difficulty in arriving at decisions involving property rights 
allocation. While the situation may improve if  class actions are 
introduced i t  remains true that subjectivity in valuation is s t i l l  
present because judges would have to assess the society's preferences 
for the non-marketed benefits.
Clearly the opportunity cost criterion, and valuation by 
analogy, voting,and the legal system retain many of the disadvantages 
of subjectivity: decision makers are relied upon to assess
accurately society's preferences in situations where a trade-off 
between marketed and non-marketed benefits is required. No accurate 
valuation is actually made by the opportunity cost criterion 
and whilst this is not true for the other valuation procedures, they 
are severely limited by other problems. None of the techniques 
address themselves to the concepts of welfare measurement discussed 
in the preceding chapter. It can be concluded therefore,that these 
methods are not satisfactory, despite their relative ease of 
application. The methods considered in the remainder of this chapter 
are directly related to the welfare change measures which Chapter 1 
concluded to be relevant when an ordinary (or compensated) demand 
function for a good is not readily observable: f i r s t ,  valuation
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through related markets is analysed - a consumer's surplus measure 
is calculated using a demand function derived from the market 
information for a specificially related good; and secondly, 
income equivalent valuation is considered - the Hicksian welfare 
change measurements are derived using hypothetical valuation questioning 
techniques.
2.4 VALUATION THROUGH RELATED MARKETS
2.4.1 The Theory
If there exists an efficiently operating market for a good 
which is related in some way to the non-marketed benefit being 
valued,then i t  is possible, in certain circumstances, to exploit 
the relationship to achieve relatively accurate, and theoretically 
consistent valuation. To analyse this type of valuation, two situations 
are considered: the f i r s t  occurs when the non-marketed good is
a factor input into a production process which also uses marketed 
factor inputs; but a more frequently encountered situation, in 
the case of the non-marketed benefits of natural ecosystem preservation, 
is when the good enters directly into the individual's ut i l i ty  
function. The factor input case will be analysed f i rs t .
When a change in the quantity available of a non-marketed 
good results in changes in production costs which are observable 
in the market, there are two possible valuation procedures. The 
f i r s t  can be used i f  the price of the final good is fixed, say in 
the case of a price-taker when the change in quantity only affects 
a small number of producers. By increasing the amount of the non- 
marketed good available, the marginal cost curve to the producers
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affected would be shifted to the right as a result of factor 
substitution: the resultant increase in producer's surplus,^ or
if  producers are price takers for variable factor inputs, the 
increased surplus accruing to the fixed factor owners, provides the 
appropriate benefit measurement. Alternatively, if  the change 
in the quantity of the non-marketed factor input affects most 
producers in the price-takers example, the price of the final 
good may change in response to the shift  in the aggregate marginal 
cost or market supply curve - in the example of an increased amount 
of the non-marketed factor input being available, the consumer's 
surplus would increase as a result of the supply shift induced price 
fa l l ,  but the effect on producer's surplus would depend on the 
elast ici ty of the demand response.
Measurement in both of these cases is achieved through 
the use of standard consumer's and producer's surplus calculations. 
Clearly, the welfare implications of these techniques are consistent 
with the theoretical aspects outlined in Chapter 1. However only 
the benefits arising from the use of non-marketed goods in 
production processes are considered - i f  other benefits are enjoyed 
directly by the consumers of these goods,then they must be measured 
separately, using other techniques.
Non-marketed goods commonly enter directly into the 
individual's u t i l i ty  function,and when this occurs, use of other 
markets to derive a valuation is more diff icul t ,  and in some
1 The producer's surplus is a measure of the welfare of 
individuals providing a good - i t  is analogous to the 
Marshallian consumer's surplus.
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circumstances, impossible. To determine i f  the related market 
valuation technique is applicable, i t  is necessary to establish 
ini t ia l ly ,  any relationship which exists between the goods consumed 
by individuals. The basis of these relationships centres on the 
concept of separability - an individual's u t i l i ty  function is said 
to be separable i f  separate goods enter the ut i l i ty  function in 
subsets. A u t i l i ty  function is 'weakly separable i f  the marginal 
rate of substitution between any pair of goods within a partition 
or subset is independent of the quantities of goods in any other 
subset . . .  (and is) strongly separable i f  the marginal rate of 
substitution between two goods in different subsets is independent 
of the quantity of any good in any other subset' (Freeman (1979), 
p. 170). When a ut i l i ty  function is non-separable,each good is 
related to all other goods entering the function. It is only in 
the case of ut i l i ty  functions which are weakly separable that 
relationships between non-marketed and marketed goods are sufficiently 
strong to enable cross valuation,and within this category, 
several circumstances have been recognized as being conducive to 
the related market valuation technique. The description of these
ll
circumstances which follows, draws largely from the work of Maler 
2(1974) who undertook a  theoretical analysis of concepts
3
used by economists to evaluate such non-marketed goods
as recreational activi t ies.
2 Further contributions to the theoretical analysis of 
related market valuation have been made by Bradford and 
Hilderbrandt (1972) and Hori (1975).
3 For example, Clawson and Knetsch (1966).
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The f i r s t  circumstance described by Maler,occurs when goods 
entering a ut i l i ty  function display "weak complementarity": the
quantity demanded of a particular marketed good, Y, is dependent 
not only on i ts own price but also on the quantity provided of 
the non-marketed good, X, and the demand function for Y must be such that 
i f  the quantity demanded of Y is zero then the marginal ut i l i ty  of 
X is also zero. These conditions enable the estimation of the 
constants of integration which occur when the estimated demand 
system is integrated to yield the expenditure function. With the 
expenditure function completely specified, the willingness to pay 
functions of all goods entering the individual's ut i l i ty  function, 
including that of the non-marketed good X, can be calculated.
Maler also derives a formula which links the marginal demand 
price of the non-marketed good X, W, with the price of a private 
good Y - j ,  P Yj , and the marginal rate of substitution between Y-j  
and X, MRSxYj*
W =  P y-j M R S x Y
When the ut i l i ty  function is weakly separable, i t  is possible to 
derive MRSxy-j f rom information on the elast ici ty of substitution 
and the constant of substitution. Two situations which make this 
calculation easier are i f  X and Y are perfect substitutes, or if  
X and Y are perfect complements. In the case of perfect substitution, 
because the elast ici ty of substitution is infinity,  W reduces to a 
function of PYj and the readily observable substitution ratio. When the 
goods are perfect complements, the situation is a l i t t l e  more complex.
In the case where the non-marketed good X is held constant, as the 
supply of Y increases, i ts  price, Py, fal ls and the quantity demanded
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of Y expands, but at some price, Py1, the demand for Y becomes 
perfectly inelastic - the possibili t ies for complementing the 
fixed supply of X are exhausted - and the marginal u t i l i ty  of Y 
is zero. For prices above Py' , the marginal ut i l i ty  and the demand 
price of X are zero,but when the price fal ls below P y ' ,  an 
individual would demand more Y i f  there was more X available and 
so the demand price and marginal u t i l i ty  of X become positive. Hence 
Maler (p. 180-183) is able to show that when the price of Y is 
below P y '  i t  is possible to use the observable demand function for 
Y to determine the individual's expenditure function from which 
the demand price for X can be derived.
The preceding analysis is limited to situations in which 
the non-marketed good is non-excludable to the extent that once 
i t  is provided, the individual cannot reject the level of supply.
When individuals are able to choose the levels of X they enjoy, through 
their consumption of a related good,it is possible to use the 
"hedonic prices" technique to estimate the non-marketed good's 
value. This is enabled because varying levels of the non-marketed 
good differentiate the marketed good sufficiently to yield varying 
prices. By undertaking a regression analysis on the marketed good's 
price series, the effect of the different levels of X can be 
estimated. However, as Freeman (1974) points out, the relationship 
between the price of Y and the quantity of X is not a demand curve 
for X but rather a locus of individual equilibrium marginal willingness 
to pay - to achieve an estimation of the demand curve, i t  is 
necessary to undertake a second stage of analysis, which involves 
the estimation of each individual's marginal willingness to pay 
function using the original estimation of the marginal purchase price 
and socio-economic information. The welfare measures based on the
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area under the compensated demand curve can then be used to 
determine the benefits to be gained from the provision of X.
2.4.2 The Practice
The application of the theory of valuing non-marketed goods 
which are used as inputs into a production process reviewed in the 
previous sub-section, is relatively straightforward, being based 
on the well established consumer's and producer's surplus measures of 
welfare changes using the observable demand curve for the final 
product.^ This sub-section therefore considers only the applications 
of the related market valuation techniques to cases where non- 
marketed goods enter directly into consumers' u t i l i ty  functions.
The most widely used method of exploiting complementary 
relationships between marketed and non-marketed goods is the travel 
cost method for valuing recreational activities .  Hotelling (1949) 
suggested that individuals' expenses »incurred in travelling to 
and using a recreation facility, could be used as a surrogate for 
price in a demand relationship between the quantity of recreation 
enjoyed and its  causal factors.
R - j  = r 1 (TC, Z-, . . .  Zn)
where R. is the quantity of recreation undertaken by individual i 
TC is the travel cost associated with the activity 
and Z-| . . .  Zn are other factors which may affect
5
the demand for recreation.
4 Sinden and Worrel (1979) review a number of applications 
involving final markets (pp. 278-283) but also point out 
the use of production function estimates of marginal value 
products for valuing non-marketed inputs (pp. 283-287).
5 As was pointed out in Chapter 1, i f  income is included as one 
of the additional variables in an econometric estimation of 
the demand function, then the price-quantity relationship is 
a compensated demand curve.
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By assuming that the travel costs of the most distant or 
marginal users are equivalent to average benefits, Hotelling was 
able to show that users living nearer received a net benefit,or 
consumer^ surplus amounting to the difference between their costs 
and the costs of the marginal users, assuming uniform tastes.
Two types of evaluation have stemmed from this basic 
approach. By grouping visitors into zones of like distance from the 
recreational faci l i ty  and calculating the average cost of travel from 
each zone»it is possible to value the total recreational experience, 
including travel and preparation costs as well as on-site experiences. 
The value of the recreation is equated to the summation of the 
differences between each zones' costs and the furthest zone's cost. 
Clawson (1959) used this method to derive a demand curve for visits 
to Yosemite National Park in the U.S., from which he derived an 
approximation of the value of the "total" recreational experience.
The second type of evaluation concentrates on the on-site 
recreational experience. Clawson and Knetsch (1966) analysed the 
effect of simulated changes in entrance fees on the total number 
of visitors using the observed relationship between travel costs and 
visitor numbers to derive what they claimed to be a final demand 
curve for recreation on the site - total user benefit from the 
recreation opportunity being defined as the total area under the 
demand curved
The travel cost method is limited by a number of assumptions. 
F irs t ,  there must be a functional relationship between recreation
6 If a park fee is in operation, recreation benefits are 
defined as the total revenue from fees plus the consumer's 
surplus.
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use and the distance which a consumer is prepared to travel to enjoy 
the f a c i l i t y .  Secondly, the methods assume that a ll  users are able 
to enjoy the recreation to the same extent, which is obviously quite 
unlikely. In addition there must be some assumption regarding the 
zonal structure of the model : the closest user in a zone must be
wi l l ing to pay as much as the furthest user. With the Clawson and 
Knetsch extension, i t  must be assumed, in addition, that users respond 
to added park fees in the same way as they do to travel cost.
Despite these problems, a profusion of case studies have 
been attempted, the more advanced of which have incorporated a valuation 
of users' time spent travel l ing in addition to the normally 
considered travel costs such as motor vehicle running expenses.'7 As 
a result of the large number of studies,each using s l ight ly  di f ferent  
techniques, some confusion over just what is the correct approach 
arose until  Ulph and Reynolds (1979) presented a fu l l  model of the 
travel cost approach including the incorporation of the value of 
time, together with a review of the ways in which past studies have 
f i t t e d  into the ir  model. In addition they l i s t  some of the d i f f ic u l t ie s  
associated with the travel cost model in valuing recreation in 
national parks, which include:
( i )  when parks are not valued in themselves but rather as 
inputs to other ac t iv i t ie s  such as skiing, fishing e tc . ,  i t  is 
not possible to assume identical preferences between a ll  users and 
so subgroups of users must be individual ly analysed;
7 For a review of the travel cost l i te ra tu re ,  see Ulph and 
Reynolds (19 80).
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( i i)  because the inclusion of time in the travel cost 
model results in an implicit valuation of work and travel, the 
assumption of identical preferences across respondents carries 
over to imply identical shadow prices for work and travel for all 
subjects - this will not occur even i f  all individuals have 
identical preferences,as the shadow prices will also depend on the 
level of consumption which in turn will be affected by differing 
income and price levels - Ulph and Reynolds (1979) suggest that 
this problem can be overcome by more sophisticated estimation;
( i i i )  by including only total time spent by all users,
the conventional travel cost method neglects to model the importance 
of tr ip length and its  associated property of non-constant returns 
to scale - Ulph and Reynolds (1979) point to advances in transport 
demand studies as being able to solve this problem in the recreation 
context;
(iv) when an individual combines visits  to several recreation 
sites within the one tr ip ,  the travel cost model cannot explicitly 
separate the value of one site from the others but several methods
of dividing the aggregate value have been devised, largely based 
on the relative time spent at each site;  and,
(v) by aggregating users into zones of origin, considerable 
data is wasted - other demand parameters also vary across different 
zones and need to be incorporated into the analysis if  incongruous 
results are to be avoided.
While the travel cost model is obviously imperfect in most 
practical applications, i t  has the advantage of being well tried and 
relatively inexpensive to carry out. In addition, by its use of 
the complementary relationship between recreation and travel i t  has
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a theoretical base which is well founded.
The particular ease of implementing, the valuation method 
applicable when the non-marketed and marketed goods are substitutes 
is complicated by the fact that only rarely are the two perfect 
substitutes. For instance, a preserved natural ecosystem offers 
educational values which can be substituted for within-classroom 
displays: however, i t  is clearly not a perfect substitute and any
valuation based on the cost of providing the classroom display is 
an under-statement of the true value of the ecosystem as an 
educational asset.
The use of hedonic price analysis has centred largely on the
valuation of air  pollution control measures: Ridker and Henning
(1967) analysed air  pollution control in St Louis through land values
and more recently Harrison and Rubinfeld (1978) used Boston data
to calculate the average dollar benefits of the federal automobile
emission control programme to local residents. However the same
type of analysis has been used by Brown and Pollakowski (1977) to
determine the value of shoreline frontage in Seattle,and by Abelson
(1979) to evaluate hedonic prices - but not benefit measurements -
for aircraft  noise, road traff ic  and other environmental characteristics
of two Sydney suburbs,and could be applied to value the non-
participatory aesthetic benefits derived from preserved natural
8 9ecosystems by neighbouring residents. *
M
8 Maler (1977) expresses doubt as to the re l iabil i ty  of such 
estimates - 'there is no reason why willingness to pay for 
environmental quality improvements should be related in any 
simple way to the influence on property values from environmental 
quality differences' (p. 368) - even i f  i t  is possible to 
assume perfect markets.
9 Reynolds (1978) analyses the relationship between land values 
and tree cover on rural properties in the Armidale d is t r ic t  
but in the context of estimating the opportunity costs facing 
present farmers if  increased tree cover was adopted as a statutory 
requirement.
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2.5 INCOME EQUIVALENT VALUATION
When the ut i l i ty  function of an individual is either strongly- 
separable or non-separable - that is ,  when all goods are independent 
or when each good is related to all other goods, respectively - 
then there is no developed method for using other markets in 
order to value the untraded good. For strongly separable ut i l i ty  
functions this is because each good has no relationships to 
exploit,and for the non-separable case, the relationships are too 
numerous and complex to yield any meaningful results.  Even though 
Bradford and Hilderbrant (1977) dispute this to some extent in that 
' i f  one regards the value of all public goods as contingent upon 
the availabili ty of some private goods (if  there is no butter there 
is no demand for guns), the result says that all the information 
required for efficient public good provision is embedded in private 
good demand functions' (pp. 113-114), i t  is clear that the information 
requirement for the strongly separable and non-separable cases 
is beyond our capabilities at the present. In other words, i t  is 
not feasible to use benefit measurements based on the areas under 
ordinary or compensated demand curves in such circumstances, and 
economists have turned to the alternative for measuring welfare 
changes - the income equivalent of the change in resource allocation, 
as revealed by the individual concerned - as a measurement base.
The income equivalent techniques rely on either the direct or indirect 
questioning of individuals, and because the questions are usually 
set in a simulation context the techniques are also known as 
hypothetical valuation methods. The remainder of this chapter reviews
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a selection^ of valuation procedures which use income equivalents 
as a base: they range from indirect questioning of choice
patterns, through to methods which attempt to simulate an actual 
market,and to straightforward direct questioning.
A number of problems common to all income equivalent 
techniques are encountered but one is of particular interest: the
strategic behaviour of respondents. For instance, in i ts  most 
simple form, strategic behaviour involves respondents who have 
a positive value for the provision of a non-marketed good, over­
stating their willingness to pay when i t  is known that payment will 
not be enforced, and under-stating their preferences when payment is 
to be made. The under-statement aspect of the strategic behaviour 
problem - called the free-rider problem - has generated an extensive 
li terature since i ts  theoretical formalization by Samuel son (1954) 
including, more recently, studies which attempt to overcome the 
problem, i f  i t  is of sufficient strength to warrant correction. 
Because of the extent of this l i terature and the importance of the 
problem of strategic behaviour in hypothetical valuation procedures, 
i t  is only mentioned in passing here, with a more complete analysis 
being undertaken in the following chapter.
2.5.1 Valuation by Utility Analysis
It is clear from the analysis of the welfare measures carried 
out in Chapter 1 that i f  an individual's set of indifference curves 
for the non-marketed good being considered and a readily valued
10 The most prominent methods are reviewed - a more complete 
selection can be found in Sinden and Worrell (1979).
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numeraire»could be defined, then benefi t  measurement would be 
stra ightforward - i f  both goods were priced and budget l ines could 
be establ ished, both the Marshall ian and Hicksian measures could 
be calculated through the construct ion of demand curves,and where 
no prices were evident, income equivalent measures of  the Hicksian 
concepts could be computed.^ One method of deriving ind iv iduals '  
ind if ference curves has been suggested by Sinden (1974) who 
adapted the Ramsey model of  u t i l i t y  estimation to derive a value 
for  the benefi ts enjoyed by recrea t iona l is ts  who v is i te d  a state park 
in Oregon. The f i r s t  part o f  th is  sub-section outl ines the u t i l i t y  
valuation technique as used by Sinden,and the second part points 
out the advantages and problems of  the methodology.
The Ramsey model is a decision theory "game" in which subjects
are asked to choose between two prospects - with in each prospect
there are two possible outcomes which can occur with an equal
12probab i l i ty  of 0.5. Table 2.1 i l l u s t ra te s  the Ramsey model using 
a decision matr ix form. Sinden's adaptation of the Ramsey model 
involves each respondent comparing the expected u t i l i t y  gained from
Probab i l i ty  of Prospect I Prospect 2
O c c u r r e n c e ________________________
0.5 ( i )  Xa ( i i i )  Xc
0.5 ( i i )  Yb ( iv )  Zd
Table 2 .1 : Ramsey Model Decision M a t r i x . ^
11 Given that in the no-price case, the good would be j o i n t  in supply 
and pub l ic ly  provided, as was the s i tua t ion  reviewed in Chapter 1 
fo r  the cases of equivalent and compensating surpluses: See Fig. 1.3.
12 Probabi l i ty  is maintained at 0.5 to avoid bias due solely to 
d i f fe r in g  p roba b i l i t ies  and the problems of gambling, although 
i t  is not clear that the l a t t e r  d i f f i c u l t y  is overcome.
13 Af ter  Sinden (1974): numerals re fer  to the matrix posit ion
whereas le t te rs  re fe r  to potential  outcomes; fo r  example "Xa" 
specif ies "a" units o f  good X.
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Prospect 1, 0.5 U(Xa) + 0.5 U(Yb) - where "Xa" is a quantity of 
good X, the non-marketed good being valued, and "Yb" is a quantity 
of Y, the second good being used in the indifference map analysis - with 
the expected u t i l i t y  gained from Prospect 2, 0.5 U(Xc) + 0.5 U(Zd) - 
where"Xc" is some quantity of X greater than Xa,and Zd is a 
quantity of a neutral good Z which is less preferred to Yb.^
Outcome Xc is varied by the interviewer until the respondent is 
indifferent between the two prospects. By arbitar i ly  specifying 
the u t i l i t y  interval U(Yb) - U(Zd) as being a ut il  es,i t  is possible 
to infer that the interval U(Xc)-U(Xa) is also a utiles because of the 
indifference property:
0.5 (U(Xa)) + 0.5 (U(Yb)) = 0.5 (U(Xc)) + 0.5 (U(Zd)) . . .  (1)
Multyplying by 2 yields:
U(Xa) + U(Yb)= U(Xc) + U(Zd) . . .  (2)
Setting U(Yb) - U(Zd) = a gives:
U(Yb) - U(Zd) = U(Xc) - U(Xa) = a . . .  (3)
By transferring the chosen level of X, "Xc" to position ( i )  and 
repeating the process to determing "Xe",the new level of X in 
position ( i i i ) ,  the game can be repeated and the level of X which 
provides an additional a utiles to the respondent can be determined:
U(Yb) - U(Zd) = U(Xe) - U(Xc) = a . . .  (4)
By a further arbitary setting of a base level of u t i l i t y ,  say 
U(Xa) = 0, i t  is possible to construct the u t i l i t y  curve illustrated  
in Figure 2.1.
14 Outcome Zd plays no role in the valuation process except to 
provide an outcome which balances the probability distribution 
between the two prospects and to establish a u t i l i t y  interval:
1) (Yb) - U (Zd).
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,U t i I es
Figure 2 .1 : Total U t i l i t y  for Good X.
Sinden (1974) argues that because the construction of the 
total u t i l i t y  curve is dependent on the level of provision of 
the good Y, to obtain further total u t i l i t y  curves for good X, 
i t  is necessary to change the level of Y and reiterate the Ramsey 
game. First , the combination of goods, X and Yb, which provides 
a certain level of u t i l i t y ,  3, is identified from the established 
curve: in Figure 2.1, 3 utiles are said to be provided by the
combination Xf and Yb. This combination is entered into a Ramsey 
matrix as Prospect I which is compared with a Prospect I I  consisting 
of a new level of good Y, Yg, in position (iv) and the variable 
level of good X, Xh, in position ( i i i )  - the new decision matrix 
is displayed in Table 2.2.
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Probabi1i t y  of Prospect I Prospect 2
Occurrence
0.5 Xf Xh
0.5 Yb Yg
Table 2.2: Ramsey Model Decision Matrix fo r  Subsequent U t i l i t y  Curves.
From the information on Xh provided by the respondent, 
the ind if ference property between Prospects 1 and 2 is :
0.5 (U(Xf))+ 0.5 (U(Xb)) = 0.5 (U(Xh)) + 0.5 (U(Yg)) . . .  (5)
Sinden's assumption tha t :
U(Xf) + U(Yb) = 3 . . .  (6)
makes i t  possible to deduce that
U( Xh) + U(Yg) = 3 . . .  (7)
and from th is  information i t  is possible to establ ish a point on 
a new u t i l i t y  curve fo r  good X which uses Yg as a base: Figure 2.2
i l l u s t ra te s  th is  new curve,TU*.
Ut i l es
Figure 2 .2 : The Sinden Derivation of  a U t i l i t y  Curve fo r  X given
Yg from the U t i l i t y  Curve fo r  X given Yb.
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This horizontal sh i f t in g  process is used in Sinden's method to
produce a family of  to ta l  u t i l i t y  curves,from which can be derived
15a set of  ind if ference curves.
The method of  u t i l i z i n g  the ind if ference curves derived 
by the Sinden method has varied between the various case studies 
which have used the procedure. Sinden (1974) and Sinden and 
Wyckoff (1976) used the marginal costs o f  the two recreation a c t i v i t i e s  
which were involved - goods X and Y in the current notation - and 
the budget each respondent al located to recreation over the study 
period of six weekends, to construct budget l ines so that the 
compensated demand curve fo r  recreation in the State Park could be 
constructed. Liesch and Sinden (1976) in th e i r  study of the value 
of the "rura l  way of  l i f e " ,  a re la t i v e ly  d i f f i c u l t  concept to budget 
and cost, used a readi ly  valued good - overseas t r ip s  - as the Y 
good to act as a numeraire from which income equivalents could be 
calculated.
Valuation using Sinden's adaption of the Ramsey u t i l i t y  model 
has the advantage of  encouraging subjects to th ink ca re fu l ly  about 
the choices made, because of the detai led judgements required.
In addi t ion ,  the d i f f i c u l t y  some respondents have in giving do l la r  
answers to valuation questions is avoided. While no e x p l i c i t  an t i -  
strategic-behaviour mechanism is employed, the deta i l  of judgements 
made and th e i r  non-monetary nature may have the e f fec t  of lessening
15 The standard procedure of holding u t i l i t y  constant and 
observing the combinations of  X and Y which provide that 
level o f  u t i l i t y  appl ies. For instance, in Figure 2.2, (3 
u t i le s  are provided by the combinations of X and Y: 
(Yh,Yg) and (Xf,Yb).
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the problem of over-statement: this conclusion is drawn by Liesch 
and Sinden (1976) in a comparison of valuation techniques applied to a 
recreation valuation study - valuations were verified by a back- 
projection test  in which the relationship between valuation and 
actual use was tested for significance.
However an obvious limitation of the technique described,is
the time and cost of undertaking such an extensive interviewing
programme - indeed the validity of conclusions concerning the presence
of strategic behaviour drawn in all the ut i l i ty  valuation studies
reviewed are somewhat dubious because only small numbers of respondents
16had been interviewed.
One further difficulty,  involving the theoretical structure 
of the u t i l i ty  valuation method, limits i ts  use to cases in which 
the ut i l i ty  of good X can be simply added to the ut i l i ty  of good Y 
to form the joint u t i l i ty  function U(X,Y), that is:
U(X) + U(Y) = U(X,Y) . . .  (8)
To explain the reasons for this limitation, i t  is useful to return 
to the description of the Sinden approach, and particularly the 
situation depicted in Table 2.1 which is expressed in Equation (1).
When an individual is considering the expected u t i l i t i e s  to be 
gained from Prospects 1 and 2, he realizes that the outcome will 
involve only one of Xa, Yb, Xc or Zd: for instance, i f  Prospect 1 
is chosen, there is a f i f ty- f i f ty  chance that either Xa or Yb will 
occur. To represent Equation (1) more rigorously, i t  is therefore 
necessary to specify that the ut i l i ty  gained from Xa, U(Xa),will 
not be associated with any provision of other goods: this can be
16 Sinden (1974) and both the studies reported in Liesch and 
Sinden(1976) use only five subjects - the interview time for 
each respondent was between two and three hours. However Sinden 
(1980) reports that an undergraduate student at the University 
of New England was able to reduce interviewing time to 20 
minutes using a simplified procedure.
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achieved using the nota t ion U(Xa,Yo) to represent the u t i l i t y  o f a 
un its  o f  X consumed w ithout  any un its  o f  Y. Hence Equation (1) becomes: 
0.5(U(Xa,Yo)) + 0.5 (U(Yb,Xo)) = 0.5 (U(Xc.Zo)) + 0.5 (U(Zd,Xo))
The three points on the u t i l i t y  curve can then be calcula ted 
using the a r b i t a r y  se t t ing  o f  U(Yb,Xo) - U(Zd,Xo) to some specif ied 
level o f  u t i l i t y ,  a ,  and U(Xa,Yo) as a base. However, i t  is  c lear  
tha t  the curve so constructed represents leve ls  o f  X, a, c, and e, 
which are enjoyed w ithou t the prov is ion o f  any good Y. Sinden (1974) 
in te rp re ts  t h i s  curve as being dependent on the consumption o f  good 
Y a t  level b ,but fo l low ing  Kennedy's (1980) explanat ion o f  the problem, 
Sinden (1980) is  prepared to re -spec i fy  his i n i t i a l  u t i l i t y  curve 
in the Oregon Park case study as being based on zero consumption 
o f  the a l t e rn a t i v e  good - c le a r l y  th i s  problem is  overcome,but i t  
is  not u n t i l  the second stage o f  Sinden's method o f  applying the 
Ramsey model th a t  the technique's l im i t a t i o n s  are ev ident.  Consider 
once more the prospects de ta i led  in Table 2.2 , which i l l u s t r a t e s  
the f i r s t  stage o f  the u t i l i t y  va luat ion method's approach to 
generating fu r th e r  ind i f fe rence  curves, but ra ther  than inc luding 
Yb in pos i t ion  ( i i ) ,  the co r rec t  Yo outcome is  added. I f  the u t i l i t y  
curve fo r  X given one u n i t  o f  good Y, Y^, is  to be derived, then 
by the Sinden method, Y-j must be included as outcome ( i v ) :  Table 
2.3 depicts th i s  new scenario.
. . .  (9)
P ro b a b i l i t y  o f  Prospect 1 Prospect 2 
Occurrence
0.5
0.5
Xf
Yo
Xh
Y,
Table 2 .3 : Ramsey Model Decision Matr ix f o r  Deriving the
U t i l i t y  Curve fo r  X given Y-j.
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Equation 10 expresses rigorously the condition of indifference 
between the two prospects:
0.5 (U(Xf,Yo)) + 0.5 (U(Xo,Yo)) = 0.5 (U(Xh,Yo)) + 0.5 (U(Xo, Y-j))
and hence: ’ * *
U( Xf ,Yo) + U( Xo ,Yo) = U(Xh,Yo) + U(Xo ,Y-j) . . .  ( 11 )
Assuming that U(Xo,Yo) is equal to zero, i t  is possible to
rewrite (11) as:
3 = 5 + U(Xo,Y-,)
because the values for U(Xf,Yo), 3, and U(Xh,Yo), 6, can be observed 
from the original u t i l i t y  function, TU, is i l lustrated in Figure 2.2. 
Therefore:
U(Xo,Y-,) = 6 - 6  . . .  (12)
So rather than providing a point on the u t i l i t y  curve for 
good X given one unit of Y, u(Xi ,Yq), the rigorously defined 
u t i l i t y  valuation method enables an estimation of the u t i l i t y  curve 
for good Y, given no consumption of X, u(Xo,Y]). For the method 
to define u(Xi ,Yq) i t  is necessary to substitute for Equation (11) 
the expression:
U(Xf,Yo) = U(Xh,Y-|) . . .  (13)
Clearly then U(Xh,Y-|) is equal to 6 uti les and U(Xh,Y^) is a point 
on the new u t i l i t y  function u(Xi,Y-|). Because the u(Xi,Y-|) curve 
is based on the variable consumption of X given the constant 
consumption of Y, the function u(Xi,Y-|) should be vert ica l ly  above 
the function u(Xi,Yo) which is already derived, by a constant amount, 
the marginal u t i l i t y  of one unit of Y: in the current example
this distance can be derived from Equation (12) to be 6-6 uti les.
Given the necessity of considering Equation (11) to be 
equivalent to Equation (13), what are the conditions under which 
equivalence can be assumed? Smith and Bennett (1981) set out two
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c o n d i t i o n s  w h i c h  m u s t  be s a t i s f i e d  if the " s t r i c t  a d d i t i v i t y "  
a s s u m p t i o n ,  n e c e s s a r y  to m a k e  E q u a t i o n s  (11) a n d (13) e q u i v a l e n t ,  
is to hold:
(i) T h e r e  is no t h i r d  g o o d  at w h o s e  e x p e n s e  the
c o n s u m p t i o n  o f  X a n d  Y o c c u r s , a n d  w h o s e  m a r g i n a l
u t i l i t y  is no t  c o n s t a n t ;  and,
(ii) the u t i l i t y  d e r i v e d  f r o m  c o n s u m p t i o n  o f  X does
no t  d e p e n d  on the q u a n t i t y  of Y c o n s u m e d  a n d  
17wee versa.
T h e  f i r s t  c o n d i t i o n  can be e x p l a i n e d  u s i n g  P r o s p e c t  2 of 
T a b l e  2.3. S u p p o s e  the c o n s u m p t i o n  of X a n d  Y is c a r r i e d  o u t  at 
the e x p e n s e  o f  a n o t h e r  g o o d  W , a n d  t h a t  the s u b j e c t  has a total 
" b u d g e t "  to s p e n d  on g o o d s  X,Y an d  W o f  n units. T h e e x p e c t e d  
u t i l i t y  of P r o s p e c t  2 can then be w r i t t e n  r i g o r o u s l y  as:
0.5 ( U (X h ,Y o ,W n - h )) + 0. 5  ( U ( X o , Y ] , W n - l )) ... (14)
N o w  S m i t h  a n d B e n n e t t  (1981) s u g g e s t  t h a t  if the m a r g i n a l  u t i l i t y  
o f  g o o d  W i n c r e a s e s  as t h e " a m o u n t  of W c o n s u m e d  is r e d u c e d  then 
'the net u t i l i t y  g a i n  f r o m  a combination of (Xh) and (Y-j) will 
be s m a l l e r  t h an the a d d e d  ne t  u t i l i t i e s  o f  (Xh) a n d (Y-j) c o n s i d e r e d  as 
m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  even ts' (p. 7, us i n g  c u r r e n t  n o t a t i o n ) .
H e n c e :
U ( X h , Y ] , W n - h - l ) < U ( X h , Y o , W n - h )  + U ( X o , Y 1 , W n - l ) ... (15)
a n d the " s t r i c k  a d d i t i v i t y "  a s s u m p t i o n  w h i c h  e n a b l e s  the e q u i v a l e n c e  
b e t w e e n  e q u a t i o n s  (11) and (13) c a n n o t  apply.
1 7  A f t e r  S m i t h  an d  B e n n e t t  (1 981), p. 9.
60
Compliance with the second condition, that the ut i l i t i es  
from X and Y are independent, according to Smith and Bennett (1981), 
is 'most likely i f  (X) and (Y) satisfy different kinds of wants 
so that they are neither close substitutes nor close complements'
(p. 9). They i l lustrate this by describing the case which would 
occur i f  the goods were perfect substitutes: because the marginal
u t i l i ty  of a unit of X will be the same as that of an additional unit 
of Y, the ut i l i ty  function u(Xi,Yo) would be equivalent to both 
u(Xo,Yi) and u(Xi,Yi).
Clearly the study reported by Sinden (1974) and Sinden and 
Wyckoff (1976) meets neither of these conditions - the good Y in 
this case was chosen by each respondent as an effective substitute 
for the X good, days at the state park - and Sinden and Worrell 
(1979) do not recognize the importance of the independence of X 
and Y by advising prospective users of the technique to choose Y 
as a close substitute - their example uses fish disease reduction 
and fish species preservation. However,Liesch and Sinden's (1976) 
report of Liesch's work on the valuation of the rural way of l i f e ,  
appears to satisfy the two conditions - no third good is given up 
for the consumption of the rural way of l i fe and overseas tr ips,  
and the goods appear to, satisfy different types of wants.
In conclusion, the ut i l i ty  valuation method is limited by 
two constraints - the time and expense involved in interviewing 
subjects,and the need to assume a "st r ict  additivity" between the 
u t i l i t i e s  of the two goods involved. However, where only a small 
number of subjects need to be interviewed,and if  the good "Y" can 
be specified to satisfy the s t r i c t  additivity assumption, then the 
technique can provide information on respondents' valuations of
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non-marketed benef i ts. In other circumstances, a less time consuming
but the o re t ica l ly  correct questioning process to derive indif ference
curves, and hence welfare measurements, could involve the interviewer
s ta r t ing  at some a rb i ta ry  combination of goods X and Y, say (Xa,Yb),
and proceding by systematical ly changing the level of X and asking
each subject to indicate the level of good Y which would make him
ind i f fe re n t  between the new combination and (Xa,Yb). Any number of
ind if ference curves could be computed on th is  basis and used in the
18usual ways to derive the f u l l  range of welfare measurements.
The advantages of the u t i l i t y  valuation technique - notably the 
remoteness o f  the respondent from the valuation calcu lat ion and the 
use o f  quant i t ies of  goods rather than do l la r  values to establ ish 
t rade-offs  - seem to be maintained by the s impl i f ied  indif ference 
questioning procedure ,and the re s t r i c t io n s  of  cost and the a d d i t i v i t y  
assumption are reduced.
2.5.2 The P r io r i t y  Evaluator Technique (PET)
PET is a market simulation or bidding game technique in
which respondents al locate a given budget between a l te rna t ive  levels
of goods or "var iables" which are affected by the resource a l locat ion
19change being considered. For instance, a PET simulation may
18 I f  a readi ly  valued good is chosen as good Y, then the 
ca lcu lat ion of  compensating surpluses for  changes in the 
provision of publ ic goods can be achieved using Y as a 
numeraire as described in Chapter 1.
19 Another methodology establ ished on s im i la r  l ines is outl ined in 
Strauss and Hughes (1976), who use respondents' al locations of
a "budget" across hypothetical expenditure and tax recommendations 
to analyse preferences for  North Carolina state f isca l  
a l te rnat ives ,but no valuation of publ ic goods is attempted.
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involve two goods - hyd ro -e le c t r ic i ty  and wilderness - each occurring
at three levels - no h yd ro -e le c t r ic i ty  generation capacity and
complete wilderness, some h y d ro -e le c t r ic i ty  with a reduced level
o f  wi lderness, and a f u l l  scale hydro-dam which would substant ia l ly
20reduce the quanti ty of wilderness remaining. Each level is priced
21i n i t i a l l y  in the PET simulation at  an a rb i ta ry  figure,and by an 
i te ra t i v e  sequence of price changes, PET is argued by Sinden 
and Worrell (1979) to achieve an a l loca t ion  the same as that 
achieved by a per fec t ly  competi tive market. Hence PET has been 
used to provide information on the value respondents, as a group, 
have fo r  otherwise non-marketed benef i ts.
The p r i o r i t y  evaluator technique was o r ig in a l l y  developed 
by the Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR) group in 
London to measure community preferences so that p r io r i t y  values 
could be quant i f ied: Ho inv i l le  (1971), from the SCPR, summarizes
the basis of PET,and reviews the resul ts  of two p i l o t  studies 
which involved the urban environment preferences of London residents 
and the preferences of urban communities fo r  d i f fe r in g  transport 
modes. Pendse and Wyckoff (1974b) (1976) applied the technique 
to the quant i f ica t ion  of preferences fo r  recreation a c t i v i t i e s ,  
h is to r ic  si tes,and flood m i t iga t ion  which would be affected by a 
proposed dam in the Santian Val ley, Oregon,and to a study of preferences 
fo r  a l te rna t ive  campus f a c i l i t i e s  at Oregon State University.
20 "Price" in the PET l i t e ra tu re  refers not to a per un i t  pr ice,
but to the to ta l  cost to the consumer of purchasing the 
level of the var iable chosen: fo r  example,the prices of
the three levels of wilderness may be $100, $70 and $10. The 
"prices" therefore re late very c losely to the wil l ingness 
to pay of  the consumer in the PET s i tua t ion .
21 Although Pendse and Wyckoff (1974b) (1976) base th e i r  assigned 
prices on the cost o f  supply.
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The most recent use of PET has been made by Sinden and O'Hanlon 
(1976) and O'Hanlon and Sinden (1978) who used the results of a 
PET analysis of the trade-off between the benefits and costs of a proposed 
National Park in northern N.S.W., in the context of a benefit-cost 
framework,and introduced revised surveying techniques and 
sta tis t ical  testing. This sub-section reviews PET in two parts: 
f i r s t ,  the technique is described as i t  has been presented by its 
various users, noting any differences between applications; and 
secondly, an assessment of the validity of the method and its 
applicability to the task of benefit measurement is made.
Hoinville (1971) describes PET as a method designed to 
overcome the problem common to many attitudinal questions: 'respondents
are not forced - as they are in a behavioural situation - to trade­
off their preferences against others' (p. 38). The trade-off of 
preferences is achieved in PET by displaying varying levels of 
competing goods to respondents who are asked to allocate an 
arbitari ly assigned budget between the alternatives. Because the 
budget size forces respondents to choose only a limited number of 
goods, a pattern of trade-off between preferences is determined. Hoinville 
admits that the interpretation of the results generated by PET 
were, at that time, 'less wel1-developed than the practical task of 
data collection' (p. 44) but he suggests a number of alternative analyses. 
First, the prices of the levels of goods indicated by respondents as 
being indicative of their existing situation, can be used to provide 
a value for that situation ,and this value can be compared with the 
value, similarly determined, for the situation chosen as being 
optimal, to identify the pattern of preference trade-off. Hoinville 
recognizes that each individual's pattern of preferences is dependent
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on the prices assigned to each of the levels of the goods available
but maintains that an examination of the re la tive  values of
existing and optimal situations can provide information on respondents'
real valuations. For instance, a choice to "purchase" more of
a good than is currently experienced indicates that the assigned
22price is below willingness to pay.
However, rather than advocating a valuation process which
entails each respondent being presented with a sequence of price
changes that ensures the convergence of the preferred choice to the
existing situation, Hoinville (1971) suggests a probability approach:
Suppose, for example, that the relative values of 
respondents corresponded exactly to the way in which 
we had priced all of the alternative positions. It 
would not matter to those respondents which of the 
many combinations they chose as their optimum, since 
each one would provide them with an identical level 
of satisfaction. In indifference curve terms, each 
of the combinations would appear on the same curve (or 
plane) (p. 46).23
The implementation of the probability approach involves the calculation 
of the number of times a particular level of a good would occur, 
given an equal probability for all choices - the "expected frequency" - 
and comparing this with the number of times the level is chosen 
by a large sample of respondents - the observed frequency. If the
22 Pendse and Wyckoff (1974b) assign prices to alternative 
environmental amenities and dis-amenities associated with 
an on campus land allocation decision according to their 
costs of supply,and use the ratio of existing situation to 
prefered choice allocations of the PET budget to provide 
insight into the preference structure of the campus community. 
No direct valuation of goods was undertaken,but the magnitude 
of trade-offs between preferences was assessed.
23 Pendse and Wyckoff (1976) interpret the equality of relative
values and prices in a similar way: ' I f  the given prices
perfectly reflected a respondent's willingness to pay, he 
would be indifferent to the mix of environmental factors 
preferred since each combination would provide him an identical 
level of satisfaction. This would imply that each combination 
is from the same indifference curve' (p. 926).
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ratio of observed to expected frequency for a particular level 
of a good is greater than one, then i t  can be concluded under 
Hoinville's approach, that the attached price is below the mean 
value which is held by the sample for that level, and i f  the 
ratio is less than one, then the price is greater than the mean 
value.
Hoinville (1971) did not undertake an iterative pricing experiment
and merely reports the observed to expected ratios,  commenting on
the movement necessary to equate the prices with the groups
average willingness to pay. Pendse and Wyckoff (1976) applied
Hoinville's suggestion by creating a set of "optimum" prices for
each level of each good affected by the construction of a dam in
Oregon; however these prices are not the result of subsequent
surveys but are merely the suggestions of the authors, based on the
init ial  observed:expected ratio. Pendse and Wyckoff use their
so-established willingness to pay results to compare preferences
in an ordinal sense - 'the value respondents placed on flood control
($1.27 for Situation III) was alone greater than the combined
value of Situation III of all other variables' (p. 928) - and
25calculate the total willingness to pay, net of total cost, for
24 $1.27 is the "price" for situation III of flood control - a 
dam is constructed and floods are completely eliminated - 
and is to be compared with the budget to be allocated by 
respondents of $2.
25 The total cost for each situation, is the summation across 
all goods, of the prices which were originally assigned to 
those goods because the basis for these original prices 
were the costs of achieving that situation in each good.
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each situation so that conclusions could be drawn on overall 
preferences for the three situations - willingness to pay only 
exceeded costs of provision for Situation II, the no-dam but modified 
environment scenario.
O'Hanlon and Sinden (1978) employed PET specifically to 
evaluate the benefits of non-marketed goods in the context of a
26benefit-cost analysis of a proposed National Park in northern N.S.W.
Like Pendse and Wyckoff (1976),they established and described to
respondents, three situations - A, more preservation, i . e . ,  the
park, B, the existing situation, and C, more development - over
five variables, or goods - livestock output, mining output, knowledge
of the presence of a number of species, probability of seeing a
species,and naturalness of recreation areas. Mean optimal prices
were established using PET and the differences between the prices
for situations A and B for each variable were calculated and summed:
this total was interpreted as the increase in marginal ut i l i ty  - or
willingness to pay - which would be gained by a representative
27family visiting the proposed park. By multiplying this figure, 
$12.50, by the estimated number of family visi ts to the area per 
year, a total per annum benefit of park establishment was calculated:
26 O'Hanlon and Sinden (1978) include several innovations in the 
use of PET. Pilot samples were used to establish approximate 
prices before the more expensive full scale iterative sequence 
of price modification were carried out,and Chi-square stat ist ical  
analyses of the significance of the difference between observed 
and expected frequencies were introduced.
27 A direct interpretation of value was possible because the budget
used in the PET analysis was an estimation of the actual maximum 
marginal cost which would be faced by a family visiting the park 
area. Where an actual budget is not used, i t  may be possible to 
peg prices to an established marginal ut i l i ty:  see Sinden and
O'Hanlon (1976) and Sinden and Worrell (1979).
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p o
$510,600.
PET has a number of problems which l im i t  its  usefulness, but 
more importantly,there appears to be some confusion regarding the 
theoretical interpretation of the technique. These problems 
wil l  now be reviewed.
The l imitat ion of the choice provided by PET to three 
discrete situations - as has been the case in a l l  applications 
reviewed - may be a source of d i f f i c u l ty  i f  f iner  decisions of 
resource allocation are to be addressed. However, i t  seems feasible  
to a l te r  the structure of the similation technique to include more 
intermediate levels: while this would increase the complexity
of the choice facing the respondent and the magnitude of the 
calculating task facing the analyst, i t  may be important in certain 
circumstances to ensure a more r e a l is t ic  portrayal of the decision 
context.
The choice problem confronting individuals is made more 
a r t i f i c i a l  by the "rule" specified by Hoinvil le (1971), and implemented 
by a ll  subsequent case studies: ' ( the respondent) . . .  must spend
al l  the money available (except in special circumstances which 
arise as a result of the discrete nature of choices)1 (p. 43).
Forcing an allocation of the total budget neglects to account for 
the possib i l i ty  that a respondent may prefer to consume goods not 
included in the PET simulation. Sinden and Worrell (1979) recognize 
this d i f f i c u l ty  and suggest that 'a dummy factor for "all  other goods" 
could be inserted. Subjects would then have an opportunity to 
spend the budget on other things and truer responses might be e l i c i t e d 1 
(p. 329).
28 I t  is im pl ic i t ly  assumed by O'Hanlon and Sinden (1978) that 
no increase in v is i ta t ion .to the park wi l l  result from the 
increased benefit derived by society from the creation of 
the park and the associated increase in naturalness.
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Hoinville (1971) suggests that a major problem of PET 
occurs when individuals converge on the same preferred choices but 
from widely different existing positions: because of the widely 
differing starting points, the overall direction of the change in 
prices required to achieve the optimum cannot be identified by the 
ratio of observed to expected frequencies. O'Hanlon and Sinden 
(1978) sought to overcome this problem by subdividing their survey 
sample into sub-samples,grouped according to likely  perception of 
the problem: for example, members of a conservation organisation,
and a sample of farmers' sons.
As with the u t i l i t y  valuation technique, astute respondents 
could identify the possibility of overstating strategic behaviour 
when responding a PET questions - no counter incentives are provided 
by the mechanism of PET to overcome strategic bias beyond the
29remoteness of questioning relative to the problem being analysed.
The possibility of hypothetical bias - respondents do not deem i t  
worthwhile to consider carefully the hypothetical choices facing 
them and hence answer inaccurately - can be minimized using PET, 
as its simulation of the choice problem is provided at a low cost to 
respondents and may even be an enjoyable experience i f  presented 
well: all studies undertaken have indicated that most respondents
could understand the questions easily and enjoyed the interview.
The interpretation of the optimum prices derived by PET can 
also cause some d i f f icu lty .  As mentioned previously, the optimal
29 Remoteness is not l ikely to be as successful in reducing 
strategic bias in the case of PET as i t  was suggested to 
be under the u t i l i t y  valuation method because the simulation 
provided by PET attempts to place the respondent in a 
real ist ic  choice situation closely reflecting the resource 
allocation choice being examined.
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price for a particular level of a good 'perfectly estimates marginal 
30u t i l i t y 1, but i t  is necessary to specify that the price, for
example, of five safe days of ai r  quality in Sinden and Worrell's
(1979) pollution control example of PET, is not the marginal
u t i l i ty  of the f i f th day,but rather the marginal ut i l i ty  of the
31bundle of five safe days. Using this interpretation, Sinden and 
Worrell state that ' the benefit . . .  of one safe day is $100, from 
three safe days is $600 and from five safe days is $800' (p. 328). 
Clearly, the marginal u t i l i ty  of the fourthand f if th safe days is 
$800 minus $600, that is,  $200 ,and the use of marginal ut i l i ty  to 
describe the $800 is somewhat misleading even though, given the 
appropriate interpretation, i t  is correct.
A further practical difficulty of PET is the cost of 
obtaining benefit measurements. The simulation procedure involves 
an ini t ial  expense in terms of assembling and presenting information 
on the alternative levels of the goods involved,followed by the 
expense of lengthy personal interviews which must be repeated until 
no significant differences exist between observed and expected 
frequencies.
Finally, i t  must be noted that during the course of PET's 
development from a method used for comparing the strength of 
individuals'  preferences to one which produces dollar valuations 
of non-marketed benefits, there has arisen some confusion regarding 
the interpretation of the technique's theoretical basis. Hoinville's
30 O'Hanlon and Sinden (1978), p. 381.
31 That is,  the willingness to pay for five safe days.
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(1971) o r ig ina l  Statement that ' ( i f )  . . .  the re la t ive  values of 
respondents corresponded exactly to the way in which we had priced 
a l l  of the a l te rna t ive  posit ions . . .  (then) . . .  i t  would not matter 
to those respondents which of the many combinations they choose 
as th e i r  optimum' (p. 46) is true because once the respondent has 
to pay his maximum wil l ingness to pay fo r  a l l  o f  the a l te rnat ive 
posit ions then a l l  combination of those posit ions w i l l  y ie ld  a 
zero surplus. In other words, a f te r  payment, respondents would be 
in d i f fe re n t  between combinations. However th is  does not imply 
that 'each of the combinations would appear on the same (ind i f ference) 
curve' as suggested by Hoinv i l le  (1971) and by Pendse and Wyckoff 
(1976), i f  the term ind if ference curve is interpreted in i t s  
t ra d i t ion a l  economic sense: c lea r ly ,  in our e a r l ie r  example
of  h yd ro -e le c t r ic i ty  and wilderness, a respondent w i l l  be ind i f fe re n t  
between the combination, to ta l  wilderness and f u l l  hydro development, 
and the combination, no wilderness and no hydro development, i f  
he is forced to pay his maximum wil l ingness to pay for  the f i r s t  
combination - no surplus w i l l  be gained from e i ther  option. However 
i f  we were able to map the respondent's indif ference surface fo r  
hydro development and wildnerness, the f i r s t  combination would almost 
ce r ta in ly  yield a higher u t i l i t y  than the second and would be un l ike ly  
to l i e  on the same ind if ference curve.
O'Hanlon and Sinden (1978) and Sinden and Worrell (1979) 
also appear to have mis interpreted the economic concept of 
ind if ference. Both studies in te rp re t  the condition of " ind i f fe rence" ,  
used by Ho inv i l le  (1971) as the basis fo r  the observed to expected 
ra t io  te s t ,  as being ind ica t ive of  the condit ion of equi l ibr ium in
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a perfectly competitive market: that is,  the ratio of prices,
Px-p^ , for the two goods X and Y, is equal to the marginal rate of 
substitution between the two goods, or in graphical terms, the 
point of tangency between the budget line and the indifference curve. 
Sinden and Worrell (1979) continue: 'At this point this individual
will be indifferent to further trade-offs among goods 1 to n . . .
(X and Y in this two good example)' (p. 325). Clearly, the individual 
is not indifferent to further trade-offs,  because the combination 
of goods represented by the point of tangency is the most prefered 
combination of all those available to the individual - the points 
along the budget line. The confusion in the theoretical basis of 
PET has resulted from a misinterpretation of the indifference 
characteristic which is the central feature of PET.
While i t  is true that the apparent misinterpretation of PET's 
theoretical base by Pendse and Wyckoff (1976), O'Hanlon and Sinden 
(1978) and Sinden and Worrell (1979) has resulted in some confusion 
as to the way in which PET achieves the valuations of non-marketed 
benefi ts , i t  appears that the results obtained from these studies 
are soundly based, given Hoinville's (1971) exposition of the technique. 
However, in using the results of PET i t  is important to realize 
that unless a combination of zero levels of all goods is available 
to respondents then values obtained by PET are purely relative.
Hence»while O'Hanlon and Sinden (1978) are just ified in concluding that 
their Situation A is preferable to Situation B by $12.50 per respondent, 
i t  would not be correct to use the $30.50 total price for Situation 
A as a measure of total surplus gained from a park environment.
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PET has been successfully used on several occasions to 
provide information relevant to decisions involving the allocation 
of non-marketed goods. It has the advantage of being able to 
force respondents to consider the trade-offs which must be made in 
any valuation context,and despite some confusion amongst i ts  users 
as to the theoretical just ification of i ts use, PET has produced 
meaningful relative value measurements. However, like the ut i l i ty  
valuation method, PET is time consuming and costly in i ts operation 
and therefore cannot be regarded as a valuation method which is 
suitable for wide spread application. In addition, the technique 
does not involve any intrinsic anti-strategic-behaviour safeguard 
and the astute respondent would find i t  relatively easy to provide 
information to bias the results obtained by PET, especially i f  the 
technique was used repeatedly and was well publicised.
Methods which are more suited to large scale implementation 
rely largely on more direct questioning of respondents and the next 
sub-section reviews one such technique - the iterative bidding 
method. Again, however, the possibility of bias is not directly 
addressed by the technique.
2.5.3 The Iterative Bidding Method (IBM)
Earlier in this chapter i t  was shown that in certain 
circumstances, valuation of the benefits of non-marketed goods 
through relationships with marketed goods is extremely difficult  
and unlikely to produce accurate estimates. Furthermore, in the 
current section of this chapter, the hypothetical valuation techniques
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reviewed - the u t i l i ty  valuation method and the priority evaluator 
technique - have been shown to be relatively costly to operate, 
without any particular guarantee against strategic or hypothetical 
bias,and in the case of the ut i l i ty  valuation method, limited to 
use in special circumstances. The Iterative Bidding Method (IBM), 
a technique based on respondents being asked if  they are or are 
not willing to pay an iterative sequence of dollar amounts for the 
provision of a good, is able to overcome the problem of cost to 
some extent because of some reduction in questioning complexity, 
is soundly based in the theory of benefit measurement reviewed in 
Chapter 1, but cannot avoid the possibility of biased responses. 
Before analysing the bias problem in more detail i t  is useful to 
consider the theoretical basis of the technique and some examples 
of i ts  implementation.
The theoretical basis of the IBM is the Bradford bid curve - 
an "indifference curve" relating the non-marketed good, X, with a 
numeraire good, say income, Y, which passes through an origin 
corresponding to the individual's init ial  endowment of X and Y, given 
that the vertical axis indicates decreasing quantities of Y and the 
horizontal axis has increasing quantities of good X. An example 
of a Bradford bid curve is i l lustrated in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: A Bradford Bid Curve.
The Bradford bid curve is argued by Randall, Ives and Eastman (1974) 
to be better suited to the analysis of public good provision than 
tradit ional demand curves because 'the situation is not one of 
individuals responding to a parametric price per unit by choosing an 
appropriate number of units. Rather, the individual direct ly  arrives 
at the total value to himself of various given packages. In the 
case of a public good, the individual is unable to exercise any choice
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over the quantity provided' (p. 133). The interpretation of points 
on the Bradford bid curve is straightforward and readily interpreted 
in terms of the Hicksian surplus measures of welfare: i f  an individual
suffers a reduction in the level of provision of good X from X° to X" (in 
Figure 2.3), then he will be indifferent between that situation and 
his ini t ial  situation only i f  he receives Y°Y" compensation.
Similarly, i f  he enjoys increased provision of X from X° to X1 then 
he must pay Y°Y' to remain indifferent between his new level of 
provision and his original endowment. Quite clearly Y°Y" is the 
compensating surplus (willingness to accept) measure of the welfare 
loss associated with the fall in X from X° to X" ,and Y°Y' is the 
compensating surplus (willingness to pay) for the rise in X from X° 
to X'.
Y°Y' and Y°Y" are compensating surpluses because the welfare 
change is measured relative to the ini t ial  endowment of resources.
To analyse the equivalent surpluses, i t  is necessary to introduce 
another Bradford bid curve which has the combination of resources 
which occurs after the re-allocation as i ts origin because the equivalent 
measures of welfare change use the resultant resource endowment as 
a base. The equivalent surplus for a fall in the level of 
provision of X from X to X" is i l lustrated in Figure 2.4.
The new Bradford bid curve through X"Y° is B'B'. The amount 
that an individual would be required to pay to ensure his continued 
provision of X°, rather than the X" to which he has a "right",is 
Y°Y^ , the equivalent surplus: this is directly comparable with
Y°Y^ , the compensating surplus (willingness to accept compensation)
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3?for the same change in provision. '
Figure 2.4: The Equivalent Surplus of a Quantity Fall.
The Iterative Bidding Method (IBM) is designed to determine an 
estimate of each individual's bid curve so that the Hicksian surplus 
welfare measures can be calculated. Devised by Randall, Ives and 
Eastman (1974), the IBM has seen several subsequent applications,
32 Randall and Brookshire (1978) use the Randall and Stoll (1980)
result ,  which links the willingness to pay and accept compensation 
measures through e, the price f lexibi l i ty of income (see Chapter 1) 
for the non-marketed good,to show that both measures can be 
calculated from only one bid curve.
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which will be reviewed later in this sub-section, and has been 
incorporated into the U.S. Federal Register as an appropriate 
technique for evaluating the non-market benefits of water resource 
developments. * In some ways ,the IBM is similar to PET: three 
alternative levels of a non-marketed good are simulated using 
photographs or drawings to establish a uniform perception across 
respondents of three points on the horizontal axis of the bid curve 
map. However, the method used to derive willingness to pay is more 
direct: respondents are asked their willingness to pay for each
level of provision via some mode of payment - such as a u t i l i ty  charge 
or entrance fee - through an iterative bidding sequence. The 
interviewer asks the respondent i f  he is willing to pay a certain 
amount,known as the starting point: i f  the response is "yes" then
the "bid" is raised by a fixed amount iteratively until the respondent 
answers "no". If the answer is in i t ia l ly  "no", a reverse procedure 
is adopted. The respondent's willingness to pay is taken as the last 
(or f i r s t ,  in the case of a decreasing iterative sequence of bids) 
bid which is accepted. In effect a hypothetical market situation 
is established: buyers (respondents) respond to the se l ler 's  best
offer (the bid sequence) by either acceptance or rejection. No 
ar t if ic ia l  budget is established as occurs in the PET, and respondents 
allocate resources - albeit hypothetically - from their real
33 See United States Government (1979).
34 Randall, Ives and Eastman (1974) originated the use of an 
iterative bidding sequence in the context of compensating surplus 
measurement. However, Davis (reported in Knetsch and Davis (1966)) 
had previously used an iterative bidding format in questions 
designed to derive a demand curve for recreation benefits.
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3 5budget, to pay fo r  th e i r  bid.
The appl icat ions of  the IBM are varied, ind icating the 
v e r s a t i l i t y  of  the technique. Randall, Ives and Eastmans' (1974) 
o r ig ina l  work centred on the aesthetic environmental damage caused 
by the Four Corners power plant and Navojo mine in New Mexico: 
respondents were asked th e i r  wi l l ingness to pay fo r  improvements 
in the aesthetic qua l i ty  of the area through the payment modes of 
a sales tax, th e i r  e l e c t r i c i t y  b i l l  and the fee paid by recreation 
area users. Brookshire, Ives and Schulze (1976) used a s im i lar  
format in t h e i r  study of  the aesthetic damage expected to fol low the 
construction of  the Kaiparowits power plant near Lake Powell on 
the Colorado River. The most comprehensive study so fa r  attempted 
is outl ined in Randall and Brookshire (1978) and Brookshire,
Randall and Sto l l  (1980): th is  analysis gathered information through
the IBM on ' the value of  indiv idual species to hunters, fishermen, 
observers and nature lovers. The value of  a whole ecosystem to the 
above groups and those interested only in knowing that ecosystems 
are being maintained; the option value of individual species to hunters; 
and the inf luence on a l l  of the above values of  te r ra in ,  vegetation, 
w i l d l i f e  populations and congestion of hunters and observers'
(Randall and Brookshire (1978), pp. 18-19) Randall, Grünewald,
Johnson, Ausness and Pagoulatos (1978) calculated the asesthetic
35 Randall (1980b) suggests that with advancing computer
technology i t  may become possible to ask respondents to provide 
a summary of  t h e i r  budget and using that as a base, the e f fec t  
of varying wil l ingness to pay bids on other expenditures in 
the budget could be examined by the respondent so that more 
r e a l i s t i c  estimates of maximum wil l ingness to pay could be 
estimated. Such a process may not be worthwhile in 
circumstances where respondents' bids represent very small 
fract ions o f  th e i r  to ta l  budget.
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benefits of reclaiming coal surface mines in Central Appalachia 
using the IBM as an input into an overall benefit-cost analysis 
of reclamation. Finally, the poss ib ility  of linking physical data 
on the non-marketed good (or bad) with the valuation mechanism has 
been pioneered by Rowe, d'Arge and Brookshire (1980) in an IBM 
study of v is ib i l i t y  in the Four Corners Region of southwest United 
States.
Criticism of the IBM has centred on the possib ility  of bias 
created by five sources:
( i )  Strategic Behaviour. There are many variations on 
the basic notion of strategic bias arising primarily as a result 
of varying techniques of questioning and varying assumptions made 
regarding the behaviour of respondents,but only the three most 
widespread variants w il l  be reviewed. F irs t, i f  i t  is assumed 
that respondents believe that the ir individual responses to the 
questioning procedure w il l  have no policy implications,and that 
they w il l  be forced to pay the amount they bid, then the incentive 
is to under-state their true preferences - the classic free-rider 
response. Secondly, i f  i t  is assumed that respondents believe that 
the ir responses are relevant to policy and that they w ill never have 
to pay anything for the provision of the good in question, then 
over-statement of true preferences is the appropriate strategic 
behaviour. Finally, i f  respondents are informed that they w il l  be 
required to pay the mean bid calculated over a ll respondents,and 
i t  is assumed that respondents consider that this collection w ill 
eventually take place (and this involves an assumption that 
respondents believe the ir responses have policy implications) then i f  
individuals have willingness to pay which exceed the ir expectations
80
of the mean bid then the strategic response is to over-state their  
preferences. However i f  individuals have willingness to pay which are 
less than the ir  expectations of the mean bid then they would be expected 
to under-state the ir  preferences, i f  strategic behaviour was being 
undertaken by respondents. The second and third variants of the 
strategic behaviour concept have been most widely used as crit icisms 
of the IBM,but i t  is clear that of these, the general over-statement 
case is potentia lly  the most serious, because i t  results in the 
consistent upward bias of results.
( i i )  Hypothetical Response. Where i t  is assumed that 
respondents do not consider the ir  bids to be relevant to the policy 
formulation process, hypothetical response - the inaccurate 
statement of willingness to pay in respondents' bids caused by a 
lack of incentive to consider the ir  true preferences - may result.  
Clearly, hypothetical and strategic bias are mutually exclusive
on an individual basis,and i t  would be re a l is t ic  to assume that 
hypothetical bias would create a random disturbance to the 
distr ibut ion of bids rather than a consistent bias in one direction.
( i i i )  The Choice of Starting Point. The IBM is based on 
interviewers suggesting an in i t i a l  bid, or starting point, to
respondents,from which the i te ra t ive  sequence of price changes 
procedes. I f  the starting point influences respondents to change 
the ir  willingness to pay, then starting point bias is said to occur: 
for instance, i f  a respondent's true willingness to pay is $100 and 
the starting point is $1,a re-assessment of valuation may occur to
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accommodate the "expectation" of the interviewer as indicated by the 
starting point. However, the direction of the bias may be neutral 
i f  a starting point which is close to the mean bid is chosen - in 
this case, starting point bias would have the effect of compressing 
the bid distribution.
( iv) Respondent Fatigue. Closely allied to starting point 
bias is the bias which results from respondents becoming bored 
with the iterative process - i f  the starting point is $1 and the 
iterations are based on 50t increases/decreases,then the respondent 
with a $100 willingness to pay may become tired of waiting for 
the interviewer to reach that value. Again, setting the starting 
point is crucial to the reduction of fatigue bias, but even i f  the 
starting point does approximate the mean bid, compression of the 
distribution would s t i l l  result.
(v) Payment Mode Choice. The IBM involves respondents 
being asked their willingness to pay for varying levels of a public 
good through a payment mode such as a sales tax or a surcharge on 
elect r ic i ty or water rates. If a respondent has a particular 
dislike,or l ike,for the payment mode chosen, a bias in revealed 
willingness to pay may result.  A generalized direction of the bias 
cannot be determined,but cross-questioning of respondents may 
reveal obvious cases of payment mode bias in individual case
studies.
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Some analyses of these possible bias sources have been 
carried out in an attempt to justify the use of the IBM. Randall 
and Brookshire (1978), Randall e t  al .  (1978) and Brookshire et  al.
(1976) all carried out s ta tis t ica l  tests to determine if  the mean 
willingness to pay of respondents varies significantly across 
alternative payment modes,and all report that no bias could be 
established. The same studies also examined the possibility of 
starting point bias: for instance, Randall and Brookshire (1978)
used a range of starting points for the iterative bidding sequence - 
$25, $75 and $200 - but could find no significant difference between 
the mean willingness to pay bids of each group of respondents 
provided with the different starting points. Rowe e t  al. (1980) 
however, report results which do indicate a relationship between bid 
magnitude and starting point.
Hypothetical and strategic biases are more difficult  to 
detect. Brookshire, Ives and Schulze (1976) tested for strategic 
bias by examining the spread, or variance, of the distribution of 
bids, under the hypothesis that i f  strategic bias was present in 
their results - which were responses to the payment-of-mean-bid type 
question - then there would be a wide spread of bids with 'a large 
number of zero and extremely high bids' (p. 340). They observed 
that the distribution of bids had a relatively low variance and that 
'the results of the survey . . .  do not lead to the conclusion that
36 Randall (1980b) suggests that starting point bias may be a 
result of hypothetical bias when the good under examination 
involves a concept which may be unfamiliar to respondents: the
more nebulous the good, the more likely i t  will be for respondents 
to reject the option of examining their preferences carefully 
and take the starting point as a guide to an "appropriate" bid.
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Strategie behaviour was prevalent among the recreators interviewed 
at Lake Powell' (p. 340). Although useful, the distribution spread 
test  is not an absolute indicator of the absence of strategic bias - 
as Brookshire e t  al .  (1976) point out, ' there is no mechanism to 
query a $10 bid or the legitimate zero bid' (p. 340)»but in addition 
i t  must be noted that the action of the starting point and respondent 
fatigue biases may act to decrease, a r t i f ic ia l ly ,  the variance of bids. 
Randall and Brookshire (1978) go further in testing for strategic 
bias by introducing a Clarke tax format into the IBM designed
37explicitly to overcome the incentive to behave strategically.
However, they report quantitatively similar results for the standard 
and Clarke tax formats»but note a marked increase in the non-response 
rate to the Clarke tax format due primarily to the increased 
difficulty in comprehension of the more complex questions. Rowe 
e t  al .  (1980), who also usedthe payment-of-mean-bid approach, tested 
for strategic bias by informing a sub-sample of respondents before 
they bid,of a hypothetical mean of all other respondents' bids and
3 8then checking i f  respondents who wereclassified as "environmentalists" 
increasedtheir bid,or i f  "developers" decreasedtheir bid in an effort 
to 'impose their preferences by altering the overall mean' (p. 15).
Their results suggest that no strategic bias was present in the 
sample,once bids greater than ten standard deviations from the mean, 
and bids equal to zero where cross-questioning indicated obvious 
strategic bias, were deleted. In a further stage of this analysis
3 7 A full description of the Clarke tax method of overcoming 
strategic bias is provided in Chapter 3.
38 The classification was determined through questioning on 
respondents' environmental stance.
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Rowe et d l ,  provided another sub-sample of respondents with 
information that suggested their stated bid 'as an overall mean, 
was not sufficient and were asked to revise their bid1 (p. 9).
This technique is similar to the Smith Auction Process39 which is 
designed to overcome the problem of strategic behaviour, when 
applied to a variable price but constant quantity situation. The 
results from this further stage also indicate that strategic bias 
is not a problem - one third of the 73 respondents provided with 
information, post-bid, revised their bids, but the overall revised 
bid, made under the threat of exclusion, was not significantly greater 
than the original overall bid. I t  must be noted however, that 
when the bids of respondents who were presented with pre-bid 
information are compared with the bids of those who were given no 
indication of the mean of the other respondents' bids, a 
significant difference of $1.70 per month is observed: those with
information bid $1.70 per month less than those without information. 
Rowe et al .  (1980) concludes that ' i f  the individual is given 
sufficient information and their  true bid exceeds the stated mean 
bid, they i l lustrate  a form of the classical free-rider behaviour 
by bidding less than their  maximum willingness to pay' (p. 14).
Rowe et a l .  admit that the formal structure of the IBM does not 
provide the type of information they provide to induce this 
"free-riding" and Randall (1980c) interprets the Rowe et al .  results 
as providing an example of what can be avoided i f  survey designs 
are adequately pre-tested.
39 A full description of the Smith process is provided in 
Chapter 3.
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Other evidence presented to refute the possibility of the 
occurrence of both strategic and hypothetical bias is Randall 
and Brookshires' (1978) use of psychological findings. They quote 
Ajzen and Fishbeins' conclusions that behavioural intention and 
actual behaviour correspond when the action's context, target and 
time frame also correspond. The IBM's main problem lies in providing 
context reality,  because there are situations when i t  is not 
possible to represent the real world policy context real ist ical ly 
in the bidding format.- This would seem to be a legitimate constraint 
on the variety of situations in which the IBM can be used. However, 
within this limitation, psychological evidence used by Randall 
and Brookshire (1978) suggests that 'most people, when confronted 
with well designed data collection instruments and competent 
enumerators (where data is collected in face-to-face situations) 
respond sincerely and accurately; truth telling is preferred to 
prevarication by the vast majority of people, unless truth tell ing 
entails significantly greater costs'  (p. 15). These findings are 
by no means unchallenged: Bishop and Heberlein (1979)
quote the psychologists Schuman and Johnson, who reviewed 150 studies 
on the relationships between attitudes and behaviour in 1976, finding 
that 'the correlations between attitudes and actual behaviour are 
usually so low that they will not " . . .  support the substitution 
of measured attitude for behaviour . . . " .  In other words, i t  may 
not be safe to assume as economists applying (Hypothetical Valuation) 
techniques do, that what people say is what they would actually do' 
(p. 927).
Randall (1980b) suggests that strategic bias may become 
more prevalent as the use of IBM becomes more widespread - as
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ind iv iduals learn about the re la t ionship  between theirresponses
to the IBM and the outcome of pol icy de c is ions , i t  would be expected
that the incentive to behave s t ra te g ic a l l y  would be recognized
by more people. The balance between stra teg ic  and hypothetical
bias can also be affected by the interviewer:  fo r  instance, i f
wi l l ingness to pay questions concerning the provision of natural
areas are asked by members of the National Parks and W i ld l i fe  Service,
i t  would be reasonable to expect a higher level of s trategic bias
than i f  the interviewers were students. However, hypothetical bias would
be expected to be more important when students are used as interviewers.
One fu r the r  problem has become evident in a number o f  the
IBM implementations - the dif ferences between the wil l ingness to
pay (WTP) and the wil l ingness to accept (WTA) measures of the same
change in resource a l loca t ion  have been found to be greater than
the dif ferences which would be expected given the Randall and Sto l l  (1980)
resu l t  outl ined in Chapter 1. Meyer (1979) presents the ra t ios  of
WTA:WTP observed by a number o f  studies which have asked sub-samples
of t h e i r  respondents the two d i f fe re n t  questions - th is  ra t io  has
varied from 3:1 to as high as 20:1. Randall and Brookshire (1978)
suggest that when questions centre on the evaluation of a reduction
in publ ic good provis ion, the existence of a greater than expected
difference between WTP and WTA may be due to a lack of context
r e a l i t y  in the case of  WTA questions: large proportions of respondents
appear to have been unable to express th e i r  preferences in terms of
40a wil l ingness to accept compensation. They note however that i f
AO The typical response of these respondents is to state that 
no compensation would be s u f f i c ie n t  to o f fse t  the loss of 
the non-marketed good.
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the problems of WTA questioning are avoided by asking WTP questions, 
using the Randall and Stoll result to justify the validity of the 
measurement, the shift in property right vestment from the s ta tu s  
quo under WTA (the compensating surplus),to the post-change allocation 
under WTP (the equivalent surplus),may also create context-reality 
problems: i f  a respondent has an expectation that his property
right lies in the s t a t u s  quo, the WTP questioning may result in an 
inability to answer the question, the registration of a protest 
vote of a zero dollar,or at least substantially under-stated bid.
Rowe e t  a l .  (1980) introduce the property right issue as 
a reason for the WTA/WTP differential but believe that, in their 
pollution abatement context, the WTA question was answered with 
over-statements because respondents rejected the concept of'"being 
bought off to permit pollution"' (p. 9). The problem of respondents 
under-stating in WTP questioning because the WTP question implies a 
"victim pays" principle, as is suggested by Randall and Brookshire 
(1978), is not considered. The Rowe e t  a l .  (1980) analysis also 
uses the income limitation which occurs in the case of the WTP measure 
to explain the WTP/WTA differential: they suggest that WTP ranges 
'from zero to possibly 10% of income while CS . . .  (i .e.  WTA) . . .  
values may be any non zero number' (p. 8). Therefore, while Randall 
and Brookshire (1978) are inconclusive in their assessment of 
the WTP and WTA alternatives, advising only that the questioning 
which provides the highest degree of context reality is the most 
appropriate, Rowe e t  a l .  (1980) are more definite, possibly because 
their econometric analysis of bids was most successful when only
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those respondents who answered the wil l ingness to pay questions 
were included.
Summarizing the IBM, i t  is c lear that the technique is well 
establ ished, p rac t ica l ,  versati le ,and with an appropriate theoretical 
base. However, i t  is not at a l l  clear that the various possible 
biases inherent in the IBM are in s ig n i f i c a n t .  Even where the 
requirement of  context r e a l i t y  is s a t is f ie d ,  s t ra teg ic  bias and 
hypothetical bias are un l ike ly  to be both el iminated. In addit ion, 
the t rade -o f f  between the context r e a l i t y  of asking wil l ingness to 
pay questions,and the context r e a l i t y  of maintaining the s ta tu s  
quo as the accepted property r ig h t  a l loca t ion  ( in the case of a 
reduction in supply of the non-marketed good), is not c lea r ly  defined.
2.5.4 Direct Questioning
The p o s s ib i l i t y  of biases resu l t ing  from the analyst 's  choice
of s ta r t ing  point and the i te ra t iv e  sequence of  price changes - the
s ta r t ing  point and respondent fat igue biases - can be el iminated
by al lowing respondents to name d i re c t l y  th e i r  own s ta r t ing  point:
that  is the d i rec t  questioning of  respondents' wi l l ingness to pay
41
or wi l l ingness to accept. Direct questioning also has the 
advantages of s im p l ic i ty  in implementation and hence a low cost of 
operation, p a r t i c u la r l y  as i t  is adaptable to a mail questionnaire 
format. As a re su l t ,  the technique has enjoyed widespread appl icat ion 
Erskin (1972) reviews the resul ts  of d i rec t  questioning in American
41 This suggestion has been advanced by Rowe e t  a l .  (1980) along 
with the concept of  al lowing respondents to choose th e i r  
preferred payment mode: 'Perhaps some of  these problems
may be subverted by al lowing respondents to choose th e i r  
own i n i t i a l  bid and type of payment' (p. 4).
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public opinion polls used to evaluate the benefits of reduced 
pollution, Ridker (1967) analysed respondents' valuations of 
soot reduction by directly asking for their willingness to pay, 
and Hammock and Brown (1974) usedthe method to estimate the 
consirier's surpluses of waterfowl hunters.^ However, the problems 
of strategic, hypothetical and payment mode bias which were 
described in the analysis of the IBM also apply to the direct 
questioning method. In fact, Randall (1980b) argues that bias is 
likely to be larger when direct questions are used,primarily 
because respondents are not given a period in which to establish 
their valuation - he likens responses to the direct questioning 
method to the volatile reaction observed when consumers are f i r s t  
confronted with a new good, a new market or a price change. 
Randall's hypothesis is supported somewhat by the results of a 
comparison of willingness to pay and accept estimates from direct 
questions,against the amounts respondent hunters would actually 
accept to forego their season of good hunting,carried out by Bishop 
and Heberlein(1979). They found that from the actual cash offers, 
the mean surplus per permit was $63,but from the willingness to 
pay questions, the same surplus was estimated to be only $21,and 
the comparable willingness to accept figure was $101. Clearly 
the incentive to over-state preferences was not recognized by most 
goose hunters responding to the willingness to pay question, and
42 Blomquist (1979) uses direct questioning to measure the 
benefits received by respondents from a water pollution 
reduction scheme. A more complete outline of this study 
is provided in Chapter 3.
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43considerable under-stating has taken place, perhaps as a
precaution against the possibility of collection of the amount
44bid at some time in the future. Equally, with the possibility 
of having to pay their stated bid in the future replaced by a 
possibilty of receiving cash, respondents were quick to 
recognize the incentive to over-state their  preferences. The 
difference observed between WTP and WTA bids also i l lustrates 
that the trade-off between context reality from the payment approach 
and the context real i ty of the status quo assignment of property 
rights,which must be made when a reduction in the level of provision 
is being analysed by the IBM,must also be made when the same 
circumstance is being analysed by the direct questioning method.
It must be concluded that if  respondents are contemplating 
strategic behaviour,they are more likely to distort  their  revealed 
preference when answering direct questions than when responding
43 i t  should also be recognized that the $63 actual cash offer
represents a willingness to accept compensation whereas the 
$21 is a willingness to pay. Bishop and Hebelein (1979) 
just ify the comparison by referring to Willig's result outlined 
in Chapter 1: WTA, WTP and consumer's surplus are equivalent in
most circumstances, particularly when the surplus forms only a 
small part of the respondent's total budget. Bishop and 
Heberlein (1979) also note that there may be some difficulty in 
assuming that the actual cash offer represents a respondent^ true 
valuation - 'although the market we created for goose permits used 
real money, i t  was s t i l l  highly ar t i f ic ial  and may include biases of 
i ts own' (p. 929). Randall (1980b) also notes that respondents
may have viewed the actual cash offers sceptically because i t  
is illegal in Wisconson to retrade goose permits.
44 Bishop and Heberlein (1979) do not specify their hypothetical 
valuation questioning procedure or the scenario in which the 
questions were put and whilst i t  is possible to infer that
the questioning was direct because of the use of mail questionnaires, 
i t  is diff icul t  to conclude i f  respondents did realize that no 
payment would be required: the use of mail questionnaires makes
i t  diff icul t  to determine respondents' reactions to hypothetical 
questions.
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to any of  the other hypothetical valuation techniques. Therefore, 
i t  is even more important to establ ish the extent of any bias in 
d i rect  questioning response before they can be used with confidence 
in a po l icy formulat ion role.
2.6 CONCLUSIONS
Where re l ia b le  data is avai lable on the markets of spe c i f ica l ly  
related goods which are operating e f f i c i e n t l y ,  then the value 
of a non-marketed good can be estimated, re la t i v e ly  accurately, using 
the Marshall ian concept of welfare measurement, the consumer's 
surplus5and in certain circumstances using the appropriate areas 
under derived Hicksian demand curves. However,in many cases, 
non-marketed goods do not have marketed goods which are related in 
a weakly separable fashion, or i f  such goods do ex is t ,  i t  is often 
the case that th e i r  markets are d is tor ted and information concerning 
demand and supply fo r  the related good is not p a r t i c u la r ly  useful:  
in these circumstances non-market methods must be employed to carry out 
the valuation.  The non-market or hypothetical valuation methods tend to 
concentrate on the income equivalent versions of  the Hicksian concepts of 
welfare measurement by asking,in varying ways,for respondents' wi l l ingness 
to pay or accept compensation fo r  the change in the level of 
provision of the non-marketed good. Of the hypothetical valuation 
techniques reviewed, only the i te ra t iv e  bidding method and the 
d i rec t  questioning method (as a s im p l i f i ca t ion  o f  the IBM) are 
considered adequate from both the theore tical  and the cost-effect iveness 
viewpoints. The u t i l i t y  valuation method was shown to be appl icable 
only in a re s t r ic ted  set of  circumstances and to be time consuming,
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and hence costly, in its operation, and while the priority evaluator
technique is capable of providing marginal value information, despite
some misunderstanding regarding its theoretical basis, i t  is
also costly to implement on a large scale. In addition, neither
of these methods can be regarded as being immune from the possibility
of strategic or hypothetical bias, although the complexity of
the relationship between individual response and policy decision
may be a factor which would cause a reduction in strategic behaviour. The
iterative bidding method is theoretically subject to strategic, hypothetical
starting point, respondent fatigue and payment mode biases,but the
studies reviewed which consider these biases have been inconclusive.
The direct questioning technique is able to overcome the starting 
point and respondent fatigue biases but may well be subject to 
more severe strategic bias. I t  seems ,therefore,that Sinden and 
Worrell's (1979) suggestion that the method used for measuring the 
benefits of a non-marketed good must be chosen with great care and
45with the situation under study specifically in mind, is appropriate 
the choice between the iterative bidding method and the direct 
questioning technique being based on the trade-off between the cost 
advantage, questioning simplicity, and freedom from starting point 
and respondent fatigue bias provided by the direct questioning ,and 
any lessening of the strategic/hypothetical bias which may be faci l i ta ted  
by the iterations of bidding provided by the IBM.
45 Sinden and Worrell (1979) undertake a comparison of the
methods of estimating monetary values they review (see Table 
14.1, pp. 308-309) but they draw no firm conclusions. However 
i t  must be noted that the relevance of their results is 
limited because their  data base is small - the surveys 
undertaken involved only ten respondents.
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The role of strategic behaviour as a major determinant of 
the usefulness of both the iterative bidding and direct questioning 
methods has been emphasised in this chapter. Because of the 
importance of strategic bias, the following chapter is devoted to 
a consideration of this topic, involving f i r s t  a study of the 
real i t ies  of strategic behaviour, and secondly, a review of 
mechanisms designed to ensure that respondents truthfully reveal 
their preferences, both from a theoretical and a practical perspective.
CHAPTER 3
STRATEGIC BIAS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
I t  was concluded in Chapter 2 tha t  the evaluat ion o f  non- 
marketed benef i ts  through the use o f  techniques which re ly  on 
information generated by the markets fo r  other goods may not 
always be possib le. Only when the non-marketed good is  re la ted 
to another good so th a t  the i n d i v id u a l ' s  u t i l i t y  funct ion is  
weakly separable and when the market f o r  the re la ted  good is  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  free from d is t o r t i o n  to provide information which can 
be used to ca lcu la te  shadow prices,can va luat ion through the 
re la ted  good be achieved. In cases which do not s a t i s f y  these 
cond i t ions ,  i t  was concluded th a t  the use o f  hypothet ica l  va luat ion 
techniques, which re ly  on the establishment o f  cont ingent markets 
to generate information on the Hicksian surplus measures o f  
wel fare change discussed in Chapter 1, is  appropr ia te. Of the 
hypothet ica l  va lua t ion  or income equivalent techniques reviewed, 
only the i t e r a t i v e  bidding and d i re c t  quest ioning methods were 
regarded as being adequate from both the the o re t ica l  and cost- 
e ffec t iveness v iewpoints. However, it  was noted tha t  these methods 
have not received general acceptance, p r im a r i l y  because of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  respondents behaving s t r a t e g i c a l l y :  tha t  i s ,  over -s ta t ing
preferences when payment is  not requi red, under-s ta t ing when payment 
is  required, or attempting to a f f e c t  the mean bid by over- or under­
s ta t in g ,  according to the magnitude o f  respondents' bids r e la t i v e
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to the expected mean bid when payment of the mean bid is anticipated 
to result from the measurement exercise. However, empirical 
evidence from a number of case studies on the extent or existence 
of strategic bias collected during the implementation of the 
i terative bidding method has been inconclusive.
This chapter is aimed at extending the examination of 
strategic behaviour beyond the consideration of specific hypothetical 
valuation case studies carried out in Chapter 2. Because economists 
in the past have been interested primarily in the phenomena of 
free-riding as a cause for the under-supply of public goodsJ the 
emphasis of this chapter is on the under-stating aspects of strategic 
behaviour. However,the consideration of free-riding behaviour is 
able to provide important insight into the occurrence of over-stating 
strategic bias, the problem most likely to be encountered by 
hypothetical valuation techniques. Given that all strategic behaviour 
types are based on a common logic - the individual seeking to 
maximize his well-being in the setting of a public good allocation 
problem - and that all misrepresentations of preferences require 
individuals to reject the option of tell ing the truth, i t  is not 
unreasonable to assume that i f  free-riding has been observed in 
circumstances where i t  would be expected, then over-statement would 
be likely in circumstances to which i t  is appropriate. Hence the 
f i r s t  task undertaken by this chapter - a review of the real i t ies
1 McMillan (1979) summarizes the issue succinctly: 'since the
individual consumes the total quantity of public good supplied, 
i t  is in any individual's interest to understate the satisfaction 
he gains from consuming the public good, thereby only slightly 
reducing the quantity of public good supplied but significantly 
reducing his own tax burden. Everyone reasons in this way and 
the public good will be under-supplied. Thus arises a paradox: 
individually rational action leads to an outcome which is 
collectively irrational '  (p. 95).
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of the free-rider problem - can be used to supplement the evidence 
concerning the extent of other strategic behaviour types, which was 
presented in the examination of hypothetical valuation techniques 
carried out in the previous chapter.
Because sufficient evidence is not available to dismiss 
the prospect of free-riding specifically, and hence strategic behaviour 
generally, i t  is concluded that ideally, any hypothetical valuation 
method should involve a questioning format which ensures the 
truthful revelation of preferences by respondents. Providing such 
a format has been at the centre of the public finance l i terature 
for many years and new interest in an anti-free-riding mechanism 
has been stimulated by the discovery and re-discovery of a number 
of so-called "demand revealing processes" (DRP). Although the DRPs 
were largely init iated in response to the free-rider problem, their 
application has been demonstrated, at least in theory, to overcome 
both the over-statement and under-statement aspects of strategic 
behaviour. In Section 3.3 a review of the theoretical debate 
surrounding the various DRPs is provided, in addition to a brief 
description of each process. It is shown that the central issues 
of the debate have been the optimality and stabil i ty of each mechanism, 
and to further assess their sui tabil i ty,  a study of the empirical 
applications of the processes is undertaken in Section 3.4. It is 
found that while the studies reviewed suggest that the supposed 
instabil i ty of the equilibrium attained through the Groves and 
Ledyard mechanism and i ts derivative, the Smith Auction Process, is 
not a problem, the limitations of any DRP in a large scale 
questionnaire application become evident and again the severity of,
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or existence of,a free rider problem, in the type of scenario 
considered ,is found to be questionable. The conclusions, which 
are set out in Section 3.5,are therefore pessimistic with regard 
to the widespread operation of hypothetical valuation methods 
which incorporate DRPs, primarily because of log is tic  problems 
which substantially increase the cost of surveying and the in a b il i ty  
of many respondents to understand the complexity of the DRPs.
However,it is concluded that there is scope for the use of DRPs in small 
scale surveys ,and two applications are envisaged: f i r s t ,  where a
public good is supplied to only a small number of people, optimal 
provision and pricing may be established using DRPs; and secondly, 
the processes may be useful in back-up studies which are used to 
establish the approximate severity of strategic behaviour in large 
scale surveys which use hypothetical valuation methods, by testing 
representative sub-samples of respondents for truthfu l revelation 
of preferences.
3.2 THE REALITIES OF STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR
Doubt as to the severity of the free-rider problem in practical 
terms, has been raised by several economists. Leif Johansen (1977) 
specifica lly  addresses the issue of free-riding behaviour in a 
po li t ica l decision making context where elected representatives 
are involved, and concludes that a representative w il l  not free- 
ride on any issue for which his electorate has strong preferences 
because i t  is doubtful i f  individual voters would understand the 
rationale behind the ir representative's contradictory behaviour -
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the more po li t ica l sound option being to actively support the
issue. However Johansen also considers free-riding in a more general
context. Two factors are seen as reducing the prospect of strategic
behaviour; f i r s t ,  an extension of the principle of honesty beyond
any obvious incentive to te l l  the tru th ; and secondly, the
tendency for individuals to form groups within larger collectives,
creates a stronger interdependence between individuals than is
recognized by the free-rider theory. There is no formal empirical
evidence presented by Johansen to support these propositions, but
he does point to the lack of evidence of misrepresentation and
the adequate supply of public goods. However, i t  should be noted
that most of the public goods which are provided are not privately
provided and that the mechanism for funding such publicly provided
goods, taxation, must be made compulsory for i t  to operate effective ly
and even then i t  is openly subject to misrepresentation. Despite
this evidence on the whole community scale, other cases on a loca l-
community scale show fu l l  private provision: for example, Church
building,and park fa c i l i t y  provision are often carried out privately,
notwithstanding considerable free-riding by a large proportion of 
2the population.
2 Clearly, the size of the group making the decision regarding the 
supply of a public good is important: as numbers increase, the
effect of each individual's contribution on the overall level of 
provision decreases and the incentive to free-ride increases. Note 
also that as numbers increase, the interactions between individuals 
decreases and hence peer-group pressure to honestly reveal preferences 
also declines. Therefore, the case of taxation, where extremely 
large numbers are involved and where interactions between individuals 
are minimized by laws restricting the a va ilab il i ty  of information 
concerning an individuals tax share, presents a prime example of a 
situation susceptible to free-riding. However in small collectives, 
such as a local church group raising funds for a new church, the 
free-rider problem may be minimal. In intermediate cases, sub- 
optimal but positive provision of public goods by communities may 
result.
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Brubaker (1975) also has an optimistic outlook on human 
nature. Specifically he believes that an individual will rank 
goods acquired by bargaining ,higher than those gained by deceit and 
hypocrisy»such as is involved in free-riding. Brubaker argues 
that the free-rider is seen by his peers as a hypocrite or adversary, 
and the effectiveness of this feeling in combating free-riding is 
reinforced by the likelihood of preference interrelationships between 
friends and neighbours, as was pointed out by Johansen. Brubaker 
makes the additional point,that at relatively low levels of supply, 
the marginal rates of substitution between public goods and other 
closely related items are high and so groups would form to ensure 
provision: for example, if  law and order services were so run
down as to be ineffective, vigilante groups may form to provide 
protection. Hence Brubaker sees free-riding as being a problem, 
but not as severe a problem as would be expected in theory.
A study by McMillan (1977) suggests that the theory of free­
riding is at fault because i t  does not examine the dynamics of 
the real world: by concentrating on the stat ic analysis, the
theoretical free-rider concept does not involve the dynamic aspects 
of an individual's actions, being observed by others, influencing 
the future behaviour of all. McMillan sees this as a learning process 
whereby co-operation will eventually result in the optimal provision 
of public goods. Again, no empirical evidence is presented beyond 
the statement that public goods are supplied (albeit not privately), 
but in addition, McMillan's study assumes that all public decisions 
are on-going processes. This is quite, often an unrealistic 
assumption as public good supply decisions are often made on a once- 
only basis: in such a case,the original static Samuelson model of
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f re e - r id ing  is based on reasonable grounds.
The most au tho r i ta t ive  study yet carr ied out is that of 
Bohm (1971) (1972). His work is based on the proposition that 
f re e - r id ing  and other types of s t ra teg ic  behaviour can be overcome 
i f  the formulat ion of  strategies by ind iv iduals  is made so d i f f i c u l t  
that they t e l l  the t ru th .  To make strategy formulation d i f f i c u l t ,  
Bohm introduces uncertainty as to the actual method of payment 
that w i l l  be used to co l le c t  the money from respondents to o f fse t  
the costs of providing the publ ic good. To tes t  the proposit ion,  
Bohm conducted a series of experiments designed to detect any 
dif ferences between the hypothesised s t ra teg ic  behaviour responses 
and the wil l ingness to pay of  those ind iv iduals  subject to 
uncerta inty in payment method.
211 people, from a random sample of 605 Stockholm residents 
chose to take part in a questioning session aimed at estimating . 
the demand fo r  a te lev is ion  programme featur ing a well known Swedish 
comedy duo. The basic question asked of each of these people was 
to estimate, in do l la rs ,  how much they found i t  worth, at a 
maximum, to watch the show - i f  the wil l ingness to pay exceeded the 
cost, the programme would be shown. The whole sample was divided 
in to  six groups, each of which involved a d i f fe re n t  method of 
payment fo r th e i r  members:
( i )  the amount stated (which would be expected to y ie ld  
the f re e - r id e r  response of  a downward bias) ;
( i i )  an amount proportional to the stated wil l ingness to 
pay, such that the to ta l  payouts equalled the to ta l  cost (Bohm 
suggests th is  would reduce the p o s s ib i l i t y  of under-revelat ion of 
preferences);
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( i i i )  Bohm's "no bias" wi l l ingness to pay whereby payments 
are to be made by any of the a l te rna t ives ,  i ,  i i ,  iv  or v ( th is  
uncerta inty was hoped to induce t ru th fu l  reve la t ion) ;
( iv )  a f ixed price fo r  a l l  ind iv iduals ( i f  the subjects 
wi l l ingness to pay is higher than the set pr ice, exaggeration is 
l i k e l y  and vice versa - the bias is dependent therefore on the 
strength of  the group's preference re la t ive  to the f ixed pr ice ) ;  
and,
(v) no payment is required, with costs being met from 
outside sources (an over-statement would be expected).
In addi t ion ,  a fu r the r  group was formed and they were asked 
two questions: f i r s t ,  they were asked how much the programme was 
worth to them, without l ink ing  th is  f igure to any payment ru le ;  and 
secondly, each person was asked to bid fo r  one of  only ten seats 
avai lable fo r  the showing. These questions were added to tes t  i f  
responses were in fac t  representat ive of  true demand: the f i r s t  being
assumed by Bohm to induce respondents to over-state s l i g h t l y  th e i r  
preferences; and the second, to cause a s l ig h t  under-statement. I t  
must also be noted that the descript ions provided fo r  Groups ( i )  
to (v) included counter-strategic arguments aimed at h igh l igh t ing  the 
an t i -soc ia l  aspect of  a f re e - r id e r  response.
On a r r iva l  at the experiment,each indiv idual was given the 
equivalent of $10 in small change with which to e i the r  pay for  the 
TV programme, or re ta in fo r  other purposes. The respondents were 
then placed under the spec i f ic  i l l u s io n  that there were many more 
respondents pa r t ic ipa t ing  in the survey than could be seen by each 
person - i t  was suggested that other groups were pa r t ic ipa t ing  in other
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rooms. A f te r  the questions were detai led and the results calculated, 
a l l  groups were informed that payments had exceeded costs and the 
TV programme was run, with payments being col lected according to 
the rule detai led fo r  each group.
Bohm, using the resul ts  of th is  experiment, tested the 
hypothesis that the payment methods used fo r  Groups ( i )  to (v) would 
y ie ld  identical estimates. He found that there were no s ign i f ica n t  
dif ferences between the mean bids of a l l  groups. Group (v i )  the 
" t ru th fu l  revelat ion group" was therefore superfluous, but i t  was 
found that the mean bid fo r  Groups ( v i )  and ( i i i )  were the only ones 
below the other groups' mean bids. This resu l t  is surprising because 
the payment methods described to Groups ( i i i )  and (v i )  were a p r io r i  
assumed to provide respondents with the least incentive to f ree-r ide .  
Bohm adds that the experimental s i tua t ion  may have been a 
counteracting force to the f re e - r id e r  response in that anonymity of 
respondents was not preserved and counter-strategic arguments were 
put forward to each respondent. Bohm concludes by suggesting the 
need fo r  experimentation with larger samples and higher payments 
(to induce a better  sample) and is not preapred to refute completely 
the f re e - r id e r  problem on the basis of his experimental results .
Smith (1976) has commented on Bohm's experiment. S pec i f ica l ly ,  
he bel ieves that the payment method detai led to Group ( i )  is 
equivalent to the Smith Auction Process as applied to an in d iv is ib le
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3public good, and so is not subject to free-riding, and that the 
lower mean bid detected for Group ( i i i )  is in accordance with the 
"ambiguity hypothesis" - because i t  is the most complex and 
psychologically ambiguous question, people will tend to respond 
cautiously and hence bid below their maximum willingness to pay.
Smith also suggests that a "mixed motive" may have been involved 
in subjects' responses: as well as the counter strategic arguments
which Bohm introduced, any downward bias in respondents' bids may 
have been counteracted by respondents believing that they had a 
"social duty" to the rest of the nation to ensure that the programme 
was shown.^ Finally, Smith notes that a repetition of the experiment, 
using the same respondents but with a different good may produce 
different conclusions regarding the presence of strategic behaviour, 
because the gains from free-riding may not be evident without 
prior experience of the procedure.
Despite the contributions of Bohm, Johansen, Brubaker and 
McMillan i t  is not possible to reject completely the possibility of 
free-riding,either in situations involving actual public good provision,
3 The Smith Auction Process is reviewed in full in Section 3.3.4 
but, in brief,  i t  is a demand revealing process based on the 
proposition that an iterative sequence of bidding where 
respondents are provided with information regarding the 
divergence between the total group bid and the cost of provision, 
will ensure truthful revelation of preferences in the case of a 
public good which is supplied as one discrete unit, as is the 
case with Bohm's television programme. Smith's assertion that 
Bohm's payment method for Group (i) is equivalent to the Smith 
Auction Process is accompanied by a caveat that the iterative 
sequence was not carried out in Bohm's experiment.
4 The context of the game was that the experiment was a tr ial  
to establish if  the television programme was suitable for 
widespread circulation.
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or in the context of hypothetical valuation methods. However, i t  
would also seem unlikely that a l l  respondents to hypothetical 
valuation methods will behave strategically and this hypothesis 
has been supported generally by the results of case studies reviewed 
in the previous chapter. Despite this ,  the possibility of strategic 
behaviour, which may increase with widespread application of 
hypothetical valuation as respondents become more aware of the 
advantages of misrepresenting their  true preferences, deserves attention. 
Ideally, hypothetical valuation techniques could involve a 
questioning format which eliminates the respondent's incentive 
to behave strategically. The derivation of such a "demand revealing 
process" has been of major interest to public finance economists 
since Samuelson's (1954) clarification of the free-rider issue.
The following section of this chapter provides a review of the two 
most promising processes, and involves a description of their structure 
and a summary of their advantages and failings.
5 Two other basic types of DRPs have also been developed: the risk
averse process and the mini-max mechanism. The risk averse process 
was originally conceived by Thompson (1965) who called i t  the "D- 
process" and subsequently re-visited by Auster (1978) whose version 
has been named the "compensating election". This type of mechanism 
is subject to a number of problems which limit its usefulness to 
the extent that i t  is not considered in detail by this thesis. 
Specifically, the possibility of risk-prefering behaviour by 
individuals is not adequately considered, the de-stabi1izing effects 
of non-zero income e las t ic i t ies  of demand are not incorporated and,as a 
consequence of the resultant imbalanced budget, the process is not 
Pareto efficient.  The mini-max mechanism or "tatonnement process" 
has been developed by Dreze and de la Vallee Poussin (1971) however 
i t  is severely limited by its  mini-max behavioural assumption - 
Groves and Ledyard (1977a) show that the process will generally 
fail to indicate a Pareto optimal equilibrium when the more likely 
competitive behaviour assumption is used. In addition, Dreze and 
de la Vallee Poussin (1971) themselves point out the difficulty of 
implementing a continuous (tatonnement) process in cases where the 
solution to be implemented is a discrete, non-variable level of 
public good provision.
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3• 3 DEMAND REVEALING PROCESSES: THEORY
3.3.1 The Clarke Tax Mechanism (CTM)
The basis of the ClarkeTax Mechanism (CTM) was or iginated 
by Vickrey (1961), who proposed a "counterspeculation" process 
aimed at overcoming any market imperfections in private good auctions, 
and was re-discovered fo r  the publ ic good case by Clarke (1971) 
whose work was subsequently presented graphical ly by Tideman and 
Tul lock (1976). The mechanism is based on an assumption of 
competi tive behaviour,and re l ies  on presenting each individual with 
a choice between accepting the decision regarding the level of 
publ ic good provision that would be made by the community or group 
without his p a r t ic ipa t ion ,  and changing that decision by paying an 
amount equal to the costs which are incurred by the rest of the 
group in th e i r  accepting his proposal.
The mathematical formulat ion of the Clarke tax mechanism is 
set out in Groves and Ledyard (1977) and Fane (1978)»and involves 
adding the CTM to the t ra d i t ion a l  Arrow-Debreu general equi l ibr ium 
pr ivate good model. The basic assumptions and notat ion used are:
( i )  there is one pr ivate good Y and one publ ic good X, 
which are perfect substi tutes in production;
( i i )  the opportunity cost of  the provision of Y, q, 
is independent of demand;
( i i i )  there are n ind iv iduals in the community;
( i v )  ind iv idual i has a u t i l i t y  function U1*(X,Y^);
(v) the true marginal wi l l ingness to pay fo r  X,Z^, is 
measured in units of Y per units of X and is the marginal rate of 
subst i tu t ion  between Y^  and X;
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(vi) all income effects are concentrated in the demand 
for Y. so Z- is a function of X only, i .e.  = 0 ^  (X);
(vii)  the demand for X of all individuals except i is 
represented by E ipJ (X); and,
j / i
(vii i ) the quantity of X chosen by the group is X, 
whereas the quantity demanded by the group i f  i had not participated 
is X1' .
The CTM involves each i supplying the government or decision 
maker with his complete marginal willingness to pay function. The 
individual is then taxed to ensure honest revelation of demand by 
the tax rule:
Ti = a.qX + f* (l-a,)q I ip (X) dX . . .  (1)
J xi 1 j / i
The rule can be broken down into two components: the f i r s t
term c^qX represents i ' s  standard tax burden for the provision of X, 
where is a constant representing i ' s  tax incidence level and the 
second term, the integral, is the Clarketax element, representing the 
area between the "synthetic supply curve" the social cost, q, minus 
the aggregate demand for the good X of all individuals except i ,  
q - E T"1 (X) , and the proportion of the cost which is to be paid
-  j 7
by i» c^q, over the range X to X .
6 Note that the magnitude of , is irrelevant,  i ts  only constraint 
being that E a .  = 1.
7 The mathematical proof which establishes why the individual has 
no incentive to misrepresent preferences can be found in Groves 
and Ledyard (1977) or Fane (1978) and will not be repeated here.
107
To explain the mathematical formulation of the CTM, i t  is 
useful to consider the diagramatic exposition of Tideman and 
Tullock (1976) as presented here in Figure 3.1.
Note: Functional notation only is used in this diagram. Hence 01'
represents 01(X).
Figure 3.1: The Clark Tax Mechanism.
A x
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The individual's standard tax share for the socially optimal
level of provision of good X, X, is the area Oa.q C X. By
revealing his demand curve 01' , the Clark tax, ABC, i .e.  the difference
between the "synthetic supply curve", q - E ^ , and c^q, is
calculated and levied. The Clarke tax forces individuals to consider
the cost to the community of changing the level of provision from
what i t  would demand without his involvement, OX^ , to the overall
9equilibrium, OX, by i ts use of the synthetic supply curve: this
is the key to the CTM's abili ty to ensure the truthful revelation
i 10of demand. If i under-states his demand (01-), he foregoes the 
benefit DBXX” - the area under his true demand curve between X" 
and X - which could have been achieved at a tax cost of EBXX” - 
the area under the synthetic supply curve. Hence DBE could be gained 
by i if  he chooses to specify his true demand curve. Similarly, i f  i 
over-states his demand(0  ^+) ,BFG could be saved by his revealing 01'. 
Individuals are clearly in an optimal position when they equate 
their demand with the synthetic supply curve, and this occurs only 
when aggregate demand is equal to q, the marginal cost of supply: the 
overall optimum.
8 X is determined by the equality of the marginal cost of supplying 
X, q, and the aggregate demand for X, E + 01, where E ^  is 
the demand of all individuals in the group except i and 0"1 is
i ' s  demand for X. Note that this graphical analysis is for the 
case of an individual wishing to increase the level of provision 
from that which would occur without his participation - a converse 
analysis applies i f  he wishes to decrease X.
9 The synthetic supply curve q - E ^  is beyond the control of 
the individual i.
10 If 0^ ~ is revealed as the individual's demand curve, X will 
be the resultant level of provision.
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The most significant point of criticism levelled at the Clarke 
taxing scheme is that i t  does not yield a Pareto optimal allocation 
of resources because the surplus which results from the Clarke tax 
component must be wasted.^ Groves and Ledyard (1977b) suggest that 
the CTM 'may lead to a worse resource allocation than yielded by 
some other mechanisms' (p. 114) because of the wasteage of resources.
The second problem affecting the CTM relates to the assumption 
stated earl ier ,  that all income effects are concentrated in the demand 
for the private good Y - under the more real ist ic assumption of a 
non-zero income elast ici ty of demand ,for the public good X, the 
payment of the Clarke tax, by i ts effect on an individual's income, 
will affect the individual's demand and hence the amount of his Clarke 
tax and other individuals' Clarke taxes and demands. Fane (1978) 
argues that even if  the cyclical relationship between demand and 
Clarke taxes does converge to an equi1ibrium,the 'existence of efficiency 
and stabil i ty properties of the resulting equilibrium has not been 
analysed. Nor is i t  obvious whether large numbers and small income
12effects help to ensure existence, efficiency and stabil i ty'  (p. 21).
11 If the surplus was redistributed, the demand revelation properties 
of the CTM would be lost as the beneficiaries of the 
redistribution would have an incentive to over-state their 
preferences in an attempt to increase the overall magnitude
of the Clarke tax.
12 Groves and Ledyard (1977b) show that in non-zero income elast ici ty 
of demand conditions the dominant strategy equilibrium of the
CTM may be replaced by the weaker Nash equi1ibrium ,but doubt 
the stabil i ty of such an equilibrium particularly given the 
possibility of sophisticated consumers strategically manipulating 
the outcome 'from the Nash Equilibrium . . .  to a more advantageous 
outcome for (themselves)' (p. 120).
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On the other hand, Tideman and Tullock (1977) assert that because 
the Clarke tax becomes small and uncertain in the case of large 
numbers, income effects would be negligible - the case for empirical 
testing is obvious.
A further problem with the CTM is considered by Bennett and
Conn (1977) who show that no mechanism can be both "decision satisfactory"
- that is,  ' the public good is provided if  and only if  the net social
benefit is posit ive1 (p. 95) - and "group incentive compatible" -
that is 'no group of agents can make themselves better off by misrepresenting
their preferences' (p. 96). This "impossibility theory" implies that
i f  a scheme eliminates strategic behaviour, then i t  will be
susceptible to the manipulation of colluding agents. Tullock (1977c)
discounts the coalition problem,in practical implementation, because
of the difficult ies involved in organising such coalitions when large
13numbers of individuals are involved.
However, while the problems of coalition formation and income 
effect destabilization may be reduced in the large number case, i t  
is in this situation when the CTM faces another problem - the 
undermotivation of individuals, f i r s t  to participate in the decision, 
making process, secondly to obtain information relevant to the decision 
and finally to ascertain their own preferences. Undermotivation 
increases as numbers increase because the size of the Clarke tax 
component of an individual's tax bill decreases as more people are
13 Ironically ,the organizational difficul t ies occur largely because 
of the free-rider problem.
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involved in the decision group:"14 because i t  is this component which 
provides the incentive for people to participate, when Clarke taxes 
are relatively large, individuals can recognize more readily the 
potential gains and losses involved. Clarke (1977a) addresses the 
incentive problem in the context of a large scale budget allocation, 
suggesting that motivation would be assured through the operation of a 
political mechanism,which involved the formation groups of respondents 
with similar interest,and their nominating representatives to act in 
the group's best interest. He adds that some individuals would choose 
not to be represented and hence 'accept a "benefit tax" representing 
their  allocated benefit share' (p. 41): for this limited representation
approach to ensure optimal levels of public good provision, the 
preferences of those who do not participate would have to be either 
randomly distributed or act to cancel each other when aggregated.
Green and Laffont (1977a) (1977b) consider that the problem of 
incentive can be overcome using a sampling approach: 'for a particular
set of stochastic specifications i t  can be shown that by using the 
optimal sample size an expected social outcome superior to that 
attainable by sampling the entire population can be achieved' (p. 80). 
However,they show that the optimal sample size - which minimizes sampling 
error - is dependent on the abili ty  of respondents to process information 
regarding the benefits created by the provision of varying quantities of 
the public good. If information processing abili ty is related to the 
preferences of individuals - that is, for example, if  respondents who
14 The inverse relationship between group size and the magnitude 
of the Clarke tax per person is demonstrated by Tideman and 
Tulloch (1976) who calculate that ' i f  the citizens of the 
United States were voting on the annual federal budget, the grand 
total of all the Clarke taxes charged would be in the neighbourhood 
of $2000, or about one-thousandth of a penny per person' (p. 1156).
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have a high preference fo r  national parks also have a superior 
a b i l i t y  to process information -then the sampling approach may not 
produce an optimal level of provision. One solut ion to the problem 
which resu lts  from the corre la t ion between information processing 
a b i l i t y  and preferences,is to estimate th is  corre lat ion using a sub­
sample of respondents who have been given information and paid to 
par t ic ipa te ,and then to use th is  estimation to correct fo r  the bias found 
in the f u l l  survey. Green and Laffont (1977a) (1977b) however,point out
that 'we face the d i f f i c u l t y  that  in the sub-sample, t ru th  revelat ion 
w i l l  not be in general a dominant strategy anymore' (p. 93) and that 
the ind iv iduals in the sub-sample may choose not to process the 
information which is provided. Clearly a complete resolut ion of  the 
incentive to par t ic ipa te  problem cannot be gained from th is  type of 
survey approach.
3.3.2 The Groves and Ledyard Mechanism (GLM)^^
The Vickrey (1961) counterspeculation process,which forms the 
basis fo r  the Clark tax Mechanism,was also re-discovered by Groves 
(1976) and subsequently presented in a general equi l ibr ium context .by 
Groves and Ledyard (1977a). However,the Groves and Ledyard "Optimal" 
Mechanism (GLM) d i f fe rs  from the Clarke tax mechanism in a number of 
key aspects: the outcome is Pareto e f f i c i e n t  because there is no
budget surplus which must be wasted; income e f fec ts  are in terna l ized 
by the use of a general equi l ibr ium model; and, only single points or
15 This sub-section uses the assumptions and notat ion establ ished 
in 3.3. 1 except that the assumption regarding income ef fects  
is no longer required because of the general equi l ibr ium 
spec i f ica t ion  used by the model.
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messages, m., ind icating the desired level of output change, are'i
transmitted to the decision maker. 16
The GLM sets X to the aggregate of a l l  messages, on. with
i=l
the amount of tax payable by each indiv idual being determined by the 
formula:
T. = a-q Em.• + \  6 { (n - l )n ” ’ (m .-y . )2 - a - 2 } . . .  (2)
1 j 7 i J
where y. = ( E m j ) / (n - l ) ,  the average of a l l  other 
J7i
messages except m.,
2 2
a.  = {E ( m . - y . )  } / (n -2 ) ,  the variance of  a l l  
1 j^i 0 1
other messages except m.., and,
5 is a posi t ive constant which is set by the 
decision makerJ^
As Fane (1978) shows, the GLM ensures a balanced budget - that i s ,
ET • = qX - but i t  is necessary to assume that each ind iv idual t reats  
i lg
the messages sent by a l l  others as exogoneous before i t  is possible 
to show that the GLM ensures the provision of good X such that the
aggregate marginal wi l l ingness to pay is equal to the marginal cost of 
supply.
16 This is to be contrasted with the Clarke Tax Mechanism which 
requires ind iv iduals to reveal th e i r  complete marginal wi l l ingness 
to pay schedule. Fane (1978) shows that the information contained 
in rrij can be used to determine the marginal wi l l ingness to pay 
function through the equation (from Fane's Equation 18):
01' ( X) = m.j6 + a^q - 6Xn ^
17 While 6 is shown by Groves and Ledyard (1977) to have no e f fe c t  
on the op t ima l i ty  of the GLM, i t  is clear that a large 6 w i l l  
y ie ld  a large tax and vice versa , and th is  could have important 
ramif icat ions in terms of the respondents' incentive to 
p a r t i c ip a te .
2
18 In mathematical terms, 3y. / am. = 9a . /3m. = 0, which is Fane's
(1978) Equation 13. 1 1 1
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A s im p l i f ied  scheme which has the same incentive compat ib i l i ty
propert ies as the GLM,is Smith's (1976) "Decentralised Auction Process".
Under Smith's Auction Process (SAP) each ind iv idua l , i , submits a
proposal fo r  the quanti ty of publ ic good to be supplied (X^),as well
as a monetary bid (b •) fo r  that proposed quanti ty . Each ind iv idua l 's
submission is made with the understanding that his share of the cost q
19is (q-zb ■) »where zb - is the sum of  a l l  bids except b-. In an i te ra t ive  
j 7 i J J
sequence, each agent signals agreement to ,  or vetos, the un i t  cost
(q- zb •) which a l l  other agents determine fo r  him,by e i ther  choosing 
I
b- = (q-zb.:) to agree, or b- f  (q-zb-) to veto,or by choosing X- = X 
j  X i J _ j 7 i J
to agree>or X^  X X to veto. Agreement is reached only i f  a l l  members of the
group signal agreement - in that case, X units are provided,with each
agent paying the un i t  cost share,q-zb- .
j X i 3
The GLM and SAP are subject to a number o f  the same problems 
experienced by the Clarke Tax Mechanism - there is a lack of  incentive to 
part ic ipa te in the large numbers case and when only small numbers are 
involved,they may be subject to manipulation by col lus ions.  However,while 
i t  is true that by "balancing the budget" the GLM and SAP avoid the 
problem of  Pareto sub-optimal i ty , they remain subject to other d i f f i c u l t i e s .
19 Smith (1976, p. 29-30) shows that the individual faced with
the GLM w i l l  bid fo r  his desired change in public good provision
an amount equal to the dif ference between marginal cost and
the sum of  a l l  other bids, that i s ,  b- = q-zb-. Smith considers that
j i ' i  J
th is  in te rp re ta t ion  of the GLM is helpful in explaining why incentive 
com pat ib i l i ty  occurs: ' the rule presents each agent with a "pr ice" . . .
(q -zb* ) , determined by the actions of a l l  other agents over which i 
j7*iJ
has no " s ig n i f i c a n t "  contro l .  Agent i is then essent ia l ly  in 
the posi t ion of an agent in any competi tive market' (p. 30).
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Greenberg, Mackay and Tideman (1977) point out two problems
with the GLM - and hence the SAP - which resul t  from the processes'
fai lure  to produce a Dominant Equilibrium. F i r s t ,  given
the lack of a dominant s t rategy,  i t  has been questioned i f  consumers
will behave competitively and t r e a t  other individuals '  messages as
20fixed. The Ledyard - Roberts Impossibili ty Theorem suggests
that  they will not» but Groves and Ledyard (1977) argue that  the
GLM is analagous with the Arrow-Debreu private goods economy where
'a sophist icated consumer can gain by considering how prices and his
prof i t  shares are affected by his own demand; in our public goods
model under our mechanism, a sophist icated consumer can gain by
considering how equilibrium prices ,  his p rof i t  shares and the other
consumers' messages are affected by his own decision'  (p. 807). Fane
(1978) suggests that  this  analogy with the Arrow-Debreu model is
inappropriate because the corresponding public good resul t  to the Hurwicz
resul t  for an Arrow-Debreu private good model (which s ta tes  that  the
difference between competitive and optimal behaviour tends to zero
as the size of the decision group tends to i n f i n i t y ) , has not been
proved by Groves and Ledyard. Fane shows that  large numbers
are not suf f ic ient  to ensure the equivalence of competitive and optimal
behaviour: he points out that  the GLM re l i es  on respondents assuming
t h a t •23m . / d m  . = 0,  and while ' i t  seems i n tu i t ive ly  plausible that  
]7i J 1
as the number of individuals . . .  becomes large,  the e ffec t  on any
20 The Ledyard - Roberts Impossibili ty Theorem states  that  in 
an economy with both private and public goods, no al locat ion 
mechanism can be both incentive compatible and Pareto optimal. The 
theorem is a restatement of the Hurwicz impossibi l i ty theorem 
which applies in the case of a private good only economy.
Clearly the Clarke tax mechanism does not contradict  the Ledyard- 
Roberts Theorem because i t  is not Pareto optimal.
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particular message, m-, of a change in some other message, m. should 
become arbi tari ly small . . .  i t  is not at all obvious that this sum 
over . . .  (n-1) . . .  terms should also tend to zero as . . .  (n) . . .  tends 
to infinity'  (p. 3). Fane concludes that 'the GL optimal mechanism 
does not solve the "Free Rider" problem, in the sense that i t  is only 
a solution if  self interested individuals act under a specific delusion' 
(p. 4).
The second problem associated with the GLM,which is identified 
by Greenberg et a l .  (1977) ,is that Groves and Ledyard do not specify 
explicitly,  the adjustment process which would be used in the achievement 
of the Nash equilibrium: without such a specification they assert
that the stabi l i ty of the equilibrium is in doubt. Groves and Ledyard 
( 1977c) agree with Greenberg et a l .  ( 1977), but suggest that i t  is 
a matter of empirically testing the GLM to determine if the Nash 
equilibrium is appropriate.
3.3.3 Conclusions
The two demand revealing processes which have received most 
attention in the 1iterature,and which appear to offer the most 
potential , are the Clark tax mechanism (CTM) and the Groves and 
Ledyard mechanism (GLM). However i t  has been demonstrated that neither 
the CTM nor the GLM is free from fault.  Both the CTM and GLM: (a)
may be subject to manipulation by collusions of respondents; and,
(b) provide very l i t t l e  incentive for respondents to participate 
when large numbers are involved. In addition the CTM: (c) fails to
achieve Pareto optimality; and,(d) may produce an equilibrium 
(Nash) which is unstable when the income elast ici ty of demand is non-
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zero. The GLM (e) may produce an equi l ibr ium (Nash) which is 
unstable even when income e la s t i c i t y  of demand is zero; and,( f )  
w i l l  ensure the equivalence of  competitive and optimal behaviour 
only when respondents act under a "spec i f ic  delusion". I f  i t  is 
r e a l i s t i c  to assume that income effects  w i l l  be present, the 
comparison between the CTM and GLM centres on problems (c) and 
( f )  because problems (d) and (e) become equivalent: whi le the Pareto
sub-optimal i ty cannot be disregarded, i t  may be possible that  
respondents do act under the spec i f ic  delusion referred to by Fane 
(1978) but th is  p o s s ib i l i t y  can only be explored by empirical 
observation. I t  is therefore important to review the empirical 
evidence which has been col lected on these schemes before a complete 
comparison can be achieved.
3.4 DEMAND REVEALING PROCESSES: PRACTICE
Overal l ,  very l i t t l e  spec i f ic  test ing of the problems facing 
the Clarke Tax and Groves and Ledyard Mechanisms has been carr ied out, 
but several pract ica l  appl icat ions, both in the laboratory s i tua t ion  
and in f i e l d  t r i a l s ,  have been attempted. The primary purpose of 
these studies has been to tes t  the deviat ion of results obtained 
from the operation of the mechanisms from those thought to represent 
the f re e - r id e r  response. L i t t l e  detai led work has been carr ied out 
on behavioural aspects or the s t a b i l i t y  of Nash e q u i l i b r ia ,  with the 
exception of Smith's laboratory experiments. This section w i l l  review 
Smith's resu lts in addit ion to the work of Scherr and Babb (1975)
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21and a f i e ld  study carr ied out by Blomquist (1979).
3.4.1 The Scherr and Babb Experiment
The aim of the Scherr and Babb experiment (1975) was to test
the revelat ion incentive propert ies of the Clarke tax and the Leohman-
22Whinston (1971) Average Incremental Cost Pricing Scheme. The two 
systems were examined in comparison with a th i rd  scheme,based on a 
voluntary subscript ion, which was thought to approximate the conditions 
necessary fo r  f re e - r id ing  to occur. The experimental environment 
was a hypothetical s i tua t ion  in which 100 students were each given $10 
to be e i ther  retained or donated to two campus public goods - a concert 
fund and a l i b ra ry  fund: By donating any amount to these causes a l l
student respondents could expect to receive an equal number of concert 
t icke ts  and book donation acknowledgements. To simulate the bids of 
"other respondents",required by the pr ic ing systems, each agent was 
paired with what they thought was another par t ic ipant  (via a computer 
visual display un i t )  which was actua l ly  a pre-programmed constant "stooge". 
The size of the fund was therefore dependent on each respondent and the
21 The inclusion of a Clarke tax based question by Randall and 
Brookshire (1978) in th e i r  study of th e i r  i te ra t ive  bidding 
technique, reviewed in the previous chapter, is noted.
22 The Leohman-Whinston Scheme is based on the pr inc ip le  of users 
being charged according to the incremental costs caused by th e i r  
respective demands. When the good is publ ic in character then the 
incremental cost becomes the to ta l  cost divided by the number of 
users i . e .  average cost. They hypothesize that since the cost to 
each user is the same fo r  any level of  output the concealment of 
demand is discouraged. The scheme operates by the individual 
select ing one level of output knowing that th e i r  cost w i l l  be 
affected by the output select ions of others.
119
"stooge1, with the number of tickets and acknowledgements available to
all being determined by the total contribution divided by the cost
of provision. Individuals were informed of their  personal contribution
and the total contribution following the experiment but were not
informed of the level of provision - after one month all respondents
23were given the $10 and asked to contribute personally to the funds.
The results of the experiment indicated that the price
system used did not significantly affect the size of the funds. Some
evidence suggested that the Clarke tax mechanism resulted in the
lowest level of fund support and that the voluntary scheme produced
the highest contributions. Debriefing interviews suggested that the
voluntary scheme was regarded to be the simplest, fairest  and the
easiest to control personally: there was no indication of a desire to
24free-ride. The Scherr and Babb results are therefore very similar
to those derived by Bohm (1972), and lead to a further questioning 
of the severity, or perhaps even the existence, of the free-rider 
problem in the type of situation being analysed.
The Scherr and Babb experiment also raises another point of 
interest :  the complexity of the task facing respondents who are
asked to reveal their demands. Because university students saw the 
schemes as being so complex and "unfair" that most sought the voluntary 
revelation procedure as a means of revealing their  true preferences,
23 Respondents were informed that "administrative difficult ies" 
had resulted in a failure to purchase the tickets and books,
as had been requested by respondents during the experiment. Of 
course, i t  would have been interesting to observe how the 
respondents actually spent the $10.
24 It could be argued that a free-rider would be reluctant to 
admit, in a personal interview, that he had acted strategically.
120
the use of the demand reveal ing processes over the whole society must 
be questioned.
Clarke (1975), in a comment on the Scherr and Babb experiment,
recommends that part ic ipants  be given more e x p l i c i t  information on
the implicat ions of various revealed demand strategies in any
repet i t ions of the experiment. Spec i f ica l ly ,  he suggests the
establishment of stronger l inks between payoffs and resul tant
welfare gains and losses i f  experimental results are to approach
those expected from the theore tica l  studies. Clarke also comments
on the use of  a "stooge" - he indicates a preference fo r  the use
of real l i f e  partners in such experiments so that " si de-arrangements"
25could be formed. Smith (1976) c r i t i c i z e s  the use of the "stooge"
because the use of paired combinations could have created special
responses which would not have been given had larger co l lec t ives
been used. Two fu r the r  issues are raised by Smith: f i r s t ,  he points
26out that because pa r t ic ipa t ing  students had only one response,
there was no p o s s ib i l i t y  of respondents reconsidering th e i r  bids
'on the basis of i te ra t iv e  experience' (p. 51); and secondly,
respondents may have had d i f f i c u l t y  in reveal ing th e i r  true preferences
for  the concerts and the l i b ra ry  because the questions asked
27involved "mixed motives".
25 Clarke (1975) suggests that when side arrangements can be 
formed, f re e - r id ing  would re-emerge under the Loehman- 
Whinston scheme but his own scheme would continue to ensure 
t ru th fu l  revelat ion of demand.
26 As does Clarke (1975).
27 Smith (1976) p a r t i c u la r ly  draws attention to the use of the 
word "donation" as being the source of 'a certain congruence 
between the purpose of the exercise and the voluntary 
system' (p. 51).
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Despite the problems of the Scherr and Babb experiment, i t  
shows that the experimental methodology is useful in the analysis 
of public good pricing and demand revelation. They found that the 
consistency between and within samples indicated l i t t l e  bias due 
to the experimental procedures.
3.4.2 Blomquist1s Du Page River Study
28Blomquist (1979) utilized a questionnaire format which 
involved the Clarke Tax Mechanism in a study designed to 
estimate recreat ionists1 and nearby residents'  valuations of improved 
water quality in the Du Page River, Il l inois.  Being a field study, 
Blomquist was faced with the important trade-off between being able 
to place respondents in a situation which would ensure honest 
revelation ,and being able to ensure respondent comprehension and 
abili ty to answer. The resultant questionnaire was therefore limited 
to a verbal outline of the Clarke tax process of charging each 
person the extra costs he causes other residents to pay for having 
the water cleaned up (or polluted) more than they want. Even so, 
the questionnaire can be regarded as being lengthy and relatively 
complicated.
Blomquist (1979) structured his survey so that two thirds 
of the 365 respondents interviewed were asked the Clarke tax based 
willingness to pay question while the remaining one third were asked
28 The format used is based on the Brookshire et  al.  (1976) 
reviewed in the previous Chapter. However, the iterative 
bidding sequence was replaced by a single direct question.
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a straightforward direct question. Analysis of the results was 
undertaken using multiple regression techniques. The coefficient for 
the dummy variable indicating i f  the respondent had answered the 
Clarke tax question proved to be not di fferent from zero,at the 
five percent level of significance. Although Blomquist expresses 
some disquiet with regard to the overall quality of the respondents' 
estimates of willingness to pay, he concludes that 'the Clarke tax 
paragraph appears to have had l i t t l e  effect on reported values'
(p. 13),and agrees with Clarke(1977b), that the experimental approach 
which analyses the responses of a small sub-sample of individuals 
is a more appropriate way of employing the Clarke Tax Mechanism.
3.4.3 The Smith Experiments
The most comprehensive experiments so far undertaken have 
been carried out in a "laboratory" setting by Smith (1976, 1977a, 
1980a, 1980b) , using groups of university students (who are unable 
to communicate amongst themselves during the experiment) endeavouring 
to gain maximum u t i l i t y  from the provision of an abstract good,
X, which is produced at a constant per unit cost, q. Because the 
good is abstract, u t i l i t y  from provision must be a r t i f i c a l l y  induced 
by the experimentor. This is achieved by the private specif ication, 
to each individual, of their  u t i l i t y  function V i(X) which is
29 Smith (1977b) has also derived an "Auction Election" which 
is useful in the special case of respondents voting for 
their  prefered social state from an exhaustive set of mutually 
exclusive alternatives. He concludes from the results of f ive 
sessions of experiments that 'the mechanically simpler Auction 
Election invites more strategic bluff ing and signalling by 
members of the col lective'  (p. 930).
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tabulated in the form of dollars per level of production. Under 
the experiment rules, i f  a group of respondents agrees on a level 
of provision of X, then each individual is able to claim the 
number of dollars specified by his u t i l i t y  function for that level 
of provision, less the cost of provision which includes any taxes 
specified by the various mechanisms under consideration. Alternatively,  
i f  no agreement is reached, no payment is received by participants, 
except for a small wage paid to compensate for the time spent "playing 
the game".
Smith (1976) used 21 discrete laboratory settings
involving 118 subjects to compare the Groves-Ledyard Mechanism (GLM)
and the Smith Auction Process (SAP) with each other and against a
control mechanism, called "the Lindahl Process", which was designed
to attract the free-rider response. Specifically, the GLM
experiments consisted of an iterative procedure whereby individuals
privately communicated, to the experimentor, their proposals to either
increase or decrease the level of provision of X. From this information,
the experimentor calculated and displayed publicly the total of all
subjects' proposals. In addition, the total change proposed by all
other respondents was privately communicated to each individual,
allowing each person to calculate his n e t valuation of the proposed 
31level of output. On the basis of this information, respondents
30
30 By controlling individuals' u t i l i t y  functions i t  is 
possible to determine the prices and output levels predicted 
by theory for use in comparisons with those actually observed.
31 The formulation of the GLM tax rule was not explic it ly
described to respondents: knowledge of the function came
only with experience of its action.
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could either re-submit their original proposal, or submit a new one:
the sequence continued until either a pre-determined number of
t r ia l s  were completed without agreement, or agreement was reached
under the stopping rule that all individuals must submit three
consecutive equal proposals. The "Lindahl" pricing procedure
involved each agent submitting a non-increasing l i s t  of bids for
the possible incremental levels of public good provision to the
experimentor, who calculated the total of individual bids for each
level of provision of X. The group proposal rule was that X would
be provided at the level which equated unit cost to the total group
bid, with each respondent paying the amount he bid multiplied by
the level of provision. The same stopping rule as used in GLM
32experiment was employed. The "language" involved in the SAP was 
the bid, b.., and the total level of public provision required, X..
The experimentor, given these quantities, which were privately 
communicated by each respondent, calculated the total of all bids 
zb., and the mean level of X demanded, X, and announced them publicly. 
The respondent was then able to calculate his own "price", 6^  = -  b^
and X., the mean of all other respondents output proposals, and 
hence q - (b./X.), his personal per unit cost share. Again, the 
stopping rule was the same as employed by both other processes.
The results of the experiments indicated that both the GLM 
and SAP produced levels of output which approximated the optimal level 
of provision with individual contributions closely resembling the 
Lindahl optimal prices. The "Lindahl Process" consistently produced 
lower levels of provision than both of the other mechanisms. Smith
32 Smith is careful in his discussion of the Lindahl mechanism 
to point out the necessity for careful wording of the questions 
put to agents: to gain free-riding responses, no mention of
truthfulness or any such moral suasion should be used.
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notes, however, that the GLM experiments converged to the Lindahl 
equi l ibr ium more rapid ly  than the Auction Process. I t  was also
observed that neither the GLM nor SAP was sensi t ive to changes in
33 34group size, cost of provision, value function and to ta l  surplus
avai lable at the Lindahl equi l ibr ium.
Smith's (1977a) second group of experiments attempted to
include income effects  into the experimental framework, by using
Cobb-Douglas pay-off func t ions , manipulated to simulate varying
preferences over d i f fe re n t  income d is t r ib u t io n s :  Smith chose to set
the parameters so that the poorer class had the stronger preferences
fo r  the good. The increased complexity of the experiment
necessitated the use of a standardized procedure (programmed on a
computer) whereby subjects were questioned via a visual display un i t .
Smith notes that by introducing income e f fec ts ,  both the
f in a l  quant i t ies agreed upon by the groups, and the f in a l  bids of
each sub ject ,became more var iable.  However,the e f fec t  of the size
of co l lec t ive  was again found to be unimportant, except that larger
co l lec t ives  seemed to agree on larger levels of provision and
35appeared to converge more slowly than smaller co l lec t ives ,  and 
the amount of experience which subjects had gained did not seem to 
a f fe c t  the number of t r i a l s  required to reach agreement or the level 
of provision agreed upon.
33 Note however, that the group size was varied from four to six
ind iv idua ls :  the overal l  size of these groups causes some
scepticism as to the v a l i d i t y  of the resul ts .
34 Value functions which involved negative valuations fo r  some 
levels of publ ic good provision appeared to have no e f fe c t  on 
the a b i l i t y  of the GLM and SAP to achieve agreement on the 
optimal level of provision.
35 Again, the overall  co l lec t ive  size is small , with nine member 
co l lec t ives  being the largest group used.
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The Auction Process experiments detailed in Smith (1980a)>
are noteworthy for their failure to produce Lindahl optimal prices
for each individual. Smith found that the optimal quantity was
chosen repeatedly by the collectives, but that free-riding behaviour
was occuring. Interestingly, "anti-free-riding" behaviour, whereby
subjects bid amounts in excess of their true willingness to pay,
even up to their full  income income or endowment, for the good being
allocated, continually off-set any under-stating of preferences.
There was a strong correlation between the type of behaviour
individuals displayed and their endowment of income: endowment rich
subjects contributed more than their willingness to pay whilst
endowment poor subjects under-contributed,relative to their Lindahl
optimum. In all other respects, these experiments are supportive
of Smith's earl ier  hypotheses ,but the failure to produce Lindahl
optimum pricing creates an allocation which is not Pareto optimal.
The same tendency for respondents to bid non-Lindahl prices
was observed by Smith (1980b) in a further set of experiments.
However, the primary aim of these experiments was to determine i f
the "unanimity-excludability" feature of the SAP was the essential
feature of its apparent ab i l i ty  to overcome the incentive to free- 
36ride. Smith's method of addressing this aim was to introduce
two new public good mechanisms which both involved collective 
37excludability , but which th e o re t ic a l ly , should be subject to strategic 
behaviour: one was constituted purely to produce the free-rider
36 Brubaker (1975) suggested that "pre contract group excludability" 
could be used to minimize the free-rider problem.
37 Collective excludability is attained by employing a unanimity 
stopping rule.
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equilibrium and the other was a combination of the free-rider 
mechanism and the SAP. The "Free-Rider Mechanism" required 
respondents to bid only in terms of the amount they were willing 
to pay for the provision of X: the group's consequent level of
provision of X was dictated by the total bid divided by the unit 
cost, q. The same experimental procedure was used as with the 
SAP. The "Quasi Free-Rider Mechanism" required respondents to 
bid both in price and quantity terms and used an amended SAP 
valuation function: rather than paying {q-(b./X..)}X, the respondent
payed qX-b. for the provision of X, and Smith shows that the free­
rider option remains dominant when this payment rule is followed.
Smith draws some interesting conclusions from an analysis 
of the results of the experiments which used the three mechanisms; 
'both of the free-rider mechanisms yield public good quantities 
significantly larger than the theoretical free-rider quantity'
(p. 18) and ' the Auction Mechanism does not produce significantly 
larger quantities of a public good than the alternative mechanisms' 
(p. 18). While Smith is willing to conclude that his results 
support the claims of Brubaker (1975), that free-riding may not 
be a severe problem when unanimity exclusion is practiced, he is 
not willing to state that the absence of strong free-rider behaviour 
is a result of unanimity exclusion.
Smith's experiments, although not being able to provide firm 
evidence to suggest the precise reason for a lack of strategic
38 Note however,that this conclusion is based on an overall 
assessment of the results.  When "no agreement" experiments 
are excluded from the assessment, the Auction Mechanism 
yielded levels of provision which approximate the Lindahl 
equilibrium quantity.
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behaviour - be i t  the unanimity exclusion property, the use of the 
ex te rna l ly  contro l led pr ic ing formula or even the 'costs of th ink ing, 
ca lcu la t ing and s igna l l ing '  (Smith 1977b, p. 928) - have shown that 
the Groves and Ledyard Mechanism and the Smith Auction Process can 
produce Lindahl optimal group decisions on the quant i ty of public 
good provis ion, in the experimental sett ings used. However when 
income e f fec ts  are evident, i t  is c lear that the Smith Auction Process 
w i l l  not produce a pr ic ing structure which is Lindahl optimal 
with high income indiv iduals  tending to over-bid,and low income 
ind iv iduals  under-bidding.
In terms of the a b i l i t y  of the mechanisms to converge on 
a (weak) Nash equi l ibr ium, the point of debate which was emphasised 
in Section 3.3 as a major determinant of  the super io r i ty  of the 
Groves and Ledyard Mechanism over the Clarke Tax Mechanism, i t  
appears that convergence is achieved regu la r ly ,  whether or not income 
ef fects are present: th is  resu l t  is robust fo r  changes in a l l  
parameters involved in the experiment, except perhaps fo r  group size, 
when increasing size has been observed to increase the number of 
i te ra t ions  which are required to achieve agreement.
F in a l ly ,  i t  must be noted that the Smith Auction Process 
(SAP) has an operational counterpart. The Public Broadcasting 
Service Station Programme Co-operative in the U.S. uses a method to 
select programmes - described by Ferejohn and Noll (1976) - which 
Smith (1976) believes to have the essential features of  the SAP. 
Programme select ion is based on the stat ion managers' bids in a 
series of 12 i te ra t iv e  auctions. The two character is t ics  of 
the select ion process which correspond to the SAP a re : ( i ) i f  a 
manager f a i l s  to bid fo r  a programme, his stat ion fo r f e i t s  the pr ivate
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net benefits which would have been enjoyed had the station shown 
the programme ; and, ( i i ) a manager can veto the cost share 
allocated to him by the choices of al l  other stations. However, 
the programme selection process fa l ls  short of the complete SAP 
in that stations can only accept or reject a programme by a bid 
which is predetermined mechanically by a set cost formula.
3.4.4 Conclusions
A number of important points arise from the empirical evidence 
presented in this section:
( i )  The results of the Smith experiments indicate that the
Groves and Ledyard Mechanism and the Smith Auction Process usually
converge to a stable equilibrium which approximates the Lindahl
equilibrium. Therefore, in the experimental context i t  appears that
most individuals do act under Fane's "specif ic delusion",and that
the Nash equilibrium is stable. Given these results, the Groves
and Ledyard Mechanism and Smith Auction Process seem to be superior
to the Clarke Tax Mechanism which cannot avoid the d i f f i c u l t y  of
39being Pareto sub-optimal. I t  is important to realize that these
conclusions are specific to the experimental setting used by Smith, and 
that the results of Smith's (1980b) testing of the Auction Process 
against processes which encourage free-riding but which use a similar 
experimental framework, give support to the hypothesis that i t  is 
no t the taxing rule which produces an equivalence between competitive
39 Note however that the problem of non-Lindahl pricing under
the Smith Auction Process which was discovered by Smith (1980a) 
may result in an overall al location of resources which is sub- 
optimal to the Clarke Tax Mechanism, but i t  may also be true 
that non-Lindahl prices eventuate from the Clarke Tax Mechanism: 
no experiments have been carried out to detect this possib il i ty .
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and optimal behaviour,but ra ther , i t  may be the unanimity exclusion 
principle or the cost to respondents of calculating the strategic 
responses.
( i i )  The Blomquist (1979) study is important in demonstrating 
that the Clarke Tax Mechanism, and by inference the Groves and 
Ledyard Mechanism and the Smith Auction Process, is not suitable 
for implementation in a large scale questionnaire context. The 
existence of a severe free-rider problem is also questioned by 
Blomquist's result.
( i i i )  The Scherr and Babb (1976) study il lustrates that the 
Clarke Tax Mechanism, and therefore other demand revealing processes, 
are suitable for use in experimental circumstances other than the 
str ic t  laboratory cases which Smith features. Again,the results 
of this study are inconclusive regarding the existence of a free­
rider problem.
( iv) Finally, i t  is important to note the overall complexity 
of the mechanisms in relation to the ab i l i ty  of respondents to 
answer valuation questions which involve demand revealing processes. 
Only the Blomquist (1979) and the Randall and Brookshire (1978) 
studies have involved the general public in their use of demand 
revealing process and both studies report some d i f f icu lty  on the 
part of respondents in understanding the mechanisms.
3.5 CONCLUSIONS
Section 3.2 reviewed a number of studies concerned with the 
extent of the free-rider problem. While free-riding, or under­
stating strategic behaviour, is only one aspect of strategic bias,
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a number of points arose which are relevant to the whole range of 
strategic behaviour types, including over-stating,the bias expected 
in responses to hypothetical valuation questions which do not 
involve any payment. Specif ically, i t  was found that two factors 
may act to l im i t  the extent of al l  types of strategic bias. First,  
the number of individuals involved in the group making the decision 
concerning the level of public good provision has a v ita l affect 
on strategic behaviour: i f  the number involved is large the
effect of each individual's response is small and this w i l l  encourage 
free-riding but make over-stating relat ively ineffective. Similarly, 
i f  only small numbers are involved, the incentive to free-ride 
is diminished while over-stating would be more effective. Additionally, 
in the small numbers context, interaction between individuals 
may l im i t  the extent of both aspects of strategic behaviour, especially 
i f  individuals' responses are made public. The second l imit ing 
factor found to have general application across al l types of strategic 
behaviour is the belief,  held by Johansen, that the principle of 
honest revelation of preferences extends beyond any obvious incentive 
to te l l  the truth.
On the basis of these factors,and the results of Bohm's 
experiments, i t  is concluded that strategic behaviour is not as 
severe a l imitat ion as would be expected given Samuelson's 
exposition of the free-rider problem. However, the possibil i ty  
of strategic behaviour cannot be rejected - rather the problem can 
be moderated in circumstances dictated by the two factors, the honesty 
principle and the numbers involved. This conclusion is in support 
of the evidence concerning the presence of strategic behaviour in 
the specific context of hypothetical valuation techniques, which
132
was presented in the previous chapter. It is advisable therefore, 
that any hypothetical valuation process should be used in conjunction 
with a mechanism designed to detect ,or perferably eliminate ,any 
strategic behaviour. Ideally, this would involve the incorporation 
of an anti-strategic-behaviour mechanism into hypothetical 
valuation processes.Several demand revealing processes, although 
originating from attempts to overcome the free-rider problem 
specifically, appear to have a potential for practical implementation 
in the hypothetical valuation context. Howeversthe demand revealing 
processes reviewed in Section 3.3, the Clarke Tax and Groves and 
Ledyard Mechanism, are subject to a number of limiting problems: 
the stabil i ty of both processes' resultant equilibria is questionable; 
they may be subject to collusive misrepresentation; they do not 
provide adequate incentive for participation when group size is 
large; the Clarke tax mechanism is Pareto sub-optimal; and, the 
Groves and Ledyard mechanism makes a restrict ive assumption regarding 
individuals' behaviour.
The empirical applications of the Demand Revealing Process 
reviewed in Section 3.4 serve to allay the concerns regarding the 
stabil i ty of the processes,and appear to support the validity of the 
assumption of individuals' behaviour made by Groves and Ledyard, 
at least in the context of a laboratory experiment. However, i t  
was concluded that large scale implementation of Demand Revealing 
Processes in conjunction with hypothetical valuation techniques, 
was not a viable option for eliminating any strategic bias evident 
in the results gained from such measurement methodologies. Although 
most of the empirical studies reviewed support the results reviewed 
in Section 3.2 and in the previous chapter regarding the severity
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of the strategic behaviour problem in the situations involved, 
there remains no strong evidence to completely deny the strategic 
behaviour hypothesis. This continuing doubt regarding the 
severity of strategic bias ,together with the successful implementation 
of the demand revealing processes in experimental circumstances 
observed throughout Section 3.4, leads to the conclusion that the 
most appropriate way of addressing the strategic behaviour problem 
in the hypothetical valuation context is a sub-sampling approach 
similar to the type suggested by Clarke (1977b) and Green and 
Laffont (1977a) (1977b). This would involve the normal application 
of either the iterative bidding or direct questioning method over 
a sample of the population ,with a representative sub-sample of 
respondents being selected to answer a more detailed questionnaire 
involving the implementation of the Smith Auction Process ( as i t  
appears to be the simplest and most easily understood of all the 
demand revealing processes) so that their responses can be used 
to check for strategic bias in the main sample,and possibly to 
provide a bias correction factor. Given this approach, one of the 
most serious obstacles to the successful implementation of the 
hypothetical valuation techniques may be overcome.
CHAPTER 4
MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF NATURAL ECOSYSTEM PRESERVATION
4.1 I NTRODUCTION
The previous three chapters have been concerned w i th  p rov id ing  
the in fo rm a t ion  base f o r  the ana lys is  undertaken in t h i s  chapter - 
the c ons ide ra t ion  o f  which techniques are s u i ta b le  to  the 
measurement o f  the var ious b e n e f i t s  o f  preserved natu ra l  ecosystems. 
Chapter 1 considered b e n e f i t s ,  in a general sense, by e s ta b l i s h in g  
the we lfa re  foundat ions o f  the b e n e f i t  measurement c r i t e r i a  - the 
M arsha l l ian  consumer's surp lus  and the fo u r  H icks ian measures - and 
suggested the s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  each c r i t e r i o n  to vary ing circumstances. 
Chapter 2 used the sugges t ion ,made in  Chapter l , t h a t  the appropr ia te  
c r i t e r i a  f o r  measuring the b e n e f i t s  o f  goods which are not marketed 
d i r e c t l y ,  are the Marsha l l ian  consumer's surplus - when a s p e c i f i c a l l y  
re la te d  good is  marketed - and the Hicks ian income equ iva len t  
measures - when no such good e x i s t s  o r  when the market f o r  the 
re la te d  good can not be used to  provide usefu l  in fo rm a t ion  f o r  shadow 
p r ic e s .  S p e d f i c a l l y , t h e  chapter  discussed techniques o f  b e n e f i t  
measurement which u t i l i s e  these c r i t e r i a .  However, i t  was concluded 
t h a t  the hypo the t i ca l  v a lu a t io n  techn iques,  which r e l y  p r im a r i l y  
on the Hicks ian income e q u iv a le n t  c r i t e r i a  and are useful  in 
c i rcumstances where no re la te d  markets are in o p e ra t ion ,  are sub jec t  
to  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  producing biased b e n e f i t  es t imates caused by 
respondents behaving s t r a t e g i c a l l y .  Because o f  the p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  s t r a t e g i c  bias in  hypo the t i ca l  v a lu a t io n s ,  Chapter 3 was devoted
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to the investigation of the problem in a general context: f i r s t ,
to establish the existence and severity of strategic behaviour, 
most notably the phenomena of free-riding and secondly, to 
consider the possibility of correcting the problem if  i t  exists.
While the theoretical evidence suggested that the extent of strategic 
behaviour may be limited by factors such as the number of people 
involved and a strong preference for telling the truth, the 
conclusion reached was that the possibility of strategic bias could 
not be ignored. However,the demand revealing processes which have 
been developed to correct strategic behaviour, were found to be 
unsuitable for application on a wide scale. Rather, i t  was suggested 
that measurement using hypothetical valuation techniques should 
involve a sub-sampling procedure which uses the simplest corrective 
device, or demand revealing procedure, the Smith Auction Process, 
in an "experiment" context>to check the validity of the full 
sample response and perhaps to provide a bias correction factor.
With the array of measurement techniques so established i t  
is now possible to consider which technique (or techniques) is (are) 
suitable to the task of measuring the benefits gained from the 
preservation of natural ecosystems. To achieve a categorization 
of benefits and techniques, this chapter considers each of the eight 
benefit types defined in the Introduction - production, recreation, 
health, aesthetic, educational,gene-pool maintenance, scientific 
research and existence benefits' -  as separate identi t ies,  dealt with 
in separate sections. In each section, the benefit is carefully 
specified (so as to avoid confusion as to what is being measured, and 
hence avoid any double counting or ommissions in measurement), the
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features of the benefit which may influence the selection of a 
measurement technique are noted, and f in a l ly ,  recommendations 
are advanced regarding the appropriate technique(s).
The consideration of benefits as separate enti t ies however, 
neglects to acknowledge that many benefits of nature preservation 
are interrelated - such relationships may make i t  more convenient 
to measure the value of a group of benefits rather than using the 
separation approach. To incorporate the group valuation possib il i ty ,  
Section 4.2 considers the interrelationships existing between 
benefits, and this information is used in the following sections 
to account for each benefit type being involved in a group measurement 
process: appropriate techniques to the various aggregate
measurement tasks are suggested.
A notable exclusion from the l i s t  of benefits which are 
considered in this chapter,is the option value gained from the 
preservation of a natural area. An appendix to this chapter concludes 
that while option values for a preserved area wi l l  exist, the 
sign of each individual's option value is unpredictable: that is,
individuals may have positive or negative option values. Hence, 
even i f  across the whole community, the option values do not cancel 
out, i t  would not be appropriate to include an option value component 
in a benefit-cost calculation, because the prevailing sign would 
not be known. Option values are therefore not included as a benefit 
classif ication in this chapter.
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4.2 BENEFIT INTERRELATIONSHIPS
The benefi ts of preserved natural ecosystems are enjoyed 
primarily by three user types; pa r t i c i pa to ry , non-part icipatory 
and s c i en t i f i c .  Because each type of natural ecosystem user often 
experiences a combination of benef i t s ,  an interrelat ionship between 
benefi ts can exis t  through the user. I t  is important to take account 
of these in ter re la t ionships  when measurement is undertaken so that  
i t  is clear  exactly what benefi t  and which recipient  is under 
analysis.
Par t icipatory users are those who use natural ecosystems 
di rect ly by vis i t ing such areas.  Those who v i s i t  primarily for 
recreational  benefi ts may also enjoy health benefi ts (from the 
exercise and s t ress  relaxat ion) ,  aes thet ic  benefi ts  (from undertaking 
the recreat ion in a scenic environment), and perhaps some educational 
benefi t  (from experiencing the natural environment or from contact 
with displays of information). Other v i s i to r s  may be primarily 
motivated by aesthet ic  i n t e r e s t s , but also benefi t  from health and 
educational aspects of the natural area. Another important class 
of par t ic ipatory use in some natural areas are school, college and 
universi ty visi ts ,aimed primarily at  educational benefi ts .  Students 
on such v i s i t s  may also enjoy recreat ion,  health and aesthet ic  
benef i t s .
Scient i f ic  users are occasionally part icipatory users,  in that  
di rect  v i s i t s  to natural areas are involved, but deserve a specifical  
c lass i f ica t ion .  Research may involve the gene-pool maintained by
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the preservation of a natural area: for instance, viable drugs
or food sources may be discovered by scientists. Production 
benefits may also be the result of scientif ic research.
Non-participatory users are those individuals who do not have 
any direct contact with the natural ecosystem which has been 
preserved,but nevertheless enjoy benefits arising from the area.
First in this classification are those who receive production benefits 
through their consumption of goods produced directly from the natural 
area or from an input originating in the area. Individuals who 
enjoy l iterature or television material concerning preserved natural 
areas are consuming both aesthetic and educational benefits. In 
addition, these people may enjoy existence benefits,and such benefits 
may be received by others throughout the world given only the 
in i t ia l  knowledge of existence.
Benefit interrelationships can often be exploited when a 
measurement of the aggregate of benefits derived from a particular 
preserved natural area is required - rather than measuring each 
benefit separately and then adding them together, i t  may be more 
convenient to consider, for instance, all  participatory benefits 
using one measurement process. However, in such cases i t  is 
important to determine the range of benefits which is being considered 
so that measurement of the same benefits is not repeated using 
another technique, or so that some benefits are not inadvertently 
excluded. I t  is also important to be able to exclude some benefit 
types from an overall or grouped evaluation of benefits - for instance, 
members of the general public may not be expected to have sufficient 
information to determine their  value of scientif ic research carried 
out in preserved areas. Furthermore, a separation of benefits may
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be required i f  the optimal strategy for managing a preserved natural 
area is being debated - the relative magnitudes of specific benefit 
types is the important consideration in such circumstances.
Because of the need to carefully define benefits and techniques, 
the importance of separating some benefit types and the 
possibility of requiring individual benefit measurements, the 
remainder of this chapter is not centred on measuring the many 
possible combinations of benefits, but rather, concentrates on the 
single benefit ent i t ies ,  with the interrelationships which may occur 
between benefits being accounted for in each case.
4.3 PRODUCTION BENEFITS
Preserved natural ecosystems provide both inputs to the process 
of producing marketed goods and marketed goods themselves. For 
instance, the clear water run-off from a natural area may be used 
by farmers for irrigating crops or by pulp mills in the production 
of paper, and a preserved ecosystem may provide the breeding grounds 
for commercially caught species such as some fish and wildfowl. 
Measurement of production benefits of both of these types is 
relatively straightforward: when the good is marketed directly then
the Marshallian concept of consumer's surplus - the area under the 
ordinary demand curve - can be successfully implemented to estimate 
the benefits of provision,and when the good is a factor of production, 
the techniques outlined in Section 2.4, which value the inputs in 
terms of their effect on the welfare measures, usually the Marshallian 
consumer's surplus, in the market for the final product, can be 
employed.
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4.4 RECREATION BENEFITS
Many types of recreation activ i t ies are possible in preserved 
natural areas. They range from active to passive - for example, 
from canoeing to picnicking - and from compatible to incompatible 
in terms of maintaining the degree of "naturalness" - for example, 
from wilderness bushwalking to four-wheel-drive-touring. Depending 
on the type of goals pursued by the managers of a preserved natural 
area and its physical characteristics, different patterns of 
recreation will  occur. For instance, a coastal area which has been 
preserved primarily for existence and gene-pool benefits may exclude 
surfboard riders, whereas a specifically recreation oriented area 
would welcome visitors with such interests.
As was demonstrated in the Introduction, markets for 
recreation in natural areas seldom occur,1argely because the benefit 
provided is often d i f f ic u l t  to price exclude. In addition, 
governments may regard the jointness qualities of the benefit - 
at least up to levels of congestion - and the possibility of monopoly 
supply in cases where areas offer unique recreational attractions,  
as sufficient reasons for their supplying natural areas for recreation 
purposes. Together, these factors create a situation which 
requires recreation benefit valuation to be carried out using 
techniques other than direct market observation, as can be used in 
the case of production benefits.
The f i r s t  option available for such measurement is to exploit 
the relationships between recreation at natural areas with 
marketed goods which are either substitutes or complements, given
the u t i l i t y  condition of weak-separabi1i t y . The theoretical basis
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for this type of measurement technique was outlined in Section 
2.4.1. To carry out this technique i t  is necessary f i rs t  to 
determine the exact nature of the relationship - i t  can range from 
complementary, in the case of backpacks and tents for bushwalking"* 
in wilderness areas, to substitutive, in the case of owning a 
pool instead of swimming in a natural lake. Of course, the degree of 
such relationships is very important to ensure an accurate 
measurement of the benefit. Cl early,a swimming pool in the backyard 
is not a perfect substitute for a natural lake, but this may not be due 
to the inability of the pool recreation to substitute for the lake 
recreation - rather , i t  may be due to the addition of other benefits, 
such as aesthetic benefits, to the pure swimming benefit in the case 
of natural lake use.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, benefits are often interrelated 
through the user, and this characteristic can be exploited when the 
analyst is required to value the total use experience involving 
possibly aesthetic, health, educational as well as recreational benefit. 
For instance, the relationship between travel costs and the total 
visi t  benefit has been extensively used to value the participatory 
use of natural areas. This "travel cost" measurement method has been 
discussed in some detail in Sub-Section 2.4.2 and all that needs to 
be added at this stage is to reiterate that this method measures a l l  
the benefits gained by a visitor to a preserved natural area.
1 Note,however, that tents and backpacks are complementary goods 
to the whole bushwalking experience which almost certainly 
includes other benefits besides the pure recreation benefit.
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The use of non-market valuation methods such as direct 
questioning or iterative bidding is unlikely to be suitable for measuring 
recreation benefits when they are associated with other benefits, 
because of the difficulty of explaining to respondents just what 
they are being asked to value and the uncertainty that respondents 
are actually separating the value of their recreation benefit 
from the other benefit 's values. However these hypothetical valuation 
methods have been used to measure the whole user experience, and 
are thereforeComparable with the travel cost method. Because park 
fees can be used as an accepted mode of payment, the direct 
questioning and iterative bidding methods seem well suited to this 
type of valuation task, but the use of a demand revealing process 
in a sub-sample "experiment" context, to provide a check for strategic 
bias in the main sample, would remain advisable.
4.5 HEALTH BENEFITS
During the twentieth century the incidence of many of the 
endemic diseases such as polio, smallpox and typhoid has decreased 
markedly. However, in their place have emerged the so-called 
diseases of civilization - these are the stress related afflict ions 
such as heart diseases, high-blood pressure and some would argue, 
cancer. It is thought that the preservation of natural areas allows 
the city dweller to escape from his crowded urban environment and 
to enjoy the chance for healthy exercise in a clean environment.
Anon (1969) argues that there is a psychic, as well as a purely physical 
need of man for the preservation of natural areas, in that,  in
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addition to the physical exercise involved in activi t ies carried 
out in such areas, there is a degree of relaxation of the mind 
involved. Indeed, many people use preserved areas not for exercise, 
but purely to "recharge their mental batteries".
Because health benefits are derived by participating users, 
the reasons why we generally do not observe markets for the health 
benefits of natural areas, and hence why we must rely on valuation 
techniques which are designed for non-marketed goods, are the same 
as those which were detailed in the previous section, and in the 
Introduction, for the case of recreation benefits.
Where an individual is forced to stop work as a result of 
an illness which could have been prevented by his use of a preserved 
natural area, the value of his work - wages foregone (if  the labour 
market is not severely distorted) - can be used as a lower bound 
measure of the health benefits of preservation. It  is a lower bound 
measure because foregone wages are only one cost associated with 
an illness - i t  does not include, for instance, the costs of pain
2and suffering endured by the individual or his family and friends.
"There appear to be very few substitute goods which 
can be used for valuation purposes - with the possible exceptions 
of rather imperfect substitutes such as drugs and therapy -
2 One possibility for achieving a measure of the change in total
well-being resulting from the health benefits of a natural ecosystem 
is the use of l i t igation findings. The legal system is occasionally 
required to calculate the compensation to be paid to damaged parties 
for the loss of both physical and mental well-being. However, 
inferring values specifically for the health benefits of a natural 
ecosystem from these compensation decision would be a diff icul t  
undertaking, particularly considering the extrapolation required to 
infer values across a widely diverging society from a small number 
of l i t igat ion findings.
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and even fewer complementary goods which relate specifically to 
health benefits.
We are therefore limited to the use of hypothetical valuation 
techniques for valuing the health benefits of preserved natural 
areas. As stressed in Chapter 2, a real ist ic  questioning context 
is essential for the successful operation of a hypothetical valuation 
technique and this may be d i f f ic u l t  to achieve i f  a distinct 
measurement of health benefits is required, primarily because i t  
may be d i f f ic u l t  to formulate a real ist ic  set of questions which 
effectively separates the health benefits from participatory users' 
other benefits. More scope for measurement lies in an aggregated 
benefit approach, aimed at participatory users, of the type detailed 
in Section 4.4.
4 .6 EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS
Five sub-categories of educational benefits can be identified:
( i )  the satisfaction gained purely from any knowledge 
acquired during a v is i t  to a natural area;
( i i )  the effect on the production and consumption of 
marketed goods which may result from an educational v is i t  to a 
natural area - for instance, f i rs t  hand experience of natural means 
of reducing soil erosion may result in better farming practices;
( i i i )  the satisfaction gained from any knowledge obtained 
during the reading of books, magazines and articles and the viewing 
of films or television documentaries which are based on preserved 
natural areas;
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(iv) the effect on the production and consumption of
marketed goods resulting from individuals reading and viewing
nature related material - this includes the gains to be enjoyed
from the implementation of the results of scientific research
undertaken in natural areas for production benefits; and,
(v) the effect on non-marketed goods which results from
either participatory or non-participatory use - for instance, much
scientific research undertaken in national areas has direct implications
for the management of such areas for the provision of the whole
range of benefits including those which are not marketed.
Each of these categories of educational benefit is amenable
to different measurement techniques. The f i r s t  category of benefit
is clearly not directly marketed, for the same reasons as detailed
for the other participatory benefits. Measurement must therefore
rely on any relationships that exist with other markets and
hypothetical valuation techniques. Scope for measurement exists
using other markets in terms of the substitute goods such as books,
films and other simulations ,but the hypothetical valuation option is
again subject to the problems of separating educational benefits
from any other benefits which may occur in conjunction. However,
separation may be possible by hypothetically varying the level of
educational benefit received by a visi tor by proposing further displays,
talks by rangers etc. ,  and employing an iterative bidding sequence
3
or a direct question on that basis. The second and fourth categories
3 Even this separation may not exclude aesthetic benefits which 
are enjoyed by respondents viewing displays of educational 
material.
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both involve marketed goods and the procedures recommended in 
Section 4.3 for measuring the benefits of non-marketed inputs 
into the production process of a marketed good,can be used to 
evaluate these types of educational benefits. The third category 
involves measurement by the use of the relationship between non­
parti ci patory educational benefits and the marketed goods which are their 
complements - books, films, magazines etc.^ Finally, the measurement 
of the fifth category of educational benefits is dependent on the 
type of non-marketed benefit which results.  Again, the possibility 
of measuring participatory educational benefits within an aggregate 
of all participatory benefits must be recognized.
4.7 AESTHETIC BENEFITS
Aesthetic benefits are enjoyed by participatory users so 
long as those users' preferences favour natural scenery. Other 
individuals, who do not actually venture within the boundary of 
the natural area, may enjoy non-participatory aesthetic benefits by 
passing-by and looking at the aesthetically pleasing scenery.
Readers of "coffee-table" type books, which feature photographs 
of natural areas, also enjoy non-participatory aesthetic benefits.
Participatory aesthetic benefits will not be marketed for
5
the reasons outlined for the case of recreational benefits.
4 Again, complete separation will not be achieved. Aesthetic 
benefits are important attributes of many popular nature-based 
publications and films.
5 As was noted in the Introduction, the problem of non-excludability 
is particularly evident in the case of passers-by who gain 
aesthetic benefits.
147
Scope for valuation through related markets exists because marketed 
published material and films may be regarded as reasonable 
substitutes for the actual experience - noting,of course,the 
dif f icu lty  of separating the educational and aesthetic aspects 
of such a valuation. In addition, hypothetical valuation techniques 
may be employed for valuing participatory aesthetic benefits - 
because i t  is possible to vary the aesthetic benefits available 
from a v is i t  to a natural area, say by hypothetically providing 
additional pathways or roads to particularly scenic places which 
would otherwise be unobserved, i t  may be possible to separate, to 
some extent, aesthetic benefits from overall v is i t  benefits.
Again, the broader valuation methods aimed at measuring participatory 
benefits such as the travel cost method will  include aesthetic 
benefits in their approach. However, passers-by who enjoy the 
scenic benefits of a natural area are not included under such broad 
approaches - this situation is d i f f ic u l t  to deal with because 
interviewing respondents could prove costly, but where travellers 
who wish to enjoy the aesthetic benefits of a natural area need to 
travel by an alternative, more time consuming route, valuation may 
be possible using time as a complementary good.
Non-participatory aesthetic benefits can be valued directly 
from the markets for the books, films, magazines, etc . ,  which 
provide these benefits. However, i t  must be noted that multiple 
benefits may be derived from these goods, particularly educational
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and aesthetic benefi ts in combination. 6
4.8 GENE-POOL MAINTENANCE BENEFITS
Because environments are constantly changing, considerable 
uncertainty as to peoples' future requirements ex is ts .
Downes (1969) sees th is  uncertainty as necessitat ing the preservation 
of the widest possible range of  genetic materia l,  because with 
our present state of information, we cannot be sure which species 
may become important in the future . The requirement of a wide 
range of genetic material may not only come from a change in the 
environment, but may also come from the ingenuity of man - Anon(1969) 
points out the p o s s ib i l i t y  of  improving domestic stra ins by the 
introduction of wi ld genes, and stresses the role of the environment 
as a huge laboratory where nature conducts the rough experiments 
of natural se lec t ion ,  which can be taken and b u i l t  on by man 
to su i t  his requirements. However, once ex t in c t ,  a species cannot 
be resurrected and a l l  potential  value, be i t  in food, medicine, 
f i b re ,  fue l ,  pleasure, or even as yet unknown u t i l i t y  producing goods 
and services, is los t .  The gene-pool maintenance case is fu r the r  
argued by P h i l l ip s  (1976) in connection with the preservation of 
the Cal i fornian Tule Elk, an animal which is well adapted to semi-arid 
environments with great var ia t ions in cl imate and topography. He
6 I t  is in terest ing to note also that once the books, f i lm s ,  
magazines, e tc . ,  have been made, the natural area can be 
developed without the recip ients o f  the non-part ic ipatory aesthetic and 
educational benefi ts being affected. Hence, s t r i c t l y  speaking, 
preserved natural ecosystems are only valuable, in terms of 
these types o f ,ben e f i ts ,  fo r  the material which wi l l  be w r i t te n ,  
recorded or fi lmed using those areas in the future. Obvious 
measurement d i f f i c u l t i e s  are associated with predict ing the 
production of these goods but only to the extent to which a l l  
production benefi ts are affected.
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believes that the future demand for such a "forage to animal" 
protein convertor may well be very strong,and that if  this 
potentially valuable gene-pool becomes extinct, there could be a 
considerable loss of social benefits.
Markets are unlikely to operate for the gene-pool maintenance 
benefits provided by preserved natural ecosystems, primarily because 
of the public good characteristics of the information associated 
with discoveries concerning the gene-pool.'7 However, i t  remains 
possible to measure gene-pool maintenance benefits through the 
markets for the goods and services which may result from the use 
of the preserved genes, but this measurement task is likely to be 
exceptionally difficult  given the uncertainty of both supply and 
demand. An alternative approach, useful in the case where the good 
resulting from a maintained gene-pool is not marketed,would be to 
present a sample of respondents with information on the concept of 
gene-pool maintenance benefits and use a hypothetical valuation 
technique to estimate their income equivalent measure of consumer's 
surplus. However, i t  would be diff icult  to establish a questioning 
process which had a real ist ic context, and the problem of 
ensuring the separation of benefits would also occur, particularly 
given the close relationship between gene-pool maintenance benefits 
and scientific research benefits. A further alternative in the non-
7 As noted in the Introduction, the "merit good" argument which 
stresses the excessively myopic approach of private individuals 
and the lack of knowledge concerning the future benefits of 
maintaining a gene-pool which is characteriStic of many 
individuals, are used as points of just ification for government 
provision of natural areas.
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marketed good case could involve the calcu lat ion of  gene-pool 
maintenance benefi ts through the market fo r  substi tute goods: 
presumably, the establishment of  zoological gardens and seed banks 
could p a r t i a l l y  f u l f i l  the gene-pool maintenance purpose of natural 
areas however, these goods are only pa r t ia l  substi tutes because 
they ignore the in te rre la t ionsh ips  ex is t ing between species 
which may provide important effects  fo r  the evolutionary process. 
F ina l ly ,  l inks with s c ie n t i f i c  research benefits may be u t i l i z e d  
to provide aggregate measures of benef i ts: th is  measurement option
is pursued in the next section.
4.9 SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH BENEFITS
S c ie n t i f i c  research benefi ts can be thought of as an 
intermediate stage of benefi t  production - i t  is through research 
that future benefi ts may reach fu l f i lm e n t .  For instance, agronomists 
may develop planting patterns using observations from natural areas, 
or use a preserved gene-pool to breed new va r ie t ies ,  which reduce 
the incidence of disease. The dif ference between the y ie lds of 
old and new var ie t ies  would be the basis of valuing the benefi t  
of  research. A l te rn a t ive ly ,  a plant species under study may y ie ld  
a chemical found by experiment to cure cancer, or the study of gene- 
flow and maintenance of heterogeneity in the plant and animal 
kingdoms, may have important implicat ions for  the human population. 
Important in such research is the sett ing aside of  viable areas 
representing a l l  types of natural ecosystems to be used as bench marks
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for sc ient i f ic  investigation. Such zones could serve both as reference 
areas with which to compare developed sites and also as experimental 
laboratories of a grand scale, irreplaceable by man.
Clearly, given the relationship between gene-pool maintenance
Q
benefits and some sc ient i f ic  research, the reasons why markets 
for some scient i f ic  research benefits do not exist, are the same as 
described for the case of gene-pool maintenance benefits and the 
same d i f f icu l t ie s  which were mentioned as being expected to occur 
when measuring end-product benefits wi l l  also occur. I f ,  the good 
which results from sc ient i f ic  research in natural area is non-marketed 
the techniques of valuation via substitute goods such as laboratory 
simulation - although such substitutes are not perfect - and 
hypothetical valuation techniques - despite the problems of providing 
accurate information and separating the sc ient i f ic  benefits from 
other values - may be applicable. I t  would seem that the greatest 
scope for the measurement of sc ient i f ic  benefits using hypothetical 
valuation techniques l ies in the jo in t  consideration of sc ient i f ic  
and gene-pool maintenance benefits, where the two occur together, 
when the d i f f i c u l t y  of benefit separation and provision of a 
rea l is t ic  context are somewhat lessened.
4.10 EXISTENCE BENEFITS
Existence values have been defined by Bishop (1978) as 'the 
u t i l i t y  that people receive from simply knowing that something 
exists' (p. 15). This u t i l i t y  was recognized by Krut i l la  (1967) 
who noticed the satisfaction that many people enjoyed from the 
knowledge that parts of North America remain as wilderness areas
8 The l ink between benefits is clear: by preserving a gene-pool, 
scientists are able to research its  properties and perhaps 
produce results which induce improvements in health or material 
wel1-being.
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'even though they would be appalled by the prospect of being 
exposed to i t '  (p. 781). He also drew attention to subscriptions 
to the World Wildlife Fund as evidence of existence demand: 'these
funds are employed predominantly in an effort to save exotic 
species in remote areas of the world which few subscribers to the 
Fund ever hope to see' (p. 781). Barkley and Seekler(1972) mention 
existence demand, in reference to the blue whale: 'countless millions
of people derive pleasure from simply knowing that the whale 
exists'  (p. 131). In the case of the Tule Elk in California, Phillips 
(1976) takes care to separate existence values from other benefits 
derived from the animal, such as recreation, scientific study and 
gene-pool maintenance.
Despite the widespread recognition of the concept of existence 
value, there appears to be some confusion regarding the exact nature 
of the benefit. First ,  the category of benefits which some 
economists have called existence benefits appears to be wider than 
the s t r ic t  definition provided by Bishop and used in this study: 
for instance, Krutilla's concept cannot be claimed to represent 
existence benefits exclusively, because in the case of World Wildlife 
Fund subscriptions, which he uses as an example of existence demand, 
individuals could be valuing the benefits of gene-pool maintenance, 
the possibility of successful scientific research, or could be 
exhibiting a bequest motive for future generations to observe the 
species protected by the Fund. A similar argument applies to the 
demand Krutilla observed for preserved wilderness areas - i t  is not 
clear that this demand is purely for the existence of the wilderness, 
but rather i t  would seem likely that i t  would be a combination of 
present and future non-participatory values,and expected participatory
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values. Similarly, Barkley and Seckler (1972) do not define 
precisely their concept of the existence benefit of the blue whale 
beyond a distinction between this value and the benefits derived 
from whale products such as oil and meat. Hence, their existence 
value includes such distinct benefit types as scientific research, 
gene-pool maintenance and even aesthetic.
The second point of confusion amongst economists who have 
considered existence benefits is the distinction between option 
and existence values. Krutilla (1967), for instance, considers 
existence values to be one of a number of option values, which he 
defines as arising from the 'willingness to pay for retaining the 
option to use an area or faci l i ty that would be diff icult  or impossible 
to replace and for which no close substitute is available'  (p. 780). 
Clearly, this definition is much broader than the currently most 
widespread definition of option value, as advanced by Cicchetti and 
Freeman (1971) - option value is a risk premium to be included in 
addition to the expected value of the range of benefits provided 
by preservation - and is interpreted by Krutilla to involve the 
classification of what this thesis has defined as scientific,
g
gene-pool maintenance and existence benefits, as option values. A 
somewhat similar confusion arises in Phi l l ip ' s  (1976) analysis of the 
Tule Elk - Phillips uses the subscriptions to the Committee for the 
Preservation of the Tule Elk as a measure of the option value for
9 An analysis of why option value, as defined by Cicchetti and 
Freeman, is not included as a benefit of preservation is 
undertaken in an appendix to this chapter.
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the animal^whereas in terms of the definitions established by this 
thesis, these donations actually represent a combination of the 
current and expected values of the whole range of preservation 
benefits, including existence benefits.
One point of c la r i f ica t ion is necessary to prevent the 
emergence of another source of confusion - i t  should be recognized 
that existence value is an anthropocentric concept, in that only 
peoples' demands to know that a species or ecosystem exists are 
involved. Often, i t  is argued - for instance, by E l l io t t  (1978) - 
that animals and plants have a right to exist beyond that to which 
they are enti t led as a result of any benefits they may 
yield to man. This so-called "moral argument" is not part of 
existence demand: whereas existence demand asserts that individuals
would l ike to preserve plants and animals, the moral argument 
presents individuals with a moral imperative - we ought to preserve 
plants and animals. The distinction between the two concepts is 
further exemplified by their  implications for benefit-cost analysis: 
whereas existence benefits can be measured using the revealed 
preferences of people, the "moral benefits" can only be incorporated, 
given the benefit-cost analysis framework, by measuring the 
preferences of plants and animals. Needless to say, valuation processes 
which are complicated enough when people are involved, become even 
more so when non-human creatures are incorporated into the social 
welfare function.
As noted by Bishop (1978), existence benefits are extremely 
close to the pure Samuelsonian public good. Once a natural area 
is preserved,the knowledge of i ts  existence is available at zero
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marginal cost (or perhaps a small cost to each individual to obtain 
the information) with no congestion limits and i t  is impossible 
to exclude those who do not subscribe to the existence of the 
ecosystem (aside from some possibility of totally excluding all 
from the knowledge of existence). Clearly,no market will operate 
for existence benefits and so valuation must rely on related markets 
or hypothetical valuation techniques. However, i t  seems that there 
are no related marketed goods, with the possible exception of public 
subscription funds already mentioned and these funds provide only 
a very crude measurement base because of the interrelated "package" 
of benefits to which such funds are addressed. In addition, valuation 
through subscriptions is limited because the particular ecosystem 
or species under examination may not have been the subject of a 
fund raising operation.10 It is therefore most likely that valuation 
of existence benefits beyond any valuation involving the full range 
of benefits, would necessitate the use of hypothetical valuation 
techniques, noting of course the difficult ies of excluding other 
benefits, and of providing a real ist ic context for questioning, as 
well as the need to substantiate any benefit estimate with a 
"demand revealing process" sub-sample experiment.
4.12 CONCLUSIONS
While i t  has been demonstrated in this chapter that a number 
of the benefits of preserving natural ecosystems can be valued using
10 Of course, the accuracy of valuations based on subscriptions
is debatable because of the possibility of free-riding behaviour.
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direct or indirect relationships with marketed goods, and indeed 
some benefits are themselves marketed, many of the benefits arising 
from the provision of these areas enter directly into the individual's 
u t i l i t y  function without being marketed and without satisfactory 
relationships with any marketed goods: the measurement of these
benefits must rely on the use of hypothetical valuation techniques. 
These techniques, particularly the iterative bidding method and 
direct questioning, with the appropriate strategic bias detection 
sub-sample, are also useful where i t  is found that the markets, to 
which some non-marketed benefits are related, are subject to severe 
distortions or where i t  is necessary to carry out valuation cross­
checks when related goods are not perfect substitutes or complements.
This chapter has also stressed the interrelationships which 
exist between benefits and concluded that in many cases, benefit 
measurement may be better carried out by considering groups of 
benefits ,rather than by considering each classification separately» 
when a valuation of the total benefits of the preservation of a 
particular natural area is required. However, in such an overall 
valuation exercise, i t  is important to exercise care to ensure that 
the groups of benefits do not overlap, particularly as i t  would be 
almost inevitable that a number of different valuation methods would 
be involved: precision of benefit definition is therefore vital
to the measurement process.
Finally, the techniques suggested in this chapter as being 
suitable for the measurement of natural ecosystem preservation 
benefits all  stress the role of information provision. Any measurement 
process which attempts to forecast the welfare effects of a resource
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allocation change must be in the position to use accurate data on 
the physical responses involved as a basis: for instance, before
i t  is possible to estimate the benefits of providing a preserved 
natural ecosystem i t  is essential that the results of that 
preservation, in terms of how much recreation will  be available, 
which species will  be saved that will  otherwise be destroyed, etc.,  
are known. The role for scientists, technologists, physicians, 
etc . ,  is clearly established.
Despite the problems which are associated with the various 
techniques and their implementation, i t  can be concluded that 
potential exists for measuring the benefits of preservation to provide 
useful information for decision makers. However, i t  is clear from 
the material presented in this chapter, and the review of measurement 
techniques carried out in Chapter 2, that while this potential has 
been largely realized in the case of measuring participatory benefits 
in aggregate - both through the use of the travel cost and hypothetical 
valuation techniques - non-participatory benefits have been somewhat 
neglected. While i t  has been shown that the non-participatory 
aesthetic, educational, scientific research and gene-pool maintenance 
benefits are amenable to measurement using well established 
techniques, often including valuation directly from the market, 
existence benefits appear to present a particular problem to the 
benefit-cost analyst. Not only is i t  unlikely that any method other 
than hypothetical valuation will  be suited to the measurement task , 
but the di f f icu lty  of creating a real ist ic  context within which to 
establish an iterative bidding or direct questioning process appears 
to be especially l imiting. I t  can be concluded therefore, that the 
main problem facing the analyst attempting to measure the benefits
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of natural ecosystem preservation is the assertion of existence
values.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
OPTION VALUE
A notable  except ion from the cons ide ra t i on  of  the measurement 
of  the be ne f i t s  of  na tura l  ecosystem prese rva t ion  undertaken in 
Chapter 4 was the concept  of  opt ion va lue ,  a term int roduced by 
Weisbrod (1965) to desc r ibe  the d i f f e r enc e  between the pr i ce  a 
person was w i l l i ng  to pay to ensure the cont inued a v a i l a b i l i t y  
of  a good which is sub j ec t  to i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  and t h e i r  expected 
value of  actual  use.  Both Weisbrod5and Cicche t t i  and Freeman (1971) 
argued t h a t  t h i s  opt ion value would be p o s i t i v e ,  thus undermining 
the convent ional  approach of investment  appra i sa l  which considers  
only the  expected value,  and hence n e c e s s i t a t i n g  the i nc lus ion  of 
a f u r t h e r  b e n e f i t  to be considered when choosing between developing 
and preserving a na tura l  ecosystem. To explain why such a b e n e f i t  
has n o t been included in t h i s  ana l ys i s  i t  is necessary to analyse 
c a r e f u l l y  the Cicche t t i  and Freeman argument.
The p o s i t i ve  opt ion value was suggested to a r i s e  because of 
the need fo r  a r i s k  premium when s oc i e ty  i s  assumed to be made up 
of  predominant ly r i s k  averse  i nd i v i du a l s .  For i n s t a nce ,  cons ider  
the example of  a choice to be made between the p rese r va t i on  of an 
area of  land conta ining an endangered species  ,and the c l ea r i ng  of  
the area for  i n d u s t r i a l  use.  Let us assume t h a t  the development 
opt ion has the i r r e v e r s i b l e  e f f e c t  of  making the species  e x t i n c t .  
Furthermore,  the development be ne f i t s  are  well def ined and the only 
problem facing the b e n e f i t - c o s t  a na l ys t  i s  the assessment  of  the 
p rese rva t ion  b e n e f i t s ,  a t a sk  which is c a r r i e d  out  by asking for  
each i n d i v i d u a l ' s  wi l l i ngnes s  to pay to keep the na tura l  area in a
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preserved state. If Y is the individual's income and D is the 
available quantity of the endangered species, such that d represents 
the species being preserved and d indicates that the species is 
made extinct, then the willingness to pay, or compensating variation,
CV, can be defined by the equation:
U (Y-CV,d) = U (Y,d) . . .  (1)
where U (x-pX^) is the individual's u t i l i ty  function for income, 
x-j, and the species availabili ty,  x .^
Hence, under an assumption of demand certainty, the choice 
between development or preservation is simply a question of whether 
ECVn, the sum of all individual's compensating variations, is smaller 
or larger than the benefits arising from development. However, if  
the individual is uncertain about his future preferences for the 
endangered species, i t  is necessary to complicate this analysis by 
involving alternative possible preference patterns. This is achieved 
by assuming that two states of ths- world may eventuate: one (1) in
which the individual has strong preference for preserving the species; 
and the other, (2), in which the individual is indifferent between 
having the species preserved or i t  being extinct. Hence, the equation: 
Ui (Y.-CV.,d) = U .  (Y.,d ) i = 1,2 . . .  (2)
is able to provide information the CV for each possible state of 
the world, i ,  from which can be derived expected willingness to 
pay, E ( C V):
E (CV) = ( ttC V ,  +  ( 1 — t t)CV2) ••• (3)
where tt is the probability of state of the world 1 occurring.
The Weisbrod/Cicchetti and Freeman objection to using E (CV) as 
a measure of preservation benefits a r is^  because i t  is an ex-post
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evaluation of willingness to pay, calculated after the state of 
the world is known - they argued that people might be willing to pay 
more now for preserving the species than E(CV) because i t  would 
eliminate the uncertainty associated with their future preferences.
Hence they defined the option p r ic e , OP, as the amount an individual 
would be prepared to pay, whatever the state of the world, to 
ensure d rather than d:
ttU-j (Y1 -OP,d) + (1-ti) U2(Y2-0P,d) = 7,U1(Y1,d) + (l-n) U^Y^d)1
. . .  (4)
Therefore, while CV-j and CM^ pertain specifically to the 
two states of the world, OP is an ex-ante measure of willingness 
to pay corresponding to a strategy of the individual committing 
himself to pay OP for the species preservation, no matter what his 
preferences will be. Weisbrod's init ial  assertion that OP must be 
greater than E(CV) is based on the notion of a risk premium analogous 
to the following situation. Suppose that the E(CV) for the individual 
is as described by Equation 3. Two possible outcomes can therefore 
occur: Y-CV^  and Y-CV^ , given the simplying assumption that Y-j =Y^
(but not that U^ (Y) = U^Y)). In Figure 4.A.1 the probability 
of Y-CVp occurring, 1-tt, is assumed to be the ratio AD:AB and so 
the extent of E(CV) is given by Y-E(CV) below D. However, the 
expected u t i l i ty  of the two outcomes, V*, is given by the U(Y) function, 
and so i t  is established that the individual's willingness to pay 
to avoid the risk is Y-OP - clearly OP is greater than E(CV) and
1 Note that the only uncertainty relates to the individual's 
future preferences and hence about his willingness to pay. 
There is no uncertainty about whether the resource will be 
available - that is the resource allocation question which is 
being addressed.
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Y-OP Y- E(C V]
I ncome
Fjgure 4.A.1: A Positive Option Value.
hence the difference between the two, the option value, is positive.
The risk premium argument is correct, however, only for 
a world in which peoples' u t i l i t y  functions involve only one 
variable, usually income. In the case the option value, 
there are three variables - income, the avai labi l i ty  of the 
resource,and the state of the world - and the u t i l i t y  of income 
curve il lustrated in Figure 4.A.1, is a function not only of income 
but of the other variables as well. The result is that i t  cannot 
be concluded that OP will  be greater than E(CV) in general, and
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therefore option value can take on any sign. To i l lustrate that
option value can either be positive or negative, i t  is useful
2
to consider the scenario used by Henry (1974b). By assuming, 
for simplicity that U(Y^, d) = U(Y2 ,d) for all Y and that 
Tr =  1 — tt = 0.5, Henry re-expresses the option price equation (Equation 
4) as follows:
U-j (Y-OP ,d) + ü2( Y-OP) = U-j (Y ,d) + U2(Y2) . . .  (5)
From Equation 5 i t  is possible to construct a decision 
matrix ,simi1ar to those used in Chapter 2 to describe the u t i l i t y  
valuation technique. Table 4.A.1 depicts this matrix.
State of Option Price
Not Paid Pa i dthe World
1 U,(Y,d) U-| (Y-OP ,d)
2 u2( y ) U2(Y-0P)
Table 4.A.1: Option Price Decision Matrix.
The decision facing the individual is whether he should 
pay the option price, and hence receive d rather than d, given a 
50% chance that he will  value the species i f  i t  is preserved. From 
Table 4.A.1 i t  is clear that i f  he does not pay OP then there is 
a 50% chance of wanting d and not getting i t ,  U-j (Y ,d ) , and a 50% 
chance of not getting i t  and not wanting i t ,  U2(Y). Similarly,
2 Although this analysis uses the scenario established by 
Henry (1974b), the option value issue is approached in a 
different way.
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i f  he does pay OP, the probability of wanting d and getting i t ,
U i (Y-OP, d), is 0 .5 ,and the same probability applies to him not 
wanting d but getting i t  anyway, U^Y-OP). The individual then 
chooses OP so that the certainty equivalent of the "paid" choice 
is equal to the certainty equivalent of the "not paid" choice - 
in other words, Equation 5 is satisfied by the choice of the option 
price.
Assume in i t ia l l y  that the individual is risk neutral and 
hence that i t  is possible to substitute E(CV) for OP wherever i t  
occurs in Table 4.A.I .  Now i f  the individual has a ranking for 
the four outcomes possible in Table 4.A.1 such that:
U2(Y2-0P) < U2(Y2) < U1(Y] ,d) < U1(Y] -0P,d) 
the variance in u t i l i t y  associated with the outcomes which could 
result from paying the option price is clearly greater than the 
variance associated with the no payment outcomes. Hence i f  the 
individual becomes risk-averse, he will  value the "paid" outcomes 
relat ively less than the "not paid" outcomes and the equality 
required by Equation 5, given E(CV) substituting for OP, will  not 
hold. To ensure this equality, the individual will  reduce his OP 
below E(CV) and a negative option value will  result. In general, a 
negative option value will occur whenever the difference between 
U-| (Y-OP, d) and U^fY-OP) is greater than the difference between 
U-|(Y-|,d) and U2(Y). To i l lustrate the reverse case, consider the 
ranking of outcomes:
U-j (Y,d) < U-| (Y-OP,d) ,  < U2(Y-0P) < U2(Y)
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Now the variance associated with the "not paid" outcomes 
is greater than the variance in u t i l i t y  i f  OP is paid,and the 
individual who has become risk averse will  be prepared to increase 
the option price he is willing to pay above E(CV) to maintain the 
equality specified'in Equation 5: a positive option value results.
In general, a positive option value will  occur whenever the 
difference between U-j (Y-OP,d) and U^tY-OP) is less than difference 
between U-j (Y,d) and U^Y).
The conclusion that the size and sign of the option value 
associated with the preservation decision are unpredictable has 
the implication that while the use of expected values is almost 
certaintly inaccurate for the individual, their use is satisfactory 
for calculating the range of preservation benefits over society as 
a whole.^ Using this rationale, the consideration of the benefits 
of natural ecosystem preservation carried out in Chapter 4, did not 
introduce any specific option value component. However i t  must be 
stressed that this does not imply that option value does not exist, 
rather i t  implies that the effects of option value cancel each 
other out,or when they do not sum to zero, the predominant sign can 
not be predicted.
4 Note, as Henry (1974b) points out, that the option value 
argument is quite independent of irreversibi 1i t y . Rather he 
suggests (Henry (1974a)) that option value - or "quasi option 
value" - can be gained by a society which chooses the 
reversible decision, preservation, because only then can 
future information, regarding the optimal resource allocation 
strategy, be of any use.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: PART I
Part I has considered the theoretical aspects of measuring 
the value which the community places on the benefits of preserving 
areas of natural ecosystems. The techniques which have been 
assessed as being suitable to the task of measuring individual benefit 
types and groups of interrelated benefits have been detailed,with 
particular reference to any difficult ies which may be involved in 
their practical application.
Chapter 1 established the theoretical basis for considering 
the measurement techniques:
(i) Benefits arising from the consumption of a good, can be 
defined in terms of the area under an individual's ordinary demand 
curve.
(i i) For the case of a benefit arising from a price fal l ,  the 
compensating v a r ia t io n  (based on the compensated demand curve) is 
more appropriate than the consum er's su rp lu s  (based on the ordinary 
demand curve).
( i i i )  For the case of a benefit arising from an increase in the 
supply of a good which is provided at zero price by the government, 
the compensating su rp lu s  is the appropriate measure.
( iv) When the property right to the area of natural ecosystem 
under consideration is not defined, i t  is not clear if  the resource 
allocation question should be asked so that preservationists be 
the losers or the gainers (that is ,  i f  they require hypothetical 
compensation or be required to make hypothetical payments). However, 
because the e q u iv a le n t v a r ia t io n  and su rp lu s  measures (which are 
appropriate when the property right is defined in the resource 
allocation which eventuates from the implementation of a proposal),
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are not s ig n i f ic a n t ly  d i f fe re n t  from the compensating var ia t ion and 
surplus (and the comparable consumers' surplus in most cases),the 
problem of property r igh t  d e f in i t io n  is concluded to be of 
reduced importance.
(v) Pract icab i1i t y  is hence most important in the choice an 
appropriate benefi t  measure, and in most cases, the consumer's surplus 
is easier to estimate than the comparable Hicksian measures.
(v i ) An important exception to th is  conclusion, and one that 
appl ies p a r t i c u la r ly  in the case of measuring preserved natural 
ecosystem benef i ts ,  occurs when an ordinary demand curve cannot be 
observed, p r in c ip a l l y  when the benefi t  is not marketed.
( v i i )  Two measurement a l te rnat ives are avai lable when a benefi t  
is not marketed: f i r s t ,  i t  may be possible to impute a demand
re la t ionship  fo r  the non-marketed good i f  i t  is related to a marketed 
good; and secondly, the income equivalent approach to calculat ing 
the Hicksian measures can be adopted, noting the p o s s ib i l i t y  of 
ind iv iduals misrepresenting th e i r  true preferences.
Chapter 2 carr ied out a review of measurement techniques which 
are based on valuation through related markets and income equivalence 
questioning.
( i )  Non-monetary techniques are inadequate because they are 
non-comparable and do not provide measures of value which are in 
accordance with the pr inc ip les establ ished in Chapter I.
( i i )  The opportunity cost c r i te r io n  is not a measurement 
technique but does provide a superior way of presenting non-monetary 
valuation information to the decision maker.
( i i i )  Valuation through related markets is stra ightforward when 
the non-marketed good is used as a fac tor  in the production of a 
marketed good. The f ina l  good market can be used to calculate consumer's
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surplus measures of the benefits involved.
( i v ) When non-marketed benefits enter directly into the 
individual's u t i l i t y  function, valuation through related markets is 
only possible when this function is "weakly separable". In such cases, 
the special relationships existing when goods are close substitutes 
or complements greatly fac i l i ta te  measurement.
(v) When the level of consumption of a non-marketed good, 
di rect ly  enjoyed by an individual, can be varied through the 
purchase of a marketed good, i t  may be possible to use the "hedonic 
prices" technique to estimate the consumer's surplus arising from 
the provision of the non-marketed good.
(v i ) Applications of the related market valuation techniques 
indicate a wide degree of acceptance over a large variety of situations. 
In particular, the travel cost method has been extensively used to 
value the recreational benefits of preserved natural areas.
(v) Of the income equivalent or hypothetical valuation methods, 
both the u t i l i t y  valuation approach and the pr ior i ty  evaluator 
technique are severely limited because of time and expense involved 
in their  application. In addition the u t i l i t y  valuation approach can 
only be used when the goods used in the questioning process conform 
to the assumption of " s t r ic t  addi t iv i ty" .
(vi) The iterative bidding method, another technique based on 
income equivalence, has been used extensively but has been crit ic ized 
on the basis of the possible presence of five biases: strategic,
hypothetical, starting point, respondent fatigue, and payment mode.
The provision of a rea l is t ic  context for the questioning process is 
important to the minimization of hypothetical and strategic bias.
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(v i i )  Direct questioning hypothetical valuation overcomes the 
problems of starting point and respondent fatigue bias, but the possibility  
of strategic bias may be increased. Direct questioning is also superior 
to the iterative bidding method in that i t  is easier and cheaper to apply.
( v i i i )  The choice between the iterative bidding method and 
the direct questioning technique depends on the trade-off between 
the elimination of starting point and respondent fatigue, and the 
reduction in expense offered by direct questioning, and the possibility 
of reduced strategic/hypothetical bias provided by the iterative  
bidding method.
Chapter 3 extended the review of the reali ties of the strategic 
behaviour problem and examined the possibility of eliminating the 
strategic bias from hypothetical valuations using demand revealing 
processes, to further assess the usefulness of the iterative bidding and 
direct questioning methods.
( i )  The under-stating aspect of strategic behaviour, or 
free-riding, is limited in reali ty  by three factors: f i r s t ,  an
extension of the principle of honesty; secondly, by peer group 
pressure when the number of people involved is small; and thirdly,  
by the dynamics of learning by experience.
( i i )  Bohm's results,also suggest that strategic behaviour may. 
not be as severe a problem as expected in theory.
( i i i )  However, i t  is clear that no firm evidence to deny 
strategic behaviour»across all individuals ,is available. Therefore, 
hypothetical valuation techniques should ideally involve a demand 
revealing process to ensure the correct revelation of preferences.
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( i v ) Demand revealing processes present each individual with 
a choice between accepting the decision regarding the level of publ ic 
good provision made by a group without the person, and changing 
that decision by paying an amount equal to the costs incurred by 
the others in the group in th e i r  accepting his proposal.
(v) Both the Clarke Tax and Groves and Ledyard Mechanisms, 
the two most widely accepted demand reveal ing processes, are subject 
to the problems created by agents act ing in col lus ion, and provide 
l i t t l e  incentive fo r  respondents to par t ic ipa te  when the number of 
people involved is large.
(v i )  The Clarke Tax Mechanism is not Pareto optimal and may 
not produce a stable Nash equi l ibr ium when the income e la s t i c i t y  of 
demand is pos i t ive.
( v i i )  The Groves and Ledyard Mechanism may not produce a stable 
Nash Equil ibr ium even when the income e la s t i c i t y  of demand is zero 
and requires respondents to act under a "spec i f ic  delusion".
( v i i i )  The Smith experiments have indicated that the Groves 
and Ledyard Mechanism is stable, with respondents appearing to behave 
as assumed. Hence the Groves and Ledyard Mechanism (and i t s  de r iva t ive ,  
the Smith Auction Process.) is superior to the Clarke Tax Mechanism.
( i x ) Smith also shows that s t ra teg ic  behavior may not be 
el iminated by his Process>but that over-stat ing behaviour cancels out 
any under-stat ing behaviour. He also questions the extent to which 
"unaniminity exclusion" is responsible fo r  t ru th fu l  revelat ion of 
preferences.
(x) Blomquist's study shows that demand reveal ing processes 
are, in general, not sui table fo r  large scale appl ica t ion ,wh i1e the
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Scherr and Babb, and Smith studies demonstrate the suitabil i ty of 
the processes to small scale "experiments".
(xi) Hypothetical valuation techniques should be used in 
conjunction with a sub-sample Smith Auction Process (the process 
respondents appear to understand most fully).
Chapter 4 considered, on the basis of the information 
presented in the previous three chapters, which techniques are best 
suited to the measurement of particular benefits,and groups of 
interrelated benefits, of natural ecosystem preservation.
(i) Production B e n e f i ts  can usually be valued using the 
markets for the benefits themselves,or the markets for end product 
goods,to estimate consumer's surplus measures.
(i i )  Recrea tion  B e n e f i t s , in isolation, may be valued 
approximately using the markets for substitute and complementary goods
such as swimming pools and tents. However, more scope for measurement
■\
is evident when recreation benefits are considered within the 
aggregate of participatory benefits, particularly using the travel 
cost method and hypothetical valuation techniques.
( i i i )  Health B e n e f i t s  may be approximately measured as separate 
enti t ies using the wages foregone method, or the markets for 
substitute goods such as drugs and therapy. Measurement is likely 
to be more accurate i f  these benefits are considered in aggregate 
with other participatory benefits.
(iv) Educational B e n e f i t s  may be separated for approximate 
measurement by considering the market for the goods providing the 
benefit such as books and films in the case of a non-participatory 
benefit, or by using hypothetical valuation techniques based on changes
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in the level of information provided at preserved natural areas, 
when the benefit is derived from visitation. The benefits of 
both visi t  and non-visit based education,may be reflected in the 
markets for other goods,and measurement within the aggregated 
participatory benefits may also be possible.
(v) A e s th e t ic  B e n e f i t s  enjoyed by visitors may be valued using 
hypothetical valuation methods based on providing better views, or 
in aggregate,with all other participatory benefits. Non-participatory 
aesthetic benefits may be measured using the markets for the books 
and films which supply the benefit.
( v i ) Gene-Pool Maintenance B e n e f i t s  and S c i e n t i f i c  Research 
B e n e f i t s  appear to be diff icult  to separate for measurement purposes.
The markets for goods which result from these activi t ies appear to 
be the most promising measurement option with hypothetical valuation 
being required if  the resultant good is public.
(vii) E xis tence  B e n e f i t s , because of their apparently complete 
separation from established markets, must be measured using hypothetical 
valuation techniques, in particular,  the direct questioning method 
with a Smith Auction Process sub-sample experiment to detect any 
strategic bias present.
(viii) While aggregated participatory benefits have been 
measured successfully using both the travel cost and hypothetical 
valuation methods, l i t t l e  empirical work has been carried out on the 
non-participatory benefits.
(x) Of the non-participatory benefits of nature preservation, 
only the existence benefits appear to present particular difficult ies.  
The assertion of existence values, particularly when a proposal to 
preserve an area of natural ecosystem involves the limitation of 
visi tat ion,  is the main problem confronting the benefit-cost analyst.
P A R T  TI
INTRODUCTION TO PART II
Par t  I of  t h i s  t h e s i s  has cons idered ,  in a general  context ,  
the range of  b e ne f i t s  which are l i k e l y  to be provided by a preserved 
na tura l  ecosys tem, and the techniques  which have been e s t ab l i shed  to 
e s t i mate  the wel fare  s ign i f i c ance  of  a change in the level  of  provis ion 
of  these  b e n e f i t s .  I t  was noted t h a t  the measurement of  p a r t i c i p a t o r y  
b ene f i t s  - those be ne f i t s  which involve people v i s i t i n g  a preserved 
area - i s  well e s t a b l i s h e d  both in theory and p r a c t i c e .  However, 
even though the n o n - p a r t i c ip a to r y  b e ne f i t s  of  p re se rva t ion  were de f ined ,  
and methods suggested for  t h e i r  measurement,  p r a c t i ca l  a pp l i c a t i o n s  
were found to be scarce .  The dear th  of  case s t ud i e s  involving 
the measurement of  n o n - p a r t i c ip a to r y  b e ne f i t s  can of t en  be explained by the 
r e l a t i v e  i n s i gn i f i ca nce  of  t h i s  type of  b e n e f i t :  i t  i s  not  necessary 
to measure the n o n - p a r t i c i pa t o r y  b e ne f i t s  of  p re se rva t ion  when the 
p a r t i c i p a t o r y  b e ne f i t s  alone are g r e a t e r  than the c os t s .  However, 
i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  many proposals  to preserve na tura l  a reas  involve a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  propor t ion of  b e ne f i t s  which accrue to people o the r  than 
the d i r e c t  user s .  In p a r t i c u l a r  b e n e f i t - c o s t  analyses  of  the 
p rese rva t ion  of  wi lderness  a r e a s ,  where v i s i t a t i o n  i s  s t r i c t l y  l i m i t ed ,  
wi l l  be inadequate when rion-part i  ci patory b e ne f i t  measurements are 
not  incorpora ted .
Despi te the s c a r c i t y  of  case s t ud i e s  involving n o n - v i s i t o r  
ed uca t i on a l ,  a e s t h e t i c ,  s c i e n t i f i c  r e sea r ch ,  and gene-pool maintenance 
b e n e f i t s ,  Chapter 4 showed t h a t  po t en t i a l  fo r  measuring these  
b en ef i t s  e x i s t s .  The main problem in measuring the be ne f i t s  of 
na tura l  ecosystem prese rva t ion  was concluded to be the a s s e r t i o n
174
of existence demand. Not only has some confusion arisen in the 
d e f in i t io n  of the existence value concept, but l i t t l e  has been done 
to establ ish i t s  magnitude.
Given that the de f in i t ion a l  problems involving existence 
values have been addressed in Part I ,  i t  is the aim of Part I I  to 
consider the p r a c t i c a l i t i e s  of measuring the existence values, held 
by a sample of Canberra residents, of a pa r t icu la r  preserved natural 
ecosystem, Nadgee Nature Reserve on the fa r  South Coast of N.S.W.
In Chapter 4 i t  was recommended that d i rec t  questioning, 
implemented in conjunction with a Smith Auction Process sub-sample 
experiment to determine the extent of the stra teg ic  behaviour problem, 
was the most appropriate technique fo r  measuring existence values.
One task which must be addressed by th is  part therefore, is the 
consideration of the a b i l i t y  of th is  technique to provide useful 
measurements of existence values. This exercise must be considered 
in apposition with the main purpose of  th is  part - the establishment of 
the magnitude of the existence values of Nadgee Nature Reserve - 
because i t  is c lear that i f  the technique cannot be regarded as 
successful,then the resul tant measurements cannot be treated with any 
confidence.
Nadgee Nature Reserve was chosen fo r  the case study because 
i t  possesses a number of features important to the achievement of 
the aims of th is  part. F i r s t ,  because the area is managed pr imar i ly  
fo r  i t s  non-part ic ipatory values, p a r t i c u la r ly  i t s  existence values, 
i t  can be regarded as a case in which existence values are l i k e l y  
to make up a considerable proportion of the area's overa l1 benef i ts , 
and hence play a key role in the economic ra t ionale of  i t s  continued
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preservation. It can therefore be argued, that i f  existence values, 
in general, are ever significantly positive, then they will be 
detected in Nadgee Nature Reserve. The second reason for using 
Nadgee for the case study also involves i ts pattern of management.
In Chapter 2, i t  was stressed that a real ist ic context is an essential 
component of any successful hypothetical valuation question. Because 
the aim of this part is to consider the measurement of existence 
benefits specifically, i t  was necessary to choose a case study where 
these values could be analysed in isolation, but where the context 
of questioning remained real ist ic.  Clearly, any questioning process 
which totally isolates existence benefits is unrealistic: presumably,
this would involve taking an area of preserved ecosystem and 
launching i t  into space where, although i t  would always exist,  no- 
one would ever be able to see i t  or derive any other benefit from 
i t ,  beyond the knowledge of i ts continued existence. It was decided 
that the only possibility for isolating existence benefits, while 
maintaining a real ist ic context, was to base questioning on an 
hypothetical area of preserved natural ecosystem which would couple 
the reality of an actual Reserve with the hypothetical constraints 
needed to isolate this particular benefit. Because the management 
strategy employed at Nadgee places limitations on participatory 
use, while concentrating on the provision of the non-participatory 
benefits, the Reserve was regarded as an ideal base on which to build 
the hypothetical area concept.
This part of the thesis begins in Chapter 5, with a description 
of all the benefits of Nadgee Nature Reserve. Not only does this 
description define the nature of the existence values of the Reserve, 
but i t  places these values in perspective, and provides a sound base
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for the consideration of the design of the hypothetical area concept.
The questionnaire»which was constructed on the basis of the direct 
questioning of individuals regarding their willingness to pay for 
the existence values supplied by the hypothetical area,is detailed 
in Chapter 6. The mechanics of sampling and surveying the Canberra 
population are briefly noted in Chapter 7, together with an analysis 
of the representativeness of the sample, and an introduction to the 
characteristics of the respondents. The analysis of the data 
obtained from the survey is carried out in Chapters 8 and 9. Chapter 
8 is primarily concerned with presenting information relating to 
the distribution of respondents' willingness to pay bids,but also 
includes an analysis of the effect on existence values of the level 
of information provision and the degree of species rari ty,  and some 
observations on the relationship between respondents' choices of 
payment mode and their willingness to pay. Chapter 9 contains an analysis 
of the factors which may explain respondents' willingness to pay.
Two types of studies are involved: f i r s t ,  the decision whether or
not to bid anything for existence benefits is considered using 
crosstabulation and discriminant analyses; and secondly, an explanation 
of positive bids is undertaken using crosstabulation and multiple 
regression analyses. The second stage in the estimation of existence 
values, the Smith Auction Process sub-sample experiment, is described 
in Chapter 10. However, in addition to the results concerning the 
presence of strategic-behaviour which can be ascertained from the 
experiment, the chapter also considers a number of analyses aimed at 
detecting strategic bias, which use data collected during the main survey. 
Finally, a summary of the conclusions, established during Part II is
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presented. Many of the conclusions relate not only to the specific 
context of the Nadgee case study but also to the general conclusions 
established during Part I.
CHAPTER 5
THE BENEFITS OF NATURAL ECOSYSTEM PRESERVATION: NADGEE NATURE RESERVE
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The f i r s t  task in the process o f  using the d i r e c t  ques t ion ing  
method to  measure the value o f  ex is tence b e n e f i t s  is  the 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  the b e n e f i t  - in o ther  
words,  the quest ion  "what is  being measured?"., must be answered.
The d e l in e a t io n  o f  the ex is tence b e n e f i t s  gained by the community 
from the cont inued p rese rva t ion  o f  Nadgee Nature Reserve - an area 
o f  land on the f a r  South Coast o f  New South Wales,managed by the 
New South Wales Nat iona l  Parks and W i l d l i f e  Service (NSWNPWS) (see 
Figure 5.1)^ - is  the re fo re  the pr imary purpose o f  t h i s  chapter .  
However, in a d d i t io n  to desc r ib ing  Nadgee's ex is tence va lues ,  the 
o the r  b e n e f i t s  provided by the Nature Reserve are a lso d e ta i l e d .
While in a s t r i c t  sense i t  is  necessary to  cons ider  the f u l l  range 
o f  Nadgee's b e n e f i t s  on ly  i f  a t o t a l  b e n e f i t  est imate is  to be 
made, f o r  the purposes o f  the ex is tence value measurement task 
c a r r ie d  out by t h i s  t h e s i s ,  such a cons ide ra t ion  is  impor tant  f o r  
two reasons: f i r s t ,  the ex is tence b e n e f i t s  are placed in perspect ive
by the implementat ion o f  the b e n e f i t  c a te g o r i z a t io n  process developed
1 A d e ta i le d  account o f  the h i s t o r y ,  c l im a te ,  geology, topography, 
vege ta t ion ,  and fauna o f  Nadgee Nature Reserve can be found in 
New South Wales Nat ional  Parks and W i l d l i f e  Service (1969).
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Source: N.S.W. National Parks and Wildlife Service,  Nadgee Nature 
Reserve, Pamphlet, December 1976.
Figure 5 .1 : Nadgee Nature Reserve.
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in Chapter 4; and secondly, a sound base is provided for the 
analysis of the problem of separating existence values from the 
other benefits, which must be faced when designing the questionnaire 
to be used to implement the direct questioning valuation process.
This chapter is structured, therefore, so that the benefits other 
than existence values are outlined in Sections 5.2 to 5.8, with 
the existence benefits being described in detail in Section 5.9.
5.2 PRODUCTION BENEFITS
There are few, i f  any direct gains to physical production 
resulting from Nadgee being maintained as a Nature Reserve. I t  
is true that the existence of relat ively pollution-free estuaries 
helps the breeding cycle of commercially caught f ish, but at 
presentthere are s t i l l  many other estuaries along the coast which 
are suff ic ient ly  unpolluted to maintain this function.
I t  is also believed (Fox (1978b))that i f  a marine extension 
was added to Nadgee, suff ic ient abalone larvae, being free moving, 
would be bred in the reserve to supply fisherman for up to 50 
miles away, both in a northerly and a southerly direction. Such 
reserves have been established along the African coast and appear to 
be successful. The decline in abalone stocks on the South Coast 
of New South Wales in recent years, i l lustrates the value of breeding 
reserves»particularly as stocks regenerate only slowly.
A cost associated with Nadgee is the outlay involved for 
its  maintenance and administration. Up until  1977, a fu l l - t ime 
Park Ranger was located at Nadgee, however now, only a Park Worker
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is employed. In addi t ion, s ta f f  are located at Eden to serve a l l  
the NSWNPSW areas in the region, a proportion of whose duties 
concern Nadgee. S im i la r ly ,  Head Off ice in Sydney devotes a number 
of man hours each year to Nadgee's administrat ion. This employment 
causes mult ip le  effects  ,pr imar i ly  on the local economy Jn addition 
to the more d i rec t  effects  caused by contracts l e t  to local business 
fo r  improvement works. In an economy which has i t s  resources 
f u l l y  employed, these items must a l l  be considered to be costs, 
because resources used are merely being taken away from other 
production. However, where the resources are drawn from an unemployed 
pool,they can be leg i t im a te ly  counted as benefi ts (or at least 
negative costs) accruing to Nadgee,because th e i r  social opportunity 
cost is less than th e i r  market price.
F ina l ly ,  discussion of the remaining benefi ts w i l l  indicate 
that several s ign i f ica n t  ind i rec t  production benefi ts are derived 
from the Reserve. These benef i ts ,  although best described as 
production benef i ts ,  are a t t r ibu tab le  as sp in -o f fs  from the other 
benefi ts which arise from preservation.
5.3 RECREATION BENEFITS
Nature Reserves are not p r imar i ly  intended as recreation 
areas, but th is  does not e n t i re ly  preclude a l l  informal, non­
research v i s i t s  to such areas. Fox (1977) suggests:
'Recreation in the "games" sense, "sports" sense or of 
a mechanized kind, f inds no place in a nature reserve. 
"Re-creation" of a kind aimed at enjoying the natural 
systems phenomena, is a bonus use, allowed only so long 
as the reserve is unimpaired' (p. 139).
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The primary purpose of  Nature Reserves as Fox sees i t  is 
'maintaining the d ive rs i ty  of species, process and phenomena'
(p. 138),and these de f in i t ions  have been practised in the management 
of Nadgee Nature Reserve. The out l ine of  guidel ines fo r  v is i ta t io n  
provided by the Development Plan (NSWNPSW (1969) pp. 49-50) has 
been fol lowed re la t i v e ly  closely since Nadgee's inception. Three 
basic c r i t e r i a  have been applied in considering prospective v i s i t s :
' ( i ) Will  the v i s i t  endanger or impair the 
qua l i ty  of the habi tat in re la t ion  to 
component organisms?
( i i )  What is the purpose of  the v is i t?
( i i i )  Will  the v i s i t  impair or hinder any continuing 
approved research programme?' (p. 49).
With these in mind, v i s i t o r s ,  besides those ac t ive ly  involved 
in approved research and educational v i s i t s ,  have been c lass i f ied  
as day v is i to rs  or period v i s i to rs .  Day v is i to rs  have been allowed no 
fur ther  south in the Reserve than L i t t l e  Beach,and the to ta l  number 
o f  such v is i to rs  present in Nadgee at any point has been l imi ted 
to 30: when th is  number has arr ived,  the gates are locked. People
wishing to stay longer in the Reserve, have been required to 
wri te  to the Ranger applying fo r  a permit. No more than 10 groups 
of campers can be accommodated at the Newtons Beach s i te  and 
numbers are control led accordingly. The Ranger of Nadgee up un t i l  
1978 also enforced a l im i t  of  20 on the number of bushwalkers south 
of L i t t l e  River at any one time, providing, of course that there 
was no interference with current research.
A steady trend to increasing v is i ta t io n s  has been observed 
over time: Table 5.1 indicates a doubling of v i s i to rs  numbers over
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the f ive  year period 1965-1970.
YEAR VISITORS
1965 343
1966 432
1967 519
1968 440*
1969 533
1970 688
*Nadgee was closed fo r  some time in the summer of 68-69, causing 
a decline in v i s i t o r  numbers.
Source: NSWNPSW (1969)
Table 5 .1 : Nadgee V is i t a t io n ,  1965-1970.
The introduct ion of the permit system has caused a more 
consistent level of use, but s t i l l  the Reserve is not f u l l y  u t i l i z e d  
at a l l  times of the year under the regulat ions outl ined above. I t  
can be expected therefore, that although a continuation of th is  
trend would be possible fo r  some time, the capacity of the area 
w i l l  be reached. More recent f igures of v is i ta t io n s  are not 
avai lable and so i t  is d i f f i c u l t  to comment on the present s i tua t ion .
5•4 HEALTH BENEFITS
A l l ied  closely to the recreation benefits of Nadgee are the 
health benefi ts which flow from such a c t i v i t i e s .  L i t t l e  can be said 
about the spec i f ic  case of Nadgee beyond the general arguments 
outl ined in Chapter 4. However, Nadgee does provide what some 
authors ( fo r  example see Boyden and Harris (1977))see as the special
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health benefits of a wilderness area. Hope (1978) saw the 
recovery from prolonged exposure to the stress of city living that 
Nadgee provided, as one of the most important benefits that the 
Reserve had to offer the long term visi tor.
As regardsmore strenuous exercise for physical well being, 
Nadgee is an ideal area for bushwalking, both along the coast and 
in the coast ranges. The excellent beaches and estuaries provide 
swimming and surfing act ivi t ies ,  however surf-board riding has been 
banned from the Reserve in the past.
5.5 EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS
An important aspect of most recreational trips to Nadgee is 
the education that visitors gain from contact with the natural 
ecosystem. This was particularly true during the period when Hope 
was ranger because of the very low visi tor to ranger ratio - visitors 
to Nadgee were given a brief by Hope before entering the Reserve 
proper, detailing the purpose of Nadgee as well as the physical 
features of the area. The free exchange of questions and answers 
was catered for by the Ranger and his wife. Hence some interaction 
between recreation and education benefits occured.
Similarly, recreation benefits are often experienced by those 
engaged in s t r ic t ly educational visi ts:  such visi ts have been in
2 Helman a t  a V  s (1977) classification on wilderness areas in S.E. 
Australia, includes Nadgee, despite i ts  small size, because 
of i ts position on the coastline.
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operation in Nadgee since the early 1970's. Both high schools 
and tert iary institutions have been involved - at the high * 
school level, several expeditions from local schools have stayed 
in Nadgee on study excursions. The response to such excursions 
has been found,from personal observation by Fox (1978b) and Hope 
(1978), to increase significantly as the depth of knowledge of the 
area and the concept involved in the area's preservation has increased.
Tertiary visitations involved in programmes of study at 
Nadgee include Macquarie University, the Canberra College of Advanced 
Education and the Australian National University. By continuous 
re-visit ing, successive years of students from these institutions 
have been able to follow-up the previous years work. Greater benefit 
has been found to flow from this approach and Nadgee is an ideal 
venue because over the year l i t t l e ,  if any, non-natural influences 
are brought to bear on the study zone.
Another area of community education is the field of 
publications. At present, no widely distributed material is 
available on Nadgee except from the NSWNPSW booklet which is given 
free to visitors and has also been distributed to parks throughout 
NSW. School booklets prepared by the Australian National Parks 
and Wildlife Service (ANPWS) mention the Reserve, however no glossy 
page pictorial book is to be published. This policy is a response 
to the difficulty of publicity: although the NSWNPWS sees the
virtue in educating the public at large in issues relating to Nature 
Reserves, when such publicity is given, there is usually an over­
whelming response from the public to visi t  the area. The predicted 
levels of use resulting from publicity are unacceptable to the aims 
of the Nature Reserve system. Evidence of the publicity problem
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has even been seen in the case of the le a f le t  on Nadgee d is t r ibu ted 
by the NSWNPWS - so much in te rest  has been created by i t s  
descript ion of the Reserve, that too many people were wanting to 
v i s i t  the area and so i t s  d is t r ib u t io n  has been reduced to only 
those people v is i t i n g  the Ranger's Station at Merrica River.
5.6 AESTHETIC BENEFITS
To provide aesthetic benef i ts , an area of land must be seen.
As i t  has been a pol icy of the NSWNPWS to l i m i t  any publ icat ion 
concerning Nadgee, p a r t i c u la r ly  of photographs showing i t s  scenic 
beauty, the public at large are usual ly not recip ients of  th is
3
type of benef i t .  Aesthetic benefits are therefore largely  l im i ted to 
recreat ion is ts  and other users of the reserve.
The scenery which Nadgee does provide embraces a wide var ie ty  
of sett ings: forest glens, sandy beaches, coastal c l i f f s  and
mountainous slopes. Perhaps the only sa t is fac tory  way of  describing 
Nadgee's aesthetic benefi ts is through the photographs included as 
an attachment to th is  thesis.
I t  is true that Nadgee is not the only area on the NSW South 
Coast to have th is  type of beauty, but the Reserve is unique in that 
i t  is the only place to have such re la t i v e ly  natural beauty over a 
large area.
3 Some photographs of Nadgee have appeared in general publ icat ions 
on Austra l ia and in wilderness calendars.
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5•4 *7 SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH BENEFITS
4
Nadgee Nature Reserve has been the s i te  fo r  over 40 
s c ie n t i f i c  research projects and while th is  section w i l l  not 
consider in deta i l  the benefits of the research carried out i t  is 
useful to establ ish what advantages Nadgee of fers  as a research s i te :  
to understand these advantages f u l l y ,  a number o f  the more 
s ign i f ica n t  research projects w i l l  be described.
Two teams from the Division of W i ld l i fe  Research ,CSIR0,have used 
Nadgee to study the dingo. The f i r s t  team, headed by Newsome and Catl ing, 
was financed by the Austral ian Meat Research Council to study the ecology 
of the dingo: the biology, breeding patterns, movements, d ie t  and habitat 
use were investigated in order to form the basis fo r  a plan of 
dingo management. The study began with a three year period in A l ice 
Springs, where the techniques of analysis were establ ished,and from 
the re ,the work progressed to a four year (1972-76) analysis of  dingos 
including one study at Nadgee. The Nadgee work was aimed at 
establ ishing the ecological pr inc ip les which apply to dingoes in any 
environment and provided a comparison with work done in another 
wilderness area in the Snowy Mountains - a continuum from alpine to 
coastal environments was thus establ ished.
The methods employed in Nadgee by Newsome and Catl ing 
included trapping dogs and small mammals every three months, the use
4 Fox (1978a) states that over 30 projects had been undertaken
before 1972 in Nadgee and between 1972 and 1978 a fu r ther  10 have
been carr ied out or were in progress. A complete bibl iography of
research material is being prepared by the NSWNPWS during 1981.
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of radio transmitters to study movements and the reading of tracks 
on raked sand plots located every 300 metres along a track frequented 
by dingos. I t  was the use of  these methods, essential to the 
study, which made Nadgee so v i ta l  to the study. Of primary importance 
was the lack of publ ic interference in the study area: traps and
raked tracks could be l e f t  unattended with sa fe ty , in  the knowledge 
that they would not be disturbed by people. The lack of interference 
added to the ease of  experimentation as equipment could be l e f t  
on the s i te , thus overcoming the d i f f i c u l t y  of  continual transportat ion 
in rough te r ra in .  More importantly , Nadgee provided the necessary 
natural s i tua t ion  fo r  the study of the dingos ecology. This is 
p a r t i cu la r ly  true fo r  the dingo because of the cross-breeding with 
domestic dogs which commonly occurs in more populated areas.
Related to th is  a b i l i t y  to provide a base l ine  study area is Nadgee's 
posit ion - being the only such area ex is t ing on the NSW coast, i t  
was able to provide the coastal case study region for  the apl ine 
to coastal ecosystem continuum required by the dingo study.
The second CSIRO team studying dingos in Nadgee, headed by 
Mcll roy, analysed the ef fects  of dingo poisoning campaigns on 
populations of small mammals. When the study began, l i t t l e  was known 
about the small mammals in Nadgee and so the f i r s t  task of Mcl l roy 's  
team was to investigate the ecology of th is  fauna. Once these basic 
deta i ls  were establ ished, actual ba i t ing was carr ied out, not 
with 1080, the poison under review, but with a dye which could be traced 
through to the gut and faeces of the small mammals. This study had much 
in common with the work of the f i r s t  CSIRO team and so many of the 
advantages of Nadgee apply equal ly to both: the a b i l i t y  to control the
plan f ie ldwork; the provision of a coastal l i n k  in the continuum from 
coast to escarpment; and, the existence of  natural surroundings.
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Both studies were also advantaged by the existence of a well documented 
history of the area, with regard to fire and agriculture. In 
addition much of the ground work to this type of study had already 
been completed, particularly the mapping of vegetation,and the 
listing of observed species. The most important feature of Nadgee 
for scientific research remains however,its use as an extreme point, 
or base-1ine,for comparison with other ecosystems.
Also working on small mammals within Nadgee in the late 60's 
and early 70's were the Australian Museum team of Recher, Lunney and 
Posamentier. However this work, and the two CSIRO studies, were 
interrupted in December 1972 when a major wildfire swept through 
the whole of Nadgee, including the plots being studied by the three 
teams. This seemingly catastrophic event brought about some of 
the most important research to be carried out in Nadgee. Because 
so much information had been accumulated on the small mammal 
populations of Nadgee before the f ire,  experiments could be undertaken 
to determine the recovery of the animals and their habitats after 
the fire.  The results of this work is technical and will not be 
detailed here.5 In addition, much detailed research on the fire 
and i ts effects on a wider section of the ecosystem,including birds 
and vegetation,was carried out by Fox (1978a).
Together, these pieces of research provided important 
insight into the processes of recovery in the ecosystem after a 
particularly severe wildlife. This is especially relevant because
5 See Recher, Lunney and Posamentier (1974, 1975) and Newsome,
Mcllroy and Catling (1978).
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of the p o s s ib i l i t y  of using the resul ts  to develop a f i r e  pol icy 
fo r  the commercially managed forests which adjoin Nadgee. Many 
of the results can also be used in a wider context fo r  managing
r
forests and parks elsewhere in the state. The resu l ts ,  of course, 
apply d i re c t ly  to Nadgee i t s e l f  and so are important to the 
management of f i r e  w i th in the Reserve: the f i r e  plan which is
currently  being designed fo r  Nadgee draws extensively fo r  such 
studies. ^
One of the most important aspects of the f i r e  pol icy of 
Nadgee w i l l  be the management of Heathland in pa r t icu la r ,  with 
reference to the maintenance of the Ground Parrot ( Pazoporus W allious). 
This 12 to 13 inch long te r re s t r ia l  parro t,  which is 
l i s te d  amongst endangered species by the NSWNPWS, is r ich green 
in colour mottled by black and yel low with a red forehead, long 
t a i l  and a pale yel low bar on the wing. I t  is found in coastal 
heaths, estuarine f la ts  and swamps but is rarely seen unless flushed 
from cover. I t  has been found to frequent heath only at a pa r t icu la r  
stage of growth a f te r  f i r e ,  as i t  feeds on the grains produced 
by low sedges. I f  the heath is protected from f i r e  fo r  approximately 
10 years or more, the t a l l e r  hakeas, mellalucas, banksias and 
eucalypts overgrow these sedges, rendering the heath unsuitable as 
a Ground Parrot habi ta t .  Fox's (1967) study on f i r e  in the management
6 Fox (1967) has used his study of the Nadgee w i ld f i r e  in a comparison 
with work on f i re s  at Kurnell near Sydney and Myall Lakes.
7 Following a fu r the r  w i ld f i r e  in Nadgee in December 1980,the NSWNPWS 
has sought to coordinate a research e f f o r t  aimed at determining 
the e f fec t  of f i r e  on the ecosystem.
191
of heath!ands ,and Groves and Tot terdel l  (1971) work with aeria l 
photographs of Nadgee heathlands are therefore closely related to 
the continued survival of the Ground Parrot. More intensive work 
on the Ground Parrot has been undertaken by Ful lagar (1978) and
o
Forshaw (1978). Overal l ,  the study of heathland management has 
important ramif icat ions along much of the more developed coastl ine 
of NSW. Because increased coastal development has decreased the 
areas of heathland, fo r  the remainder to survive, careful management 
of fu r the r  development w i l l  be necessary - the resul ts  of the Nadgee 
experiments w i l l  be useful in achieving such management.
Another important f i e l d  of research which or iginated in the 
Recher team's study of small mammals has been the e f fec t  of 
wood-chipping on the ecology of the South Coast. In 1975 the 
Austral ian Museum was contracted to assess the impact of the woodchip 
industry on the environment of SE Austra l ia (Recher, Clarke and Mil ledge 
(1975) p.110) by Harr is-Daishowa Pty. L td . ,  the company which operates 
the wood-chip m i l l  at Eden. The f ieldwork fo r  the study was conducted 
in forest camps with in the Naghi State Forest, to the west of Nadgee 
Nature Reserve, however Recher, e t  a l .  acknowledge that research 
carr ied out in Nadgee was v i t a l ,  in a comparative sense, to the 
t r i a l s  undertaken w i th in the chipped areas. Experience in the type 
of research being undertaken was also gained in Nadgee. I t  is 
clear there fore , that in order to successful ly manage the woodchipping 
operation in re la t ion  to i t s  environmental impact, i t  is useful to 
have Nadgee as a reference point from which to base other studies.
8 This research is considered in Section 5.9 of  th is  chapter.
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!\s previously mentioned, no other such areas ex is t in the 
Eden forest management area.
The other major research project which has centred on
Nadgee is the Austral ian Atomic Energy Commission's (AAEC) study
of the L i t t l e  River estuary (Giles (1972) (1978)). The project team,
headed by Gil es,carr ied out extensive hydrographic and bio logical
surveys of the estuary followed by a release of  two radioactive
32 3tracers phosphorus 32 ( P) and t r i t i u m  ( H). The aim of  the 
project was to calculate the l im i ts  to be used by governments as the 
acceptable levels fo r  low level radioactive nuclear waste discharges - 
the rate at which radioactive substances and th e i r  non-radioactive 
counterparts are removed from the estuary or concentrated in i t  
was thus the primary object ive of  the study. However, in addi t ion, 
the techniques used fo r  handling radioisotopes in f ieldwork were also 
under■scru t iny. A group of students from the Australian National Uni­
vers i ty  Zoology Honours course under Marples (1978) were involved in 
much of the study.
Giles (1972) describes the L i t t l e  River estuary as ' ideal 
fo r  th is  experiment, since i t  is small , eas i ly  mapped and free 
from human interference which might introduce extraneous factors 
such as the presence of phosphorus from agr icu l tu ra l  pursui ts '
(p. 2). The securi ty of the Reserve was also important because 1.5 
Curies of radioactive isotope were released: a certain amount of
danger therefore existed to anybody unaware of the experiment and 
so the Reserve was closed to the public during the release stage 
of  the pro ject.  The 32P isotope has a h a l f  l i f e  of 14 days3 
and was completely undetectable in the environment a f te r  six weeks. 
The naturalness of the area was important because of i t s  use as a
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base l ine study. A highly pol luted estuary, the Georges River 
in Sydney, above which the Lucas Heights AAEC reactor is located, 
was used as a comparison to the Nadgee work. The posit ion of  the 
Nadgee Nature Reserve is even more important in th is  study because 
Giles searched the coastl ine from Gladstone in Queensland to 
Kingston in South Austra l ia to f ind that Nadgee's three estuaries 
are the only remaining "natura l"  estuarine ecosystems. This factor 
is v i ta l  to future research projects involving estuaries.
Of importance to Nadgee as a suppl ier of research benef i ts,are 
the many research topics which could be studied. Fox (1978b) and 
Groves (1978) both suggest that research is needed into the concept 
of Nadgee being an important l ink  in the continuum of species around 
the coast. A need for  research into estuarine f ish  breeding 
is also noted by Fox as a prime topic fo r  study. There has also 
been very l i t t l e  research done on insects or rep t i les  anywhere in 
the region. Much can also be done,in terms of  the wood-chipping 
indus t ry ,p a r t icu la r ly  in respect of nu tr ien t  cycles and the a b i l i t y  
of forests to sustain such intensive management. The existence of 
three freshwater streams which do not contain introduced species 
of f ish  o f fe r  research potential  into native f ish .  Obviously, th is  
is a very incomplete l i s t  of prospects,not the least due to the 
fact  that d i f fe ren t  problems w i l l  evolve over time, however, equal ly 
obviously, Nadgee has,and w i l l ,p rov ide  sc ien t is ts  with a useful 
area in which to carry out experiments into the natural ecosystem.
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5•8 GENE-POOL MAINTENANCE BENEFITS
Nadgee is suitable as an area of  gene-pool maintenance 
because of three features: f i r s t ,  there exists with in Nadgee
an extremely wide range of habitats,and hence species,in a 
comparatively small area of land; secondly, the to ta l  size of 
Nadgee appears to be s u f f i c ie n t l y  large to provide 
habitats of  a natural size of  a l l  f lo ra  and fauna present; and 
t h i r d l y ,  the forest operations to the west, Ben Boyd National Park 
in the north and Mallacoota National Park in the south,provide 
some securi ty to Nadgee's supply of genetic materia l.
I t  i s ,  of course, d i f f i c u l t  to predict what gene in the future 
could be of v i ta l  sign if icance to mankind which is at present 
being maintained in Nadgee. Speculation is thus point less ,other 
than to re i te ra te  the arguments of medical drug 
discoveries and cross-breeding between domestic and wild species 
(in Nadgee th is  could involve cross-breeding with native f ish  e tc . )  
detailed in Chapter 4. However, in the next section, the species 
and habitats in Nadgee which are l is te d  as endangered w i l l  be 
examined: the genes of these species are threatened by ext inct ion
and are being e f fe c t iv e ly  maintained in the Nadgee Nature Reserve.
5.9 EXISTENCE BENEFITS
Nadgee Nature Reserve provides existence benefi ts in respect 
to a number o f  ind ividual species and can, in i t s e l f ,  be regarded 
as an ecosystem from which ind iv iduals  can gain existence benef i ts.
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First,  Nadgee has one of the largest remaining flocks of 
the Ground Parrot. Only approximately 12 habitats remain 
along the NSW coast which are suitable for the Ground Parrot: 
these areas account for 0.1% of the total area of the state.
Further reductions in the area suitable to the Ground Parrot are 
likely,due to heathland's suitabil i ty for development: i t  is
easy to clear and has a coastal location. Outside NSW, only 
Tasmania has significant areas of heathland suitable for the Ground 
Parrot but this area is also being diminished. Within NSW»numbers 
of Ground Parrots are at present quite reasonable,and a casual 
review of the situation could conclude that the bird is far from 
extinction. However, a more careful consideration reveals that the 
parrot exists only in reserves which are a considerable distance 
from each other - notably Nadgee in the south, Barren Ground Nature 
Reserve, a highland heath west of Wol1ongong,and a recently declared 
National Park south of Hat Head on the North Coast. After f ire,  the 
parrot must move to another area of suitable habitat within its 
50 kilometre range and if  by coincidence all the major reserves 
were burnt out in the one season, Ground Parrot numbers would fall 
to dangerous levels. The situation, will be even more crit ical 
in the future as non-reserve heaths are used for development purposes.
An example of the precarious hold of the Ground Parrot is 
found in the work of Fullagar (1979) and Forshaw (1978). In 1969 
a severe fire burnt out all but three hectares of the Barren Ground 
Nature Reserve. Eight parrots were found to be living (in very 
high density) within these three hectares. The remainder of the 
population had flown, without any knowledge of the distance or direction
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of a new food source, mostly to die of starvation. Some made their 
way to an area of heathland near Sassafras, west of Nowra, and 
i t  appears that together with the birds which remained at the 
si te,  they recolonized the whole Barren Ground area when i t  recovered 
to a suitable stage of regrowth. Had the area been totally burnt 
out and the fleeing birds not been able to find suitable refuge,
Barren Grounds would have lost i ts population of Ground Parrots - 
the hold is therefore tenuous and becoming even more so, over time. 
Nadgee has an outstanding abili ty to harbour populations of the 
Ground Parrot from such occurences. Because of i ts  position - with 
Malacoota and Ben Boyd National Parks to the north and south, 
and with fire unlikely to spread simultaneously over the whole area - 
the birds inhabiting the area are able to find suitable refuge close at 
hand. Even a fire of the severity of the 1972 experience,did not 
spread to the Green Cape heaths of Ben Boyd National Park and so the 
Ground Parrots of Nadgee were able to use i t  as a temporary 
habitat. Relatively greater safety is thus offered by Nadgee.
Much less is known about the second endangered species 
thought to be found in Nadgee - the Eastern Bristle Bird. This 
bird usually lives along side the Ground Parrot,using a slightly 
different stage of heath regrowth as its habitat. It is well known 
at Barren Ground Nature Reserve but only unconfirmed sightings 
have been made at Nadgee. Being less reliant on the heathlands, 
i t  may be that Nadgee is not as important to the Eastern Bristle 
Bird as i t  is to the Ground Parrot. However, so l i t t l e  is known about 
i ts presence in Nadgee that no conclusions can be drawn.
197
Finally, the Glossy Black Cockatoo, another endangered 
species,is also found in Nadgee. This bird has quite significant 
numbers at present in NSW,but i t  is feared that there exists a 
potential for i ts damage and so i ts numbers are being carefully 
monitored. Two factors threaten the Black Cockatoo: f i r s t ,  its
nesting habits require eucalypts of sufficient age to form hollow 
sections in their trunks and such "degenerate" trees are usually removed 
in forests managed for timber or woodchips; and, secondly, the 
cockatoo requires Casuarina stands on which to feed and these are 
also regarded as non-productive items in a commercial forest 
inventory. The lat ter  problem is not severe in woodchipping 
concessions»where the casuarina is one of the f i r s t  pioneers to 
grow after clear felling. Nevertheless, both of these habitat 
requirements are present in Nadgee and i t  therefore represents an 
ideal sanctuary for the species, should the situation elsewhere 
become less favourable.
These individual species are, however, only the most 
obviously endangered species. A full l i s t  of rare and endangered 
species, both flora and fauna, which exist in the area can be 
found in Appendices A and B of Recher, Clark and Mill edge (1975).
Nadgee,as a total ecosystem,can also be regarded as providing 
existence benefits: i t  remains the only coastal area which
remains in a relatively natural state in south-eastern Australia, 
in addition to being one of the most diverse mosaics of habitats 
to be found anywhere in Australia, in such a compact area. Even 
if  only the heathland areas of Nadgee are considered, the relative 
scarcity of such an ecosystem may be reason for individuals to enjoy 
existence benefits.
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5.10 CONCLUSIONS
The features of Nadgee Nature Reserve which are l ike ly  to 
provide individuals with existence benefits - three species of birds 
which are classif ied as endangered species and the ecosystem as 
a whole - have been detailed in this chapter. However, i t  has 
also been noted that the Reserve provides other types of benefits: 
while the management of Nadgee is oriented toward the provision 
of sc ient i f ic  and non-participatory benefits, the area is visited 
by people who consequently enjoy recreation, health, education and 
aesthetic benefits.
The varied nature of the benefits supplied by Nadgee, 
creates d i f f icu l t ie s  in the effective but rea l is t ic  separation of 
existence benefits from all  other benefits, which is required for 
the direct questioning valuation task addressed by Part 2 of this 
thesis. The questionnaire which sets out the description of the 
Nadgee-based "hypothetical" area of preserved natural ecosystem used 
to separate existence benefits is described in the following 
chapter.
CHAPTER 6
THE QUESTIONNAIRE
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In i t s  d iscuss ion o f  poss ib le  methods f o r  measuring the 
b e n e f i t s  o f  preserved natu ra l  ecosystems, Chapter 4 concluded 
t h a t  hypo the t i ca l  va lua t ion  mechanisms were the on ly  methods 
s u i ta b le  f o r  the measurement o f  ex is tence b e n e f i t s  because o f  the 
lack o f  a market f o r  these b e n e f i t s  o r  even marketed complementary 
or  s u b s t i t u t a b l e  goods or  serv ices  from which a value could be 
i n f e r r e d .  Furthermore , i t  was concluded in Chapter 2 t h a t  the d i r e c t  
ques t ion ing  technique o f fe re d  the p o te n t ia l  f o r  accurate measurement 
at  a cost  which would be lower than o the r  comparable methods.
Because the aim o f  Part  I I ,  the em p i r i ca l  sec t ion  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  
i s  to es t imate the ex is tence b e n e f i t s  generated by the cont inued 
p rese rva t ion  o f  Nadgee Nature Reserve as a na tu ra l  ecosystem 
d i r e c t  ques t ion ing  o f  a sample o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  was 
chosen as the most app rop r ia te  techn ique,  given the c o n s t ra in ts  
on a v a i la b le  research funds.
I t  i s  poss ib le  to implement the d i r e c t  ques t ion ing  technique 
by e i t h e r  using a ques t ionna i re  completed in w r i t i n g  by a respondent and 
re tu rned by m a i l ,  o r  by d i r e c t  i n te r v ie w e r  con tac t  w i th  each 
respondent. However ,the importance o f  in te r v ie w e r  con tac t  in d i r e c t  
ques t ion ing  and i t e r a t i v e  b idd ing  s tud ies  as a c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c to r  
in the at tempt to  minimize m is rep resen ta t ion  o f  w i l l i n g n e s s  to  pay 
responses,was o u t l i n e d  in Chapter 2 - t h i s  s u p e r i o r i t y  o f  personal
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interviewing can be regarded as being general across all  types of 
questions partly because i t  tends to ensure the continued attention 
of respondents throughout the interview. The major problems of 
personal interviewing are the relat ively high cost,and the possib il i ty  
of bias due to respondents wishing to impress the interviewer in 
some way. The la t te r  problem can be avoided by the use of carefully 
selected and adequately trained interviewers»while the cost in this 
case was regarded as being outweighed by the expected benefits 
of increased accuracy which could be achieved using personal 
interviewers. The decision to use personal interviews as the 
surveying technique was fac i l i ta ted by the existence, at the Australian 
National University, of the Survey Research Centre (SRC), a group 
which, as one of i ts  roles on campus, was to co-ordinate and carry 
out an omnibus, or multiple user, survey of Canberra residents on 
a bi-annual basis. The SRC had an established and well trained 
team of interviewers for the omnibus survey,and the per question 
cost of the survey was within budgetary l imitations.
The questionnaire,designed for the purposes of this thesis, 
is based therefore, on a personal interviewer context and forms 
only one part of the larger omnibus questionnaire, which is 
reproduced in Appendix I. The section of the omnibus questionnaire 
pertaining to this thesis, is the f inal outcome of a re-drafting 
exercise involving the incorporation of comments and suggestions 
made by col 1eagues,and the elimination of problems uncovered during 
a pre-test of the penultimate questionnaire. The pre-test was 
carried out independently of the SRC and involved the personal 
interviewing of a randomly selected sample of 30 Canberra residents,
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drawn from the electora l r o l l s  of the Federal div is ions of  Fraser
and Canberra. Following each pre-test interview,the respondent was asked
i f  any spec i f ic  question was the cause of a comprehension problem
and general comments on the whole interviewing procedure were
sought.
The overal l  omnibus questionnaire is made up of two d is t in c t  
parts: the f i r s t ,  which was answered by a l l  ind iv iduals resident
in a sampled household, asks questions designed to explore the 
socio-economic character is t ics  of each respondent; and the second, 
which was answered by selected members of  the sampled household, is 
a combination of a number of groups of questions with those 
pertaining to th is  thesis being Questions 1 to 18,and 52. Fortunately, 
the questions relevant to th is  study were asked at the beginning 
of each interview and i t  can be assumed that the amalgamation with 
other material had no influence on ind iv idua ls '  responses. For the 
remainder of th is  chapter, the questions pertaining to th is  thesis 
w i l l  be referred to as the questionnaire»unless spec i f ic  mention 
is made of the amalgamated omnibus questionnaire.
Individual questions were designed so that respondents 
were subject to a minimum of ex terna l ly  induced bias. This was achieved 
through the careful wording of a l l  questionnaire material and by the use 
of open ended questions: where respondents were asked fo r  a reason
or a d e f in i t io n ,  no formal structure fo r  repl ies was presented 
to the respondent's, and they were allowed to answer without outside 
inf luence. The responses to open-ended questions have the disadvantage 
of being more d i f f i c u l t  to process and code, but the advantage of 
reduced bias outweighs th is  problem.
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The questionnaire is structured so that three separate 
sections can be identified. The f i r s t  section, made up of Questions 
1 to 8 of the individual questionnaire, can be described as a 
lead-up section,designed to introduce the subject matter of the 
questionnaire to respondents,and at the same time, gather information 
on their preferences and attitudes. The second section, Questions 
9 to 13, contains the questions directly concerned with an 
hypothetical reserve ,which is based on the physical features of 
Nadgee Nature Reserve,and specifically, the willingness to pay for 
i ts existence benefits. The final section, consisting of Questions 
14 to 18, is a back-up section consisting of some specific socio­
economic characteriStic probes and cross checking questions.
The majority of socio-economic questions are contained in the 
separate demographic section of the overall questionnaire.
Rather than describing the questionnaire in the sequence 
of its structure, this chapter considers each of the aims which the 
questionnaire addresses so that i t  is easier to relate questions to the 
theoretical issues underlying each aim and the interrelationships 
between aims. Section 6.2 describes the primary aim of the 
questionnaire: the estimation of willingness to pay for existence
benefits. The five major problems associated with direct questioning 
estimation»which need to be addressed by the questionnaire,are 
considered within this section. The last  problem, strategic bias, 
and its detection are considered in detail in the next section,
6.3, as a secondary aim of the questionnaire. Provision of 
information by the questionnaire for the purpose of examining the 
effects of species rarity and information i tsel f  on respondents' 
willingness to pay for existence benefits is the subject of Section 6.4.
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The f ina l  two sections are concerned with the aim of 
determining respondents 'characteris t ics: Section 6.5 considers
the way in which information on respondents' preferences and 
a t t i tudes ,  both stated and actual,  was col 1ected»and Section 6.6 
deta i ls  the range of socio-economic characte ris t ies which was 
gathered by the questionnaire.
6.2 WILLINGNESS TO PAY ESTIMATION
The primary aim of the questionnaire was to estimate the 
benef i t  a respondent enjoys as a resu l t  of the continued preservation 
of Nadgee Nature Reserve as a provider of existence values. The 
f i r s t  issue therefore, that was introduced to respondents was 
the benef i t  which they are to be asked to value.
6.2.1 Iso la t ing Existence Benefi ts
As has been shown in Chapter 5, Nadgee Nature Reserve 
provides the community with the whole spectrum of benefi ts of natural 
ecosystem preservat ion. Because th is  thesis is concerned only with 
the existence benefi ts of Nadgee, i t  was necessary to design a
questionnaire which isolates these benefi ts from a l l  others.
Benefi t  separation is achieved in the questionnaire by describing 
to respondents a hypothetical Nature Reserve, which is based on the 
physical features of Nadgee,but which has a r t i f i c i a l  res t r ic t ions  
designed to el iminate a l l  but the non-part ic ipatory benefi ts of Nadgee. 
This descript ion fol lows immediately a f te r  Question 8. By giving 
the area the characte r isecs of d i f f i c u l t  access and iso la t ion  from
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passers-by, the respondent is led to believe that visitation to 
the area is very rare. In addition, the description gives the 
respondent some notion of the undisturbed quality of the area. 
Photographs (displayed in an attachment to this thesis) are then 
shown to the respondents to enable them to understand further the 
type of existence benefits they can expect to receive i f  the area 
is preserved. Immediately before Question 9, the questionnaire 
informs respondents of a proposal which would maintain the hypothetical 
area in a natural state and so avoid the loss of existence benefits 
which would result from development. The proposal involves the 
restriction of al l  visits»except those associated with scientific 
research and management. Questions 9 and 10,and the intervening 
sentence,were designed to help respondents think of the existence 
benefits as a separate entity from the scientific benefits.^ To 
further ensure the separation of scientific and existence benefits, 
the paragraph preceding Question 11 sets out one role of government 
in the proposal: by the government paying for scientific values,
the respondent is left  with only the existence values to consider 
when i t  comes to the point of being asked if he is willing to pay 
for the proposal.
Of course,it is not possible to be certain that respondents
clearly understood the distinction between benefits ,even with
2the area description and categorization of benefits provided -
1 Scientific research and gene-pool maintenance benefits are 
amalgamated for the purpose of the questionnaire because of 
the complication involved in a further subdivision of benefits.
2 Following the pre-test of the questionnaire, respondents were 
asked if  the existence benefits of the hypothetical reserve 
had been effectively separated from the other benefits of 
preservation - all respondents indicated that they had satisfactori ly 
understood the process of benefit separation.
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for instance, some respondents may not have been convinced that
their visiting the area was not at least a distant possibility
and others may have thought of gene-pool benefits as existence
benefits rather than scientific benefits. However in questionnaire
design, a trade-off must be established between the degree of
complexity of questions, and the time and effort required of the
respondents who are being surveyed. It was decided therefore that
to introduce further complexity by specifying gene-pool benefits
as a separate entity and any further reference to exclusion of
visitors would have involved considerable costs in terms of respondents
3
losing concentration and their not providing accurate responses.
6.2.2 Context Familiarity
It was mentioned in Chapter 2 that an important feature of 
any successful contingent valuation mechanism is that the context 
of the hypothetical market established be real is t ic.  By giving 
respondents a real is t ic question to answer, i t  was shown that a 
more honest revelation can be expected, both in terms of strategic 
and hypothetical bias. Therefore i t  was important in the design of 
this questionnaire to make sure that respondents were familiar with 
the scenario being portrayed,especially considering the hypothetical 
nature of the "reserve's" conditions of entry. For instance, i t  
would have been more convenient to exclude all users and so eliminate
3 Nor are the non-participatory aesthetic and education benefits 
specifically removed from the respondent's consideration - 
questioning complexity again ruled out this possibility.
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any consideration of s c ie n t i f i c  values, but i t  was f e l t  that to do 
th is  would jeopardize the r e a l i t y  of the proposal being put to 
respondents.
Also in the in te res t  of  context r e a l i t y ,  i t  was decided 
to ask respondents to answer a "wi l l ingness to pay to prevent 
the loss of existence benefi ts" question,rather than a "wi l l ingness 
to accept compensation i f  existence benefi ts are los t"  question.
As was noted in Chapter 1, the the o re t ica l ly  appropriate measure 
of  existence benefi ts in th is  case is a compensating surplus, given 
that ind iv iduals  usual ly perceive that because the area exists now, 
they have a property r ig h t  to the establ ished set o f  circumstances. 
Therefore a wil l ingness to accept compensation (WTA) is the 
th e o re t ica l ly  correct question to ask. However, i t  was stressed 
in Chapter 2 that where contingent valuation mechanisms have used 
a "wi l l ingness to accept" format, respondents have had d i f f i c u l t y  
in answering and a large proportion of "no compensation would be 
su f f ic ie n t "  responses were recorded. I t  was suggested in Chapter 2 
that th is  outcome is probably the resu l t  o f  the un fam i l ia r i ty  of 
respondents to the s i tua t ion being simulated by the questionnaire. To 
maintain re a l i t y  i t  was decided to use the wil l ingness to pay (WTP) 
format in the rea l iza t ion  that th is  may have two possible e f fec ts :  
f i r s t ,  the impl icat ion inherent in WTP questions that respondents 
do not have a property r igh t  to the current s i tua t ion ,  may cause 
some respondents to re jec t  the procedure completely,or at least bias 
th e i r  estimates downwards as a "protest"  vote; and secondly, i t  was 
accepted that there was a p o s s ib i l i t y  that the income effects  between 
WTP and WTA are s ign i f ica n t  enough to cause bias, again downwards, 
in the estimation of actual benefi ts . Because both of these biases
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are po ten t ia l ly  negative, no threat to the conservative nature of 
the estimates was perceived.
The wil l ingness to pay questioning sequence begins with Question 
10, which el iminates a l l  those respondents who rank the existence 
benefi ts of  the hypothetical reserve as being "not important at a l l "  
from any fu r the r ,  more detai led questions about the area,apart from 
a request, using an open-ended question, fo r  information about 
th e i r  negative preferences fo r  the existence benefi ts . Those respondents 
with posi t ive preferences fo r  the reserve's existence values are 
asked, in Question 11, i f  the a t t i tude  response to Question 10 can 
be translated into a wi l l ingness to pay. I f  th is  is answered in 
the negative, then reasons are sought, again using an open-ended 
question, and no fu r the r  deta i l  on wil l ingness to pay is required, 
but i f  respondents agree to pay a posi t ive sum, the extent of th e i r  
'b id '  is sought by Question 13.
A number of problems with the wil l ingness to pay questioning 
process were foreshadowed by the pre- test  responses, pr imar i ly  
ar is ing from a reluctance on the part o f  respondents to specify 
the actual amount they would be w i l l in g  to pay: typica l  responses
were"I need more information", " I t  depends on the cost" ,  or simply 
" I don11 know".
The "need more information" response is d i f f i c u l t  to handle 
because i t  is necessary to establ ish a t rade -o f f  between information 
provision and respondent boredom: s u f f ic ie n t  information fo r  one
respondent is l i k e l y  to be in s u f f i c ie n t  fo r  another but too 
much fo r  someone else. The number o f  ca l ls  fo r  more information in 
the pre-test seemed well balanced with the amount of boredom 
reported by respondents and so no fu r the r  information was added to
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the questionnaire as a resu l t  o f  the "need more information" 
response.
Also d i f f i c u l t  to handle is the respondent who w i l l  not 
bid without an ind ication of the cost of preserving the hypothetical 
reserve. I f  respondents were given a cost est imation, there may be a 
tendency fo r  respondents, who would normally reveal th e i r  true pre­
ferences, to bid th e i r  perceived per capita cost share,rather than th e i r  
true wil l ingness to pay,just because i t  is suggested to them as 
a reasonable estimate of  an "acceptable" bid. Clear ly, i t  is not 
in the in terest  of accurate responses to supply a cost estimate to 
respondents,but the "need to know the cost" response did give r ise 
to the recognit ion of another problem - the p o s s ib i l i t y  that 
respondents may not perceive the incentive to over-state preferences 
and actua l ly  perceive an incentive to under-state th e i r  bids.The under­
stat ing incentive may arise from a suspicion that co l lec t ion  of th e i r  
stated bid may be carr ied out, despite the assurances to the contrary 
made by the in terv iewers, or because respondents feel that the i r  bids
may be used as a basis fo r  a co l lec t io n ,^  or i t  may occur out of 
a habit of under-stating to any questions concerning the payment 
of money, real or hypothetical.
Respondents who answered the wil l ingness to pay question 
with " I  don't  know" also cause problems, despite the fac t  that 
during the pre- test interv iew, fu r ther  probes were made to establ ish 
the exact reason fo r  the lack of a b i l i t y  to estimate th e i r  wi l l ingness 
to pay. The majori ty  of "don't  know" respondents seemed to be
4 Under-statement w i11 only occur, in th is  case,amongst those 
respondents who feel that th e i r  wi l l ingness to pay is less 
than th e i r  expected enforced payment.
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doubtful because of an inability to be precise about the amount 
of money they would be willing to sacrifice for the provision of 
the hypothetical reserve's existence benefits,and rather than 
thinking more deeply about the problem put before them, respondents 
would choose to take an expedient course of action and reply with 
"I don't know".5
A further problem of context reality established by the pre-test 
of the questionnaire, was the interest displayed by respondents in 
the actual location of the reserve described. Because of the problem 
of individuals recognizing the area and then realizing that the 
full information was not entirely true, i t  was decided that the 
location of the scenery displayed in the photographs would not be 
revealed. The explanation formulated to explain this unwillingness 
to reveal the location of the actual reserve was: "if  respondents
knew of the location and remembered a visi t  to the area, i t  may bias 
their answers to the questions relating to that reserve". This 
explanation was accepted by all pre-test respondents when i t  was 
included as a prompt,and a subsequent briefing of the interviewers used 
forthe main survey involved an explanation of the necessity of this 
prompt.
5 It was fel t  that some prompt could be useful in helping the 
"don't know" respondents to define their willingness to pay: 
in the case of an iterative bidding mechanism,this is achieved 
by providing a starting point for bidding and goes further by 
leading the respondent to their final valuation by an iterative 
process, however a similar structure was rejected for this 
questionnaire because of the possibility of bias created by the 
formalization of a starting point. Furthermore, i t  was fel t  that 
any prompting of "don't know" respondents would create a bias 
between these respondents willingness to pay and the valuations 
of respondents who were able to answer Question 13 without 
assistance. With these two possible sources of distortion i t  was 
decided that a proportion of "don't know" responses would have 
to be tolerated in the main survey.
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Finally , i t  must be mentioned that the use of photographs 
to i l lu s t ra te  the ecosystem proposed as a reserve was considered 
to be v ita l in the e f fo r t  to promote a r e a l is t ic  context for the 
willingness to pay questions. In fact, the provision of all  the 
information in the willingness to pay section of the questionnaire 
was used as a device to increase the re a l i ty  of the situation 
being portrayed.
»
6.2.3 Hypothetical Bias
As was pointed out in Chapter 2, the hypothetical nature 
of the contingent valuation mechanisms, questions may cause a lack 
of interest amongst respondents,and this could result in respondents 
not considering the ir  answers suff ic ient ly  to enable the correct 
reporting of the ir  preferences. I t  was concluded that a re a l is t ic  
context and the provision of low cost information to the respondent 
could play a considerable role in the minimization of this type 
of bias. Again, the problem of a trade-off  between providing 
information and loosing the respondents interests occurs. Clearly, 
the threshold of "boredom" is d if ferent  for each respondent and i t  
is not possible,with one questionnaire,to provide an "optimal" amount 
of information to each respondent. As a resu lt ,  i t  is never clear 
i f  hypothetical bias is eliminated. However, because the direction of 
the bias,which can be expected to result from the hypothetical nature 
of the process,is random, l i t t l e  effect  to the mean bid is l ike ly .
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Importantly, there is no direct mention made in the 
questionnaire of the fact that the questions are hypothetical, and 
the willingness to pay question, Question 13, does not specify 
directly that the money will not be collected - i f  this was done 
then i t  could be expected that hypothetical bias would be more of 
a problem. It should be understood that respondents were fully 
informed by the interviewers as to the confidentiality of their 
questionnaire responses and i t  would be clear from that statement 
that there could be no possibility of collection of the amount 
stated in the future. Collection on the spot was also ruled out in 
the respondents mind because the Survey Research Centre, the body 
which organized the actual survey, made i t  quite clear to respondents 
that they were not collecting money.
6.2.4 Payment Mode Bias
Payment mode bias can occur in hypothetical valuation 
mechanism estimates,if a respondent objects, on some independent 
grounds, to the mode of payment chosen in the questionnaire. In 
such a case i t  is likely that he will either object to the question 
completely and refuse to answer, or in the WTP context, under-state 
his preferences as a "protest" vote. Equally, if  the mode of 
payment appeals to the respondent, there may be an over-statement 
of preferences in a WTP context. The problem of under -statement can 
be overcome to some extent, by allowing the respondent to choose 
between alternative payment modes. In the questionnaire, the options 
of paying an additional tax to allow government provision, and 
paying a donation to a conservation organization specifically for
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the purpose of preserving the area, are set out for  respondents 
ju s t  p r io r  to Question 11. The choice between payment modes is 
made by the respondent in Question 12 a f te r  which he is required 
to give some reason fo r  that preference, in an open-ended 
question.
By al lowing th is  f l e x i b i l i t y  in payment mode, i t  is possible 
fo r  the respondent who objects, fo r  instance, to "government 
in te r fe rence" , to reveal his true preferences in a wi l l ingness 
to pay to a conservation organization ,and vice versa. However the 
two payment mode solut ion does present other problems. F i r s t ,  once 
chosen,the conservation organization mode may inspire a "char i ty"  
response: respondents may be accustomed to being asked fo r  donations
by a l l  types of char i ty  organizations and the customary $2 donation 
could be expected.from even those who do not value existence 
benefi ts that highly.  Secondly, once chosen, the tax option may 
encourage respondents to e i the r  over- or under-state th e i r  wi l l ingness 
to pay, depending on the extent of th e i r  valuations re la t ive  to 
th e i r  estimations of the tax increase they assume w i l l  be the resul t  
of the questioning process. Clearly, fo r  the l a t t e r  problem to 
occur, i t  is necessary fo r  respondents to assume that the tax option 
w i l l  be eventual ly enacted, and that th e i r  bids w i l l  have an e f fec t  
on the level o f  tax which is enforced. However, i t  is possible to 
analyse the extent of the dif ference between the wil l ingness to pay 
fo r  each payment mode, and from those resu l ts ,  some conclusions 
may be drawn as to the l i k e l y  biases involved.
6.2.5 Strateg i c Bias
A possible a l te rna t ive  to hypothetical bias in hypothetical
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valuation mechanism resul ts  is s t ra teg ic  bias. When a respondent
believes that the hypothetical valuation questions are s u f f i c ie n t l y
important in the decision making process to warrant his time and
e f f o r t  estimating his true preferences (and so overcoming the
problem of hypothetical bias) i t  is the o re t ica l ly  in the respondents
best in te res t  not to reveal those preferences. By over-stat ing his
6preferences, given that there is no payment of  bids, he hopes to 
influence the provision of  the good by counteracting low (or negative) 
bids from other respondents.
Again, i t  was pointed out in Chapter 2, that the provision 
of a r e a l i s t i c  context may provide some amelioration of th is  problem. 
However, i t  is by no means clear that s t ra teg ic  behaviour is 
el iminated so easi ly . The checking fo r  the presence of s t ra teg ic  
behaviour is one of the important secondary aims of th is  questionnaire.
6•3 STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR DETECTION
I t  was concluded in. Chapter 3 that the use of "demand 
reveal ing processes" in the context of  a large scale questionnaire 
using hypothetical valuation techniques was impractica l , and because 
the co l lec t ion  of money could not be achieved by the Survey 
Research Centre, i t  was not possible to carry out s t ra teg ic  behaviour 
tests in the questionnaire»except on a superf ic ia l  leve l.
6 Note, however that i f  respondents assume that th e i r  bids w i l l  
influence the amount they w i l l  eventual ly  have to pay fo r  
preserving the area»the d i rec t ion of each respondent's s tra teg ic  
bias is dependent on the magnitude of  th e i r  preference re la t ive  
to the amount they e x p e c t  to pay.
214
The f i r s t  method for detecting strategic behaviour using 
the questionnaire results is to compare the willingness to pay 
bids of individuals against the ir  socio-economic characterist ics, 
part icular ly  income: this information is obtained largely in the
demographic section of the omnibus questionnaire and is outlined 
in Section 6.6. Obvious cases of strategic behaviour can be detected in 
this way, but the test is only subjective: for instance, i t  could 
be true that a low income earner values existence benefits to the 
extent that he is prepared to pay a large proportion of his income 
to ensure the preservation of this natural ecosystem. This 
individual could be judged incorrectly to be behaving strategical ly  
under this subjective judgement. Clearly there is no way of 
detecting strategic behaviour of a more subtle nature.'7
A second method for determining i f  respondents have behaved 
strategical ly  is to examine examples of the ir  actual behaviour.
By comparing stated attitudes with actual act ions , i t  may be possible 
to gain some insight into the strategic behaviour pattern which can 
emerge' in at t i tudinal  type questions. This observed relationship can 
then be used, indirect ly ,  to analyse the willingness to pay responses. 
For instance, Question 1 asks respondents for a ranking of their
7 Over-statement of preferences in an interviewer/respondent 
situation can be regarded as being less than that expected 
in an anonymous mail questionnaire situation because the 
respondent is usually prepared to over-state only to an extent 
which he believes wi l l  leave his answer credible to the 
interviewer. Hence the subjective detection technique is 
probably of use in only a small number of cases within the 
sample.
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perceived importance of "conservation", the d e f in i t io n  o f  which 
is l e f t  to the respondents themselves; Question 15 then goes on 
to ask i f  the respondent has subscribed to a conservation organisation
o
in the last 12 months . Using the information from the 
re la t ionship between at t i tudes and payments,it is possible to 
look at a t t i t u d in a l  type questions addressed sp e c i f i c a l l y  at 
existence benef i ts , such as Question 10, with the aim of in fe r r ing  
a r e a l i s t i c  d is t r ib u t io n  of wi l l ingness to pay bids, given actual 
payment.
However, the inference process cannot indicate the true 
benefi ts received by respondents. Besides the process's obvious 
inaccuracy,and the non-comparabil ity between general conservation 
benefi ts and spec i f ic  existence benef i ts , the inferred bids are 
themselves subject to under-stating s tra teg ic  bias, or f ree - r id ing .  
Subscriptions to conservation organizations are subject to free­
r id ing because ind iv iduals  w i l l  ra t io n a l ly  contr ibute zero in the 
hope that the other members of  the community w i l l  contr ibute enough 
to al low the continued provision of benefi ts by the organization and 
pay nothing themselves. Therefore, the true wil l ingness to pay 
of each individual is l i k e l y  to be somewhere between the two extremes 
of actual payments and hypothetical valuations where no payment is 
required or inferred. The process of inference from actual payments 
and stated a t t i tudes is therefore re a l ly  a way of providing a lower
8 To help in the comparison of  these questions i t  is also asked 
of respondents to give any reasons why they may not have 
subscribed.
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bound on the benefits of existence, and so gives a useful benchmark 
to the study of strategic behaviour: i f  the average bid is lower
than that predicted by the attitude/subscription relationship, 
i t  can be concluded that under-stating strategic behaviour is a 
severe problem in direct questioning benefit estimation.
So far,  this discussion has centred on the incentive for 
respondents to over-state their  willingness to pay,given that no 
payment is required. However, i t  was detected in the pre-test of 
the questionnaire that respondents may also perceive an incentive 
to under-state their  preferences, possibly as a result of their  fa i l ing 
to believe that no payment would be enforced,or to an 
inab i l i ty  of respondents to overcome the habit of under-stating 
their  preferences when asked for payment in a bidding situation.
To test i f  the under-statement of willingness to pay is a problem 
in the case of respondents who say they are not prepared to pay 
anything for the preservation of the hypothetical reserve, i t  is 
useful to compare respondents' preparedness to pay, as disclosed 
in Question 11, with their  responses to the att i tudinal question 
centring on the existence benefits offered by the reserve, Question 
10. I f  respondents state that they have a positive preference for 
existence benefits in Question 10 by giving any response other 
than "not important at a l l " ,  yet respond to Question 11 in the 
negative, there is some evidence to support the under-statement strategic 
behaviour hypothesis even when payment is not required or inferred.
The extent of under-statenent would be d i f f i c u l t  to establish because 
the problem of over-statement of attitudes in opinion questions, 
such as Question 10, is not readily determined. However, the 
direction of the strategic behaviour involved in the act of bidding
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zero would be beyond di spute ,given that only respondents with 
negative or zero perceived existence benefits would consider 
answering Question 10 with "not important at al l".
The detection of this type of strategic behaviour when i t  
results in a positive non-zero bid is more difficult  to carry out 
and cannot be achieved within the questionnaire. However, an 
analysis of the results of an experiment designed to detect 
strategic bias even in non zero bids is carried out in Chapter 10.
6.4 THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION
A further secondary aim of the questionnaire is to detect 
the effect of varying the level and type of information provided 
for respondents on their willingness to pay for the hypothetical 
reserve's existence benefits. To vary information across respondents 
the questionnaire segments the sample, presenting each sub­
sample with different descriptions of the reserve and varying the 
outcome of any development in the area. The alternative information 
sets are located after the init ial  description of the area and 
the presentation of photographs, and are distinguished by the 
arrangement of Groups 1 to 4. Group 1 is designed to be the base 
or control group: no further information, beside that given to all
respondents in the init ial  description and photographs, is presented, 
except for a statement that 'virtually all the special features 
of the area would be lost '  i f  development proceeded. Group 2 contains 
an increase in the amount of information provided for respondents 
by introducing photographs of two birds found in Nadgee, but does 
not change the description of the outcome of development on the
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hypothetical reserve. A comparison of bids from respondents in 
Group 1 and 2 therefore allows an analysis to be made of the 
e f fec t  of the provision of information,on wil l ingness to pay for 
existence benef i ts . Groups 3 and 4 keep constant the level of 
information concerning the character is t ics  of the hypothetical 
proposed nature reserve,but change the descript ion of  the outcome 
of development: Gfoup 3 makes speci f ic  reference to the r a r i t y
of the bird l i f e  in the reserve by suggesting that some species 
'might be threatened1; and,Group 4 provides a fu r ther  step in the 
progression of  ra r i t y ,b y  sp e c i f i c a l l y  mentioning the Ground Parrot 
as a b ird which could become ex t inc t  i f  development were allowed.
A comparison between respondents' bids from Groups 2, 3 and 4 
therefore, allows an analysis to be carr ied out on the e f fec t  of 
species ra r i ty ,on  wil l ingness to pay fo r  existence benefi ts .
6•5 PREFERENCES AND ATTITUDES
An examination of  respondents' preferences and att i tudes 
toward a broad range of environmental ly related concepts and 
practices is useful to the analysis of wi l l ingness to pay fo r  Nadgee's 
existence benefi ts in two ways: f i r s t ,  they can be used to examine
the character is t ics  of the sample chosen, both fo r  the purpose of  
describing the respondents, and for  comparing th is  sample with the 
population as a whole, sub-populations or other samples (given that 
l i ke  information on these character is t ics  is avai lable fo r  these 
other groups); and secondly, i t  is of in te res t  to establ ish any 
re lat ionships which may occur between preferences and a t t i t u d e s 5 
and the wil l ingness to pay of respondents fo r  existence benef i ts.
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In addition, questions on preferences and attitudes are useful 
in introducing the subject matter of the questionnaire to respondents, 
beginning at a broad conceptual level and gradually becoming more 
specific to the main area of interest of the questionnaire.
Preferences and attitude centred questions can be separated 
into two classifications: those which examine respondents'
stated opinions on issues; and questions aimed at revealing 
respondents' actual behaviour. Stated opinions are of somewhat 
limited value because the incentive to reveal preferences honestly 
is weak: for instance, Question 1 asks the respondent 'How
important is conservation to you?' and because there is no trade-off 
required between another commodity and "conservation" there is 
no incentive for the person who is in favour of "conservation" to 
answer with anything else but the extreme "very important" response.
The converse applies for the respondent who is opposed to conservation. 
However, even with exagerated preference revelation, stated opinion 
questions do provide information on any basic dichotomy of 
preferences existing in the sample.
Question 1 is concerned with the attitude of respondents 
to the general issue of conservation. To ensure that respondents 
are not biased in any way, the question does not attempt to define 
what is meant by conservation: this task is left  to the respondent
in Question 2, an open-ended question which asks respondents why 
they have their particular opinion of conservation. Most respondents 
will answer this type of question by providing a definition of 
conservation ,however, i t  is possible that respondents will choose 
not to do so: for instance respondents whose atti tudes,  revealed
in Question 1, reflect some misgivings about conservation may choose
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to answer Question 2 with responses which attempt to jus t i fy  
their  somewhat negative stance toward conservation - this is 
useful information in i tse l f .
Other stated opinion questions are concerned with the more 
specific issue of the importance of the various uses of National 
Parks and Nature Reserves: recreation (Question 4), education
(Question 5), aesthetic (Question 6), sc ient i f ic  (Question 7) 
and existence (Question 8). While i t  is impossible to completely 
prevent the overlapping of some benefits in a questionnaire context 
(particularly recreation and aesthetic uses), Questions 4 to 8 
attempt to discriminate park uses as far as possible. Questions 9 
and 10 are restatements of Questions 7 and 8 for the case of the 
specific reserve described to respondents. As well as attempting 
to separate clearly in the minds of respondents sc ient i f ic  and 
existence benefits»Questions 9 and 10 help respondents to consider 
the specific reserve rather than the more general concepts 
previously examined. An analysis of any change in response between 
the pairs of questions, Question 7 and Question 9, Question 8 and 
Question 10 can be useful in the consideration of the effect of 
information on respondents' attitudes.
Questions concerning preferences and attitudes which are 
based on respondents' actual behaviour are more l ike ly  to reflect 
individuals' true preferences because choices made in reali ty  
involve the respondents considering their  demands for the good or 
service involved with respect to the trade-offswhich would be 
involved, and their  total budget allocations.
Question 3 is the f i r s t  behavioural atti tude question and 
is centred on the preferences of respondents for National Parks,
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Nature Reserves and other preserved natural areas. By asking 
respondents the reason for,and the time spent on ,each v i s i t  to 
natural areas, i t  is possible to establ ish the re la t ive  
importance of each use of National Parks and Nature Reserves and 
so compute the importance which respondents' perceive fo r  each 
of the par t ic ipa to ry  reasons fo r  the preservation of natural areas 
as addressed by Questions 4 to 6. Question 3 also involves a 
prompt which reminds respondents who i n i t i a l l y  answer that they 
have not v is i ted  any natural areas in the past year,of a number 
of the more popular preserved areas around Canberra. I f  respondents 
s t i l l  answer "No", the questionnaire proceeds to establish 
reasons fo r  th is  negative revealed preference. Like a l l  questions 
which ask respondents fo r  an explanation of an answer, the las t  
part of Question 3 remains open-ended so that respondents are 
not biased by any suggestion of  appropriate responses.
Question 15 is the next behavioural preference question 
and i t  is concerned with respondents' actual subscript ions to 
conservation organizations. The use of the data provided by th is  
question in the study of  s t ra teg ic  behaviour in the wil l ingness 
to pay questions has already been examined in Section 6.3. In 
addit ion to th is  ro le , Question 15 provides useful information on the 
strength of in te rest  in respondents have in conservation issues, 
and also reasons why respondents have not subscribed, with pa r t icu la r  
in te rest  in any mention of del iberate s t ra teg ic  behaviour.
F in a l ly ,  Questions 17 and 18 investigate respondents' use of 
nature-related te lev is ion programmes, books, magazines,and a r t ic le s  to 
gain the non-part ic ipatory benefi ts of preserved natural areas 
such as education, and aesthetic benefi ts . Together with
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Question 3, Questions 17 and 18 provide information on a broad 
range of  benefi ts which is l i k e l y  to be d i re c t ly  enjoyed by 
respondents.
6.6 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
As previously noted, the questions so fa r  analysed,form 
part of  a larger omnibus questionnaire co-ordinated by the Survey 
Research Centre, Austral ian National Universi ty . A separate 
demographic data section ,attached to the omnibus questionnaire, 
includes questions on the socio-economic characte ris t ies of both 
the indiv idual respondent and of the household of which the 
respondent is a member. Information is obtained on the fol lowing 
character is t ics  in the separate section: re la t ionship to head of
household, sex, place of b i r t h ,  age, marital  status, occupation, 
type of work, major a c t i v i t y  and income. A fu r the r  f ina l  section, 
Question 52, probes the respondent's level of education - information 
on the age l e f t  school, place of schooling and qua l i f ica t ions  
gained since leaving school are obtained. This education information 
is supplemented by Question 16, which probes the content of  any 
schooling fo r  a Biology/Ecology related component. The information 
on income gained from the demographic questionnaire is supplemented 
in the ind iv idual questionnaire by Question 14 which spe c i f ica l ly  
looks at the re s t r i c t io n  which may be imposed on respondents' 
wi l l ingness to pay because of income.
Information on respondents' socio-economic backgrounds is 
important to the task of establ ishing i f  the sample is representative 
of the population from which i t  is selected and i f  inference is
223
to be taken from the results to a wider demographic area, then
i t  is important to compare the characteristics of this larger
population with those of the sample. Respondent characteristics
are also of importance in any attempt at explaining willingness
to pay or any other variable such as park use, conservation organization
subscription ,or any attitudinal response.
6.7 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has analysed the structure and aims of the 
questionnaire used for the purposes of this thesis. The major 
points which have been mentioned are: the importance of personal
interviewing; the design of the questionnaire to allow an 
"interest attracting" lead-up based on generalized concepts before 
the main section devoted to specific willingness to pay questioning; 
the use of various safeguards to ensure unbiased responses, 
especially the use of open-ended questions; and the multi-purpose 
nature of the questionnaire to involve the secondary aims of 
strategic behaviour detection, information variation, preference 
and attitude estimation,and socio-economic characteristics 
determination. Before examining the results of analysis of questionnaire 
responses, an explanation of the survey methodology employed and 
the detailing of the sample chosen must be carried out, and that is 
the role of Chapter 7.
CHAPTER 7
THE SURVEY AND THE SAMPLE
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The ques t ionna i re  discussed in Chapter 6 formed pa r t  o f  
the omnibus survey o f  Canberra res iden ts  c a r r ie d  out by the Survey 
Research Centre (SRC), A u s t ra l i a n  Nat ional  U n i v e r s i t y , i n  September 
and October,  1979. Sect ion 7.2 o f  t h i s  chapter  descr ibes the 
mechanics o f  t h i s  survey and the fo l l o w -u p  p rocedures , inc lud ing  
in te r v ie w e r  d e - b r i e f i n g ,  coding o f  responses,and the use o f  computer 
programmes in ana lys ing the data.  Sect ion 7.3 begins by d e t a i l i n g  
some o f  the socio-economic c h a r a c t e r i s t i e s  o f  the survey respondents:  
t h i s  in fo rm a t ion  is  then used to  determine i f  any s i g n i f i c a n t  
d i f f e re n c e s  e x i s t  between the sample age-sex d i s t r i b u t i o n , a n d  the 
age-sex d i s t r i b u t i o n  observed in the o v e ra l l  Canberra pop u la t ion ,  
thus e s ta b l i s h in g  i f  the sample is  re p re s e n ta t i v e ,  in these basic 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , o f  the popu la t ion  from which i t  i s  drawn. A 
s im i l a r  ana lys is  is  then c a r r ie d  out to  determine i f  the Canberra 
popu la t ion  can be regarded as rep res en ta t iv e  o f  the whole A u s t ra l i a n  
popu la t ion ,as  a check before any e x t ra p o la t i o n  o f  r e s u l t s  is  undertaken. 
Given t h i s  basis o f  the sample's rep resen ta t iveness ,  the chapter 
proceeds in Sect ion 7.4 to  present s>ome o f  the bas ic  data c o l le c te d  by 
the s u rv e y , in c lu d in g  the pa t te rns  o f  a t t i t u d e s  and 
preferences e x h ib i te d  by the survey p a r t i c i p a n t s .  As wel l  as 
p rov id ing  in fo rm a t ion  w i th  respect to  the sample, the d e s c r ip t i o n  o f  
a t t i t u d e s  and preferences serves as a usefu l  i n t r o d u c t i o n  to  the
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consideration of the magnitude of respondent's wi l l ingness to pay for 
Nadgee's existence benefi ts which is carr ied out in the fol lowing chapter.
7.2 THE MECHANICS OF SAMPLING AND SURVEYING
7.2.1 Sample Selection
The processes of sampling and surveying were carr ied out by 
the Survey Research Centre and w i l l  not be reviewed in d e ta i l ,  
but i t  is important to set out the mechanics of sample select ion 
to demonstrate the achievement of a random sample.
The sample of ind iv iduals was based on a l- in -100 systematic 
random sample of block and section references from an Austral ian 
Capital T e r r i to ry ,  Department of the Capital Te r r i to ry  Rates F i le .
Of the 681 addresses selected in th is  way, 580 were avai lable 
fol lowing the exclusion of  temporary residents,  diplomats and vacant 
lo ts ,  and these addresses yielded 590 households. Each member of 
these households provided information of a demographic nature fo r  
the survey,and of these 1,883 ind iv idua ls ,  593 ind iv iduals  over 
the age of 18 were selected to respond to the individual 
interview, on the basis of a random select ion procedure which used an 
id e n t i f i c a t io n  code and the ind iv id ua l 's  posit ion in the household.
As a resu l t  of refusals and fa i lu res  to contact, 551 interviews were 
completed and seven of these were discarded because language 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  had rendered questioning meaningless, leaving a f ina l  
to ta l  of 544 successful responses.
The d iv is ion of the 544 ind iv iduals sampled into the four 
groups,created for  the investigation of var ia t ion due to changing the
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level of information and species rari ty,  as outlined in the preceding 
chapter, was carried out using a sub-sampling process based on the 
address of the individual's place of residence. Address numbers 
were chosen at random but in a way that ensured a distribution 
across the groups of approximately 7:1:1:1 : if respondents resided 
at addresses ending in the numbers 00, 01, 03, 04, 06, 07, 09, 10,
12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19 they were included in Group 1 and provided 
with the information pertaining to that Group, whereas respondents 
with address numbers ending in 02 or 11 were assigned to Group 2 and 
so on. In the sample selected, 380 respondents were assigned to 
Group 1, 54 to Group 2, 51 to Group 3 and 59 to Group 4. This 
structure was established so that Group 1 constituted the main segment 
of the sample with Groups 2, 3 and 4 being of sufficient size for 
s tat ist ical  testing within themselves but primarily acting as sources 
of supplementary information to the main sample, Group 1.
7.2.2 Survey Procedure
The f i r s t  stage of the survey involved the selection and 
training of 29 interviewers and this was carried out by 
the SRC early in September 1979. Many of the interviewers chosen 
had been employed on previous Canberra Population Surveys, and this 
experience»together with the SRC training programme»ensured that 
interviewers were competent. Part of the interviewer training 
process .was a seminar outlining the aims of the questionnaire which, 
although presented at a non-technical level, attempted to introduce 
interviewers to the major issues involved, the way in which the 
questionnaire attempts to reveal information relevant to these issues,
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and the problems which could be expected to arise with particular 
questions, as were revealed by the pre-test of the questionnaire.
Interviewing was carried out during September and October 
1979 with each interviewer being allocated respondents on a regional 
basis to minimize travel costs. Respondents had been informed 
of their selection for the survey by let ter  prior to interviewing 
and so interviewers were- advantaged to the extent of not having to 
introduce the survey as a totally new concept. The policy adopted 
for accepting an individual or a household as a non-contact was 
the failure to make contact on three separate occasions.
On the finalization of all questionnaires, the interviewers 
were recalled to the SRC for a de-briefing session in which any 
problems encountered during the survey were spelt out. The de­
briefing revealed only minor problems with the questions,other than 
those expected following the experience of the pre-test.  One 
difficulty deserves mention: with some of the (less interested)
respondents, i t  was clear to interviewers that Questions 4 to 8 were 
answered without much thought, as responses were repetitive. For 
instance, once such a respondent had decided that National Parks 
and Nature Reserves were "very important" for recreation, all 
of the other purposes of such areas were given a "very important" 
rating. It is, of course, impossible to detect the extent of this 
problem as i t  becomes speculation whether a set of five "very 
important" responses is due to a lack of thought or is a genuine 
reflection of attitudes.
228
7.2.3 Data Coding and Analysis
Completed questionnaires were coded during November 1979, 
the primary task being to formulate coding frames for the open- 
ended questions. These frames were designed so that the range of 
responses was not limited excessively,but also so the size of 
each response category enabled meaningful analysis over large 
numbers of responses. In December 1979, the coded responses were 
entered onto a computer tape and the f i r s t  results were produced 
in January 1980. The majority of the analysis was carried out 
using the programme 'Statistical Package for the Social Sciences' 
(SPSS), but the need for a more rigorous regression analysis 
necessitated the use of the programmes ' OLS' and 'AUTREGAL' »which 
were designed by Dr. Adrian Pagan of the Department of Statis t ics ,
The Faculties, Australian National University.
7.3 SAMPLE REPRESENTATIVENESS
This section examines the representativeness of the sample 
selected at random by the Survey Research Centre, for the whole 
Canberra population. Because i t  is found that the differences 
between the sample and the population are not significant, and hence 
that the results derived from the survey responses can be 
extrapolated to apply to the Canberra populace, the study is extended 
to determine if  the Canberra population is representative of the 
whole Australian community. Both of these studies use the socio­
economic characteristies of the three groups - the sample, the
229
ACT populat ion,and the Austral ian population - as the basis fo r  
the tes t  of  representativeness, sp e c i f i c a l l y  age, sex and income.
The f i r s t  task of th is  section is therefore to describe the socio­
economic character is t ics  of the SRC sample.
7.3.1 Socio-Economic Character ist ics of the Sample
AppendixII sets out a f u l l  documentation of the socio­
economic characteris t ies of the respondents in the SRC sample.
In th is  sub-section these character is t ics  are reviewed,with pa r t icu la r  
emphasis being placed on the age, sex,and income d is t r ibu t ions  
used in the la te r  analyses of sample representativeness.
The sex of respondents was re la t iv e ly  evenly d is t r ibu ted ,  
with s l i g h t l y  more females than males being sampled (Table A . I I . l ) .  
Respondents were mostly in the 20 to 44 age group with s t r i k in g ly  
few respondents (6.6«) being over the age of 60 (Table A . I I . 2).
The age d is t r ib u t io n  is ref lected in the l i f e -c y c le  stage of 
respondents: 47.3% of those sampled were indiv iduals with a young
family (Table A. I I . 3). The income d is t r ib u t io n  displayed in 
Table A . I I . 8 is the respondent's household income: the income of
the whole household is the relevant var iable because the 
individual may be dependent on the incomes of the other members of 
the household. For instance, in the case of the housewife who 
has a personal income of zero, i t  is the income of  her husband, and 
hence the household, which is the constra int on her a c t i v i t i e s .
46.7% of respondents had a household gross yearly income in excess
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of $20,800 and 26.8% of respondents were included in the $26,000 + 
category (Table A.II .8). A partial explanation of this strong 
trend toward high household incomes lies in the fact that only 
20.4% of respondents were not in the workforce, indicating that 
there was a high proportion of multiple income households included 
in the sample. The income distribution is somewhat reflected by 
the industry and occupation groupings of respondents, with a strong 
bias being evident toward clerical and administrative types of 
employment - over 50% of respondents were classified as being engaged 
in public administration or community services (Table A.II .5 and 
A. I I . 6). A reflection of the high proportion of white-collar 
workers in the sample is the distribution of the qualifications of 
respondents - over 20% of respondents had tert iary qualifications 
(Table A.II .7).
7.3.2 Comparison with the Canberra Population
Using the age and sex distributions described in Sub-Section 
7.3.1, Jones (1980) carried out an analysis to determine if the 
SRC sample was representative of the Canberra population. The 
results of Jones' study are presented in Table 7.1. Using the 
Australian Bureau of Statist ics "benchmark" (an independent estimate 
of the population distributions of age and sex,based on the 1976 
Census) to create the age-sex distribution which would be expected 
in the sample, Jones found, using Chi-squared tests,  that 'the 
difference between the age-sex distribution of persons in responding 
households and that derived from the ABS benchmarks are minor1 (p. 3).
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Sample
Age Group Actual ( % ) Expected (%) 2kX
(a) Males
0-14 307 (33.0) 311 (32.4) 0.05
15-19 90 (9.6) 81 (8.4) 1 .00
20-24 63 (6.8) 73 (7.6) 1.37
25-29 77 (8.3) 92 (9.6) 2.45
30-34 103 (11.1) 100 (10.4) 0.09
35-39 87 (9.3) 74 (7.7) 2.28
40-44 53 (5.7) 58 (6.0) 0.43
45-49 47 (5.0) 46 (4.8) 0.02
50-54 36 (3.9) 43 (4.5) 1.14
55-59 37 (4.0) 35 (3.6) 0.11
60-64 10 (1.1) 20 (2.1) 5.00
65 + 22 (2.4) 28 (2.9) 1.29
Total 932 (100.2) 961 (100.0) 15.23
(b) Females
0-14 280 (29.5) 292 (30.6) 0.49
15-19 95 (10.0) 77 (8.1) 4.21
20-24 83 (8.7) 8^3 (8.7) 0.00
25-29 97 (10.2) 99 (10.4) 0.04
30-34 91 (9.6) 99 (10.4) 0.65
35-39 85 (9.0) 72 (7.5) 2.35
40-44 50 (5.3) 55 (5.6) 0.45
45-49 42 (4.4) 43 (4.5) 0.02
50-54 32 (3.4) 41 (4.3) 1.98
55-59 29 (3.1) 33 (3.5) 0.48
60-64 19 (2.0) 21 (2.2) 0.19
65 + 46 (4.8) 40 (4.2) 0.90
Total 949 (100.0) 955 • (100.0) 11.76
* Chi-squared = (Actual
9
-Expected) - Expected. Each ind iv idua l
chi-squared has one degree o f  freedom. The to ta ls  f o r males
and females separately have twelve each. Their  sum has 24.
The 5% level o f  s ign i f icance  x2 with  one degree o f  freedom is  3.84, 
and with 12 degrees o f  freedom is 21.0.
Source : Jones (1980).
Table_7.1: Comparison o f  Sample Age-Sex D is t r ib u t io n  with the Canberra
Popula t ion.
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Jones also analysed the breakdowns of members of  households by 
the second stage of sampling,and found that the selected group's 
age-sex d is t r ib u t io n  was not s ign i f ica n t  differences between the 
sample and the Canberra population Jones accepts the age-sex 
d is t r ib u t io n  tes t  as being the most crucia l in test ing i f  the sample 
is representat ive. Given th is  caveat, i t  is accepted that the 
sample selected by the SRC is representative of the Canberra 
populat ion.
7.3.3 Comparison with the Austral ian Population
A s im i la r  analysis to that carr ied out by Jones,and described 
in Sub-Section 7 .3 .2 ,was undertaken fo r  the differences between the 
Canberra population (which is e f fe c t iv e ly  represented by the SRC 
sample) and the to ta l  Austral ian population»to determine i f  i t  
is wise to extrapolate resul ts  from the Canberra Population Survey 
to a national context. Austral ian Bureau of  S ta t is t ic s  data from 
the 1976 Census was used for  th is  comparison ,and three character is t ics  
were chosen to analyse Canberra/Austral ia dif ferences: sex, age and
incomeJ Table 7.2 sets out the age/sex d is t r ibu t ions  of the 
ACT and Austral ian populations,and Table 7.3 presents the income 
d is t r ib u t io n s .
I t  is clear from the x? s ta t i s t i c s  that almost a l l  
categories of  the age, sex and income d is t r ib u t io ns  in the ACT 
are d i f fe re n t  from the Austral ian population at the 5% level of
1 The income d is t r ib u t io n  used fo r  th is  comparison is personal 
income rather than household income which was used to describe 
the sample in Sub-Section 7.3.1.
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A.C.T.
Age G r o u p A c t u a l ( %) E x p e c t e d  ( % ) * y
( a )  M a l e s
0 - 1 4 3 1 7 5 8 ( 3 1 . 7 ) 2 7 9 3 3 ( 2 7 . 9 ) 523
1 5 - 1 9 9 2 5 9 ( 9 . 2 ) 9 17 5 ( 9 . 2 ) 1
2 0 - 2 4 8 8 6 3 ( 8 . 9 ) 8261 ( 8 . 3 ) 44
2 5 - 2 9 11071 ( 1 1 . 1 ) 8 45 2 ( 8 . 4 ) 811
3 0 - 3 4 9 1 1 9 ( 9 . 1 ) 7101 ( 7 . 1 ) 573
3 5 - 3 9 7022 ( 7 . 0 ) 6 16 6 ( 6 . 2 ) 119
4 0 - 4 4 5647 ( 5 . 6 ) 5 51 3 ( 5 . 5 ) 3
4 5 - 4 9 5 1 4 8 ( 5 . 1 ) 5 8 6 0 ( 5 . 9 ) 86
5 0 - 5 4 4 6 7 6 ( 4 . 7 ) 5 56 2 ( 5 . 5 ) 141
5 5 - 5 9 3029 ( 3 . 0 ) 4 5 6 5 ( 4 . 5 ) 517
60 + 4 5 1 2 ( 4 . 6 ) 1 1 5 1 5 ( 1 1 . 5 ) 4 2 5 8
T o t a l 1 0 0 1 0 3 ( 1 0 0 . 0 ) 1 0 0 1 0 3 ( 1 0 0 . 0 ) 7076
( b )  F e m a l e s
0 - 1 4 3 0 1 7 4 ( 3 0 . 9 ) 2591 3 ( 2 6 . 6 ) 700
1 5 - 1 9 8 79 6 ( 9 . 0 ) 8 57 5 ( 8 . 8 ) 6
2 0 - 2 4 9541 ( 9 . 8 ) 7 9 5 4 ( 8 . 2 ) 317
2 5 - 2 9 1 1 1 5 8 ( 1 1 . 4 ) 8102 ( 8 . 3 ) 1153
3 0 - 3 4 8461 ( 8 . 7 ) 6 6 4 6 ( 6 . 8 ) 496
3 5 - 3 9 6 8 3 4 ( 7 . 0 ) 5745 ( 5 . 9 ) 206
4 0 - 4 4 5 0 0 4 ( 5 . 1 ) 5 0 8 2 ( 5 . 2 ) 1
4 5 - 4 9 4 7 7 6 ( 4 . 9 ) 5349 ( 5 . 5 ) 61
5 0 - 5 4 4247 ( 4 . 4 ) 5 2 8 8 ( 5 . 4 ) 205
5 5 - 5 9 2 7 9 3 ( 2 . 9 ) 4 5 3 3 ( 4 . 6 ) 6 6 8
60 + 5736 ( 5 . 9 ) 1 4 3 3 2 ( 1 4 . 7 ) 5155
Total 9 7 5 1 9 ( 1 0 0 . 0 ) 9 7 5 1 9 ( 1 0 0 . 0 ) 8 9 6 8
*The Expected age-sex distribut ion for the ACT is based on the 
age-sex distribution of the Australian population.
Source: Australian Bureau of S ta t is t ics ,  'Population and Dwellings
Summary Tables: 1976 Census', Canberra, A.G.P.S.
Table 7 .2 : Comparison of the Canberra Age-Sex Distribution with
the Australian Population.
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A.C.T.
Income Group Actual ~ w  ~ Expected W * X?
0 21655 (16.8) 21710 (16.9) 0
0- 1500 9517 (7.4) 8888 (6.9) 45
1501- 2000 4195 (3.3) 9406 (7.3) 2887
2001- 3000 6188 (4.8) 12909 (10.0) 3499
3001- 4000 4857 (3.8) 7513 (5.8) 939
4001- 5000 5662 (4.4) 7822 (6.2) 596
5001- 6000 7425 (5.8) 10602 (8.2) 951
6001- 7000 10341 (8.0) 12509 (9.7) 376
7001- 8000 11124 (8.7) 10658 (8.3) 20
8001- 9000 9599 (7.5) 7970 (6.2) 333
9001-12000 16287 (12.6) 11013 (8.6) 2526
12001-15000 9595 (7.5) 4010 (3.1) 7779
15001-18000 6445 (5.0) 1664 (1.3) 1 3750
18000+ 5641 (4.4) 1859 (1.4) 7694
Total 128533 (100.0) 128535 (100.0)
^Expected income d is t r i b u t i o n  fo r the ACT is derived from the
Austra l ian  income d i s t r i b u t i o n .
Sourc e : Aus tra l ian  Bureau o f  S t a t i s t i c s ,  'Populat ion and
Dwellings Summary Tables: 1976 Census', Canberra,
A.G.P.S.
Table 7 .3 : Comparison o f  the Canberra Income D is t r ib u t io n  with
the Austra l ian  Population.
s ign i f icance  - the 5 level o f  s ign i f i cance  x: > with one degree of 
freedom, is  3.84. In p a r t i c u la r ,  the ACT has a higher representat ion o f  
young persons, espec ia l ly  the ages 0-14 and 25-34 and a lower represent­
at ion of o lder  res idents , 50 years and o lde r ,  thus i l l u s t r a t i n g  the 
predominance o f  young fa m i l ie s .  The income d i s t r i b u t i o n  favours 
the higher ranges at the expense of the low income categories.
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The significant differences in the distribution of age, 
sex,and income which exist between the Canberra and Australian 
populations imply that the results of any analysis carried out 
on data from the Canberra Population Survey cannot be used for 
extrapolation beyond the Canberra population ,without extreme 
caution being exercised. Under this limitation, the remainder of 
this chapter proceeds with a description of the patterns of attitudes and 
preferences displayed by the survey participants, to promote an appreciation 
of the sample characterisecs ,and to provide a background to the 
analysis of existence value carried out in the following chapter.
7.4 SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
This section draws the distinction between respondents' 
stated opinions regarding issues related to conservation and 
natural areas ,and their actual behavioural patterns. A full 
documentation of the characteristics mentioned in this section 
is presented in Appendix II.
7.4.1 Stated Opinions
The vast majority of respondents regarded conservation as 
being important to some extent with only 1.3% of respondents 
considering conservation to be not important at a l l ,  while less 
than 10% considered conservation to be of l i t t l e  importance 
(Table A.II .9). Because peoples' attitudes to the importance of 
conservation are very closely related to what they believe conservation 
is,  i t  is important to consider the definitions of conservation
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given by respondents - this information is obtained by Question 2. 431 
respondents chose to answer Question 2 by providing a definition 
of conservation. Despite the unstructured nature of the question 
and the wide variety of answers obtained, i t  was possible to 
distinguish 10 clear definitional types. The most popular 
definition chosen by respondents was that conservation involved 
the preservation of plants and wildlife (33.6%). The preservation 
of resources was nominated by 27.4% of respondents: more than half
of these respondents specifically mentioned future generations.
The other major definition proposed was that conservation was the 
preservation of the quality of l ife (18.3%). Table 7.4 presents 
the full l i s t  of definitions.
A number of interesting points emerge from these definitional 
responses. First ,  i f  i t  can be assumed that the 18% of respondents 
who suggested that conservation was the preservation of the 
quality of l ife were thinking in terms of the preservation of plants 
and wildlife, i t  can be argued that a majority of respondents 
(33.6% + 18.3%) relate conservation to the preservation of natural 
environments. The usually accepted definition of conservation 
involves the preservation of resources overall, a response given 
by 27% of respondents.
It must be noted however,that only 80% of the total sample 
chose to define conservation. The remainder, excluding 50 non­
responses, chose to give the reason why they held negative feelings for 
conservation,or why they were reserved in their attitude. Most 
of these respondents fel t  that a trade-off between conservation 
and "exploitation" was necessary to achieve a balance within
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society.  A fu r th e r  M  o f  the whole sample were opposed to
2
conservation because o f  the " ra d ica l "  out look which i t  impl ied. 
Table 7.5 sets out these responses in d e ta i l  and provides 
complementary information to Table 7.4. Together,Tables 7.4 and 
7.5 de ta i l  a l l  responses to Q2.
D e f in i t io n  : 
"Conservation is . . . "
Absolute 
Frequency
Relat ive 
Frequency 
of Total  
Sample ( % )
Relat ive 
Frequency 
o f  D e f in i t io n  
Responses [ % )
The preservat ion o f  plants and 
w i1dl i fe 145 26.7 , 33.6
The preservat ion o f  q u a l i t y  o f  l i f e 79 14.5 18.3
The preservat ion o f  resources fo r  
fu tu re  generations 68) 118 12.5)21_7 151' 8 ) 2 7.4
The preservat ion o f  resources 50 9.2 11 .6
Preserving our means o f  surv iva l 29 5.3 6.7
Liv ing in harmony with nature 19 3.5 4.5
The proper use o f  resources 14 2.6 3.2
The prevention o f  i r r e v e rs ib le  
consequences 14 2.6 3.2
The stopping o f  p o l lu t io n 8 1.5 1.9
The preservat ion o f  h is t o r i c a l  
b u i1 dings 5 .9 1 .2
Total 431 79.3 100.0
Table 7.4: D e f in i t io n s  of Conservation
2 At the time o f  the survey, the issue o f  logging the ra in fo re s t  
at Terrania Creek on the North coast o f  NSW was being debated 
in the media,and exposure to demonstrations of th i s  kind may 
have helped to boost the proport ion o f  respondents rep ly ing 
in these ways.
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Reason ; Absolute 
Freq.
Re 1 a t i v e  
Freq. of 
Total
Sample (%)
Relative 
Freq. o f 
Reasons ( % )
Must be a trade o f f 33 6.1 52.4
Not in terested 23 4.2 36.5
Impl ies a " ra d ic a l "  out look 7 1.3 11.1
Total 63 11.6 100.0
Uni formative 19 3.6
Others 3 .5
Don' t  know 23 4.2
Refusal 5 .9
Total 50 9.1
Grand Total  Q2 544 100.0
Table 7 .5 : Reasons fo r  Negative A t t i t u d e  to Conservation.
The responses to Questions 4 to 8 (Tables A .11.10 to 
A .11.14) provide information fo r  an analys is  o f respondents' stated 
a t t i tu d e s  to the f i v e  categories o f  Nat ional Park and Nature 
Reserves use. A summary o f  these Tables is presented in Table
7.6.
A l l  f i v e  uses were regarded by respondents as v i t a l  to the 
operat ions o f  National Parks and Nature Reserves and Chi-squared 
analys is performed on the responses to the f i ve  quest ions»overal1, 
showed tha t  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n i f i c a n t  d i f fe rences ex is ted between 
respondents' a t t i tu d e s  to the d i f f e r e n t  park uses,at the 5% level 
o f  s ign i f i cance .
239
Category Label
Relative Frequency (*)
Recreation Education Aesthetics Research Preservation
Very important 82.7 82.4 79.6 68.8 76.3
Somewhat important 14.3 15.3 15.1 21.9 13.6
A l i t t l e  important 2.2 2.0 4.6 6.1 7.4
Not important at a l l .6 .2 .4 2.0 1.5
Others .2 .2 .4 1.3 1.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 7 .6 : Comparison of Respondents' Att i tudes to the Five Major
Purposes of National Parks and Nature Reserves
However,a pairwise comparison between the responses to 
individual questions showed that the responses to the questions on 
rec rea t iona l , educational and aesthetic uses were not s ig n i f ic a n t ly  
d i f fe ren t  at the 51 leve l ,  but when responses to these questions 
were compared with the responses to the s c ie n t i f i c  research and 
preservation use questions, s ign i f ica n t  dif ferences were detected. The 
di f ference between these l a t t e r  two uses was also found to be s ign i f ica n t .
Given these dif ferences, i t  is possible to compile an 
ordinal ranking of park uses, by analysing each purpose's level 
of support as shown by the re la t ive  frequency tables. This ranking 
is ,  in decreasing level of support:
(1) The par t ic ipa to ry  purposes: recreation, education and aesthetics.
(2) The preservation of natural ecosystems)
) non-part ic ipatory uses.
(3) S c ien t i f i c  research )
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The clear distinction between the participatory and non- 
participatory uses is to be expected. For instance, some respondents 
detailed their impressions of scientific research being the 
dissection of "poor innocent l i t t l e  animals": the benefits of such
dissections were too distant for some respondents to appreciate5 
and so research was the least popular of the five uses. Interestingly, 
relatively more respondents answered "somewhat important", instead 
of "very important" ,to the scientific research question, but even 
so,a very low percentage - (2%) - regarded research as being not 
important at a 11.  ^ Details of the Chi-squared analysis of these 
results can be found in Appendix III of this thesis.
7.4.2 Behavioural Characteristies
To capture the attitude of respondents toward the non- 
participatory uses of natural areas, Q17 and Q18 probed the 
respondents use of television programmes and printed material concerned 
primarily with nature study. The response to Q17 revealed that 
the majority (81.7%) of respondents "usually" watched TV nature 
study programmes»where "usually"was defined by the individual 
(Table A.11.15), but the responses to Q18 showed that only 48.2% 
of respondents "often read books, magazines or art icles which feature 
the study of nature" (Table A.11.15). It can be concluded that most
4 It should be noted that some respondents when answering 
Question 4, regarded recreation as being less than very 
important because of i ts effects on the environment. These 
respondents could be regarded as extremely environmentally 
conscious and inevitably rated preservation as being very 
important.
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respondents gained some non-participatory benefits from the 
preservation of natural ecosystems, but a l i t t l e  under one half 
of respondents were more serious in their pursuit of such benefits.
The extent and pattern of the participatory benefits of 
preserved national areas which were enjoyed by respondents, can be 
observed from the responses to Question 3. 77.6% of respondents
had visited a reserved natural area in the 12 months preceding 
the survey (Table A.II .17),and of these,over 80% spent less than 
seven days within such areas (Table A.11.18). The types of use 
which respondents made of the available preserved natural areas are 
set out in Tables A.II .19 to A.11.23 and a summary of this information 
is presented in Table 7.7.
Some difficulty was encountered in classifying respondents' 
activi t ies into the use types set up by the definitional categories 
of Chapter 4 ,primarily because of the multiple-use visi ts which are 
most commonly undertaken. For instance, most visi ts to natural 
areas involve both recreation and aesthetic benefits and can vary 
from a picnic in a developed portion of a reserve to a wilderness 
bushwalking tour. The classification which is displayed in 
Table 7.7 therefore breaks down the Recreation/Aesthetic category 
of use into two classes: hoiidays/picnics,and bushwalking/camping.
Hence the category of recreation is reserved for pure sports 
activi t ies such as surfing and down-hill skiing which can be assumed 
to have l i t t l e  associated aesthetic benefit, and the aesthetic 
category includes only activi t ies such as scenic drives through natural 
areas which have l i t t l e  recreation content, where recreation is defined 
in terms of physical activity. Other cross-classifications of uses
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were formulated such as recreation/education, but i t  was found 
that these classes were o f  l i t t l e  signif icance.
Clearly the most popular use of  natural areas among the 
respondents was the aesthetic use,with the somewhat closely 
associated passive recreation/aesthetic use of  hol idays/picnics 
being th-e next most popular use. The bushwalking/camping type 
uses were of minor re la t ive  importance but tended to involve 
respondents who spent longer periods in natural areas. F ina l ly ,  
recreation use was moderately strong, especia l ly in the less than 
one day time category. Overal l ,  however, the level of actual 
pa r t ic ipa t ion  in natural area based a c t i v i t i e s  appears to be re la t i v e ly  
small , with over 70% of respondents using these areas for  less 
than three days per year. This appears to contradict the very 
strong support fo r  pa r t ic ipa to ry  benef i ts evident from the stated 
at t i tudes of  respondents.,presented in Table 7.6. The divergence 
between respondents' behaviour and th e i r  opinions w i l l  be examined 
fur ther  in fol lowing chapters.
7.5 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has presented information on the sampling and 
surveying procedures used by the Survey Research Centre fo r  the 
September-October 1979 Canberra Population Survey during which a 
sample of Canberra residents were asked the set of  questions 
detai led in Chapter 6. In addi t ion ,  de ta i ls  of  the interviewer 
b r ie f in g ,  and the coding, computerization ,and analysis o f  data 
gathered during the survey,have been presented.
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It was shown in Sub-Section 7.3.1 that the sample selected 
by the Survey Research Centre was made up of a large proportion 
of respondents with young families, often with a multiple 
household income,and employed, characterist ical ly, in professional 
and clerical occupations. While i t  was demonstrated in Sub-Section 
7.3.2 that this sample was representative of the Canberra population, 
Sub-Section 7.3.3 found that significant differences in the 
distributions of age, sex,and income exist between the Canberra 
and Australian populations. As a consequence, the results of any 
analysis carried out on data from the Canberra Population Survey 
cannot be used for extrapolation beyond the Canberra population 
without extreme caution being exercised.
With this caveat in mind, Section 7.4 considered some of 
the attitudinal and behavioural characteristies of the sampled 
respondents. The stated opinions of respondents were indicative 
of a widespread, strong support for conservation in general, and the 
preservation of natural areas specifically. However, i t  was found 
that respondents' actual use of natural areas for participatory 
purposes was less than would be expected, given the attitudinal results 
Of the participatory uses, sightseeing, holidays and picnics were 
the most popular. Respondents were also observed to enjoy non­
parti ci patory benefits of preserved natural ecosystems, primarily 
through the medium of television but also through printed matter.
Given this background information on the survey sample, 
and the limitations involved in extrapolating any results derived 
from the sample responses, i t  is possible to proceed to an analysis 
of the value the Canberra population place on knowing that Nadgee 
Nature Reserve continues to exist in a preserved condition.
CHAPTER 8
EVALUATION OF EXISTENCE BENEFITS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Part I I ,  the empir ical  sect ion o f  th i s  th e s is ,  is  designed 
to evaluate the existence benef i ts  enjoyed by the Canberra community 
from the continued preservat ion o f  Nadgee Nature Reserve in a 
natural  s ta te .  So f a r ,  the special  features which may cause 
ind iv idu a ls  to value the existence o f  Nadgee have been described 
in Chapter 5 together with information on the other benef i ts  o f 
preserving the reserve; the quest ionnaire which was designed to 
determine the value of Nadgee's existence benef i ts  to a sample of 
Canberra people has been de ta i led  in Chapter 6; and Chapter 7 has 
spec if ied  the way the quest ionnaire was presented to
respondents and how these respondents were selected fo r  the survey.
These three chapters provide the background information necessary
fo r  the analys is  o f resu l ts  which is  carr ied  out in th i s  and fo l low ing
chapters. S p e c i f i c a l l y  , th is  chapter considers the primary aim of
the quest ionnaire ,as ou t l ined  in Section 6 .2 , the est imation of the
existence benef i ts  enjoyed by Canberra residents as a r e s u l t  o f
the preservat ion o f  Nadgee Nature Reserve in a natural  s tate (Section 8.2)
and two o f  the secondary aims: the e f f e c t  o f  information on
existence benef i ts  (Section 8.3) and the impl ica t ions of th is  fo r  the
primary aim (Section 8 .4 ) ;  and, the d i f fe rences in w i l l ingness  to
pay across the opt ional payment modes (Section 8 .5 ) .
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Ini t ial ly,  five assumptions are made under which willingness
to pay bids represent accurate measurements of existence benefits.
ASSUMPTION I : Every respondent to the questionnaire is fully aware
of the nature of the good for which he is bidding: 
that is ,  the existence benefit is assumed to have been 
successfully separated from all the other benefits of 
the "hypothetical" reserve described in the questionnaire. 
This assumption is made because of the possibility, 
outlined in Chapter 6, that respondents may not report 
only their valuation of existence benefits when asked 
for their willingness to pay to ensure the preservation 
of the "hypothetical" reserve. Assumption I will be 
maintained throughout the analysis of questionnaire 
results because i t  is not amenable to any empirical 
testing ,beyond the consideration of the information 
obtained from the questionnaire pre-test and the de­
briefing of interviewers,both of which suggests that most 
respondents were convinced at least that they would not 
be able to visi t  the reserve in the future. Therefore, 
i t  is reasonable to conclude that participatory benefits 
are effectively eliminated from respondents' valuation 
calculus, but i t  is not clear that all non-participatory 
benefits,other than existence benefits,are similarly 
eliminated. Assumption I must be made therefore, so 
that the analysis of existence valuations can take 
place without the confusion of other benefits being 
present. Consideration of all conclusions must be
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undertaken in the fu l l  knowledge of the possib il i ty  
that Assumption I could be violated for some 
respondents.
ASSUMPTION 2 : Existence benefits are always a "good". Chapter 6
explained the necessity of context re a l i ty  in hypothetical 
valuation situations and how, as a result ,  i t  was 
decided that a willingness to pay question, rather than 
the theoretically  correct willingness to accept 
compensation question, should be used to evaluate 
respondents' existence benefits. For the same reason, 
i t  was decided to l im i t  willingness to pay bids to 
zero or positive amounts,and not to allow the possibil i ty  
of respondents with negative preferences for the 
existence benefits of the described "hypothetical" 
reserve, being able to receive compensation, i f  the 
reserve was preserved, by bidding a negative amount.
Like.Assumption I ,  empirical testing of this assumption 
is not attempted in this thesis and remains in force 
throughout the analysis of existence benefits, making all  
conclusions subject to the proviso that Assumption 2 
may not be true for a l l  individuals. I f  Assumption 2 
is not valid the estimated existence benefit  is greater 
than the true value because some individuals have 
negative valuations but were forced to reveal a valuation 
of zero in the questionnaire. However, i t  would appear 
that only a very small proportion of respondents - 2% -  
considered that the provision of Nadgee's existence
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benefits was "not important at a l l " ,  and even this 
response does not imply a negative preference for the 
"good" but may indicate that the respondent neither 
l ikes nor dislikes the knowledge that the area remains 
preserved. Assumption 2 can be regarded therefore, as 
being a reasonable approximation of re a l i ty .
ASSUMPTION 3 : Respondents' bids do not exhibi t hypothetical bias. I f
respondents feel that the ir  reported valuations wi l l  not 
affect the decision outcome in any way because the 
willingness to pay question is only hypothetical, they 
may not be motivated suff ic ient ly  to determine their  
preferences, and consequently they wi l l  bid inaccurately. 
While i t  was shown in Chapter 2 that hypothetical bias 
may only have the e ffect  of increasing the variance of 
bids rather than the more serious effect of shift ing the 
mean of willingness to pay, i t  is necessary to make 
Assumption 3 for the presentation of the results of the 
questionnaire. Again, conclusions drawn from these 
results,must be considered given the possib il i ty  of 
hypothetical bias. However some indication of the extent of 
hypothetical bias is obtained, by implication only, from 
the analysis of the ef fect  of information on willingness 
to pay carried out in Section 8 .3 ,and from the analysis 
of the relationship between willingness to pay and choice 
of payment mode undertaken in Section 8.5.
ASSUMPTION 4 : Payment mode bias does not occur. I t  is possible that in
considering their  willingness to pay for the existence
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benefi ts provided by the preserved "hypothetical" 
reserve, respondents may be influenced by the modesof 
payment presented by the question. According to the 
preferences of respondents, wi l l ingness to pay for  
existence benefits w i l l  be biased upwards or downwards 
by the mode of payment.
ASSUMPTION 5 : Respondents do not behave s t ra teg ica l ly .  I f  respondents
do consider that th e i r  response to the hypothetical 
valuation process w i l l  a f fec t  the decision outcome, i t  
is possible that they w i l l  behave s t ra teg ica l ly  by under- 
or over-stat ing th e i r  preferences fo r  the existence benef i ts,  
given that payment of t h e i r  bid w i l l  NOT be enforced, 
and that the size of  any future payments w i l l  not be 
determined by th e i r  response. Because the questionnaire 
used fo r  th is  thesis does not attempt to el iminate 
s tra teg ic  behaviour, the resul ts of th is  survey must be 
analysed under the assumption of no s tra teg ic  behaviour. 
However, fo r  conclusions to be drawn s a t i s fa c to r i l y  from 
the survey resu l ts ,  i t  is necessary to consider the 
l i k e l y  extent of the s tra teg ic  behaviour problem and th is  
task is addressed s p e c i f i ca l l y  by Chapter 10,and in 
passing in Section 8.5 of th is  chapter.
Under these f ive assumptions -accurate knowledge, existence 
benefi ts always "goods" and no hypothet ical ,  payment mode ,or stra teg ic  
behaviour biases - th i s  chapter begins by examining the d is t r ib u t io n  of 
respondents' wi l l ingness to pay bids in order to estimate the extent of 
th e i r  valuationsof the existence benefi ts o f  Nadgee Nature Reserve.
The analysis of the e f fec t  of information on wil l ingness to pay is
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described in Section 8.3,and i t  is shown that the results of this 
analysis can be interpreted to provide weak evidence on the possib il i ty  
that Assumption 3, no hypothetical bias, is valid. Section 8.4 
reconsiders the distribution of bids,given the results obtained in 
Section 8.3, and Section 8.5 proceeds to consider the 
differences in willingness to pay between the two payment modes 
available to respondents ,pointing out the possibil i t ies of both 
hypothetical and strategic behaviour occurring.
8.2 THE DISTRIBUTION OF BIDS
8.2.1 The Raw Data
Given the five assumptions outlined in Section 8.1, i t  is 
possible to analyse the responses to Question 13 of the questionnaire, 
'What is the maximum amount that you would be prepared to pay (to 
ensure the preservation of the "hypothetical" reserve, based on the 
physical features of Nadgee Nature Reserve, for the existence benefits 
i t  w i l l  provide)?' as though each respondent fu l ly  understands the 
nature of the good for which he is bidding, and accurately reveals 
his preferences. To establish the extent of existence benefits which 
accrue to respondents, under these assumptions, this section analyses 
the distribution of bids made by respondents who were assigned to 
Group 1 - the major proportion of the sample. As detailed in Chapter 
7, the 380 Group 1 respondents are the base group of the sample,and 
are provided with the least amount of information about the hypothetical 
reserve of al l  the groups. The distribution of the bids of respondents
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in Group 1 is 
in Figure 8.1
presented in Table 8.1 and is graphed,as a bar graph,
Wi 11 ingness Absolute Relative Adjusted Cumulative
To Pay Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency
% l %
0 98 25.8 30.0 30.0
1 16 4.2 4.9 34.9
2 25 6.6 7.6 42.5
3 3 0.8 0.9 43.4
4 1 0.3 0.3 43.7
5 31 8.1 9.5 53.3
10 45 11.8 13.7 67.0
15 2 0.5 0.6 67.6
20 27 7.1 8.2 75.8
24 2 0.5 0.6 76.4
25 3 0.8 0.9 77.3
26 2 0.5 0.6 77.9
30 8 ' 2.1 2.4 80.3
35 1 0.3 0.3 80.6
40 2 0.5 0.6 81.2
50 23 6.0 7.0 88.2
52 4 1.1 1.2 89.4
80 1 0.3 . 0.3 89.7
100 19 5.0 5.8 95.5
150 2 0.5 0.6 96.1
200 7 1.8 2.1 98.2
250 1 0.3 0.3 98.5
300 1 0.3 0.3 98.8
500 4 1.1 1.2 100.0
Need more in fo .  6 1.6 Missing 100.0
Depends on cost 3 0.8 Missing 100.0
Don11 know 43, 11.3 Missing 100.0
Total 380 100.0 100.0
Table 8 . 1: Wil l ingness to Pay, Group 1.
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The most noticeable feature of the distribution set out 
in Table 8.1»is the high proportion of respondents who were not 
prepared to pay anything for the continued provision of the 
existence benefits offered by the reserve described to them by 
the interviewers: 30% of Group 1 respondents offering a valid
response, bid the modal score of zero. Under the Assumptions 1 
to 5 detailed in Section 8.1, i t  can be concluded that approximately 
one quarter of the Group 1 sample do not gain any benefit from the 
knowledge that Nadgee Nature Reserve exists in a preserved state.
Table 8.2 details the reasons given by the 98 respondents 
who reported a zero valuation, for their lack of support for the 
preservation proposal. 28% of these respondents indicated that the 
government should pay the full cost of preservation by the use 
of funds already collected by taxation, implying that their personal 
valuation of the existence benefits provided by the Reserve in 
i ts natural state is positive, but that they object to paying any 
more than the amount already paid in taxation.^ 25% of the zero 
valuation respondents did not wish to subscribe because of the 
lack of access to the preserved area: this implies that these
respondents valued the participatory benefits of preservation 
relatively highly,but i t  does not imply,absolutely,that they value 
existence benefits at zero, because a zero bid in this case can also 
be taken as a protest vote against user exclusion, rather than a
1 Some doubt is placed on the validity of Assumption 5 as a result 
of the strength of support for this "government responsibility" 
argument evident within the total sub-sample of Group 1 (7.3%), 
because i t  would appear that these respondents are not revealing 
their true willingness to pay in this type of questioning and 
are involved in some sort of strategic behaviour. This point 
will be taken up in Section 8.5 and again in Chapter 10.
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true ind ication of zero existence benef i ts. The "an t i - tax "  and 
"anti-doorknock" responses indicate the presence of payment mode 
bias, contrary to the v a l i d i t y  of Assumption 4, despite the 
provision of an option between payment modes by the questionnaire. 
Again, respondents object ing to the payment mode may well be 
register ing a protest vote,rather  than reveal ing a true valuation of 
zero for  these existence benefi ts . Eleven respondents registered a 
zero bid because of an income c o n s t ra in t ,and nine respondents stated 
that they were "not interested" in the concept of existence 
benef i ts.  These 20 respondents appear to be the only bidders who 
can be accepted,c a te g o r ic a l l y ,as having a zero wil l ingness to pay 
fo r  the'existence benefi ts described, and they represent 5% of the 
to ta l  Group 1 sub-sample.
2
Reason fo r  Zero Contribution Absolute Frequency Relat ive Frequency
%
Anti - tax 10 10.2
Anti-doorknock 1 1.0
Government's respons ib i l i ty 28 28.6
Too poor 11 11.2
Need access to area 24 24.6
Not interested 9 9.2
Don't know 11 11.2
Others 4 4.0
Total 98 100.0
Table 8.2: Reasons fo r  Zero Contr ibution, Group I.
2 Another implicat ion of the " lack of access" response is that the 
questionnaire appears to have been somewhat successful in 
persuading respondents that the reserve would be excluded 
from the general publ ic , thus substantiat ing the v a l i d i t y  of 
Assumption 1, at least p a r t i a l l y .
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The re la t ive ly  high proportion of the Group I sub-sample 
respondents who were unable to reveal the ir  willingness to pay 
is also noteworthy. Three types of non-response were detected: 
respondents were unable to determine the amount they would be 
wil l ing to pay because the amount of information provided in the 
interview was insuff ic ient;  because information on the cost of 
purchasing the "hypothetical" reserve to provide the existence 
benefits is not detailed by the questionnaire; and, because 
respondents "didn't  know". The total non-response proportion was 
13.7% 5with the majority of these individuals offering a "don't 
know" response (11.3%). The d i f f i c u l ty  encountered by the 52 
respondents who were unable to estimate the ir  willingness to pay 
can be explained, at least p a r t ia l ly ,  by an unfamil iarity with 
the concept of being asked questions involving hypothetical valuations, 
and this could be an extreme form of hypothetical bias: the
respondent who answers "I don't know" could be acting quite rat ionally  
i f  he perceives the questions as being irre levant to the actual 
decision making process ,and is not wi l l ing to suffer the costs 
of examining his preference set and budget constraints to enable 
him to estimate his willingness to pay for no perceived gain.
The distribution of the non-zero bids is of in te r e s t ,f i r s t  
because of i ts  discrete nature, and secondly»because of its  large 
range. Figure 8.1 i l lus tra tes  the discrete pattern evident in 
willingness to pay bids: no bids other than whole dollar bids
were registered, and bids tended to be concentrated on the series 
$1 , 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100. I t  is unlikely that every respondent 
in Group I valued the existence benefits of Nadgee Nature Reserve
256
in exact dollars,and i t  is more likely that individuals introduced 
some hypothetical bias into their bids by estimating their 
willingness to pay to the closest dollar, or even to the closest 
"commonly used" dollar multiple in the $1, 2, 5 etc. ,  sequence.
The way respondents "rounded-off" their bids is open to speculation, 
but one possibility is a step-wise consideration of value, 
similar to that formalized in the Iterative Bidding Method detailed 
in Chapter 2: if the respondent considered his willingness to pay
for the existence benefits to be less than say $2 but greater 
than $1, then if  his true valuation is less than say $1.50 he may 
bid $l»but i f  i t  is greater than $1.50 he may adjust his bid upwards 
to $2. Of course, the $1.50 break-point would vary according to 
the preferences of the respondent, but if  a similar reasoning 
applies to the zero-one dollar decision, i t  can be argued that 
many of the 98 respondents bidding zero actually have a small, 
positive willingness to pay.
Under Assumptions 1 to 5 outlined in Section 8.1 i t  must 
be concluded that the observed range of non-zero bids, $1 to 
$500 is indicative of a large range of preferences for existence 
benefits in the Canberra population. However, given the possibility 
of respondents behaving strategical ly , such a large range may be 
considered as evidence supporting the strategic bias hypothesis 
outlined in Chapter 2. A1ternatively, the large spread of bids 
may be interpreted as an indication of hypothetical bias: respondents, 
realizing that their bid had no policy implication, did not carefully 
consider their  preferences and bid at random.
257
The lumpiness, wide range,and predominance of zero bids, 
are reflected in the summary s ta t is t ics  of the willingness to 
pay distribution for Group 1 respondents. Zero is the modal 
score being the most frequently occurring bid; the median bid 
is $5.18 with 50% of the bids occurring above and below that 
amount; and, the mean of the distribution is $28.57 with a standard 
deviation of $67.89. However, while all the summary stat is t ics  
provide useful information about the distribution, i t  is difficult  
to isolate any combination of the s ta t is t ics  which effectively 
describes the distribution - for instance, the mean and standard 
distribution do not completely specify the distribution because 
i t  is non-parametric, or non-normal, the mode describes only the 
special importance of zero;and,the median alone does not indicate 
the range of bids.
8.2.2 The Transformed Distribution
It is clear that a more detailed examination of the 
distribution is necessary to gain a working knowledge of the 
respondents' willingness to pay. Observation of the bids illustrated 
in Figure 8.1 reveals that the distribution becomes more manageable 
i f  the range is reduced by eliminating the six "outliers" who
3
bid in excess of $200, and then condensed by taking a natural 
logarithm transformation of all non-zero bids. Finally, the
3 It can be argued that these respondents are acting strategically,  
but this will be pursued in Chapter 10.
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distribution can be restructured to make more ex p l ic i t  the lumpy 
structure of the $1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100 sequence. The 
resultant distribution is i l lustra ted in Figure 8 . 2 , and detailed 
in Table 8.3.
I f  the zero bids are omitted from the distr ibution,  
the remaining logarithmic transformation seems more l ike ly  to have 
been drawn from a normally distributed population ,than does the 
original distr ibution. This is reflected in the s imilar i ty  of the 
mean, mode and median of the distr ibut ion:
MEAN = 2 . 4 8
MODE = 2 . 3 0  
MEDIAN = 2.51
I t  is therefore reasonable to use the mean and standard 
deviation (2.48 and 1.37) as summary s ta t is t ics  for the distribution  
of non-zero bids, grouped in the a lbei t  arbit rary manner displayed 
in Table 8 . 3 , and transformed by natural logarithms. These 
sta t is t ics  are meaningful only when used in association with the 
25% estimation of zero bids and the 15% estimation of non­
response.
Given that respondents are fu l ly  aware of the good for 
which they are bidding and that they reveal the ir  preferences 
accurately i t  can be concluded, by extrapolation, that approximately 
25% of the Canberra population, of which the SRC sample is representative,^
4 The following section demonstrates that the Group I sub-sample 
is not signif icant ly  dif ferent in terms of respondent 
characteristics from the total SRC sample.
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Absolute
Frequency
3 0 3-91 4 61
Grouped Log W TP
0 69
Figure 8 .2 : Transformed Will ingness to Pay, Group 1,
(Absolute Frequency).
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Log WTP Absolute 
Frequency
Relative 
Frequency
°l
Adjusted
Frequency
°l
Cumulative
Frequency
%
Zero 98 98 25.8 25.8 Missing Missing
0 0 16 16 4.2 4.2 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1
0.69 \ 25 j 6.6 " 11.2 “ 18.3 "
1.0 ■ .69 3 ' 29 0.8 • 7.7 1.3 •12.9 19.6 ■ 20.0
1.39. 1 0.3 . .4 . 20.0 ,
1.61 1.61 31 31 8.1 8.1 13.8 13.8 33.8 33.8
2.30 2.3 45 45 11.8 11.8 20.1 20.1 53.9 53.9
2.71 ' 2 " 0.5" 54.8 "
3.00 27 7.1 12.1 66.9
3.18 3.0 2 - 44 0.5 .11.5 .9 • 19.7 67.8 * 73.6
3.22 3 0.8' 1.3 69.1
3.26 2 0.5 .9 70.0
3.40 . 8 2.1 , 3.6 73.6 4
3.56 ' 1 * 0.3 "1 ■41 74.0^ 13.69 2 0.5 .9 74.9
3.91 > 3.91 23
1 3 1
6.0 ‘ 8.3 10.3 *13.8 85.2 ’ •d-CO
3.95 4 1.1 1.8 87.0
4.38, ■ 1 0.3 .4
*
87.4
4.61 ' 191 5.0 ^ 00 CJ1 96.0"5.01 t 4.61
2
* 28 0.5 ‘ 7.3 .9 “12.5 96.9 *100.0
5.30^ ^  J 1 .8 0 3.1 a 100.0 ^
on- response 58 58 15.3 15.3 Missing Missing
Total 380 380 100 100 100
Table 8.3: Transformed Willingness to Pay, Group 1, 
in Detai1.
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do not value the existence benefits of Nadgee Nature Reserve
and approximately 15% are not able to estimate their valuation,
given the format of the type of question used to determine
willingness to pay. However, the remaining 60%, who are willing
to reveal their non-zero preferences, have an average ,grouped,
log willingness to pay of 2.48 each for the existence benefits
of Nadgee (as a once only lump sum payment).
As a final point in the consideration of the distribution
of existence value bids, i t  is important to realize that i t  is
meaningless to undertake a s tat is t ical  test  on the survey mean
bid to determine if  the population mean bid is significantly different
from zero. Because the survey respondents are members of the
population, once one positive bid is recorded in the sample,it
is invalid to suggest that the population mean bid is zero -
admittedly i t  would be very small, but not zero. However, i t  is
possible to suggest a confidence interval, using all the Group 1 responses,
for the population mean bid, using the formula:
X - 1.96 _SD < y < X + 1.96 SD 
/ H  /~n
where, X is the sample mean bid,
SD is the sample standard deviation,
n is the sample s ize ,
y is the population mean bid, and,
1.96 is the 5% significance factor.
Hence, the probability is 0.95 that the interval from $21.22 to
$35.92 will contain the true population mean. The fact that this
range does not include zero is indicative of the fact that the
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population mean bid is not zero. There is a problem with this 
analysis: the confidence interval, $21.22 to $35.92, is calculated
on the basis of the untrasformed bids, and i t  has been noted that 
this distribution is unlikely to have been sampled from a 
population with a normal distribution. Hence the confidence 
interval is, theoretically, not a valid interpretation of the 
results. The alternative analysis is to present the information 
on the transformed - loged and grouped - distribution, which does 
approximate the normal distribution, in a confidence interval 
format:
2.30 < p < 2.66
noting that only non-zero bids are involved.
8.3 THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION
I t  was pointed out in the previous section that the sample 
used in the analysis of the distribution of bids was based on only 
380 of the 544 people responding to the SRC Canberra Population Survey. 
The remaining 164 respondents were presented with three different 
types of information about the "hypothetical reserve" featured in 
the questionnaire: Group 1 received only the basic information on
the features and the level of threat of extinction of these features; 
Group 2 were given greater information, primarily about the species 
of bird inhabiting the reserve, but the level of threat was 
not changed; Group 3 maintained the level of information but 
increased the level of threat by suggesting that 'some of the species 
of bird l i f e  l iving in the area might be threatened'; and Group 4
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changed the descript ion only by increasing the level of threat 
by introducing the ground parrot as a species in danger of absolute 
ex t inc t ion .  This group structure was sp e c i f i c a l l y  designed to 
establ ish whether respondents' wi l l ingness to pay fo r  the reserve's 
existence benefi ts was dependent on the amount of information 
provided or the level of threat of ex t inc t ion  of the special 
features of the reserve, notably the bird l i f e .
8.3.1 Group Representativeness
Before tests can be performed to detect any differences 
between the wil l ingness to pay d is t r ib u t io ns  across the four groups, 
i t  is necessary to determine i f  the four sub-samples are a l l  
representative of the same population : th is  can be achieved
by analysing the crosstabulat ions of the respondents' socio-economic 
character is t ics  and the group a l loca t ion .  Table 8.4 summarizes 
the results  of the crosstabulat ion analysis which is presented in 
f u l 1 in Appendix I I I .
Crosstabulation of 
Group Al location With . x2
Degrees of 
Freedom
x2
Significance
Uncertainty
Coeff ic ient
Age group 2.47 6 • .87 .002
Sex 1.03 3 .79 .001
Place of b i r th 7.25 3 .06 .007
Life cycle stage 15.21 15 .44 .015
Occupation group 7.16 9 .62 .007
Graduate status 2.09 3 .55 .002
Marital status 5.19 6 .52 .006
H/hold income group 9.20 12 .69 .008
Table 8 .4 : Differences in Socio-Economic Characterist ics
Across Groups.
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No differences in respondents' socio-economic characteristics 
across the four groups could be detected, using the x2 s ta t is t ic ,  
at the 5% level of significance»and the level of association 
between characteristies and group, indicated by the uncertainty 
coeff ic ient ,  is very weak for all  variables. The only possible 
exception to the pattern of insignificant differences is the case 
of the characteristic "place of birth":  with a x2 of 7.25 and
three degrees of freedom, the level of significance is .06, 
largely due to the re la t ive ly  low level of respondents born in 
Australia included in Group 1. However, the strength of association 
between place of birth and group membership, measured by the 
uncertainty coeff ic ient ,  is very low at .007 and hence i t  is 
reasonable to conclude that the four group sub-samples are all  
drawn from the same population.
8.3.2 Testing for Differences Between Groups 
Will ingness to Pay Distributions
I t  is now possible to consider the differences in willingness 
to pay across the groups. Formally, the f i r s t  hypothesis to be 
tested is that information does not a f fect  the mean of the willingness 
to pay distribution,using the null hypothesis:
Ho : viI ~ up
and the alternative hypothesis:
H i  : u  i  f v> 2 • . . .  1 .
where \i is the Group n population mean bid.
The second hypothesis is that the level of threat of extinction 
does not affect  the mean of the willingness to pay distr ibut ion,
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using the nu l l  hypothesis:
Ho * V12 ~ ^3 ~ *J4 
and the a l te rn a t iv e  hypothesis:
H] : y2 ^ y3  ^ y4* •■• 2
To te s t  these hypotheses, i t  is not s t a t i s t i c a l l y  sound to 
use the o r i g i n a l ,  untransformed data f o r  t - t e s t s  because, as was 
shown in Section 8.2, i t  is u n l i k e ly  th a t  the populat ion d is t r ib u t i o n  
o f  b ids,  from which the sample is  drawn, is normal. Rather, the 
te s t  procedure used is  to compare zero and non-response proport ions 
across groups in a non-r igorous way, and to transform the v a l id ,  
pos i t ive  bids in the manner suggested in Section 8.2 - grouping and 
taking natural  logari thms - and to carry  out t - t e s t s  on these 
transformed d i s t r ib u t i o n s .  Therefore, the f i  rs.t stage o f  th i s  analysis 
is  to analyse the w i l l ingness  to pay d i s t r ib u t i o n s  from each group: 
Figures 8.3 to 8.6 and Tables 8.5 to 8.8 d isp lay th i s  information.
Log WTP 
(Grouped)
Absolute 
Frequency
Relat ive 
■ Frequency
%
Adjusted Cumulative
Rel. Frequency Frequency
t  %
0 16 4.2 7.1 7.1
0.69 29 7.7 12.9 20.0
1.61 31 8.1 13.8 33.8
2.3 45 11.8 20.1 53.9
3.0 44 11.5 19.7 73.6
3.91 31 8.3 13.8 87.4
4.61 28 7.3 12.5 100.0
Zero 98 25.8 Missing -
Non-Response 58 15.3 Missing -
Total 380 100.0 100.0
Table 8.5 : Group 1 Transformed Wil l ingness to Pay.
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Log WTP 
(Grouped)
Absolute 
Frequency
Relat ive 
Frequency
%
Adjusted Cumulative
Rel. Frequency Frequency
% %
0 0 0 0 0
0.69 3 5.5 9.1 9.1
1.61 5 9.3 15.3 24.2
2.3 12 22.2 36.4 60.6
3.0 5 9.3 15.2 75.8
3.91 4 7.4 12.1 87.9
4.61 4 7.4 12.1 100.0
Zero 14 25.9 Missing 100.0
Non-Response 7 13.0 Missing 100.0
Total 54 100.0 100.0
Table 8.6: Group 2 Transformed Wi l l ingness to Pay.
Log WTP 
(Grouped)
Absolute
Frequency
Relative
Frequency
1o
Adjusted 
Rel. Frequency
%
Cumulative
Frequency
%
0 1 2.0 3.3 3.3
0.69 4 7.8 13.3 16.7
1.61 6 11.8 20.0 36.7
2.3 9 17.6 30.0 66.7
3.0 3 5.9 10.0 76.7
3.91 3 5.9 10.0 86.7
4.61 4 7.8 13.3 100.0
Zero 12 23.6 Missing 100.0
Non-Response 9 17.6 Missing 100.0
Total 51 100.0 100.0
Table 8 .7 : Group 3 Transformed Wi l l ingness to Pay.
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Log WTP 
(Grouped)
Absolute 
Frequency
Relat ive
Frequency
t
Adjusted
Rel . Frequency
%
Cumulative 
Frequency
%
0 4 6.8 11.1 11.1
0.69 4 6.8 11.1 22.2
1.61 9 15.3 25.0 47.2
2.3 7 11.9 19.4 66.7
3.0 6 10.2 16.7 83.3
3.91 4 6.8 11.1 94.4
•4.61 2 3.3 5.6 100.0
Zero 13 22.0 Missing 100.0
Non-Response 10 16.9 Missing 100.0
Total 59 100.0 100.0
Table 8.8: Group 4 Transformed Wi l l ingness to Pay.
The information presented in Tables 8.5 to 8.8 is
summarized in Table 8 .9 to enable a comparison o f  the w i l l ingness
to pay d is t r ib u t i o n s across the four  groups.
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Zero Bids (%) 25.80 25.90 23.60 22.0
Non-Response (%) 15.30 13.00 17.60 16.9
Mean (Pos i t ive  bids) 
Standard Deviat ion
2.48 2.63 2.41 2.12
(Pos it ive  bids) 1.37 1.13 1.29 1.29
Table 8 . 9 : Dif ferences in Bid D is t r ib u t io n  Across Groups.
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Relative,
Frequency
Zero Non* 0 3 0 3-91 4 61
Grouped Log W T P
0 69
Response
Figure 8 .3 : Group 1 Transformed Will ingness to Pay
(Relative Frequency).
Relative,
Frequency
Zero Non- 0 
Response
3 0 3-91 4-61
Grouped Log W T P
0 69
Figure 8 .4 : Group 2 Transformed Will ingness to Pay
(Relative Frequency).
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Rel at i vei 
Frequency
Zero Non-  0 
Response
3 0 3-91 4-61
Grouped Log W T P
0 - 6 9
Figure _8_.5_: Group 3 Transformed Will ingness to Pay
(Relative Frequency).
Relative
i
Frequency
Zero Non-  0 0 69 3 0 3-91 4 61
Grouped Log W T PResponse
Figure 8.6: Group 4 Transformed Will ingness to Pay
(Relative Frequency).
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Consider the percentage of zero bids across the four groups: 
the minimum percentage is 22% in Group 4 and the maximum is 25.9% 
in Group 2 ,creating a range of 3.9%. This range cannot be 
regarded as a large va r ia t ion ,  even though there seems to be some 
trend toward a decrease in the percentage of zero bids occurring 
as the level of species r a r i t y  increases (Groups 2, 3 and 4). The 
percentage of  "non-response" respondents also does not vary 
substan t ia l ly  across the four groups: the minimum percentage is
13.0% in Group 2 and the maximum is 17.6% in Group 3»and so the 
range across groups is 4.6%. There is no trend evident across the 
changes in species r a r i t y  of Groups 2, 3 and 4 ,but there is a 
f a l l  in the non-response percentage as information increases 
between Groups 1 and 2. However, the dif ferences across groups in 
both zero and non-response percentages cannot be regarded as due 
to anything besides chance, without fu r ther  data and more rigorous 
analys is .
Any dif ferences between groups must arise therefore, from 
dif ferences in the d is t r ib u t io n  of posit ive bids,and the appropriate 
test fo r  detecting any d i f fe rences, is the t - t e s t  between the group 
means,using the grouped,1ogarithmic transformation detai led in 
Section 8.2. The f i r s t  hypothesis to be tested is concerned 
s p e c i f i ca l l y  with the e f fec t  of information on wil l ingness to pay 
fo r  existence benefits using the respondents from Groups 1 and 2. 
Table 8.10 deta i ls  the two-ta i led t - t e s t  of nul l  and a l te rna t ive  
hypotheses (1).
271
Group Number of Mean Standard t  Degrees of 2-Tai l
Respondents (x) Deviation Freedom Probabi1i t y
1 224 2.48 1.37 - .6  255 .55
2 33 2.63 1.13
Table 8.10: t-Test Between Groups' 1 and 2 Means.
At the 5% level of signif icance the nul l  hypothesis cannot 
be rejected,and therefore i t  must .be concluded that the observed 
increase in the mean of  the posit ive transformed bids is not 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n i f ic a n t .  Hence information does not have 
a s ign i f ica n t  e f fec t  on respondent's wi l l ingness to pay.
The second tes t  concerning the e f fec t  of information on 
wil l ingness to pay fo r  existence benef i ts involves the var ia t ion 
in species r a r i t y  created by the divergences between Groups 2, 3 
and 4: Group 2 is the "base" group in which no speci f ic  mention
of species r a r i t y  is made, Group 3 describes the species as 
"threatened"; and Group 4 introduces the danger of ext inct ion facing 
the ground parrot. The three groups therefore create an increasing 
series in species ra r i ty ,and the dif ferences between the groups' 
transformed wil l ingness to pay d is t r ib u t io ns  are analysed in two 
ways: f i r s t ,  using an analysis of variance across a l l  three groups;
and secondly, by the use of t - te s ts  between the means of Groups 2 
and 3,and the means of  Groups 3 and 4. The analysis of  variance 
involves the null  and a l te rna t ive  hypotheses (2) and is summarized 
in Table 8.11.
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Group Number of 
Respondents
Mean
(x)
Standard
Deviation
F Degrees of 
Ratio Freedom
F
Probabi 1 i ty
2 33 2.63 1.13
3 30 2.41 1.29 1.49 98 .23
4 36 2.12 1 .29
Table 8.11: Analysis of Variance Across Groups'!, 2 and 3 Means.
At the 5% level of signif icance the nul l  hypothesis cannot 
be rejected,and th e re fo re , i t  must be concluded that the information 
concerning the r a r i t y  of species does not have a s ign i f ica n t  e f fec t  
on the wil l ingness to pay of  respondents fo r  the existence benefi ts 
of the "hypothetical" reserve described by the questionnaire. This 
resu l t  is fu r ther  substantiated by the resu l t  o f  the t - te s ts ,d e ta i le d  
in Table 8.12, which analyses the dif ference between Groups 2 and 3 
under the nul l  hypothesis:
Ho : m2 = k 3
and the a l te rna t ive  hypothesis:
Hq : y2  ^ y3 . . .  (3)
and Table 8.13 which analyses the dif ference between Groups 3 
and 4 underthe nul l  hypothesis:
Ho : y3 = “ 4
and the a l te rna t ive  hypothesis:
H-j : Ug f  U4 . . .  (4)
Group Number of  Mean Standard t  Degrees of 2-Tai l
Respondents (x) Deviation Freedom Probabi l i ty
2 ’ 33 2.63 1.13
3 30 2.41 1.29 -72 61 A 1
Table 8.12: t -T es t  between Groups' 2 and 3 Means.
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Group Number of Mean Standard t  Degrees of 2-Tail
Respondents (x) Deviation Freedom Probabi1i ty
3 30 2.41 1.29
4 36 2.12 1.29 .92 64 .36
Table 8.13: t-Test Between Groups' 3 and 4 Means.
At the 5% level of significance neither null hypothesis can 
be rejected. Both the analysis of variance and t- tests suggest 
that there is no signif icant effect on willingness to pay from
5
species rar i ty.
5 The observed trend in means across the groups - that the mean 
bid fa l ls  as rar i ty  increases - therefore cannot be regarded 
as being indicative of an inverse relationship. However, the 
trend for willingness to pay to decline as species rar i ty  
increases is substantiated somewhat by the change observed in 
stated attitudes from those expressed by respondents from all 
groups to the question concerning existence benefits in general 
• (Question 8) ,and the responses to Question 10, which concerns 
the importance of existence benefits specific to the "hypothetical" 
reserve. 78% of respondents answering Question 8 believed 
existence benefits,in general,were "very important", whereas 
only 68% of respondents answering Question 10 believed the 
existence benefits of the hypothetical reserve were "very 
important": the difference between distributions was found
to be signif icant at the 5% level using a x2 analysis. This 
result is subject to the caveat that while the effect of 
information is undoubtedly playing some part in the sh i f t  of 
stated att itudes, other effects may also be influencing 
responses: i t  could be argued that the provision of information
on existence benefits makes the respondent think more closely 
about the subject,and therefore that the response to Question 
8 is an inaccurate reflection of true preferences;or that the 
separation of benefits attempted in the Questions 4 to 8 is 
not effective and as a result, respondents were not excluding 
completely the other benefits from existence benefits when 
answering Question 8. The more rigorous test for the effect 
of information remains the comparison of bids between groups 
and so i t  must be concluded that the marginal changes in 
information provided across the four groups have no effect on 
respondents' existence benefits.
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The conclusion that changes in information do not have 
a significant effect on respondents' willingness to pay for the 
existence benefits provided by the "hypothetical" reserve based 
on the physical character!’stics of Nadgee Nature Reserve has two 
important implication for the remainder of the analysis: f i r s t ,
the whole sample of 544 respondents can be used for data analysis 
because the differences created by the group structure are not 
significant; and secondly, hypothetical bias may be a problem 
in the use of direct questioning willingness to pay responses as 
accurate indications of respondent's benefits. While the f i r s t  
implication is largely self explanatory, the hypothetical bias 
issue deserves further comment.
8.3.3 Possible Explanations
I t  is possible to generate several hypotheses regarding 
the causes for the lack of a relationship between information 
provision/species rar ity and willingness to pay. One explanation 
is that the size of the change in information,or rarity»provided 
between groups,was insufficient to produce significant differences 
in mean bids. For instance, differences may occur between 
individuals who are not provided with any information and those who 
are given full  details,but not between individuals provided with 
marginal changes in information. A1ternatively, significant 
differences may not arise because respondents consider the existence 
of the area, in general, as being valuable,but do not value, 
specif ically, the b i rd - l i fe ,  or the rar i ty  of the b i rd - l i fe ,  which
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inhabits the area. A further possibility is that respondents are
overwhelmed by the volume of information provided by the
questionnaire and only consider the f i r s t ,  basic information before
making their bid, with the remaining, differing information being
neglected because of i ts complexity or volume. However, i t  is
possible that the failure of the empirical results to comply with
6a p rio ri expectations - that increased rari ty and information 
will result in increased willingness to pay - indicates the presence 
of hypothetical bias. Under the hypothetical bias hypothesis, 
respondents have no incentive to consider their preferences carefully, 
and consequently, the bids of individuals are chosen more or less 
at random, with the effect of varying levels of information/ 
rarity having no effect on their choice. The validity of this 
hypothesis, and the other hypotheses regarding the lack of inter­
group differences, cannot be tested rigorously given the data 
available from the questionnaire, however,it is important to consider 
each in relation to the possibility of alternative explanations 
being correct. In this respect, the hypothetical bias hypothesis 
is only weakly supported and cannot be regarded as sufficiently 
strong to reject the assumption established in Section 8.1 
(Assumption 3) which states that respondents' bids do not exhibit 
hypothetical bias.
6 The a p rio ri expectation that increased information will result 
in increased willingness to pay is not entirely certain. For 
instance, an individual, given basic information, may extrapolate 
from those facts to produce a good which is very highly valued 
in comparison to the good revealed by a full description. 
Consequently, depending on the expectations of individuals given 
basic information, the Group 1 mean bid may be expected to be 
higher, lower or equal to the other groups. The same uncertainty 
does not apply to the rarity sequence»because levels of rarity 
are specified in each group, leaving the respondent with no 
scope for exercising his expectations.
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Before considering the differences in willingness to pay 
between the two payment modes made available to respondents by 
the questionnaire»it is important to return to the consideration 
of the distribut ion of willingness to pay bids, given now that i t  
is possible to use the total sample of 544 to estimate the Canberra 
community's valuation of Nadgee's existence benefits.
8•4 THE DISTRIBUTION OF BIDS REVISITED
Section 8.3 demonstrated that the differences in respondents' 
willingness to pay across the four groups were ins ign i f icant ,and 
so i t  is possible to reconsider the results of Section 8 .2 ,using 
all  respondents, rather than only those in Group 1. This section 
presents the type of information provided by Section 8.2, but for 
the whole sample. Table 8.14 details the distribution of bids of 
all  respondents and this information is graphed in Figure 8.7. The 
distr ibution, transformed and grouped following the same procedure 
as outlined in Sub-Section 8 .2 .2 ,  is detailed in Table 8.16 and 
graphed in Figure 8.8. I t  wi l l  be noted that differences between Group 1 
responses and overall responses are slight,and the comments made 
in Section 8.2 concerning the distr ibution of Group 1 responses 
apply equally to the aggregate distr ibut ion.  The confidence intervals  
(at the 95% level of probabil ity for the overal l ,  a l l  groups, mean 
bid are:
Raw distr ibut ion:  $20.84 < u < $33.52
Transformed distribution (non-zero bids): 2.30 < y < 2.60.
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Wi 11ingness Absolute Relative Adjusted Cumulative
to Pay $ Freq. Freq. t Freq. % Freq. %
0 137 25.2 29.3 29.3
1 21 3.9 4.5 33.8
2 31 5.7 6.6 40.5
3 7 1.3 1.5 42.0
4 2 .4 .4 42.4
5 50 9.2 10.7 53.1
6 1 .2 .2 53.3
10 73 13.4 15.6 69.0
15 2 .4 .4 69.4
20 39 7.2 8.4 77.7
24 2 .4 .4 78.2
25 4 .7 .9 79.0
26 2 .4 .4 79.4
30 9 1.7 1 .9 81.4
35 1 .2 .2 81.6
40 3 .6 .6 82.2
50 31 5.7 6.6 88.9
52 5 .9 1.1 89.9
75 1 .2 .2 90.1
80 1 .2 .2 90.4
100 26 4.8 5.6 95.9
150 3 .6 .6 96.6
200 9 1.7 1.9 98.5
250 1 .2 .2 98.7
300 1 .2 .2 98.9
500 4 .7 .9 99.8
750 1 .2 .2 100.0
Need more info 10 1.8 Missing 100.0
Depends on cost 8 1.5 Missing 100.0
Don's know 59 10.8 Missing 100.0
Total 544 100.0 100.0
Table 8.14: Wi 11ingness to Pay, All Groups.
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Reason for Zero Contribution Absolute 
Frequency
Relative 
Frequency %
Anti-Tax 17 12.4
Anti-Doorknock 2 1.5
Government's Responsibility 36 26.3
Too Poor 16 11.7
Need access to area 30 21.9
Not interested 11 8.0
Don't know 15 10.9
Others 10 7.3
Total 137 100.0
Table 8.15: Reasons for Zero Contribution, All Groups.
Log WTP 
(Grouped)
Absolute
Frequency
Relative 
Frequency
%
Adjusted
Frequency
°/o
Cumulative
Frequency
%
0 21 3.9 6.5 6.5
.69 40 7.4 12.4 18.9
1.61 51 9.4 15.8 34.7
2.3 73 13.4 22.6 57.3
3.0 58 10.7 18.0 75.2
1.91 42 7.7 13.0 88.2
4.61 38 7.0 11.8 100.0
Zero 137 25.2 Missing Missing
Non-response 84 15.3 Missina Missinq
Total 544 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 8 .16: Transformed Willingness to Pay, All Groups.
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Relative*
Frequency
Zero Non- 0 
Response
0 - 6 9 3 0 3-91 4-61
Grouped Log WTP
Mean: 2.45 
Standard Deviation: 1.33 
Median: 2.43 
Mode: 2.30
Figure 8.8: Al l  Groups Transformed Will ingness to Pay
D is t r ibu t ion  (Relative Frequency).
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8.5 PAYMENT MODE DIFFERENCES
I t  was pointed out in Chapter 6 (Sub-Section 6.2.4) that to help 
overcome the problem of respondents bidding inaccurately because 
of an independent object ion to the payment mode suggested by the 
questionnaire, i t  was decided to provide respondents with a choice 
of two a l te rnat ive payment modes: an addit ional tax to the
government or a donation to a conservation organization. By 
creating a l te rna t ive  payment modes, the questionnaire creates the 
opportunity fo r  an analysis of  the dif ferences between the 
wil l ingness to pay of respondents choosing d i f fe re n t  payment modes.
This section begins by establ ishing the nature of  any difference 
which may exist between the tax-option and the donation-option 
wil l ingness to pay d is t r ib u t io ns .  Two types of analysis are used: 
f i r s t ,  a crosstabulation of wi l l ingness to pay against payment 
mode chosen; and secondly, a t - t e s t  o f  the two payment modes' mean 
wil l ingness to pay.'7 F ina l ly ,  a number of possible causes for  the 
re la t ionship  between respondents' bids and th e i r  choice of payment 
mode are b r ie f l y  assessed.
7 This section analyses the dif ferences between the transformed 
bid d is t r ibu t ions  fo r  the two payment modes. I t  must also 
be noted that s ig n i f ica n t  dif ferences ex is t between the two 
•payment modes in terms of the non-response components: the
government tax mode att racted 42 non-response repl ies (25% 
of  a l l  tax option responses) while the donation mode 
att racted 27 non-response repl ies (14% of a l l  donation responses). 
The reasons fo r  th is  dif ference are d i f f i c u l t  to determine,but 
i t  may occur because respondents are more fa m i l ia r  with the 
concept of a doorknock appeal than with the tax option.
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8.5.1 Crosstabulation Analysis
Table 8.17 presents a crosstabulation of the transformed 
willingness to pay d is t r ib u t io n 's  described in Section 8.4,
o
across the two payment modes.
The difference between the two distributions presented 
in Table 8.17 is s ta t is t ica l ly  signif icant at the 5 % level: the
x2 s ta t is t ic  is 19.14 and there are 6 degrees of freedom, resulting 
in a significance level of 0.004. In addition, the level of 
association between the two variables, as measured by the n 
s ta t is t ic  (0.12), is reasonably strong for this type of data.
8.5.2 t-Test Analysis
The difference between the distribution detected in Sub- 
Section 8.5.1 is further confirmed by a t - tes t  of the means of 
the non-zero-transformed distr ibutions, using the null hypothesis:
Ho : UG = “ co
and the alternative hypothesis:
H1 : UG  ^ ” co
where is the population mean of the willingness to pay bids
of individuals preferring to pay a tax to the government, 
and,
8 The differences in Overall row totals between Table 8.17 and
the adjusted frequency distribution presented in Table 8.16, are due 
to the fact that only those respondents choosing either the 
tax or the donation are included in Table 8.17: those respondents
who were indifferent between payment modes, in that they choose 
either,or both, are excluded from the current analysis.
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Payment Mode
Log WTP Conservation Organization Government Row Total
(Grouped) Count Count (Column % )
(Row %) (Row %)
(Column 7 o )  (Column %)
0.0 7 11 18
(38.9) . (61.1) (6.2)
(4.3) (8.7)
0.69 25 10 35
(71.4) (28.6) (12.1)
* (8.6) (3.4)
1.61 25 20 45
(55.6) (44.4) (15.5)
(15.3) (15.7)
2.3 48 21 69
(69.6) (30.4) (23.8)
(29.4) (16.5)
3.0 25 25 50
(50.0) (50.) (17.2)
(15.3) (19.7)
3.91 ' 22 17 39
(56.4) (43.6) (13.4)
(13.5) (13.4)
4.61 11 23 34
(32.4) (67.6) (11.7)
(6.7) (18.1)
Column Total 163 127 290
(Row %) (56.2) (43.8) (100.0)
Table 8.17: Crosstabulat ion of Transformed Wil l ingness
to Pay by Payment Mode.
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yco is the population mean of the willingness to pay 
bids of individuals preferring to give a donation 
to a conservation organization.
Table 8.18 details the two-tail t - tes t  of the null hypothesis.
Payment
Mode
Number of 
Respondents
Mean Standard
Deviation
t  Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail 
Probabi1i ty
Tax 127 2.64 1.43
-1.97 288 .05
Donation 163 2.33 1.22
Table 8.18: t-Test Between Payment Mode Means.
At the 57o level, the difference between the two payment 
modes means of non-zero transformed willingness to pay is signif icant,  
and i t  is possible to reject the null hypothesis and accept the 
alternative hypothesis that the population means are different.
However i f  the alternative hypothesis is amended to:
H1 : 11G > Mco
then the one-tail test of significance at the 5% level suggests
that the null hypothesis must be accepted. I t  is possible to
conclude therefore, that the population means are di fferent,  at
the 57o level, but the conclusion is not suff ic ient ly  robust to
suggest a direction of the difference, at the same level of significance.
The d i f f ic u l ty  of determining the direction of the difference
between means is exemplified clearly by an examination of Table
8.17: stronger than average support for the taxation mode is
revealed in the 0.0 and 4.61 log willingness to pay groups,while
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the donation mode received greater than average support in the 0.69 
and 2.3 groups. Respondents with the extremes of high and low 
bids therefore seem to favour the taxation mode of payment while 
the mid-range bidders favour the donation mode.
8.5.3 Possible Explanations
The possible causes of  the dif ferences observed between 
the two payment mode wil l ingness to pay d is t r ibu t ions  are d i f f i c u l t  
to assess, pr imar i ly  because respondents chose th e i r  own payment 
mode: the two sub-samples, those who chose the donation and those
who chose the tax, were therefore not randomly selected and 
differences between the two resul tant d is t r ib u t io ns  may have arisen 
because of e i the r  differences in the real preferences of the two 
groups ( fo r  instance, people preferr ing taxation may have extremes 
of preferences for existence bene f i ts ) ,  or because of differences in other 
factors re la t ing to the payment modes (such as d i f fe r in g  incentives 
to behave s t ra te g ic a l l y ) .
Despite the d i f f i c u l t y  created by the non-random sub-samples 
approach, i t  is worthwhile to formulate a number of hypotheses which 
may explain the observed re la t ionship between wil l ingness to pay 
bids and choice of payment mode,and to examine any evidence which 
supports these hypotheses. F i r s t ,  the re la t ive  predominance of 
tax option respondents in the extreme wil l ingness to pay groups can 
be explained by the presence of hypothetical bias in these respondents' 
bids. An examination of the tax-option bids indicates a rather 
f l a t  d is t r ib u t io n  with a concentration in the highest wi l l ingness 
to pay group. Such a d is t r ib u t io n  may be the resu l t  o f  hypothetical
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bias caused by respondents viewing the tax option as an un rea l is t ic
payment mode. In contrast , the donation payment mode bids form
a d is t r ib u t io n  with a re la t i v e ly  low variance - th is  may suggest
that respondents regarded the payment of a donation to a conservation
g
organization as being more r e a l i s t i c .
An a l te rna t ive  explanation fo r  the payment mode/will ingness 
to pay re la t ionsh ip  is the p o s s ib i l i t y  of s tra teg ic  bias in the 
bids of respondents who chose the taxation payment mode. I f  i t  can 
be assumed that  tax-option respondents considered that th e i r  bids 
would have an e f fec t  on the issue of preserving the reserve, that 
th e i r  choice of  payment mode would be enacted, and that the average 
of th e i r  bids would be used to calculate an across the board increase 
in tax, then, as was pointed out in Chapter 2 , those respondents who 
estimate that  the tax increase w i l l  be below th e i r  valuations of 
preservation, w i l l  over-state th e i r  preferences, whi le those whose 
tax increase estimates are above th e i r  valuations w i l l ,  under-state the i r
9 The predominance of the donation payment mode in the 
middle ranges of the wil l ingness to pay d is t r ib u t io n ,  
especia l ly  in the $2 group, may be due to the respondents 
who chose the donation mode' having been induced to bid amounts 
which they associate with door-knock appeals - usual ly 
around the $2 f igure  - purely by force of habit .
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preferences.^0 The distribution of tax-option bids is consistent 
with this type of strategic behaviour. Clearly a crucial 
distinction between the strategic behaviour and hypothetical 
bias hypotheses is the amount of credence respondents placedin 
the survey process.
A third possible explanation for the relationship between 
payment mode choice and willingness to pay bids is that i t  is 
merely a reflection of a more basic underlying relationship. For 
instance, a respondent characteristic such as age,may be a factor 
which influences willingness to pay,but may also be a reason for 
respondents' choice of payment mode: the resultant relationship
between payment mode choice and willingness to pay would therefore 
be "spurious".
The f i r s t  two hypotheses are diff icul t  to test  rigorously, 
but some evidence as to their validity can be gained by an 
examination of the frequencies of stated reasons for the choice of 
payment mode,as presented in Table 8.19. Reasons 1 to 6 in 
Table 8.19 are arguments used to just ify the choice of the donation
10 This hypothesis relies on respondents answering Question 12, 
the payment mode choice question, without realizing that their 
actual willingness to pay would be questioned later.  If they 
did know that an estimate of their willingness to pay was to 
be taken, then all respondents with a bid in excess of their 
estimated tax increase would choose the tax option (and so pay 
less than their valuation) and those with low relative values 
would choose the donation mode (rather than the imposed, higher, 
uniform tax). The sequence of the questions in the questionnaire 
suggests that most respondents would not have been aware that a 
willingness to pay estimation was to follow the payment mode 
question,and the distributions of bids between the two payment 
mode options do not indicate a marked preference for low bidders 
to choose the donation while high bidders chose the tax.
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option,and Reasons 7 to 13 are ju s t i f i c a t i o n s  respondents put 
forward for  th e i r  choice of the taxation mode. While i t  is clear 
from Table 8.19 that the use of dual payment modes in the 
questionnaire avoids many of the problems associated with the 
enforcement of one payment mode - many of  the choice of payment 
mode reasons imply a strong preference against the a l te rnat ive 
option - the only reason which provides any useful ins ight into 
the payment mode/will ingness to pay re la t ionship  is that the 
tax mode ensures the equity of  payments across the community (Reason 8) 
The 43 respondents who gave th is  reason fo r  choosing the taxation 
mode option ,c lear ly  f e l t  that each taxpayer should share the burden 
of  the cost of preserving the area with the possible implicat ion 
that these respondents only reported th e i r  perceived cost share 
rather than th e i r  maximum wil l ingness to pay. A downward bias 
of these respondents' bids could be expected. A l te rn a t ive ly ,  the 
equity reason may be ind icat ive of respondents over-stat ing th e i r  
bids, given that they assume payment of  the mean bid as a tax 
increase in the future,  in the expectation that payments of amounts 
less than th e i r  valuations would resu l t .  Clearly i t  is not 
possible to val idate r igorously the s tra teg ic  behaviour hypothesis 
using these results alone.
The test ing of the th i rd  hypothesis regarding the payment 
mode/will ingness to pay re la t ionship - that the re la t ionship  is 
spurious - can be carr ied out with a somewhat greater degree of 
r igor .  To tes t  fo r  a spurious re la t ionship  i t , i s  necessary to 
establ ish f i r s t  i f  there are any relationships,between socio­
economic character is t ics  and the choice of payment mode - th is  is 
achieved by an examination of the crosstabulat ions of payment mode
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Reason fo r  Payment Mode Choice Absolute
Frequency
1
Relat ive 
Frequency
%
Adjusted
Frequency
%
1. M is t rus t  Government with funds 45 11.1 13.3
2. C.O. would do a be t te r  job 56 13.8 16.4
3. Govt, has too much else to do 10 2.5 2.9
4. Govt, may change the use in 
the fu tu re 9 2.3 2.6
5. C.O. Donation r e f le c t s  publ ic  
a t t i tu d e s 40 9.8 11.7
6. Too many taxes already 11 2.7 3.3
7. Govt, w i l l  guard against fu tu re  
mi suse 3 0.7 0.9
8. Tax ensures equi ty  o f  payments 43 10.6 12.6
9. Tax is  easier to c o l le c t 53 13.0 15.6
10. Ant i -conservat ion organisat ions 12 2.9 3.6
11. C.O. cou ld n ' t  carry  out aims 12 2.9 3.3
12. I t ' s  the government's duty 42 10.3 12.3
13. Govt, should be the only 
c o l le c to r 5 1.2 1.5
14. In d i f f e re n t  between modes 27 6.6 Missing
15. Others/don 't  know 39 9.6 Missing
Total 407 100.0 100.0
Table 8.19: Reasons fo r  Payment Mode Choice.
choice with  respondent 's age, l i f e  cycle stage, mar i ta l  s ta tus ,  
household income, q u a l i f i c a t io n s ,  occupat ion, and place o f  b i r t h ,  
which are de ta i led  in Appendix V. The only var iab les which produce 
a s i g n i f i c a n t  x? s t a t i s t i c  at the 5t  l e v e l ,  thus ind ica t ing  tha t
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the dif ferences in payment mode choice produced by the sub-division 
into characte r is t ic  c lass i f ica t ions  are not due to chance alone, 
were age and sex. The 18 to 30 years age group,and women,showed 
an above average tendency to chose the donation mode of payment, 
while the 30 to 40 years age group,and men»preferred the government 
a l te rna t ive .  The second stage in determining i f  the re la t ionship 
between wil l ingness to pay and payment mode is spurious,is  to 
analyse the crosstabulat ions of wi l l ingness to pay by payment mode 
fo r  each category of the sex and age d is t r ib u t io ns .  These three- 
way crosstabulat ions arealso included in Appendix V,but they do not 
present c lear-cut  evidence to support or refute the notion of a 
spurious re la t ionship: the wil l ingness to pay/payment mode
re la t ionship remains s ign i f ica n t  fo r  the age groups 30 to 40 years 
(at the 5% leve l)  and 40 years plus (at the 10% level) ,and for 
females (at the 5% level),and th is  supports the hypothesis that no 
spurious re la t ionship ex is ts ;  but fo r  the 18-30 age group,and males, 
the re la t ionship becomes ins ig i f ican t ,and  th is  supports the spurious 
re la t ionship argument. On the basis of th is  evidence i t  is unwise 
to accept ca tegor ica l ly , tha t  the re la t ionship  between wi l l ingness 
to pay and payment mode choice is spurious. I t  can only be 
suggested that respondent's choice of payment mode may be an 
independent variable a f fec t ing wil l ingness to pay,possibly because i t  
represents some respondent cha rac te r is t ics ,o r  combination of 
characterist ies»which have not been measured by th is  survey.
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8.6 CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this chapter has been to provide a basic 
analysis of the magnitude of willingness to pay bids,and to establish 
any relationships existing between these bids and the level of 
information and species rarity provided by the questionnaire ,and 
the respondent's choice of payment mode. Five assumptions were 
established in Section 8.1 under which the willingness to pay bids 
represent the equivalent surpluses which respondents gain from the 
continued supply of existence benefits from Nadgee Nature Reserve. 
These assumptions are:
(1) Every respondent is fully aware of the good 
for which he is bidding;
(2) Existence benefits are considered by all 
respondents to be a "good";
(3) Hypothetical bias does not exist in willingness 
to pay bids;
(4) Payment mode bias does not exist in willingness 
to pay bids; and,
(5) Respondents do not behave strategically.
Given these assumptions, the f i r s t  task of this chapter was 
to assess the extent and distribution characteristics of willingness 
to pay bids, using the respondents who were presented with only 
the basic level of information on the benefits to be gained from 
the preservation of the reserve as set up by the questionnaire. 
Important features of the distribution were that 25% of respondents 
were not willing to pay anything,and 14% of respondents were not
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able to estimate th e i r  wi l l ingness to pay. A f te r  excluding the 
14% non-response, the median bid was calculated to be $5.18, 
while the mean of the d is t r ib u t io n  was found to be $28.57 with 
a standard deviat ion of $67.89. I t  was concluded that the 
d is t r ib u t io n  was not normal ,but that when the lumpiness around the 
bids of $1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50 and 100 was recognized,and the 
d is t r ib u t io n  grouped to accentuate th is  pattern, the non zero bids, 
transformed by taking the natural logarithm, were observed to take 
on a near normal d is t r ib u t io n  with a mean of 2.48, standard 
deviation of 1.37,mode of  2.3 and median of  2.51.
Section 8.3 proceeded to analyse the e f fec t  of information 
on respondents' existence benefi ts using the four group structure 
of the questionnaire. Each of the four groups, or sub-samples,had 
been presented with d i f fe r in g  levels of information: Group 1 had
been given only basic information, Group 2 had received more 
information,and Groups3 and 4 had been given addit ional information 
on the level of threat of ex t inc t ion facing the species of birds 
inhabit ing Nadgee Nature Reserve,thus providing a sequence of 
increasing threat  of ex t inct ion across Groups 2, 3 and 4. Following 
a tes t ,  using x2 s ta t i s t i c s ,  in which i t  was establ ished that the 
samples in each group had been drawn from the same population, the 
four wi l l ingness to pay d is t r ibu t ions  were compared: f i r s t ,  i t  was
observed that the percentage of zero and non-response responses 
did not change substant ia l ly  over the four groups; secondly, a t - t e s t  
was used to demonstrate that the dif ference between the means of 
the non-zero transformed wil l ingness to pay d is t r ibu t ions  fo r  Groups 
1 and 2 was not s ign i f ica n t  at the 5% le ve l ;  t h i r d l y ,  an F-test 
was carried out on the means of the non-zero,transformed wil l ingness
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to pay distributions for Groups 2, 3 and 4 and i t  showed that 
there where no significant differences across the three groups; 
and f in a l ly ,  the F-test result was substantiated by pair-wise t - tests  
between Groups' 2,3 and 4 means. I t  was concluded that both the 
level of information and the level of species ra r i ty  did not 
cause any significant changes in respondents' valuations of existence 
benefits. Several explanations for the insignificance of the 
differences across groups means were advanced. The possib il i ty  
of hypothetical bias in respondents' bids was mentioned as one 
explanation but i t  was concluded that the evidence to support this 
hypothesis over the other possible causes, was insuff ic ient to 
reject Assumption 3 established in Section 8.1. Alternative  
explanations included the possib il i ty  that the changes in information 
provided by the questionnaire were too small to induce significant  
changes in willingness to pay, that individuals value existence 
benefits in terms of overall provision of the natural areas rather 
than for the bird l i f e  i t  contains,and f in a l ly  that the volume and 
complexity of the information provided was overwhelming to most 
respondents with only the basic features of the area description 
forming the basis for valuation.
Because of the result of Section 8 .3 , i t  was possible to 
amalgamate the four groups for the consideration of the willingness 
to pay distribution,and Section 8.4 b r ie f ly  considered the 
implications the amalgamation has on the results of Section 8.1:  
differences between the Group 1 distr ibut ion and the overall distribution  
were observed to be only slight - the untransformed overall 
distribution had a mean of $27.08 with a standard deviation of 
$68.82, a median of $5.21,and a mode of zero, and the s ta t is t ics
294
for the transformed overall distribution were mean, 2.45 
deviation, 1.33, median 2.43,and mode 2.30.
The overall distribution was used to analyse the differences 
in willingness to pay across the two alternative payment modes - 
a government collected tax and a conservation organization collected 
donation - which were introduced into the questionnaire in an 
attempt to overcome problems of payment mode bias, x2 and t - tes ts  
were used to show that significant differences in willingness to 
pay do occur between the payment modes, at the 5% level, with 
the trend being toward high and low range bidders choosing the 
taxation mode ,and middle range bidders choosing the donation option.
The reasons for the difference between the two payment 
mode willingness to pay distributions were found to be difficult  
to assess. Three hypotheses were suggested to explain the 
relatively f la t  distribution of tax option bids and the lower 
variance distribution of donation-option bids: f i r s t ,  that hypothetical
bias in the tax-option bids - caused by respondents considering 
that the questioning was not real ist ic - resulted in a flattening 
of the tax willingness to pay distribution; secondly, that 
strategic bias in the tax-option bids - caused by respondents 
considering that an actual across-the-board tax would be levied 
as a result of the questioning - was the originating force behind 
the f lat  tax-option distribution; and finally,  that the relationship 
between payment mode and willingness to pay was spurious. Some 
weak evidence was presented to support the second, strategic bias, 
hypothesis on the basis of the reasons suggested by respondents 
for their payment mode choice, and the test  for a spurious 
relationship between payment mode and willingness to pay was
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inconelusive.
The information provided in this chapter forms the basis 
for the analysis of the relationships between willingness to 
pay and respondents' socio-economic, a t t i tudina l  and preference 
characteristics which is carried out in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 9
EXPLANATION OF EXISTENCE BENEFITS
9.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 8 was concerned with the eva lua t ion  of  respondents '  
w i l l i ngnes s  to pay bids for  the cont inued p rese rva t ion  of  Nadgee 
Nature Reserve as a s upp l i e r  of  ex i s t ence  b e n e f i t s , i n  terms of  the 
magnitude of  b i d s ,  the e f f e c t  of  informat ion and level  o f  species  
r a r i t y  on these  b ids , and  the impl i ca t i ons  involved in respondents '  
choice of  payment mode. I t  i s  the aim of  t h i s  chapter  to extend 
the ana l ys i s  of  ex i s t ence  values to involve the explana t ion of  any 
t rends  between respondents '  wi l l i ngnes s  to pay and t h e i r  socio­
economic,  a t t i t u d i n a l  and preference  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which may be 
observed.
The assumpt ions ,  s e t  out  in Sect ion 8.1 of  the previous 
chap te r ,  under which the wi l l i ngnes s  to pay bids of  respondents  
can be t r e a t e d  as t h e i r  equ iva l en t  surp luses  fo r  the provis ion 
of Nadgee's ex i s t ence  b e n e f i t s ,  are a l so  used for  the purposes of 
t h i s  chapter .  To r e i t e r a t e  these  assumptions b r i e f l y ,  they involve 
respondents  being f u l l y  aware of  the good fo r  which they are 
bidding,  t h a t  ex i s t ence  b ene f i t s  are always a "good",and t h a t  no 
h yp o t he t i ca l ,  payment mode or s t r a t e g i c  bias  i s  evident  in the bids .
I t  was noted in the previous chapter  t h a t  the raw 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  wi l l i ngnes s  to pay bids - descr ibed in both Sect ion 
8.2 and Sect ion 8.4 - di splayed a heavy concent ra t ion  of  zero bids 
and a somewhat lumpy ch a r ac te r .  To account  fo r  these unusual 
f e a t u r e s ,  the analyses  undertaken in Chapter 8 used a dual process
297
of considering zero and non-zero bids separately, with the non­
zero bids being grouped and transformed by natural logarithms.
The analysis of the re lat ionships between wil l ingness to pay and 
respondent characteris t ies undertaken in th is  chapter, continues 
th is  separation in to  zero and non-zero bid classes by considering 
two respondent decisions: f i r s t ,  the choice between making a zero or
a posi t ive bid - defined as respondents' preparedness to pay; and 
secondly, i f  a posi t ive bid is chosen, the choice of  how much to pay - 
defined as respondents' wi l l ingness to pay. In Section 9 .2 , the zero/ 
posi t ive bid choice, or given Assumptions 1 to 5 , the choice of whether 
the respondent values or does not value the existence benefits 
provided by Nadgee Nature Reserve, is considered in terms of the 
respondent character is t ics  which may help to explain the outcome 
of the choice. Section 9.3 analyses the wil l ingness to pay decision 
in re la t ionship to respondent cha rac te r is t ies , and the conclusions 
drawn from both analyses are summarized in Section 9.4.
9.2 PREPAREDNESS TO PAY
The preparedness to pay decision is considered in th is  
section by u s in g , i n i t i a l l y , t h e  crosstabulat ions of respondents' 
preferences, stated a t t i tudes ,and socio-economic charac te r is t ics ,  
with checks being made to detect any evidence of spurious co r re la t ions . 
To substantiate the evidence provided by the crosstabulat ions,and 
to establ ish the strength of the re la t ionships,  a discriminant 
analysis is undertaken to tes t  the success with which the preference, 
a t t i t u d in a l  ,and socio-economic characteriSt ic  variables discriminate 
between the pay and not-pay groups, when the variables are combined
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into a discriminate function.^
9.2.1 Crosstabulat ion Analysis
The crosstabulation of respondents' preparedness to pay 
with th e i r  character is t ics  are set out in detai l  in Appendix 
V I 5and a summary is presented in Table 9.1. The differences across 
age groups in the proportion of respondents who are prepared to 
pay are s ign i f ica n t  at the 10% leve l ,  with a greater than expected 
proportion of "yes" responses being recorded by the young age 
group (18-30 years). The trend toward younger respondents being 
more prepared to pay fo r  preservation is substantiated by the 
s ign i f ica n t  d if fe rence, at the 5% leve l ,  across l i f e  cycle stages: 
respondents who were s ingle, or married with no chi ldren and aged 
less than t h i r t y  years,are more l i k e l y  to pay than expected.
However, those respondents who have a young family are more reluctant 
to pay, and th is  could explain the lower level o f  signif icance in 
the age crosstabulation because the 18-30 age group would contain 
respondents both with and without chi ldren. The same type of 
contradict ion in age occurs fo r  older respondents, with respondents 
having a family of older chi ldren being supportive, whi le respondents
1 A discriminant function aims to weight and l in e a r ly  combine 
discr iminating variables so that the groups are forced to 
be as s t a t i s t i c a l l y  d is t in c t  as possible - see Nie e t  a l .  
(1975), pp. 435-440.
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Characterist ic x ? D. Sign- Characterist ic Features Favouring:
of F. nificance
Yes No
Age** 4.8 2 .09 18-30 years -
Sex 1.3 1 .26 Females Males
Life Cycle Stage* 12.3 5 .02 Age <30 with no Age >30, single;
ki ds ;
Has a grown family Has a young family.
Marital Status 3.5 2 .17 Never Married Divorced,
Widowed, etc.
Household Income** 9.2 4 .06 $15600-20799,
$26000+
$0-9879
Natural Science Study .5 1 .46 - -
Age l e f t  School 5.4 6 .5 - -
Has Qualif icat ions .4 1 .5 - -
Oualificat ion Type .0 1 1.0 - -
Place of Schooling 1 .9 1 .16 City Non-City
Place of Birth .4 1 .5 - -
Activi ty 1.5 1 .2 Worked Other
Occupation 5.1 3 .16 Lower White-Collar B1ue-Collar
Watch Nature T.V.?* 15.9 1 .0 Yes No
Read Nature Books?* 10.4 1 .0 Yes No
Impt. of Conserv. 19.9 1 .0 Very Important Other
Impt. of Recreation** 2.8 1 .09 Very Important Other
Impt. of Education* 4.5 1 .03 Very Important Other
Impt. of Aesthetic* 9.6 1 .0 Very Important Other
Impt. of Research* 6.6 1 .01 Very Important Other
Impt. of Preserv.* 28.6 1 .0 Very Important Other
Total Use of Parks 4.0 2 .14 >7 Days Zero Days
Recreation Use 2.4 2 . 3 <3 Days >3 Days
Aesthetic Use 1.8 2 .4 >1 Day Zero Days
B/W and Camping Use 5.2 2 .07 >Zero Days Zero Days
Holiday & picnic Use 2.3 2 .32 >1 Day <1 Day
* Signif icant  at  the 5 level
** Signif icant  at  the 10% level
Table 9.1: Relationships Between Preparedness to Pay and Respondents' 
Character!' s t i e s .
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over 30 years old who are single are less likely to pay.
It is clear that the presence of a family is important; having a 
negative effect when the family is young,but a positive effect 
after the children have grown older.
The only other socio-economic characteristic across which 
a significant difference, at the 10% level, in preparedness to 
pay occurs,is household income. The relatively strong n s tat is t ic  
(0.13) indicates that a clear trend is evident toward higher income 
groups being more likely to pay for the preservation of Nadgee 
Nature Reserve to ensure the continued provision of existence 
benefits. The income relationship is supported by the albeit non­
significant trends exhibited between respondent' s main activity 
and occupation: those who work, and lower white-collar workers
are generally more supportive than those who do not work,and 
blue-collar workers respectively. However, none of the variables 
which are designed to measure the educational standard of respondents 
create a significant difference in preparedness to pay across i ts 
categories at the 10% level.
There are some strong differences between the distribution 
of respondents who are prepared to pay for existence benefits 
and those who are not,across different categories of preferences 
and attitudes. Respondents who watched TV programmes featuring 
nature,or who read material which concentrateson nature study, 
showed a greater likelihood of being prepared to pay for the 
existence benefits offered, with x2 s ta t is t ics  on both crosstabulations 
being significant at the 1% level. The level of respondents' use
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of natural areas for the more nature oriented uses of bushwalking 
and camping,also proved to create significant differences (at the 
10% level) across subcategories,in the proportion of respondents 
who are prepared to pay: payment is more likely to come from those
who participate in bushwalking or camping activities at any level,than 
from those who do not use natural areas for these purposes.
Stronger differences in preparedness to pay exist across the categories 
of stated attitudes: the most notable difference occurs
between the "very important" and "other" groups of responses to 
the question on attitudes to the use of natural areas for pure
2
preservation,or the provision of existence benefits (Question 8).
The attitudes of respondents to the other four uses of National 
Parks and Nature Reserves»show similar trends but to a lesser 
extent than evident in the preservation-use/preparedness-to-pay 
case. The importance of conservation perceived by respondents»shows 
another strong relationship: those considering conservation to be
very important were more likely to pay for the existence benefits 
described by the questionnaire than respondents who gave other 
answers to Question 1.
2 It can be argued that preparedness to pay for existence 
benefits and the importance of preservation are extremely 
close in concept and i t  is obvious therefore that a strong 
relationship between the two should exist (n = .23) with 
nothing being gained from the analysis other than an 
indication of the accuracy of attitudinal questions in 
approximating preparedness to pay responses.
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9.2.2 Testing for Spurious Relationships
The possibility that the relationships between attitudes 
and preferences,and preparedness to pay,are spurious,must be 
investigated before any conclusions on the combined strength of 
all the relationships so far described,can be drawn.
A spurious relationship exists i f  socio-economic 
characteristics affect both the preparedness to pay of the respondents 
and their preferences and attitudes, so that the observed relationship 
between preferences and attitudes ,and preparedness to pay is 
irrelevant. To detect the presence of a spurious relationship 
i t  is necessary to examine the relationships between preferences/ 
attitudes and preparedness to pay for each category of socio­
economic characteristic: for instance, i f  the relationship between
attitudes to conservation and preparedness to pay is simply due 
to the fact that both are strongly related to income, then the 
X 2 s ta t is t ics  for the crosstabulations of attitudes and preparedness 
to pay, carried out only on respondents in each income category, 
will no longer be significant»because the effect of income is 
removed.
Table 9.2 presents the x2 s ta t is t ics  of the crosstabulations 
of respondents' preparedness to pay by the preference and attitudinal 
characteristics which were found to be significant in the analysis 
presented in Table 9.1, controlled by the three socio-economic 
characteristies also found to be significant, x2 s ta t is t ics  which 
are s t i l l  significant, using the 10% level, are in i ta l ics .  All 
s ta t is t ics  have one degree of freedom, except the bushwalking and
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camping use crosstabulations,which have x2 sta t is t ics  with two 
degrees of freedom.
From the evidence presented in Table 9.2 i t  is reasonable
to conclude that the attitudes to recreational, educational,
aesthetics and research use,and actual use of natural areas for
bushwalking and camping purposes, exhibit spurious relationships with
preparedness to pay - no clear pattern of significance in the x2
sta t i s t ics  remains once the socio-economic variables are introduced
as controls. However, the relationships between preparedness to pay
and TV viewing, book reading and the importance of conservation,
remain in some doubt, with all three control variables having only
scattered success in explaining the differences found in the
preparedness to pay distributions across categories of the preference
and attitude variables. It is necessary therefore to investigate
the nature of the relationships between respondents' socio-economic
characteristics and their preferences for watching TV nature shows,
reading books used on nature topics,and their attitudes to
conservation, to determine if  these relationships substantiate the
suspicion that the links between attitudes and preferences, and
3
preparedness to pay are spurious.
3 If no significant relationship exists between a socio-economic 
variables and the preference variable which is thought to be 
spuriously related to preparedness to pay,then the relationship 
is not spurious to that particular socio-economic characteristic.  
However,if a significant relationship does exist,but the same 
socio-economic variable is not related directly to 
preparedness to pay,it may be true that the preference 
variable is acting as a surrogate for a different form of 
the related socio-economic variable when i t  exhibits a significant 
(but spurious) relationship with preparedness to pay.
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The relationships between age, l i f e  cycle stage, marital 
status, qualifications,, place of  school ing, and respondents' 
preference for watching nature study programmes on T.V. are 
relat ively strong: the x2 stat is t ic  for each crosstabulation is
significant at the 10% level and the strength of association in 
each case, as measured by the Uncertainty Coefficient, is relat ively  
strong for this type of data (.01, .03, .01, .01 and .01 
respectively). With this additional information, i t  is possible 
to conclude that the continued significance of the differences in 
preparedness to pay across sub-categories of preference for T.V. 
viewing of nature programmes, a f te r  con t ro l l ing  fo r  age, l i f e  cycle 
stage, and income,could be the result of respondents' marital 
status, place of schooling or qualification differences»or a 
combination of the ef fec ts  of a l l  these var iables act ing in d i re c t ly  to 
affect preparedness to pay. The relationship between T.V. viewing 
and preparedness to pay may be regarded,therefore,as being spurious, 
but i t  must also be recognized that respondents' preferences for 
watching nature programmes may be reflecting combinations of 
variables which separately do not have a significant effect on 
preparedness to pay,and so cannot be completely excluded from the 
analysis of preparedness to pay.
The same can also be said of respondents' preferences for 
reading books on nature study,but in this case, the socio-economic 
variables being reflected in preferences are more easily recognized, 
with strong re lat ionships being observed between respondents' educational 
status and their reading habits: those respondents who have
studied nature-oriented courses, gained any qualifications since
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leaving school, graduates and white-collar workers all tend to
4
read nature books more than average. In this respect, respondents' 
preferences for reading is a superior variable for the 
explanation of preparedness to pay than the less well defined 
preferences for viewing T.V. variable, to which i t  is closely 
correlated.
Finally, the only variables which create significant differences 
(at the 10% level) in attitudes to conservation across categories 
were age, sex and life cycle stage. Again i t  is difficult  to argue 
that the relationship between preparedness to pay and conservation 
attitude is spurious on the basis of this information: only
sex was not used as a control in the analysis presented in Table 
9.2,and sex did not cause significant differences in preparedness 
to pay when considered independently.
It is concluded that respondents' attitudes to conservation, 
and their preferences for reading nature books should be regarded 
as having useful relationships with preparedness to pay for 
existence benefits for analytical purposes, despite the possibility 
that they are spurious, because they appear to be representative 
of unmeasured socio-economic variables, or unrecognized combination 
of socio-economic variables. The variables considered in the 
following analysis of the relative importance of respondents'
4 The differences in preparedness to pay across categories 
of these socio-economic variables are significant at the 
10% 1evel.
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characteristies which affect their preparedness to pay for the 
existence benefits of Nadgee Nature Reserve are therefore age, 
l ife cycle stage, household income, attitude to conservation and 
preference for reading books on nature. The age (in years) and 
income (in gross dollars per fortnight for the respondent's whole 
household) variables are continuous, while the life cycle stage is a 
dummy variable indicating the presence of a family,the reading variable 
is a Yes/No dummy, the conservation attitude dummy indicates that 
the respondent ranked conservation as very important,and the 
preparedness to pay variable is coded so that "Yes" is two and 
"No" is one.
9.2.3 Discriminant Analysis
A discriminant analysis was carried out to determine the 
relative strength of the relationships between respondents' 
preparedness to pay for existence benefits,and their socio-economic, 
preference and attitudinal characteristies ,found to be significant 
in the explanation of preparedness to pay in Sub-Sections 9.2.1 and
5
9.2.2. Table 9.3 provides a summary of the distribution of 
respondents between those who are»and those who are not prepared 
to pay for existence benefits.
5 517 respondents were used in the analysis because 27 of
the original 544 respondents provided missing value 
responses to at least one of the questions used to provide 
data for the construction of the variables involved.
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Mean (and Standard Dev ia t ion )  o f  
D is c r im in a t in g -V a r ia b le s
Prepared Number o f  
to Pay? Respondents
Age L i f e  Conservat ion 
(Years) Cycle Importance 
Stage ( l= V . Im p t . )  
( l= F a m i l y ) ( 0 = 0 th e r ) 
(0=No 
Family)
Read 
Nature 
(1 = Ye s ) 
(0=No)
Household 
Income
( $ / f o r t n i g h t )
Yes
No
396 36.1 .57 .65 .53 825.7
(12.8) ( .50 ) ( .48 ) ( .50 ) (376.5)
121 38.9 .61 .40 .34 745.9
(14.0) ( .49 ) ( .49 ) ( .47) (389.5)
Table 9 . 3 : Respondent C h a ra c te r i s t i c s  Across Preparedness to
Pay Groups.
The d i s c r im in a n t  ana lys is  aims to  fo rc e  the "Yes" and "No" 
groups o f  respondents to  be as s t a t i s t i c a l l y  d i s t i n c t  as possible,  
using a weighted, l i n e a r  combinat ion o f  the f i v e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
or " independent"  v a r ia b le s  which have been shown to create
s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f fe re n c e s  in the preparedness to pay d i s t r i b u t i o n  
across t h e i r  sub-ca tegor ies :  age, l i f e  cyc le  stage, income,
conservat ion  a t t i t u d e , a n d  preference f o r  reading nature books. The 
abso lu te  value o f  the weight f o r  each v a r ia b le  in the standardized
ß
d is c r im in a n t  func t ion  in d ica tes  the s t reng th  o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n  made 
by the v a r ia b le  to  t h a t  f u n c t io n ,  and the sign o f  each
6 The standardized d i s c r im in a n t  fu n c t io n  is  based on the Z
scores (Z=X- X ) o f  each v a r ia b le  (where X is  the d is c r im in a n t  
s
score,  X is  the mean o f  a l l  d i s c r im in a n t  scores,  and s is  the 
standard dev ia t io n  o f  d is c r im in a n t  scores ).
3uy
variable indicates the direction of its contribution. A stepwise 
process for including the independent variables in the discriminant 
function was used, with the selection procedure on each step being 
based on including the variable which maximizes the smallest F ratio 
between the two groups: the minimum tolerance set for the ratio was
.001. The resultant standardized discriminant function is:
D = +0.38 AGE - 0.73 01 - 0.28 HHINC - 0.46 Q18 
where: AGE is standardized age,
Q1 is standardized attitude to conservation 
HHINC is standardized fortnightly gross household 
income, and
Q18 is standardized preference for watching T.V. 
nature programmes.
The f i r s t  point to note about this standardized discriminant 
function is that the contribution which is made by the l i f e  cycle 
stage variable (whether or not the respondent has a family) is 
insufficient to meet the tolerance specitied-,and is therefore le f t  
out of the discriminant function. When forced into the function# 
the l i fe  cycle stage variables' standardized coefficient is only 
0.07 and i t  does not affect the other variables' coefficients 
substantially - hence i t  is reasonable to conclude that the presence 
of a family does not significantly affect respondents' preparedness 
to pay, when considered together with the other four characteristic 
variables. A possible cause for the insignificance of the family 
status is the strong correlation between the presence of a family and 
age - the discrimination across preparedness to pay provided by the 
l i f e  cycle variable is almost entirely captured by the age variable.
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The second point to notice is that the standardized discriminant 
function is only able to explain 11% of the variance across the 
two preparedness to pay groups,and while this can be considered low, 
i t  must be recognized that for cross-sectional data i t  is reasonable. 
This judgement is just ified by the x2 s ta t i s t ic  for the distinction 
between the groups created by the discriminant function - at 42.7 
the x2 is significant,  even at the 1% level ,with four degrees of 
freedom. The abil i ty of the discriminant function to distinguish 
between preparedness to pay groups is well i l lustrated by Figures 
9.1 and 9.2,which display the frequency histograms of standardized 
discriminant scores for the two preparedness to pay categories.
Clearly,the two groups have different "centroids" or means, 
with the "Yes" group having a mean of the standardized discriminant 
scores of -0.16,while the "No" group mean is +0.53. However, i t  
is equally obvious that the discriminant function cannot be used 
for predictive purposes - i ts  value to this study is purely in 
terms of considering the strength of the explanation of respondents' 
preparedness to pay which is provided by their socio-economic, 
preference and attitudinal character!*sties.
Of the 11% of variance explained by the discriminant function,
9% is explained by the two attitude/preference variables - attitude 
to conservation,and preference for reading nature study books and 
art icles - this is reflected by the fact that Question 1 and Question 
18 make the highest contribution to the discriminant function, with 
standardized coefficients (in absolute values) of 0.73 and 0.46 
respectively. This is to be compared with the age coefficient of 
0.38,and the household income coefficient of 0.27 (again in absolute 
values).
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Group
Centroid
Figure 9 . 1 : Standardized Discr iminant Scores: Yes, Prepared to Pay.
Group
Centroid
Figure 9.2: Standardized Discr iminant Scores: No, Not Prepared to Pay.
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The signs of the coe f f ic ien ts  are also of in te res t :  the
posi t ive age sign indicates that as age increase, preparedness to 
pay decl ines, the negative household income sign indicates that 
as household income r ises,  preparedness to pay also r ises^ the 
negative sign on the conservation a t t i tude  variable indicates that 
as respondents showed more in te res t  in conservation, they were 
more prepared to pay;and,the negative sign on the preference fo r  
reading nature study material shows that as in te res t  in reading 
increases, so does preparedness to pay.^
9.2.4 Conclusions
Four variables have emerged from the analysis of respondents' 
preparedness to pay fo r  the existence benefi ts of  Nadgee Nature 
Reserve ,as being important in dis t inguish ing between those who are,  
and those who are not prepared to pay: age, household income,
a t t i tude to conservation, and preference fo r  reading material on 
nature. These variables w i l l  be considered in d iv id u a l ly , to  provide 
an overview of the conclusions reached in the analysis.
Age: The 18-30 years age group was shown in the crosstabulat ion
analysis to have above average preparedness to pay,and th is  was 
confirmed by the discriminant analysis which detected an inverse 
re la t ionship between age and preparedness to pay: as age increases,
preparedness to pay decreases. The l i f e  cycle stage var iable, which 
yielded a s ign i f ica n t  x2 s t a t i s t i c  in the crosstabulat ion analysis,
7 Note that "Yes" is coded two and "No" is coded one in the 
preparedness to pay variable so that t ra d i t ion a l  sign- 
re la t ionship expectations are reversed in th is  case.
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appeared to be swamped by the closely correlated age variable in 
the discriminant analysis, thus negating to same extent the 
hypothesis formulated during the crosstabulat ion analysis, that i t  
was the presence of a family that played an important role in 
dist inguish ing between the Yes and No preparedness to pay groups. 
Overal l ,  the strength of the re la t ionship between age and preparedness 
to pay is only moderate.
Income: As would be expected, the re la t ionship between
household income and preparedness to pay is d i rec t  - as income 
increases so does preparedness to pay - and th is  is shown conclusively 
by both the crosstabulation and discriminant analyses. However, 
the discriminant analysis indicates that the re la t ionship is re la t i v e ly  
weak.
Preference fo r  Nature Reading: A d i rec t  re la t ionship between
preference fo r  reading about nature and preparedness to pay is 
indicated by both analyses. The strength o f  the re la t ionship is 
greater than e i ther  the income or age re la t ionships. I n i t i a l  
reservations were held about the v a l i d i t y  of  using the reading 
preference variable in the discriminant ana lys is ,because of the 
p o s s ib i l i t y  of the re la t ionship being spurious. However, an analysis 
using two and three-way crosstabulations indicated that the preference 
var iable seemed to be representing a combination of educational 
standard variables,which by themselves were not creating s ign i f ica n t  
differences in preparedness to pay across th e i r  sub-categories, 
and therefore was useful in the explanation of preparedness to pay.
I t  was the strength of  the re la t ionship between the educational 
variables and the reading preference var iable which,resulted in the
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reading preference variable being included in the analysis»instead 
of the closely correlated watching T.V. nature shows preference 
variable, which exhibited a slightly stronger relationship with 
preparedness to pay,but was not explained by variables other than 
the age and income socio-economic characteristics of respondents.
Attitude to Conservation: This direct relationship was
the strongest discriminator of the "Yes" and "No" preparedness to 
pay groups - those respondents who believed that conservation is 
"Very Important" were more likely to pay for existence benefits 
than the remainder of the respondents. Again, a spurious relationship 
was suspected, but no evidence could be detected using two and 
three way crosstabulations,and an examination of the relationships 
between respondents' conservation attitudes and their socio-economic 
characteristics revealed no special trends. It was concluded that 
the attitude variable was representing either a combination of 
socio-economic characteristies or an unmeasured respondent characteristic.
Given this somewhat weak separation of respondents who 
are and who are not prepared to pay, i t  is possible to proceed to 
a more detailed evaluation of the respondents who did pay, aimed 
at explaining the magnitude of non-zero bids in terms respondents' 
characterist ics. Again, basic crosstabulation evidence is presented 
as a foundation to the analysis, the possibility of spurious 
relationships is investigated, and finally a multiple regression 
analysis is described.
9.3 BID MAGNITUDES
To complete the analysis of respondents' wil l ingness to pay 
for the existence benefits provided by the continued preservation 
of Nadgee Nature Reserve, which was- begun in Section 9.2 with the 
consideration of the respondents' preparedness to pay, 
th is section analyses in deta i l  the magnitude of bids made 
by the 323 respondents who were prepared to pay a posit ive sum for  
these existence benefi ts ,  given the Assumptions 1 to 5 set out 
in detai l  in Section 8.1 of the previous chapter. Following the 
pattern of analysis established in Section 9 .2 ,  the transformed 
dis t r ibut ion  of bids, presented in Chapter 8 (Table 8 . 1 6 ) , is 
examined,f irst»using crosstabulations of respondents' bids with t h e i r  
preferences, stated at t i tudes and socio-economic character is t ics .
A check to determine i f  the s ign i f ican t  preference and a t t i tu d in a l  
character is t ic  relationships are spurious is also carried out. 
However, the main element in this consideration of  respondents' bids 
is a multip le regression analysis which attempts to explain the 
will ingness to pay dependent variable  using data on the respondents' 
character is t ics  as independent variables.
9.3.1 Crosstabulation Analysis
Full deta i ls  of the crosstabulations of respondents' bids 
with th e i r  character is t ics  are presented in Appendix V I I ,and the 
basic trends and s t a t is t i c s ,  are summarized in Table 9.4.  The only 
variables which create s ign i f ican t  differences in the d is tr ibut ion  
of bids across character is t ic  sub-categories are household income, 
a c t i v i t y ,  preference for  reading material  which concentrates on
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Character iSt ic x2 D of F S ig n i f n/ (R)0 Comments
Age 11.3 12 .5 .08 -
Sex 5.2 6 .52 .009 -
M a r i t ia l  Status 15.5 12 .22 .05 -
L i fe  Cycle Stage 29.3 30 .5 .12 -
Q u a l i f i c a t io n  Type 8.3 6 .22 .13 Graduates bid higher
Has Q ua l i f ica t ions? 8.3 6 .22 .08 Qua l i f ied  respondents 
bid higher
Place o f  Schooling 7.85 6 .25 .04 -
Place o f  B i r t h 5.3 6 .5 .08 Austra l ian  born 
respondents bid higher
Occupation 25 18 .12 .08 . -
Household Income* 43.6 24 .008 .11 High income earners 
bid higher
A c t i v i t y * 20.3 6 .002 .05 Workers bid higher
Nat. Science Study 1 .5 6 .96 .05 -
Watch Nature T.V.? 4.6 6 .6 .04 -
Read Nature Books?* 19.27 6 .004 .14 Those who read, bid 
higher
Total  Use o f  Parks 15.5 12 .22 .07 Higher users are high 
bi dders
B/W & Camping Use 6.7 12 .87 .05 -
Recreation Use 7.05 12 .85 -.03 -
Holidays & Picnic 10.3 12 .59 .07 -
Aesthet ic Use 15.3 12 .2 .05 -
Conservation Impt. 4.8 6 .56 .07 -
Recreation Impt. 4.9 6 .55 .05 -
Education Impt. 9.5 6 .15 .13 "Very Important" tend 
to bid lower
Aesthet ic  Impt. 4.8 6 .57 .002
) _
Research Impt. 8.3 6 .22 .03 -
Preservat ion Impt. * 16.7 6 .01 .04
"Very Important" bid 
higher
Payment Mode* 19.1 6 .004 .17 Govt, dominates extreme
bid
^ S ig n i f i can t  at the 10% leve l .
QPearson's R is reported when both crosstabula t ion are cardinal var iab les .
Table 9 . 4 : Relat ionships Between Pos i t ive  Bids and Respondents'
C h a ra c te r is t i c s .
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nature, attitude to preservation, uses of national parks and nature
reserves,and payment mode choice. The overall trend in the income
relationship is clearly toward higher income groups being willing
to pay more,and with a Pearson's R of 0.11, the trend is relatively 
8strong. The activity variable is closely related to the household 
income variable and so i t  is not surprising that i t  too has a 
highly significant x2 s ta t i s t ic :  respondents who did not work
dominate the low bid categories while the middle range of bids are
9mostly made up of respondents who did work.
Of the preference characteristics,  only respondent's 
preference for reading material which features nature topics created 
a significant difference (at the 10% level) in the distribution of 
existence benefits bids across i ts sub-categories. The trend evident, 
is toward those with a strong preference for reading nature books
8 There are some interesting divergences from this trend - for 
instance, the highest bid category has a higher than expected 
representation of middle household income ($15,000-20,000) 
respondents- A possible explanation for this disturbance 
in the trend is that the high bidding, medium income earning 
respondents came from households where there is only one income 
earner»who is regarded as being highly paid, this inducing a 
high bid.
9 Interestingly,the high categories of bids are evenly supported 
by both activity groups,and this could be a reflection of the 
argument outlined previously in support of middle household 
income respondents making high bids. In this case, respondents 
bidding high could be the non-working spouses of high income 
earners.
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bidding more, and those who do not read such material 
being more likely  to bid in the lower range: the n stat ist ic
of 0.14 indicates that the trend is relat ively strong.
The only attitudinal variable to yield a significant x2 
statist ic  (at the 10% level),when crosstabulated with willingness 
to pay,was the attitude toward the use of National Parks and Nature 
Reserves for preserving the natural ecosystem. Because this 
relationship is inevitably spurious"*0 i t  will  not be considered 
in detail ,  but i t  is interesting to note that the trend toward 
respondents with a high ranking for preservation also being high 
bidders is not particularly strong: the n stat ist ic  is only 0.04
and a close examination of the crosstabulation reveals that while 
high bidders usually ranked preservation as "very important", some 
of the low bid categories are also dominated by "very important" 
respondents. Clearly, the possibility of using respondents' rankings 
of the importance existence benefits for the prediction of their  
willingness to pay, is l im ited .^
Finally, the respondents' choice of payment mode was found 
to create significant differences in the distribution of bids 
between the government and conservation organization categories.
This relationship has been discussed in detail in Section 8.5 of
the previous chapter and will  not be considered further in this section.
10 The two questions are addressing the same issue.
11 This conclusion is substantiated by an examination of the 
crosstabulation of respondents' bids with their ranking of 
the importance of the preservation of the specific area 
described by the questionnaire (the response to Question 10):
the x2 statistic with six degrees of freedom is 7.1 (a significance 
level of 0.31) and the n stat ist ic  is 0.02. Hence the trend 
between stated attitude and willingness to pay is even weaker 
in a circumstance which would be expected to yield a stronger 
relationship.
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Given the information revealed by the crosstabulation 
analysis, i t  is necessary to test only one relationship to detect 
i f  i t  is spurious - the preference for reading nature oriented 
material -noting that the test for a spurious relationship 
involving the payment mode choice has already been carried out 
in Section 8 .5 ,before proceeding to establish the form and 
strength of the link between respondents' willingness to
pay and their characteristics.
9.3.2 Testing for Spurious Relationships
The relationship between respondents' bids for the 
existence benefits described in the questionnaire ,and their  preferences 
for reading material featuring nature study,may merely be a 
reflection of the relationship between bids and some socio-economic 
characteristies, notably in this case, household income, the only 
socio-economic variable which creates significant differences (at 
the 10% level) in the distribution of bids, across its sub categories. 
Table 9.5 presents the x2 and n statistics of the crosstabulations 
of respondents' bids by reading preferences, for each category of 
household income. Even at the 10% level, every x2 stat ist ic  is 
insignificant, indicating that the differences in bid distribution 
across preference classifications,can be eliminated i f  the relationship 
is considered free of the effects of income. On this evidence, 
i t  would appear that the relationship between reading preference 
and willingness to pay is spurious. However, i t  should be noted 
that the n statistics listed in Table 9 . 5 »remain relat ively strong 
following the income controlling procedure,and this suggests that
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Income Category X 2 Degrees
of
freedom
Sign i f . n
$ 0 - 9879 3.12 6 .79 .06
$ 9880 - 15599 8.07 6 .23 .12
$15600 - 20799 7.20 6 .30 .21
$20800 - 25999 3.84 6 .70 .06
$26,000+ 4.48 6 .61 .13
Table 9 .5 : S ta t is t i c s  of Crosstabulations Between Bids and
Reading Preferences,Control 1ed by Household Income.
the reading preference variable has some re la t ionship with 
wi l l ingness to pay addit ional to the income e f fec t .  The strength 
of  th is  l a t t e r  argument is reinforced by the observation that the 
crosstabulat ion of reading preferences by household income y ie lds 
a x2 s t a t i s t i c  of 3.68 which, with four degrees of  freedom, 
has a signif icance level of .45 and an n s t a t i s t i c  of .08. The 
non-signif icance of th is  x2 s t a t i s t i c  implies that income and 
reading preferences are not related,and th is  tends to deny the 
presence of a spurious re la t ionship between reading preference and 
wil l ingness to p a y , i f  the variable ac tua l ly  causing the re lat ionship 
is hypothesized to be income. With the c o n f l i c t  in evidence i t  
is not possible to completely dismiss the reading preference 
variable as being spurious to income s p e c i f i c a l l y  - the p o s s ib i l i t y  
remains however, that i t  is spurious to some combination of  socio­
economic variables or some other unmeasured respondent charac te r is t ic .
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Finally, the results of Section 8.5 must be reiterated: 
i t  was found that only inconclusive evidence was available to 
substantiate the hypothesis that the relationship between payment mode 
choiceand willingness to pay was spurious,and i t  was concluded that 
the possibility of payment mode choice contributing to the 
respondents' willingness to pay decision could not be neglected.
Clearly the analysis of positive willingness to pay bids 
using crosstabulations has not provided substantive evidence of 
relationships with respondents characteristics. To achieve more 
rigorous results i t  is necessary to use multiple regression techniques 
which introduce the possibility of independent variables acting 
together to determine willingness to pay: the following sub-section
undertakes such an analysis.
9.3.3 Multiple Regression Analysis
It is the aim of this sub-section to explain the positive 
willingness to pay bids made by respondents, in terms of their socio­
economic, attitudinal,and preference characteristics.
9.3.3.1 The Linear Relationship
The willingness to pay or "dependent" variable used for the
x
init ial  regression analysis was based on the distribution presented 
in Table 8.14 - the All Groups, untransformed willingness to pay - 
primarily because this distribution carries the maximum amount of 
information on willingness to pay collected by the survey. In accordance 
with previous analyses, the zero bids were excluded,as were the
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obvious outliners in the $250 - 750 range. The distribution was 
ini t ial ly left  in i ts linear form for analysis.
The choice of respondent characteriStic,or independent 
variables,to be included in the analysis, was made using the results 
of sub-sections9.3.1 and 9.3.2 as well as the results of an 
analysis, designed specifically around the linear ungrouped willingness 
to pay distribution: this analysis consisted of t - tes ts  between
the willingness to pay means of the dummy variable groups,and a 
consideration of the significance of the correlation co-efficients 
of the relationships existing between willingness to pay and the continuous 
variables.
It is necessary to outline f i r s t  the variables which are 
considered in the analyses that follow,and this task is achieved 
in Table 9.6 - in addition,the table provides a l i s t  of the symbols 
used to abbreviate the variables' names.
The analysis of the relationships between the dummy 
independent variables and willingness to pay using t - tes ts  across 
the groups willingness to pay means,is summarized in Table 9.7, 
and the relationships between the continuous independent variables 
and the dependent variable, described by the R s ta t i s t ics ,  are 
considered in Table 9.8.
The variables which have significant relationship with 
willingness to pay (using the 10% level) are: Q52C YES, BORN, Q18,
Q12, HHINC and TOTUSE, and these variables were checked for 
multicollineari ty, and in the case of the preference and attitudinal 
variables, for spurious relationships. The multicol 1inearity test  
involved the consideration of the simple correlation coefficients,as
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Variable Abbreviation Units Coding
Willingness to Pay WTP $ Continuous
Age AGE Years Continuous
Sex SEX Dummy 0. Female 1. Male
Life cycle stage LCS Dummy 0. No Family 1. Family
Marital status MSTAT Dummy 0. Not married 1. Married
Has quali f ications? Q52C Dummy 0. No 1. Yes
Qualification type Q52CYES Dummy 0. Non-graduate 1. Graduate
Place of schooling Q52B Dummy 0. Non-city 1. City
Place of Birth BORN Dummy 0. Other 1. Aust,UK,Ireland
Activity ACT Dummy 0. Not worked 1. Worked
Occupation GPOCC Dummy 0. Blue-collar
1. White-collar
T.V. viewing Q17 Dummy 0. No 1. Yes
Reading nature Q18 Dummy 0. No 1. Yes
Household gross income HHINC $ Continuous
Importance of conservation Q1 Dummy 0. Other 1. Very important
Payment mode Q12 Dummy 0. Conservation organisation
1. Government
Used natural areas? Q3 Dummy 0. No 1. Yes
Total use of natural areas TOTUSE Days Continuous
Table 9 .6 : Variable List:  Regression Analysis
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Variable (Group) WTP
Mean
S.D. n D.F. t
SEX 0 Female 30.2 45.3 189
1 Male 27.2 36.5 134 321 0.62
LCS 0 No fami ly 29.9 44.6 142 321 0.35
1 Family 28.2 39.7 181
MSTAT 0 Not married 27.9 42.9 102 321 0.3
1 Married 29.4 41.4 221
Q52C 0 No 26.8 42.4 157 319 0.99
1 Yes 31.4 41.4 164
Q52CYES 0 Non-graduate 26.1 38.9 247 321 2.39*
1 Graduate 39.8 50.7 66
Q52B 0 Non-c i ty 27.9 41.2 135 319 0.42
1 City 29.9 42.5 187
BORN 0 Other 21.3 28.4 89
1 Aust, UK, 321 2.03*
Ire land 31.8 45.7 234
ACT 0 Not worked 27.8 45.0 123 321 0.38
1 Worked 29.6 39.9 200
GPOCC 0 B lu e -co l la r 27.1 35.9 82 252 0.37
1 W h i te -co l la r 29.0 39.1 172
Q17 0 No 24.6 31 .6 45 319 0.76
1 Yes 29.7 43.3 277
Q18 0 No 23.5 35.5 156 321 2.29*
1 Yes 34.1 46.6 167
Q1 0 Other 26.9 43.2 123 318 0.74
1 V. impt. 30.5 41.3 197
Q12 0 C.O. 22.6 33.6 163 288 3.07**
1 Govt. 37.6 49.4 127
Q3 0 No 25.5 40.7 72 321 0.79
1 Yes 29.9 42.2 251
* S ig n i f i c a n t  at the 5% level  ) 
* * S ig n i f i c a n t  at the 1% level j
2 - t a i l  t e s t
Table 9.7 : t -Tests  on Wil l ingness to Pay Means across Dummy
Variable Groups.
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Variable n R R2 Signi f icance
AGE 323 .03 .001 .30
HHINC 316 .11 .01 .03
TOTUSE 323 .07 .005 .10
Table 9.8 : Corre la t ion  S ta t i s t i c s  with WTP: Continuous Variables.
wel l  as the s ign i f i cance  o f  the m u l t ip le  regression equations 
which estimate each independent var iab le  using the remaining 
independent va r iab les .  Table 9.9 presents the re levant s t a t i s t i c s  
fo r  the mult i c o l 1in e a r i t y  tes ts .
Variable Simple Corre la t ion Coef f ic ien ts With R D/F F
Q52C YES BORN Q18 Q12 HHINC TOTUSE
Q52CYES - .06 .12 .03 .24 .19 .10 5,277 5.8
BORN .06 - -.11 .05 .10 .01 .03 5,277 1.5
Q18 .12 - .11 - - .05 .05 .11 .03 5,277 2.2
Q12 .03 .05 -.05 - -.03 .08 .02 5,277 0.9
HHINC .24 .10 .05 - .03 - .14 .06 5,277 4.6
TOTUSE .19 .01 .11 .08 .14 - .06 5,277 3.4
WTP .13 .12 .11 .14 .11 .07 -
F* = 2 2C ,05 c ' c '
Table 9.9 : Tests fo r  M u l t i c o l i n e a r i t y :  Linear Case
The simple c o r re la t io n  c o e f f i c ie n ts  suggest tha t  no two
var iab les  are re la ted s u f f i c i e n t l y  c lose ly  to cause concern. However,
2
when the va r iab les are regressed against each o ther ,  whi le the R 
s t a t i s t i c s  are r e l a t i v e l y  low, the F s t a t i s t i c s  fo r  the equat ions 
invo lv ing  Q52C YES, HHINC and TOTUSE are a l l  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t the 5 %
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level, indicating that the equation is a significant estimator of
the variable under consideration (under the null hypothesis HQ: =
. . .  = Bn = 0,and the alternative hypothesis, H-j : B-j f . . .  f B f 0.)
In particular,  household income appears to be related significantly
12to graduate status and the level of use of National Parks. It 
is concluded that the inclusion of the HHINC, Q52CYES and TOTUSE 
variables together in a regression equation is unwise: the inclusion
of HHINC alone is sufficient to capture the effects on WTP of 
all three variables.
The analysis of mult i co l1inearity has already established that 
the relationship between willingness to pay and use of parks is 
spurious,through an indirect process, and this conclusion is 
substantiated by the analysis of spuriou's relationships, summarized 
in Table 9.10. Two types of test  were performed: the f i r s t  used
t-testsacross preference/attitudinal variable groups,when the 
distribution of willingness to pay bids considered involves only 
respondents in the sub-categories of the socio-economic variable 
which is being used as a control, when the control variable is a 
dummy variable; and the second involved the analysis of partial 
correlation coefficents (correlation coefficients calculated without 
the effect of the chosen control socio-economic variables), when 
the control variables is continuous.
12 Graduate status and park use are also related significantly, 
but the relationship is most likely to be spurious through 
the joint relationship with income.
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Control 
Variable
Q18 Q12 TOTUSE
BORN: 0 1.50 2.60 -
( t )0 i 2.13 2.08 -
HHINC: R 0.06 0.22 .02
signif . 0.18 0.00 .37
0 t s ta t is t ics  between the willingness to pay means across 
Q18 and Q12 categories for each BORN category.
Table 9.10: Detection of Spurious Relationships between
Independent Variables and Willingness to Pay.
At the b% level, the difference between payment mode category (Q12) 
means of willingness to pay, when controlled for place of birth, 
remain significant,  indicating that the relationship between payment 
mode and willingness to pay is not spurious to place of birth; and the 
continued significance of the correlation coefficient between WTP 
and Q12,when controlled for income,suggests that the relationship 
is not spurious to income. The same tests carried out on Q18, 
respondents' preferences for reading nature study books, did not 
yield such clear cut results: the control for BORN yielded one t
s ta t is t ic  which is significant and one that is not, while the 
correlation coefficient for the WTP/Q18 relationship became insignificant, 
once controlled for household income. The correlation coefficient 
test  on TOTUSE supports the result predicted in the analysis of 
mult icol1inearity. Q12 is therefore accepted as a valid independent 
variable, TOTUSE is rejected and the Q18 variable requires further 
substantiation - this can be provided by the analysis of actual
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regression equations involving WTP.
The in i t ia l  multiple regression equation includes Q12, Q18,
BORN and HHINC as the independent variables, as a result of the 
preceding tests for relationship significance, mult icoll inearity 
and spurious relationships. Because of missing values in the
13independent variables, most noticeably Q12, and the use of l ist-wise 
deletion of cases involving missing values, 283 respondents were 
included in the in i t ia l  regression, analysis ,which yielded the 
regression equation:
WTP = -0.03 + 16.4 Q12 + 10.9 Q18 + 10.6 BORN + 0.01 HHINC 
(3.34) (2.23) (1.92) (1.67)
. . .  ( 1 )
( t * , 05 1.96)
.07
F = 5 6  4,278 3,0 <F*.05 = 2*4>
At the 5% level, the t -s ta t is t ics  (in brackets under each 
coefficient) indicate that the coefficients of the variables Q12 
and Q18 are signif icantly different from zero,but the coefficients 
of the variables BORN and HHINC are not signif icantly different 
from zero (under the null hypothesis, HQ: 6=0,and the alternative 
hypothesis, H-j : 6/0).
The F s ta t is t ic  indicates that the equation, as a whole, is 
signif icant at the 5% level (under the null hypothesis, Hq: 
ßQ18 = B^ORN = ßHHINC = INSTANT = 0,and the alternative hypothesis, 
H 1 : 6qi 2  /  ßq18 t  ßB0RN / f’HHINC  ^ C0NSTANT  ^ °)- However, the
13 List-wise deletion involves al l respondents who provide 
"missing value" responses to any questions used in the 
regression analysis being excluded from the analysis.
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R s t a t i s t i c  indicates that the amount of var ia t ion in WTP which 
is explained by the independent variables is quite small, even fo r  
cross-sectional data, at 7%. Equation 1 also indicates that the 
re la t ionship between Q18 and WTP may be spurious (through income) 
because the income coe f f ic ien t  is not s ig n i f ica n t  when i t  would be 
expected to have a s ig n i f ica n t  e f fec t  on WTP. To check the v a l i d i t y  of 
th is  hypothesis, Q18 is removed from Equation 1 and Equation 2 resu l ts :  
WTP = 5.94 + 15.87 Q12 + 0.02 HHINC + 9.26 BORN . . .  (2)
(3.23) (2.98) (1.67)
2
VOoII
CM
(**.05 = 1' 96>
= 5 76 3,279 D,/D ( F*,05 ‘  2' 64>
The income coe f f ic ien t  becomes s ig n i f ica n t  when Q18 is l e f t  out of 
the equat ion,ind icating that Q18 and HHINC are at least p a r t i a l l y  
mult icol 1 inear,and hence that the Q18/WTP re la t ionship is somewhat 
spurious. The BORN var iable coe f f ic ie n t  becomes less s ign i f ica n t  
when Q18 is l e f t  out of the equation, and i t  is clear that BORN is 
also an i r re levan t  variable in the explanation of WTP. Removal of 
BORN from Equation 2 y ie lds Equation 3.
WTP = 11.61 + 16.34 Q12 + 0.01 HHINC
(3.31)
.05
F = 7 i g
2,280
(1.96)
(**.05 = K96) 
(F*_q5 = 3.03)
. . .  (3)
The changes across Equations 1 to 3 suggest that some 
mult i c o l 1inea r i ty  between HHINC and BORN may ex is t ,  but Equation 3 
is the most suitable equation fo r  f ina l  contemplation of the l inear  
re la t ionship :  the t - s t a t i s t i c s  on both the Q12 and HHINC variable
coef f ic ien ts  are s ig n i f ica n t  at the 5% leve l ;  the signs of these 
coe f f ic ien ts  are in accordance with p r io r  analyses in th is  and the
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previous chapter - respondents choosing the taxation payment mode
were willing to pay more than respondents wishing to make a
donation, and there was a positive relationship among survey
respondents between willingness to pay for existence benefits and
household income; the F s ta t i s t ic  for Equation 3 is significant
2at the 5% level; however,the R remains small at .05.
Also of interest in the analysis of the regression Equation 
2 , is the plot of the residuals (the actual willingness to pay minus 
the willingness to pay predicted by the regression equation for 
each respondent) against the predicted willingness to pay, which is 
presented in Figure 9.3. Clearly the distribution of residuals 
is not at all similar to the even band across all predicted willingness 
to pay bids type of distribution, required for the regression 
equation to be acceptable. Two unusual features are evident: f i r s t ,
there appears to be a spreading out of residuals as the size of the 
predicted willingness to pay increases; and secondly, the residuals 
appear to be grouped into diagonal bands. The increasing spread 
feature indicates that the variance of the residuals increases as 
the size of predicted WTP increase,and this is known as hetereoskedasticity 
-the assumption of homoskedasticity, that is,  the variance of the 
residuals is constant for all observations, is not verified by the 
regression equation. The banding effect is more diff icult  to 
diagnos.e,but in general, a diagonal band is indicative of a linear 
relationship between residuals and the predicted WTP. The f i r s t  
step taken in attempting to correct for both of these features was
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to undertake a natural logarithm transformation of the dependent 
variable.
159.3.3.2 Logarithnio Transformations
The procedure used for choosing the independent variables 
to be included in the analysis of the transformed dependent variable, 
log willingness to pay (LWTP), was the same as that used in the linear
case described in 9.3.3.1. Table 9.11 presents the t - tes t  analyses
14 Two additional points require mention. First,  the selection 
of independent variables for the linear regression analysis 
was made on the basis of simple correlations with WTP, but 
in multiple regression i t  is possible that variables, with 
only small simple correlations with the dependent variable, 
have significant coefficients in a regression equation because 
they supplement the relationships between the other independent 
variables and the dependent variable. To account for this
possibi 1ity,the variables l isted in Table 8.25 so far not included 
in the regression analysis ,which are not mult icol1 inear or 
spurious,were added to the init ial  equation. None were found 
to have coefficients which were significantly different from 
zero at the 5% level.
Secondly, an attempt was made to overcome the problem of the 
uncertainty surrounding the validity of using Q18 as an independent 
variable,by carrying out two separate regression analyses, one 
based on respondents who specified a preference for reading 
nature oriented material, and the other using respondents who 
did not regularly read nature books or art icles.  However, i t  
was found that no clear advantage was gained by the use of 
this type of analysis in terms of the power of the regression 
equations derived, while there were clear limitations in terms 
of the interpretation of the regression equation. Similarly 
an attempt to explain respondents'wi11ingness to pay by 
dividing the sample into two groups,according to their choice 
of payment mode and carrying out separate regression analyses, also 
proved unfruitful .
15 The use of the term "logarithmic" in this sub-section refers 
to natural logarithms.
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Variable (Group) Mean LWTP S.D. n D.F. t
SEX 0. Female 2.45 1.25 189 321 0.8
1. Male 2.57 1.44 134
LCS 0. No fami ly 2.47 1.42 142
1. Family 2.53 1.33 181 321 0.4
MSTAT 0. Not married 2.39 1.43 102
1. Married 2.55 1.34 221 321 0.95
Q52C 0. No 2.32 1.42 157
1. Yes 2.69 1.24 164 319 2.5*
Q52CYES 0. Non-graduate 2.39 1.36 257
1. Graduate 2.92 1.31 66 321
2 g**
Q52B 0. Non-ci ty 2.52 1.30 135
1. C ity 2.50 1.41 187 319 0.1
BORN 0. A u s t , UK, 
Ire land 2.29 1.39 89
1. Other 2.58 1.39 234 321 1 . 6b
ACT 0. Not worked 2.24 1.53 123
1. Worked 2.66 1.24 200 321 2.7*
GPOCC 0. B lu e -co l la r 2.60 1.22 82
1. W h i te -co l la r 2.59 1.29 172 252 .04
Q17 0. No 2.44 1.32 45
1. Yes 2.51 1.38 277 319 0.33
018 0. No 2.26 1.38 156
321 3.0**1. Yes 2.72 1.32 167
Q1 0. Other 2.38 1.35 123
1. Very Import. 2.59 1.36 197 31 8 1.4
012 o o O 2.36 1.23 163
288 2.3*
1. Govt. 2.72 1.48 127
Q3 0. No 2.27 1.43 72
1. Yes 2.56 1.35 251
321 1.6
* S ig n i f i c a n t  a t the 5% leve l )
* *  S ig n i f i c a n t  at the 1% level j ^
Table 9.11: t -Tes ts  on Log Wil l ingness to Pay Means across
Dummy Variable Groups.
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of the relationships between LWTP and the dummy independent 
variables,and Table 9.12 displays the R stat is t ics pertaining 
to the relationships between LWTP and the continuous independent 
variables (both in linear and logarithmic forms).
The independent variables which have signif icant relationships
with willingness to pay (using the 10% level) are: Q52C, Q52CYES,
BORN, ACT, Q18, Q12, HHINC, LHHINC, TOTUSE, LTOTUSE. The
multicol1inearity analysis detailed in the previous sub-section
is equally applicable to the analysis of the transformed dependent
variable, except to note that Q52C and Q52YES are strongly col l inear,
2
with a simple correlation coefficient of 0.5, R s of 0.27 for Q52C
and 0.37 for Q52YES,and F stat is t ics of 18.8 for Q52C and 30.0 for
Q52YES; and that ACT and HHINC are also coll inear with a simple
2
correlation coefficient of 0.2, an R of 0.11 for ACT,and an F 
s ta t is t ic  of 6.5. Therefore, the variables considered in the analysis 
for spurious relationships are: BORN, Q18, Q12, HHINC, LHHINC and 
possibly LAGE.
The tests to establish i f  the relationships between 
the preference/attitudinal variables and the dependent variable 
are spurious, are based on t- tests across the preference/attitudinal 
variable groups when the willingness to pay bids considered are 
those of respondents in the sub categories of the socio-economic 
variable which is being used as a control, when the control variable 
is a dummy variable; and the partial correlation coefficients 
calculated without the effect of the chosen control socio-economic 
variables, when the control variable is continuous: these tests are
presented in Table 9.13.
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Variable n R R2 Significance
AGE 323 .05 .003 .18
LAGE 323 .07 .005 .10
HHINC 316 .22 .05 .00
LHHINC 316 .23 .05 .00
TOTUSE 323 .11 .01 .02
LTOTUSE 323 .12 .02 .01
Table 9 .12: Correlation S t a t i s t i c s  with LWTP: Continuous
Variables.
Control Q18 Q12
Variable
BORN: 0 2.45 2.11
( t ) 0 1 2.35 1.49
HHINC R .107 .180
s ig n i f . .06 .004
0 t  s t a t i s t i c s  between the willingness to pay means across 
Q18 and Q12 categories for each BORN category.
Table 9.13: Detection of Spurious Relationships between Independent
Variables and LWTP.
The relat ionships between LWTP,and Q18 and Q12,remain 
s igni f icant  at  the 10% level a f t e r  being controlled for the effects  
of the two signi f icant  socio-economic variables,HHINC and BORN,and 
hence no evidence of spurious relat ionships can be establ ished.
The independent variables included in the regression 
equation designed to explain the natural logarithm of respondents'  
willingness to pay are Q12, Q18, BORN and HHINC. 283 respondents
336
were included in the estimation of LWTP,which resulted in the 
regression equation:
LWTP =1. 35+ 0.0007 HHINC + 0.42Q12 + 0.42Q18 + 0.25 BORN . . .  (4)
(3.5) (2.6) (2.6) (1.4)
. 1
7.38
( t * . 0 5  = ! - 9 6 ) 
(F* .05= 2’4>'4,278
Equation 4 is superior to the linear form of Equation 3 in 
2all respects: the R is improved; only BORN remains insignificant
at the 5% level; the F s ta t i s t ic  has risen; and the signs of the 
coefficients are s t i l l  in accordance with previous analyses. However, 
the pattern of residuals, i l lustrated in Figure 9.4,s t i l l  raises 
the problems of banding and slope, even though the problem of 
heteroskedasticity appears to have been eliminated. The problem
of banding is not overcome either by dropping of the BORN variable,
or including the independent variable AGE, which was found
to explain some of the residual variance in willingness to pay in
Equation 4,despite i ts  non-significant direct relationship with
the dependent variable. The resultant equation is:
LWTP = 1.0 + 0.0008 HHINC + 0.40 Q12 + 0.37 Q18 + 0.01 AGE . . .  (5)
(4.0) (2.5) (2.5) (2.2)
R2 = .1 ( t *_Q5 = 1.96)
F = 7 3 9  ( F* = 2 4 )4,278 1 .05 ’
Clearly,the only advantage Equation 5 has over Equation 4 , is that 
all the coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
5% level. However,the sign of the AGE coefficient gives some cause 
for concern,as i t  was shown in earl ier crosstabulation analyses 
that willingness to pay does not categorically rise with age, 
but rather the young and the old are willing to pay more than the 
middle-age groups. It  was decided therefore to consider a variable
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which was the square of AGE, in place of the simple AGE variable.
However th is  AGESQ variable proved to have an in s ig n i f ica n t  
coe f f ic ien t  at the 5% leve l.  I t  was concluded that the AGE 
variable is playing a supplementary role in Equation 5,and that 
the sign of the variable need not s t r i c t l y  represent the simple 
re la t ionship between AGE and LWTP.
The double-logari thmic form of the regression equation was 
also considered in the attempt to overcome the sloped banding in 
the pattern of  residuals. The resul tant equation is :
LWTP = -4.0 + 0.57 LHHINC + 0.37 Q12 + 0.41 Q18 + 0.61 LAGE + 0.35 BORN
(4.38) (2.47) (2.73) (2.54) (1.99)
. . .  (6)
R2 * = .12 ^ * .0 5  = 1 ‘ 9^
F5 ,277 = 7,8 (F*.05 = 2‘ 4 *>
2
Improvements in the R and F s ta t i s t i c s  indicate the 
super io r i ty  of the double log form over both the l inear  and log- 
l inear  forms. I t  should be noted that the coe f f ic ien t  of the 
LHHINC variable does not have the fa m i l ia r  income e la s t i c i t y
interpretation»because WTP is a equivalent surplus var iable,  rather 
than a quanti ty demanded var iable.  The in te rpre ta t ion  should be 
based on the equation:
m ?  HHINC
<: -  _ _ _ _ _  X
-HHINC WTP
and be of the form: the percentage increase/decrease in wi l l ingness
to pay caused by a 1% increase in household income. The posit ive 
sign associated with the income variable in Equation 6 , indicates 
that wi l l ingness to pay,and hence the equivalent surplus measure
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of existence benefits,wil1 rise over for every 1% rise in 
household income.
However, despite the additional transformation, no real 
change occurred in the pattern of residuals from that displayed 
in Figure 9.4 except perhaps for a re-emergence of the 
heteroskedasticity problem: while the logarithmic form is a clear
advance over the other forms in terms of explaining willingness to 
pay, i t  does not solve the problem of a non-uniform pattern of 
residuals.
In a further attempt to explain, and hence rectify the 
problem, a regression equation was estimated over the income 
variable alone, to determine if  the presence of the dummy variables 
was influencing the residual pattern. It was found that the 
banding s t i l l  existed, but given the single dimension of the 
equation estimated i t  was possible to plot»manually, the regression 
line onto a scattergram of the income and willingness to pay 
relationship-a representation of this process is presented in 
Figure 9.5 (i),using the grouped transformed willingness to pay 
variable described by Table 8.16,to i l lustrate the point more 
cl early.
The reason for the banding of the residuals is immediately 
obvious: the dependent variable i t se l f  is banded (a fact which is
accentuated but not changed by the grouping of the data),and each 
band of residuals represents one band of willingness to pay bids - 
there are seven bands of bids and seven bands of residuals. The 
slope of the bands is explained by Figure 9.5 ( i i ) :  four responses
in the 2.3 group of log willingness to pay bids are considered in 
detail ,  with the four residuals, a,b,c,d,  (willingness to pay minus 
predicted willingness to pay) from the four responses being plotted
340
LGWTP = -118 + 0-55 LHHINC
2__________ —  a r
LHHINC
Predicted LWTPjGroupedj
Figure 9.5: ( i )  The Relat ionship between LHHINC and LWTP (grouped)
( i i )  Four Residual Points from the 2.3 LWTP group and 
th e i r  Relat ionship with Predicted LWTP.
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against the willingness to pay predicted by the equation:
LWTP (grouped) = 1.18 + 0.55 LHHINC
As the predicted willingness to pay increases, residuals became smaller, 
until the regression line intersects the 2.3 WTP group, and then 
become increasingly negative.
9.3.3.3 Per-Household-Member Analysis
To remove the banding from the pattern of residuals
i t  is necessary to remove the grouping from the dependent
variable and this was achieved, at least part ial ly,  by considering
bids on a household basis. Two variables were constructed to
analyse household bids: the log of willingness to pay divided by
the total number of people in the respondent's household /LWTP^and
1 N ;
the logarithm of the per-household-member willingness to pay
(L/WTP\). Both variables distort the grouping of WTP by introducing 
1 N ’
the effect of the ungrouped variable, number of persons in the household, 
N, into the dependent variable. To maintain the regression analysis 
assumption that all observations are independent, i t  is necessary 
to reduce the scope of the regression analyses which use the household 
as a basis,to include only heads of households ,or spouses,so that 
only one person per household provides responses: 243 respondents
remained»with 40 respondents being ommitted from the sample used 
for regression Equations 1 to 6 because of their status within their 
household.
The use of ,LWTP>, involved two major problems: f i r s t ,
I N ’
the regression equations which used LWTP as the dependent variable
N
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were found to be subject to severe heteroskedasticity; and secondly,
the interpretation of the regression equations is difficul t
because of the unusual functional form. Due to these problems,
the analysis of LWTP is not particularly useful ,in terms of the 
N
overall aim of this sub-section - the explanation of respondents'
willingness to pay bids - but i t  does provide useful insight into
the problems of estimating an equation which exhibits heteroskedasticity
and so is included as Appendix VII. The failure of the study
involving /LWTPn to provide useful information, results in the reliance 
' N ;
on the regression analysis of the dependent variable L/WTPx to
v N  )
establish an explanation of respondents' willingness to pay bids
for the existence benefits of Nadgee Nature Reserve.
The lead up to the regression analysis using L/WTP% was
1 N '
undertaken using the procedure established for the analysis of the
linear and logarithmic transformation cases: Table 9.14 presents
the t - tes ts  on the L/WTPx means across the dummy independent variable
1 N j
groups ,and Table 9.15 contains information on the correlation
sta t is t ics  for the continuous independent variables. The variables
which have significant relationships with L/WTPs at the 10% level
1 N '
are: LCS, Q52C, Q52CYES, BORN, ACT, Q18, Q12, Q3, AGESQ, L,HHINCx
1 N 1
and LTOTUSE. Mult icol1inearity is obvious between the pairs of
variables Q52C/Q52CYES, ACT/L/HHJNCx and Q3 LTOTUSE - the variable
N
in each of these pairs which has the less significant relationship
with L/WTPn is dropped, leaving Q52CYES, L/HHINC\ and LTOTUSE remaining 
1 N 1 1 N '
for consideration.
Table 9.16 presents an analysis of multicol1inearity for the 
remaining variables. The simple correlation coefficients suggest 
that no two variables are sufficiently related to cause multi- 
col 1inearity, but the F sta t is t ics  for the regression equations of 
the following variables with all other variables in the table, are
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Variable (Group) Mean L,WTPv 
1 N ’
SD n DF t
SEX 0. Female 1.32 1.54 189
1. Male 1.42 1.35 134 321 0.63
LCS 0. No Family 1.66 1.55 142
1. Family 1.13 1.35 181 321 3.29**
MSTAT 0. Not married 1.46 1.63 102
1. Married 1.32 1.38 221 321 0.80
Q52C 0. No 1.20 1.53 157
1. Yes 1.55 1.36 164 319 2.18*
Q52CYES 0. Non-graduate 1.22 1.43 257
1. Graduate 1.93 1.46 66 321 3.60**
Q52B 0. Non-city 1.38 1.43 135
1. City 1.36 1.48 187 320 0.13
BORN 0. Other 1.13 1.28 89
1. Aust ,UK,Ireland 321 1.78
1.45 1 .52 234
ACT 0. Not worked 1.10 1.62 123
1. Worked 1.52 1.33 200 321 2.51*
GPOCC 0. Blue-collar 1.38 1.33 82
252 1.331. White-collar 1.52 1.34 172
O
' 0. No 1.34 1.49 45
1. Yes 1.37 1.46 277 320 0.12
Q18 0. No 1.12 1.52 156
1. Yes 1.59 1.37 167 321 2.89**
Q 1 0. Other 1.20 1.49 123
318 1.701. Very import. 1.48 1.43 197
Q12 o o o 1.21 1.30 163
1. Govt. 1.60 1 .60 127 288 2.27*
Q3 0. No 1 .07 1.49 72
1. Yes 1.45 1.44 251 321 1.94
* Signif icant at  the 5% level )
** Significant at  the 1% level ) 2- ta i l  te s ts
Table 9.14: t -Tests  on L/WTPx Means across Dummy Variable Groups.
N
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s ig n i f ica n t  at the 5% leve l :  LCS, Q52CYES, Q18, AGESQ, L,HHINCx,
1 N * 1
LTOTUSE. Mult i  col l i n e a r i t y  is suspected therefore between AGESQ
and LCS, Q52CYES and L,HHINCx, LTOTUSE and Q18, and L,HHINC>. and
1 N ' ' N '
LTOTUSE. The fol lowing variables remain suitable fo r  fu r ther
analysis: BORN, Q12, AGESQ and L/HHINCv. Q12 must be examined fo r
V M )
evidence o f  spurious re lat ionships ,and th is  is achieved by a three-
way crosstabulation with the dummy variable BORN against L/WTPx,and
1 N ]
a par t ia l  corre la t ion analysis correct ing fo r  L/HHINCx. Both
1 N ;
tests reveal that the Q12 re la t ionship with L/WTPx remains
1 N '
s ig n i f ica n t  at the 5% level , fo l lowing cor rect ion ,  fo r  place of b i r th  
and income.
Variable n R R2 * Signif icance
AGESQ 323 0.11 0.01 .02
L(HH INC/N) 316 0.38 0.15 .00
LTOTUSE 323 0.13 0.02 .01
Table 9.15: Correlat ion S ta t is t ic s  with L/WTPx:
' N 'Continuous Variables.
Using BORN, .012, AGESQ and L/HHINC\ as the independent
1 N ’
var iables, Equation 7 was calculated:
L/WTPx = -3.68 + 0.82 L/HHINCx + 0.40 Q12 + 0.26 BORN + 0.0002 AGESQ
N N  ^  ^ (7)
(-4.08) (5.97) (2.33) (1.4) (2.57)
R = .18
F4 ,238 12-6
^ .0 5  = 
F*.05 = 2 ' 4
Removal of the i r re levan t  BORN variable y ie lds Equation 8:
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L,WTP, = 3.55 + 0.83 L.HHINC, + 0.41 Q12 + 0.0002 AGESQ . . .  (8)
' N ' 1 N '
(-4.66) (6.07) (2.44) (2.43)
R2 = .17 (t* Q5 = 1.96)
F3,239= 16 -7 ^ 0 5  - 2-64>
The plot of residuals against the predicted dependent variable
L/WTPn (from Equation 8) is presented in Figure 9.6.
1 N '
The relatively uniform pattern of residuals indicates that
heteroskedasticity is not a problem in the L,WTPx case. All
1 N '
variables, have significant coefficients at the 5% level, and the
whole equation has a significant F s t a t i s t i c a l  so at the 5% level.
The signs of the coefficients are acceptable in terms of previous
analyses: the per-household-member income elast ici ty of household-
member willingness to pay is positive (0.83)»indicating that a 1%
increase in income per-household-member yields a 0.83% increase in
willingness to pay,and hence, existence benefits (given Assumptions 1
to 5 detailed in Section 8.1 of the previous chapter) per-household-
member; respondents choosing the government option were willing
to pay more than those wishing to donate to a conservation organization;
and, the positive sign on the AGESQ variable coefficient indicates
that the parabolic response so indicated is such that young and old
respondents are willing to pay more than middle aged respondents.
2Finally, the R s ta t i s t ic  indicates that the regression Equation 8
explains approximately 17% of the variance exhibited by the dependent
2variable. Clearly on R of .17 indicates that prediction  of 
individuals' willingness to pay on the basis of Equation 8 is not 
advisable. Flowever, given that the data used is cross-sectional, 
Equation 8 does provide a useful explanatioji of existence benefit bids.
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9.3.4 Conclusions
The crosstabulation analysis of respondents' willingness to 
pay. bids for the existence benefits provided by Nadgee Nature 
Reserve against their socio-economic, preference and attitudinal 
characteristics carried out in Sub-Section 9.3.1, indicated that respondents' 
household income, preference for reading nature oriented material, and 
their payment mode choice, were the only independent characteristics 
which created significant differences in the willingness to pay 
distribution across their sub-categories. Sub-Section 9.3.2 checked the 
possibility that the relationship between the preference for reading 
and willingness to pay was spurious and concluded that the available 
evidence was contradictory and not sufficiently strong to enable 
the complete acceptance of the spurious correlation hypothesis.
The results of Section 8.5, which led to a similar conclusion 
regarding the payment mode choice variable, were reiterated.
Sub-Section 9.3.3 considered the relationships between respondents' 
positive willingness to pay bids for the existence benefits 
of Nadgee Nature Reserve,and their socio-economic, attitudinal and 
preference characteristics,using multiple regression analysis.
Three types of functional forms were reported: the linear, the 
logarithmic and the per-household-member logarithmic form. It 
was demonstrated that willingness to pay is best explained using 
the per-household-member logarithmic form, indicating that the size 
of the respondent's household is important in his/her perception of 
willingness to pay.
Independent variables were chosen for inclusion in all 
regression equations on the basis of their relationships with the 
dependent variable,and their freedom from the problems of multi-
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col 1inearity and spurious correlation. The variables which were 
found to have significant coefficients in the explanation of 
willingness to pay were:
Household Income: The household income of respondents was
consistently significant in all forms of the regression equation 
explaining willingness to pay. The positive coefficient of the 
income variable indicates that an increase in household income will 
result in an increase in willingness to pay. For the case of 
individual willingness to pay (Equation 6) ,a 1% rise in income 
results in a 0.5% increase in willingness to pay; and for willingness 
to pay per household member (Equation 8), 1% rise in per-household- 
member income results in a 0.8% increase in per-household-member 
willingness to pay. It should also be recognized that many income 
related variables also had positive relationships with willingness 
to pay: for instance, increases in educational qualifications and
use of natural areas, both result in increases in willingness to 
pay.
Payment Mode Choice: Respondents who bid high amounts tended
to choose the taxation mode over the donation mode. Given this 
result ,  i t  is possible to hypothesize that tax-option respondents 
value existence benefits higher than donation mode. However, this 
hypothesis appears to contradict the results reported in Section 8.5 
of the previous chapter - respondents bidding both high and low 
amounts are more likely to choose the taxation mode, with the 
donation mode dominating the intermediate range of bids. It  is 
clear however, that the regression analysis, by forcing the payment 
mode/willingness to pay into a linear form, cannot represent the
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essentially parabolic, or quadratic, form of the true relationship.^5 
Hence, while the regression analysis shows that, overall, tax bids 
are greater than donation bids, i t  ignores the dominance of the 
tax mode in the low bids.
Preference for Reading about Nature: Q18 is a significant
independent variable in explaining willingness to pay in the log* 
linear and log-log forms of the individual willingness to pay regression 
equation (Equations 5 and 6). This indicates that those respondents 
who read books on nature,bid higher amounts than those who do not 
read such material. However, the acceptability of the Q18 variable 
is open to some doubt because of the possibility that i ts relationship 
with willingness to pay is spurious.
Age: Although the relationship between age and willingness
to pay is positive in the log-linear and log-log equations (Equations 
5 and 6) the most satisfactory explanation of willingness to pay 
through age is in Equation 8, the per-household-member log-log form. In 
that equation, the relationship between age and willingness to pay 
was found to be in the form of a parabolic response - in accord with 
the crosstabulation analysis - with younger and older respondents 
indicating a higher valuation for the existence benefits of Nadgee 
that that exhibited by middle-aged respondents.
PI ace of Birth: While Equation 6, the log-log individual bid
regression ,includes BORN as a significant variable, indicating that 
respondents born in Australia, the U.K., and Ireland were willing to
15 A quadratic form of the Q12 variable could not be used 
because i t  is a dummy variable.
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pay more for Nadgee's existence benefits than respondents born 
in other countries, the lack of significance in other equations 
leads to the conclusion that BORN should not be considered a useful 
explanatory variable.
The multiple regression technique proved useful in the 
explanation of respondents'wi11ingness to pay»primarily because of 
its  a b il ity  to amalgamate the effects of d iffe ren t respondent 
characteristics into a single function. In addition, the significance 
of the contribution made by each characteristic to the explanation 
of the variance observed in the dependent variable,can be assessed. 
However, i t  must be stressed that the maximum amount of variance 
which is explained by any of the regressions reported is less than 
20%. Certainly, th is  level of explanation is not su ffic ie n t fo r 
predictive purposes,however the regressions are useful in the
2
examination of patterns of response over the sample. On th is  basis,an R 
of .17 is satisfactory for cross-sectional data, pa rticu la rly  given the 
significance of other relevant s ta t is t ic s ,but i t  is c learly re la tive ly  
low. The fa ilu re  of regression analysis to achieve a higher level 
of explanation may be considered as indicative of bias - predominantly 
hypothetical but possibly strategic - being present in the bids 
of respondents.
9.4 CONCLUSIONS
The aim of th is  chapter has been to analyse the willingness 
to pay bids of respondents,under Assumptions 1 to 5 set out in 
Section 8.1, the introduction to the previous chapter,in an attempt 
to gain an understanding of the equivalent surpluses which respondents 
gain from the continued supply of existence benefits from Nadgee
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Nature Reserve. These assumptions require respondents to view 
existence benefits as goods, to be f u l l y  aware of  the good fo r  which 
they are bidding,and to exh ib i t  no s t ra teg ic ,  hypothetical or payment 
mode bias in t h e i r  bids.
Spec i f ica l ly  th is  chapter, has been devoted to the consideration 
of the re lat ionships between respondents' wi l l ingness to pay bids 
and th e i r  socio-economic, preference and a t t i t u d in a l  charac te r is t ics ,  
providing an extension to the previous chapter which analysed the 
magnitude of respondents' bids. Maintaining the d is t in c t ion  between 
zero and non-zero bids establ ished in Chapter 8, Section 9.2 
concentrated on the character is t ics  which d i f fe re n t ia te  between 
respondents who chose not to bid and those who did bid a posit ive 
amount for  the existence benefi ts ,using crosstabulation and discriminate 
analyses. The variables which were found to have s ign i f ica n t  
re lat ionshipswith respondents' preparedness to pay were: age, l i f e
cycle stage, household income, preference fo r  TV viewing o f  nature 
programmes and reading nature mater ia l,  a t t i tudes to conservation and 
the use of parks for  a l l  f ive  reasons (recreation, education, 
aesthetics, s c ie n t i f i c  research and nature preservation),  and the 
preference fo r  using parks fo r  bushwalking and camping. A l l  the 
preference and a t t i t u d in a l  variables ,except the a t t i tude  to conservation 
and the preference fo r  reading nature material variables ,can be 
regarded as having spurious re lat ionships with respondents' 
preparedness to pay.
The discriminant analysis establ ished that 11% o f  the variance 
between the two preparedness to pay groups could be explained by the 
remaining non-spurious var iab les ,with the re la t ive  strengths of the
353
variables in this discrimination process being represented by the 
absolute value of the standardized discriminant coefficients: 
age, 0.38; attitude to conservation, 0.73; household income 0.28; and, 
preference for reading, 0.46. The signs of the coefficients 
indicate that as age increases, preparedness to pay declines; as 
household income rises, preparedness to pay increase; as attitudes 
shift toward conservation»preparedness to pay increases; and,as 
preferences shift  toward more reading of nature material, preparedness 
to pay increases.
The positive bids for existence benefits were examined in 
terms of their relationships with respondents' characteristics in 
Section 9.3 using crosstabulation and multiple regression analyses.
The crosstabulation analysis in Sub-Section 9.3.1 indicated that household 
income, payment mode choice»and preference for reading nature 
oriented material all had significant relationships with willingness to 
pay. In Sub-Section 9.3.2, i t  was concluded that the reading preference 
and payment mode choice relationships were possibly spurious,but a 
firm conclusion could not be reached. The regression analysis of Sub- 
Section 9.3.3 found that the best explanation of willingness to pay 
could be obtained by considering willingness to pay and income, 
per-household-member. The variables which were found to be significant 
in the explanation of log willingness to pay per-household-member 
were:log household income per-household-member; payment mode choice; 
and,the square of the respondent's age. Variables which were not 
included in the analysis because of multicollinearity were: l ife cycle
stage (the presence of a family or not); educational level; and, levels 
of use of National Parks and Nature Reserves.
354
The willingness to pay elast ici ty of household income was 
estimated to be +0.5, and the per-household-member willingness to pay 
elast ici ty of per-household-member household income was estimated to 
be +0.8, indicating that as income levels rise so do willingness 
to pay for existence benefits. The collinearity between education, 
use of parks and household income suggests a similar positive 
relationship between education and use, and willingness to pay. The 
positive coefficient on the payment mode variable indicates the 
preponderance for higher bidders to favour the taxation mode: this
result does not contradict the conclusions regarding the payment 
mode/willingness to pay relationship made in Section 8.5 of the 
previous chapter»because the true quadratic form of the relationship 
could not be incorporated into the regression equation. However i t  
does indicate that,  overall, higher bidders favoured the tax option, 
perhaps indicating a stronger support for existence values amongst 
those favouring government participation. Finally, the positive 
coefficient associated with the square of age indicates that older 
and younger respondents bid more than those who are middle-aged.
How useful the results outlined in this and the 
previous chapter are, depends crucially on the five assumptions, set out 
in Section 8.1, which enable the interpretation of the 
willingness to pay bids made by respondents as their  equivalent 
surpluses gained from the continued preservation of Nadgee Nature 
Reserve as a supplier of existence benefits. Before i t  is possible to 
assert catagorically that this and the preceding chapter have shown that 
the majority of respondents do place a value on the continued existence 
of the species found in Nadgee, and that characteristic features such as 
income, age and educational status have significant relationships
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with their valuations, i t  is necessary to validate the five 
assumptions. It was shown in Chapter 8 that most respondents 
appeared to be aware of the nature of the good for which they 
were bidding, particularly given the "no visit" implication, and that 
the dual payment mode option helped to reduce substantially the 
possibility of payment mode bias. The assumption that everyone 
considers existence benefits as "goods" can be regarded as real is t ic ,  
but cannot be empirically tested with the results obtained. 
Hypothetical bias was implied, but not proven to exist, by the 
analysis of the effect of information on willingness to pay carried 
out in Section 8.3, by the analysis of the relationship between 
payment mode choice and willingness to pay considered in Section 8.5, 
by the small amount of explanation provided by the discriminant 
analysis of the preparedness to pay choice detailed in Section 9.2, 
and by the low R obtained by the regression analyses of non-zero 
willingness to pay bids described in Section 9.3. However, even if  
i t  does exist, hypothetical bias would seem to present few real 
concerns in the interpretation of willingness to pay bids,because i t  
was shown in Chapter 2 that hypothetical bias may not create an 
upward or downward bias in bids but rather results in an increased 
spread of bids. The real matter for concern in the use of the 
willingness to pay bids as measures of respondents' valuations is 
the possibility of strategic behaviour,and the detection of such 
behaviour is the purpose of Chapter 10.
CHAPTER 10
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR IN THE DIRECT QUESTIONING VALUATION PROCESS
10.1 INTRODUCTION
The ana lys is  o f  respondents'  va lua t ions  o f  the ex is tence 
b e n e f i t s  prov ided by Nadgee Nature Reserve,which was descr ibed in 
Chapters 8 and 9,  used i n d i v i d u a l s '  w i l l i n g n e s s  to  pay bids as accurate 
measurements o f  t h e i r  e q u iv a le n t  surpluses gained from the knowledge 
th a t  the ecosystem conta ined in  Nadgee w i l l  remain preserved.
However, i t  was pointed out in both chap te rs ,  t h a t  to  ensure the 
e q u a l i t y  o f  w i l l i n g n e s s  to  pay and e qu iva len t  s u r p l u s ^ i t  i s  necessary 
to make f i v e  assumptions: a l l  respondents are f a m i l i a r  w i th  the good
f o r  which they were b id d in g ;  ex is tence b e n e f i t s  are always a"good";  
and,no h y p o th e t i c a l ,  payment mode or s t r a t e g i c  biases are ev iden t .  
Chapters 8 and 9 concluded th a t  a l l  the assumptions, except the 
ex is tence o f  s t r a t e g i c  bias ,were reasonable,  e i t h e r  because there 
was evidence to  support  the assumption in the re s u l t s  o f  the 
q u e s t ionna i re ,  or  because the e f f e c t  o f  the p a r t i a l  f a i l u r e  to 
f u l f i l  the assumption was thought to  be o f  l i t t l e  consequence. The 
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  s t r a t e g i c  bias was concluded to  be s i g n i f i c a n t ,  because 
o f  the in c e n t i v e  f o r  respondents to  over-s ta te  t h e i r  preferences 
when payment i s  not enforced,and the one-sided nature o f  the r e s u l t a n t  
b ias .  Hence i n d i v i d u a l s '  s t r a t e g i c  behaviour could cause s i g n i f i c a n t  
d i f fe re n c e s  between w i l l i n g n e s s  to  pay and t h e i r  e qu iva len t  surp luses.
I t  is  the aim o f  t h i s  chapter to  i n v e s t ig a te  the l i k e l i h o o d  o f  s t r a t e g i c
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bias in order to assess the validity of Assumption 5 used in 
Chapters 8 and 9, and hence the accuracy of the results reported 
in those chapters.
Two sources of information are used in the consideration of 
strategic bias: the responses to the main questionnaire; and,the
results of an experiment, which used a sub-sample of the respondents 
answering the main questionnaire, to concentrate on the behaviour 
of individuals under differing questioning procedures. The analysis 
of strategic bias using the responses to the main questionnaire is 
not rigorous to the extent to being able to justify the formation 
of definite conclusions, primarily because i t  was not possible to 
enforce payment, to enable the estimation of respondents' true 
valuations through a demand revealing process. However the analysis does 
provide useful insight into respondent behaviour through the use of 
evidence of contradictions between responses. On the other hand, the 
experiment was designed to compare the direct questioning willingness 
to pay of respondents with their true valuations, derived by using 
the Smith Auction Process, which was described in Chapter 3, modified 
for use with an indivisible good. Despite the differences in setting 
between the experiment and the questionnaire - the experiment was 
carried out on a small number of respondents concentrated in one 
group whereas the questionnaire was distributed to a large number of 
individuals who each answered the questions apart from the other 
respondents and the experiment asked respondents to value the showing 
of two films, in a setting similar to that used by Bohm and described 
in Chapter 3, while the questionnaire was centred on the estimation 
of the existence values of Nadgee Nature Reserve - i t  is argued that 
the conclusions regarding basic behavioural patterns in the experiment
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can be used as a general result, with application to the questionnaire's 
valuation of existence benefits, bearing in mind the non-random 
method used to draw the sample for the experiment.
Section 10.2 uses the responses to certain questions contained 
in the main questionnaire to consider the possibility of strategic 
behaviour:'- specifically,the relationships existing between stated 
attitudes and actual behaviour, the choice of payment mode, the 
characteristics respondents who can be considered as "outliers" in 
the willingness to pay distribution,and the shape of the distribution 
i t se l f  are analysed. Section 10.3 then analyses the experiment in 
detail: a brief outline of the theoretical background is given in 10.3.1,
the drawing of the sample is detailed in 10.3.2, the actual 
experimental process is described in 10.3.3,and 10.3.4 sets out the 
results of the experiment. Finally, Section 10.4 considers the 
results of Sections 10.2 and 10.3 and draws conclusions on the 
validity of the strategic bias assumption, and hence the validity of 
the use of direct questioning willingness to pay to approximate 
equivalent surpluses which was made in Chapters 8 and 9.
10.2 THE QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS
10.2.1 The_Distribution of Bids
The Brookshire, Ives and Schulze study, detailed in Chapter 
2, in attempting to determine if  respondents behaved strategically 
when answering Iterative Bidding Method questions, used the 
technique of examining the variance of the bid distribution: 
they hypothesized that i f  strategic bias was present, the 
distribution would have a large variance with 'a large
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number of zero and extremely high bids' (p. 340)J  To undertake 
a similar type of test  on the distribution of bids for the existence 
benefits of Nadgee Nature Reserve, presented in Figure 8.7 and 
Table 8.14, i t  is necessary to realize that the Brookshire e t  al.  
study was based on the bids of respondents who were led to believe 
that they would eventually have to pay an amount equal to the mean 
of their bids. While this type of questioning would be expected 
to yield a uniformly spread distribution i f  strategic bias was present, 
the question asked in this study implied no payment at al l ,  with 
the expected effect being a skewed distribution toward higher bids, 
i f  strategic bias was present. With this distribution in mind, i t  
appears that Figure 8.7 supports the hypothesis that strategic bias 
is a problem in the estimation of existence benefits using the direct 
questioning method - the standard deviation, $68.82, is large when 
compared to the mean bid of $27.08, and the high value "tail" of the 
distribution extends to $750. However, the results of the Brookshire 
et  al. test  must be considered with caution ,primarily because i t  is not 
possible to assert,  categorically, that because a respondent bids 
a large amount, he is acting strategically.
1 A discussion of Brookshire e t  a l 's (1976) results is carried 
out in Chapter 2 (Sub-Section 2.5.3).
2 It is interesting to note that zero is the modal score in the 
willingness to pay distribution. This can be argued to indicate 
that some respondents did perceive a possibility that payment 
would be required - based either on each individual's bid or the 
mean of all respondent's bids - and hence that under-stating 
strategic behaviour is also a problem. However, i t  is equally 
admissible to argue that existence benefits, being a rather 
nebulous good, are not valued at all by a large proportion of 
respondents.
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10.2.2 " O u t l ie r "  Charac te r is t ics
An ind ica t ion  of upward s t ra te g ic  bias (where the respondent
i
over-states his w i l l ingness  to pay in the no-payment s i tu a t io n )  can 
be gained by an analys is o f  the socio-economic ch a rac te r is t i cs  of 
respondents who bid very high re la t i v e  to the mean bid. The seven 
respondents who bid over and inc lud ing $250,are considered in Table 
1 0 . 1 .
C harac te r is t ic  : Code 1 2
Household Income : 1 = <$15000 2 = >$15000 2 5
Sex : 1 = Male 2 = Female 3 4
Age : 1 = <40 2
oAII 6 1
Mar i ta l  status : 1 = Married 2 = Other 4 3
L i fe  Cycle Stage : 1 = Family 2 = Other 2 5
Graduate Status : 1 = Non-graduate 2 = Graduate 7 -
Occupation : T = B lu e -co l la r  2 = W h i t e - c o l l a r 4 3
Born : 1 = Aust,UK 2 = Other 7 -
Use o f  Parks : 1 = <7 days 2 = >7 days 7 -
Subscription? : 1 = Yes 2 = No 1 6
Conservation Importance : 1 = V.Impt. 2 = Other 4 3
Read Nature Books? : 1 = Yes 2 = No 5 2
Payment Mode : 1 = Govt. 2 = C.O. 4 3
Table 10.1: Frequency o f  Character is t ies  o f  Respondents Bidding
Greater than or Equal to $250.
A number o f  con trad ic t ions  e x is t  between the magnitude of 
respondents' bids,and t h e i r  socio-economic, stated a t t i tu d e s  and 
preference c h a ra c te r i s t i c s .  Chapter 9 establ ished tha t  household income, 
educat ional leve l ,and occupation status,were p o s i t i v e l y  re la ted to 
w i l l ingness  to pay, yet o f  the seven respondents g iv ing high bids, 
none were graduates, most were b lu e -c o l la r  workers (and those who were
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white-collar respondents were all classified as lower level status),  
and even though five of the high bidders had household incomes in 
excess of $15,000, two of these were the children of high income 
families who themselves were not working. The preponderance of young 
respondents in the high bidding group is also contradictory to the 
results of Chapter 9, especially considering the positive relationship 
between age and personal income. Contradictions also exist between 
respondents' stated attitudes and their willingness to pay: only
four of the seven high bidders considered conservation to be very 
important, five read nature books regularly, and none were heavy 
users of parks. Given the size of the bids, i t  would be expected 
that all the seven high bidders would have expressed stronger support 
for most forms of conservation. Finally, only one high bidder had 
subscribed to a conservation organization in the past twelve months - 
however, i t  should be recognized that such subscriptions are subject 
to under-stating strategic behaviour, the free-rider problem.
From these observations i t  would appear that most, i f  not all 
of the high bidders are over-stating their real valuations ,when 
bidding in a direct-questioning format where payment is not required 
However this co.ncl usion cannot be substantiated completely by this 
analysis: a personal bid, of course, need not reflect the overall
trend of the sample, particularly given the low level of explanation 
provided by the trend analysis detailed in the previous chapter, and 
some unmeasured variable/s may explain such strong preferences.
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10.2.3 Payment Mode Choice
I t  was noted in Chapter 8 (Section 8.5) that the two payment 
modes - a donation to a conservation organization and a tax to the 
government - which are made avai lable to respondents in the questionnaire 
may be subject to d i f fe r in g  incentives fo r  s t ra teg ic  behaviour.
The d is t r ib u t io n  of taxation option bids was found to have a re la t i v e ly  
higher variance than the d is t r ib u t io n  of bids made by respondents who 
chose the donation mode ,and one possible cause fo r  th is  difference 
was hypothesized to be that s t ra teg ic  bias was present in the tax 
option bids but not present, or at least present to a smaller extent, 
in the donation option bids. In reviewing the evidence to support 
th is  hypothesis, the reasons given by respondents fo r  th e i r  choice of 
payment mode - detai led in Table 8.19 - were examined. Two reasons 
were found to be notable fo r  th e i r  implicat ions fo r  s t ra teg ic  bias: 
nearly one quarter of respondents choosing the donation mode did so 
because they f e l t  i t  re f lec ts  more accurately the preferences of 
society; and,over one quarter of respondents who chose the taxation 
mode did so because they wished to ensure the equity of payments 
across the whole community. The impl icat ion fo r  those respondents 
who use the " re f le c t io n  of  preferences" argument may be that s tra teg ic  
behaviour is not being contemplated: there is no consideration of
the strategy of under-statement when donations are actua l ly  sought, 
and no recognit ion that overs-statement is the optimal behaviour in the 
questionnaire context. However the respondents who used the "payment
3 Respondents may be attempting to add v a l i d i t y  to an over-statement 
of wi l l ingness to pay by choosing the " re f le c t io n  of  preferences" 
reason, however such double-bluff ing would be un l ike ly .
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equity "argument as a just ification for their choice of the tax mode 
may be attempting to behave st rategical ly: given that these respondents
believe that a tax based on the average bid will eventually be collected 
to pay for the reserve's preservation, those with valuations below the 
expected tax increase will tend to under-state their preferences, while 
those who value the existence benefits greater than the tax will 
over-statetheir willingness to pay, both behaving strategically in 
an attempt to modify the level of provision to a quantity which more 
closely approximates their personal requirements.
It remains unsubstantiated however, that the differences 
between the two payment mode bid distributions are caused by strategic 
bias, despite the evidence concerning the reasons for payment mode 
choice. Sub-Section 8.5.3 also considered two alternative hypotheses - 
the possibility of hypothetical bias,and that i t  was an underlying 
socio-economic relationship between payment mode and willingness to 
pay which caused the spurious link between bid structure and payment mode 
choice - deciding that no firm conclusions could be made on any 
of the possible causes for the distribution differences.
10.2.4 Attitudes and Actions
A further indication of the strategic bias, i f  any, present 
in direct questioning willingness to pay bids can be gained from a 
comparison of stated attitudes with actual actions, bearing in mind 
the limitations of any analysis which uses respondents' stated 
atti tudes,  which may be subject themselves to over-statement. Two 
different comparisons are used in this section: the f i r s t  involves a
comparison of respondents' stated attitudes to the importance of the 
existence benefits provided by Nadgee Nature Reserve (Q.10) with
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t h e i r  preparedness to pay; and the second considers the re la t io n sh ip  
between respondents' a t t i tu d e s  to conservat ion and t h e i r  actual 
con t r ibu t ions  to conservation organizat ions.
Table 10.2 presents the frequency o f  responses to Question 10, 
which asks respondents to state t h e i r  ra t in g  o f  the importance of 
the Nature Reserve as a supp l ie r  o f  existence b e ne f i t s ,  and Table 
10.3 presents the frequency o f  responses to Question 11, which asks 
respondents i f  they are w i l l i n g  to pay to ensure the preservat ion 
o f  the Reserve.
Importance o f  Existence 
Benefi ts
Absolute
Frequency
Relat ive 
Frequency
%
Adjusted
R.F.
%
Very Important 359 66.0 68.0
Somewhat Important 113 20.8 21.4
A L i t t l e  Important 40 7.4 7.6
Not Important a t a l l 16 2.9 3.0
Don't know 8 1.5 -
Refusal 8 1.5 -
Total 544 100.0 100.0
Table 10.2: Respondents' A t t i tu de s  to
Nadgee Nature Reserve.
the Existence Benefi ts of
Preparedness to Pay fo r  
Existence Benefi ts
Absolute
Frequency
Relat ive
Frequency
%
Adjusted
R.F.
%
Yes 407 74.8 78.0
No 115 21.1 22.0
Don't know 6 1.1 -
Not asked* 16 2.9 -
Total 544 100.0 100.0
*The 16 respondents who were not asked were the respondents
who gave "Don't  know" and "Refusal" responses to Question 10.
Table 10.3: Respondents' Preparedness to Pay fo r  the Existence Benefi ts
o f  Nadgee Nature Reserve.
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16 respondents believed that the existence benefits provided 
by Nadgee Nature Reserve were not important at al l ,yet  131 respondents 
were not prepared to pay for the preservation: 115 respondents who
indicated a positive preference for these existence benefits were 
not prepared to pay for the continued provision of the benefits. This 
result would seem to imply that up to 115 respondents were engaged in 
under-stating strategic behaviour. One caveat is associated with this 
implication: the attitudinal question (Question 10) may be subject
to over-stating strategic behaviour,in that respondents, noting the 
absence of any cost involved in stating higher attitudes than they 
actually hold, may take the opportunity to bias the result in their 
favour. However,it should be recognized that i f  respondents have 
no preference for the existence benefits of Nadgee, there is no 
incentive for them to over-state. Hence the caveat may not be limiting 
in this case ,and the conclusion that at least 115 of the zero bidders 
are attempting to behave strategically by under-stating their 
willingness to pay,even though payment is not required, is reasonably 
strong. The under-stating behaviour could be due to an inability of 
respondents to perceive the opportunity for over-statement, 
to an inability to overcome the habit of under-stating, or to a belief 
that some payment, based on their bid, would eventually be required. 
Unfortunately,it is not possible to use the under-statement of zero 
bidders as a guide to the level of under-statement which may be evident 
in the positive willingness to pay bids.
The second comparison of attitudes and actions is even less 
useful in providing firm conclusions, but i t  does enable a deeper 
understanding of the types of strategic behaviour which appear in 
direct questioning responses. Use is made f i rs t ly  of respondents'
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attitudes to conservation as compared to their actual contributions 
made to conservation organizations: Table 10.4 presents the
frequency of response to Question 1, how important is conservation?" 
and Table 10.5 sets out the distribution of subscriptions.
While nearly 60% of respondents regarded conservation as 
being very important, only approximately 15% actually made a 
subscription to a conservation organization in the 12 months 
prior to the taking of the survey. The strong contradiction between 
attitudes and behaviour in this case can be explained by two possible
Importance of 
Conservation
Absolute 
Frequency
Relative
Frequency
%
Adjusted
Frequency
%
1. Very Important 315 57.9 58.6
2. Somewhat important 169 31.1 31.4
3. A 1i t t l e  important 47 8.6 8.7
4. Not important at all 7 1.3 1.3
Don't know 5 .9 -
Refusal 1 .2 -
Total 544 100.0 100.0
Mean = 1.53 Variance = 0.50
Mode = 1.00 Median = 1.35
Table 10.4: Respondents' Stated Attitude Toward Conservation.
reasons: f i r s t ,  the attitudinal question is subject to the possibility
of over-stating strategic behaviour;and secondly, subscriptions are 
subject to the possibility of under-stating strategic behaviour.
The la tter  possibility can be assessed, to some degree, 
by examining the reasons given by respondents for not subscribing:
Table 10.6 presents these reasons.
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$ Subscription
Absolute Relative
Frequency Frequency ( t )
Adjusted 
Frequency (%)
0 463 85.1 85.4
0.5 1 .2 .2
1.0 2 .4 .4
1.5 7 1.3 1.3
2.0 13 2.4 2.4
3.0 3 .6 .6
4.0 1 .2 .2
5.0 16 2.9 3.0
6.0 3 .6 .6
7.0 1 .2 .2
8.0 2 .4 .4
10.0 10 1.8 1.8
12.0 4 .7 .7
15.0 1 .2 .2
16.0 1 .2 .2
18.0 1 .2 .2
20.0 7 1.3 1.3
25.0 2 .4 .4
30.0 2 .4 .4
40.0 1 .2 .2
65.0 1 .2 .2
Don't Know 2 .4 -
Total 544 100.0 100.0
Mean = 1.33
Mode = 0.0
Table 10.5: Total
Variance
Median
Subscriptions made
! = 25.67
= 0.02
by Respondents to Conservation
Organizations in the Previous Twelve Months.
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Reason for Zero 
Subscription
Absolute
Frequency
Relative
Frequency
%
Adjusted
Frequency
%
Nobody Asked 212 39.0 45.4
Don' t know of any 64 11.8 13.4
Too poor 30 5.5 6.6
Government's job 8 1.5 1.7
Not interested 27 5.0 5.8
Don't like C.O. 7 1.3 1.5
Don't like doorknocks 5 .9 1.1
Don't know 109 20.0 23.5
Refusal 1 .2 -
Not asked 81 14.9 -
Total 544 100.0 100.0
Table 10.6: Respondents' Reasons for not having Subscribed
to Conservation Organizations.
Most of the non-subscribing respondents gave reasons which do 
not reflect a zero preference for conservation: "Don't like
Conservation Organizations" and "Don't like Doorknocks" can be 
regarded as evidence of a payment mode bias; "Nobody asked" and 
"Don't know of any" may be seen either as valid reasons for a zero 
subscription, given that the costs involved in gaining more 
information are greater than the perceived benefit to be gained 
by subscribing, or a convenient just ification for free-riding strategic 
behaviour; and the "Don't know" reason may also be an indication 
of free-riding or an honest response.
Given the limitations caused by the possibili t ies of over-stating 
behaviour in the attitude responses, and of under-standing behaviour in 
actual subscriptions, the relationship between attitude and subscription
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can be used to examine the relationship between the specific attitude of 
respondents to the existence benefits of Nadgee, and their willingness to 
pay. The specific attitude distribution,shown in Table 10.7,is similar to 
the attitude to conservation distribution of Table 10.4.
Importance of Nadgee 
Existence
Absolute 
Frequency
Relative
Frequency
%
Adjusted
Frequency
%
1. Very Important 359 66.0 68.0
2. Somewhat Important 113 20.8 21.4
3. A Litt le Important 40 7.4 7.6
4. Not Important at a l1 16 2.9 3.0
Don't Know 8 1.5 -
Refusal 8 1.5 -
Total 544 100.0 100.0
Mean = 1.46 Variance = 0.58
Mode = 1.00 Median = 1.24
Table 10.7: Respondents' Stated Attitudes toward Nadgee's
Existence Benefits.
However, there are major differences between the distribution of 
subscriptions and the comparable distribution of willingness to pay 
bids, which is presented in Table 8.14. There are strong similarit ies 
between the distributions in terms of the fall of positive bids - 
the distributions are both lumpy, with concentrations around the $1,
2, 5, 10 and 20 amounts - but the overall magnitude of the willingness 
to pay bids (mean of $27.08) is greater than the subscriptions (mean 
$1.33). While this difference is largely due to the difference 
in the number of zero bids in each distribution (29.3% in willingness
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to pay and 85.4% in subscriptions), i t  is also caused by a higher 
distribution of positive bids.
Therefore, if  i t  can be assumed that the two attitudinal 
questions are comparable, then i t  would be real ist ic to expect a 
distribution of donations similar to that depicted in Table 9.5, 
to be gained i f  an appeal was launched by a conservation organization 
to raise money to buy the hypothetical reserve depicted by the 
questionnaire. Clearly, the willingness to pay distribution is 
greater in overall magnitude than that which could be expected from 
such an appeal,and i t  can be concluded that the under-statement bias 
evident in the willingness to pay bids,is not as great as that 
evident in an actual payment situation,or that over-stating behaviour 
in the questionnaire responses counteracts the effect of any under­
stating behaviour. However i t  is not possible to infer from the 
comparison of attitudes and actions across the two types of questions, 
specific and general at t i tudes,  and subscriptions, if  over-stating 
strategic behaviour is evident in willingness to pay bids. In 
addition, the use of attitude/action comparisons as a method for 
analysing strategic behaviour is subject to sufficient inaccuracies 
to make i t  of limited used. First ,  the use of a relationship 
between respondents' attitudesto general conservation and their 
subscriptions to predict a likely relationship between attitudes to 
the existence benefits of a specific nature reserve and the distribution 
of donations to preserve the area may not be just ified.  Secondly, 
the attitude and action responses are the result of many different 
causal factors,and to conclude categorically that any divergence from 
the expected behaviour is evidence of strategic bias,is to ignore 
the action of the other factors involved in the determination of
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respondents' actual behaviour.
10.2.5 Coricl usions
Tentative evidence of both over-s ta t ing  and under-stat ing 
s tra teg ic  behaviour has been detected in the analysis of the 
questionnaire responses. The large spread of  wi l l ingness to pay bids 
appears to be ind ica t ive of over-s ta t ing  s tra teg ic  bias. Contradictions 
between the socio-economic, a t t i t u d in a l  and behavioural character is t ics  
of respondents who made bids in excess of $200, and the magnitude 
of  th e i r  stated wil l ingness to pay were observed,and th is  was 
suggested to be ind ica t ive  of  trend toward over-statement amongst high 
bidders. One quarter of respondents who chose the taxation mode did 
so because of a desire to spread the cost of preservation 
equitably across the whole community, ind icating the p o s s ib i l i t y  of 
both over-and under-statement o f  preferences- 115 respondents were 
observed to ind icate a posi t ive a t t i tude  to the existence benefi ts 
o f  Nadgee Nature Reserve,yet were not prepared to pay anything fo r  the 
preservation of the Reserve thus ind icating some tendency to 
under-statement. F ina l ly ,  the implied d is t r ib u t io n  of l i k e l y  
donations to an actual appeal fo r  funds to maintain the existence benefits 
described by the questionnaire, was s ig n i f i c a n t l y  1ower,overal1 ,than 
the d is t r ib u t io n  of stated wil l ingness to pay bids, implying that 
under-stat ingstrateg ic behaviour in the questionnaire is un l ike ly  to be 
as severe as that evident in an actual payment s i tua t ion .  However, there 
is an overal l  lack of precision in these tenta t ive conclusions,primari ly 
because most are based on impl icat ion,  or resul ts which are influenced 
by other factors besides s tra teg ic  behaviour. Where i t  is possible to 
be more de f in i te  in making conclusions, i t  is in the context of  zero
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bids,and such results cannot be used across the whole range of 
posi t ive bids. I t  is therefore c lear,  that to understand f u l l y  the 
implicat ion of s t ra teg ic  b ias , i t  is necessary to be able to analyse, 
in a more rigorous fashion, the dif ferences, i f  any, between actual 
preferences and stated wil l ingness to pay. The problem with the 
analysis so fa r  has been the i n a b i l i t y  to determine actual preferences 
in the questionnaire context,and th is  is overcome in the fol lowing 
section by the use of  the Smith Auction Process, which was introduced 
in Chapter 3.
10.3 THE EXPERIMENT
10.3.1 Introduction
Idea l ly ,  to detect s t ra teg ic  bias in the d i rec t  questioning 
wil l ingness to pay bids of  ind iv iduals answering the main quest ionniare, 
i t  would be necessary to estimate accurate ly ,each respondent's true 
equivalent surplus fo r  the continued provision of  the existence 
benefi ts of Nadgee Nature Reserve. However,to obtain a true valuat ion, 
i t  has been shown in Chapter 3 that a Demand Revealing Process 
must be implemented, but i t  was shown also that even the 
simplest of these mechanisms, the Smith Auction Process, involves a 
substantial  increase in questionnaire complexity (and possib i ly  a 
subsequent f a l l  in context r e a l i t y  and r ise in non-response) , and hence 
questionnaire costs, as well as the need to enforce payment or at 
least  r e a l i s t i c a l l y  threaten to enforce payment. Given a constra int 
on research funding, the u n s u i ta b i l i t y  of  demand reveal ing processes 
in the context of large scale questionnaires, and the i n a b i l i t y  of
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the Survey Research Centre to collect money, the Smith Auction 
Process was not used in the main questionnaire. To overcome the 
problems of cost and questioning difficulty i t  was decided to take 
a sub-sample of the main questionnaire respondents and carry out 
an experiment involving the presentation of two different types of 
valuation questions: the direct willingness to pay question where
no payment is required, as was used in the main questionnaire; and, 
the Smith Auction Process question where payment is required, as this 
mechanism was shown in Chapter 3 to induce respondents to reveal their 
true willingness to pay. This procedure would thus enable a rigorous 
analysis of strategic bias in direct questioning willingness to pay bids.
Clearly, the experiment needed to approximate the conditions 
applying to respondents at the time of the taking of the main 
survey, so that the analysis of strategic bias in the experiment could 
be extrapolated to the questionnaire results.  However, this was 
not entirely possible: different sample sizes were involved; respondents
needed to be concentrated (geographically) for the experiment; 
and, the experiment could not re-use the existence benefits of 
Nadgee as the good for which respondents were bidding because of the 
possibility of a shift in preferences occurring during the time between 
the questionnaire and the experiment. Hence, the survey and experiment 
results cannot be used in conjunction. Therefore the approach taken was 
to use a setting similar to that used by Bohni, as described in Chapter 
3: a sub-sample of respondents were paid to attend the experiment
and asked to value their viewing of two nature-oriented films, using 
the direct questioning no payment approach, followed by the Smith 
Auction Process payment required method. It should be noted that the
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incentive fo r  the respondent to behave s t ra teg ica l ly  is  greater in 
the context of the experiment than in the questionnaire ,pr imar i ly  
because of  the numbers of  respondents involved in each case: in
the small numbers experiment»each respondent is aware that his bid 
does have an e f fec t  on the decision outcome, thus lessening the extent 
of expected hypothetical '  bias»but increasing the extent of expected 
stra teg ic  bias whereas in the large numbers questionnaire, the e f fec t  
of each respondents' bid on the outcome is not obvious and hypothetical 
b ias ,  not s t ra teg ic  bias,would be expected to dominate.^
The use of the resul ts  of  the study of s t ra teg ic  bias in the 
experiment as an ind ica tor  of the expected occurrence of s tra teg ic  
bias in the questionnaire wi l l ingness to pay bids,can be expected 
therefore ,to provide an exagerated analysis,but  in a conservative 
d i rec t ion .  The extent of any over-statement in the experiment can 
be expected to be greater than that present in the questionnaire, and 
so any downward adjustments made to questionnaire wi l l ingness to pay 
bids,on the basis of the extent of over-stat ing s tra teg ic  bias 
observed in the questionnaire ,would be greater than necessary. However, 
i t  should also be recognized that the experiment results can only be 
used as broad indications of behaviour trends,and not as precise 
weighting instruments fo r  the correct ion of biased wil l ingness to 
pay bids.
4 The argument that small numbers overcomes under-stat inq strategic  
bias because of peer-group in te rac t ion ,  is not va l id  in the 
experiment context because ind iv iduals '  bids were not disclosed 
to other respondents in the sub-sample.
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10.3.2 The Experiment Sample
The f ina l  question in the main questionnaire involved the 
introduction of  the experiment as a "fo l low-up study", in which 
respondents would attend the Universi ty  fo r  two hours one evening, 
and i t  asked i f  the respondents would be interested in pa r t ic ipa t ing  for  
a payment of $10. I f  an in te res t  was expressed,the respondent was 
given a form, presented in Appendix V I I I ,  which provided some deta i ls  
of the experiment,and required the respondent's name and address to 
be completed, and a stamped-addressed envelope in which to return 
the form. Immediately, i t  is clear that the sample o f  respondents 
fo r  the experiment was not chosen at random - only those respondents 
interested in the issues involved in the questionnaire, and/or those fo r  
whom a $10 payment was s u f f ic ie n t  inducement,would have been prepared to 
attend the experiment. The response to the request for  part ic ipants  was 
re la t i v e ly  strong: approximately 10% of the 544 questionnaire
respondents (54) returned th e i r  names and addresses. Of these 
respondents, 11 were excluded because they had given "non-response" 
answers to the wil l ingness to pay question - only respondents with 
va l id  wi l l ingness to pay bids were considered so that a comparison 
between experiment behaviour and the magnitude of wi l l ingness to pay 
bids could be accomplished. The 11 rejected respondents were sent a 
l e t t e r  informing them of  th e i r  exclusion from the experiment on the 
5th of November 1979. On the same day, the 43 remaining respondents 
were sent a l e t t e r  specifying the date and time of  the experiment, 
and asking them to confirm th e i r  wi l l ingness to part ic ipa te in the 
experiment by returning another form with th e i r  name and address.
Both of these le t te rs  are contained in Appendix V I I I .  Four respondents
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chose to re ject  the experiment inv i ta t ion ,and from the remaining 
39, 30 respondents were chosen randomly to par t ic ipa te  in the 
experiment. The nine rejected respondents were informed by le t t e r  
on the 21st of November and th is  l e t t e r  is also included in 
Appendix V I I I .  A l l  remaining respondents who had volunteered telephone 
numbers were given reminder ca l ls  on Tuesday, November the 27th, 
and on Wednesday the 28th at 7.30 p.m. the designated time of the 
experiment, 27 respondents were in attendance.
Appendix IX contains a detai led analysis o f  the representativeness 
of the 27 experiment respondents and a summary of  th is  analysis is 
presented in Table 10.8.
Respondent 
Characterist ic x2
Degrees of  
Freedom
X2
Significance
Uncertainty
Coeff ic ient
Age Group 5.30 2 .07 .02
Sex 0.10 1 .75 .00
Li fe  Cycle Stage 4.26 5 .51 .02
Marital Status 0.52 2 .77 .00
Place of Bir th 1.68 1 .19 .01
Graduate Status 25.2 1 .00 .10
Occupation Group 13.5 3 .00 .06
Household Income Group 1.8 4 .77 .01
Table 10.8: Differences in Socio-Economic Characterist ics Between
Experiment Part icipants and Non-Participants.
The socio-economic variables which create s ign i f ica n t  
d i f ferences,a t the 5% le v e l , in  the proportion of respondents 
pa r t ic ipa t ing  in the experiment across th e i r  sub-groups,are graduate 
status and occupation group: whereas in the overal l  sample, 22% of
the to ta l  544 questionnaire respondents were top wh i te -co l la r  workers,
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over 44% of experiment respondents held high status jobs. In 
addi t ion, the age variable has a x2 s t a t i s t i c  which is s ign i f ica n t  
at the 10% leve l ,w i th  a heavier than overal l  concentration of 
experiment respondents in the 30-40 age group. There are clear socio­
economic dif ferences between the respondents who were selected for 
the experiment and those who did not p a r t i c ip a te ,and th is  conclusion 
is to be expected given the biased nature of the selection procedure.
The dif ferences in the experiment sample make the use of results 
from the experiment to estimate the extent of s tra teg ic  bias in the 
questionnaire wi l l ingness to pay bids,subject to some inaccuracy, 
and considerable care must be exercised in the drawing of any 
conclusions concerning the overal l  sample.
10.3.3 The Experiment
The complete tex t  of the experiment dialogue is contained in 
Appendix X, and th is  sub-section describes the re la t ionship between th is  
tex t  and the underlying purpose of the experiment process. On 
a r r i v a l ,  respondents were paid $15, issued with th e i r  own fo lder 
o f  stat ionary and asked to take a seat anywhere in a large room where
g
30 tables and chairs had been set out. A f te r  an i n i t i a l  
welcome, respondents were to ld that the $15 payment was in the form 
of  a wage fo r  attending the experiment. A descript ion was then given
5 The $5 o r ig in a l l y  intended as a budget to be used by respondents 
sp e c i f i c a l l y  for  bidding was incorporated with the $10 attendance 
"salary" to ensure that the choice facing respondents was not 
u n re a l is t ic a l l y  bounded.
6 Respondents' companions were asked to take seats at the rear of 
the room.
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of the purpose of the questionnaire and the experiment. In an 
attempt to approximate the situation described by the questionnaire, 
a full description of the two nature films available for viewing 
was given (as the existence benefits were described), making sure 
that the respondents understood that the alternative to seeing the 
films (maintaining the existence benefits) was doing nothing except 
talking with the other respondents (losing the existence benefits). '7 
As in the questionnaire, the type of question asked of the experiment 
respondents was direct willingness to pay with no payment required. 
However the use which was to be made of the willingness to pay bids 
given by the experiment respondents was made quite specific - 'by 
adding up all your individual bids we will be able to tel l  whether 
the total amount you are prepared to pay, as a group, would cover 
the costs of showing the films, i f  we were actually to collect the 
money' - the strategic bias opportunity thus being enhanced considerably 
Before bidding, respondents were assured that their bids were 
anonymous, again in an attempt to replicate the questionnaire scenario. 
The anonymity of bids was demonstrated to respondents by the 
use of an "unmarked" piece of computer paper for the recording of their 
bids,the enforcement of a rule of silence during bidding, a request 
for respondents to fold their completed bid paper in half once completed 
and finally,bids were collected using a random pattern of movement 
amongst respondents who deposited their folded papers into a waste- 
paper bin. After asking for questions and none were put forward, the
7 Of course, no payment was required i f  the films were not shown 
thus enabling respondents to spend the full $15 on goods other 
than the films.
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importance of revealing their values,rather than their perceived 
cost share,was stressed for respondents.
Once collected, the bids were entered on a master sheet of 
respondents names, each respondent's bid being recognized by the 
use of a code number secreted on the printed side of each sheet of 
"unmarked" computer paper. Respondents were then informed that the 
costs of showing the films were covered by their total bid, regardless 
of the actual,and unknown»costs. However, to proceed with the second 
stage of the experiment, the films were not shown. Rather, respondents 
were told that the films would be shown only i f  the total of all bids, 
when actual payment was required, exceeded the "costs of provision".
The "cost of provision" was set at the total of all bids from the 
f i r s t  process when payment was not required - this is the essence of 
the second round of bids: respondents were"tested" to see i f  they
were prepared to pay the amount they said they would be willing to pay 
when no payment was required. Because payment was required in the 
second procedure, respondents were asked to write their bids on 
clearly marked pieces of paper - respondents' names were written 
at the top of each page - but the confidentiality of bids was 
stressed to enable the respondent to feel free to behave strategically 
without his fellow bidders knowing.
The Smith Auction Process iterative sequence of bidding was 
then explained - ' i f  the total bid does not cover the costs we are 
prepared to give you another chance to cover your costs,by allowing 
you to change your b id s ' . Respondents were told that there were 
three possible ways in which the "auction" could be terminated: 
f i r s t ,  if  the total group bid exceeded the total cost; secondly, if  
three consecutive iterations of the process yielded equal total bids
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which were less than the to ta l  cost; and f i n a l l y ,  i f  ten i te ra t ions  
werecarried out without group agreement. The behavioural a l te rnatives 
which were avai lable to respondents were also detai led - ' i f  you 
bid zero, you w i l l  be quite free to take a l l  the $15 home . . .  (but) . . .  
i f  you do bid zero, and everyone else does too, you won't see the 
f i lm s ' -  thus ensuring that the option to behave s t ra teg ica l ly  was 
made quite clear to a l l  respondents. I t  was planned that once the 
stopping rule was achieved, the respondents would be to ld  that no 
charge would be made fo r  viewing the f i lms,and they were free to 
leave at any stage.
Once the experiment was underway, i t  became clear that the process 
of calcu la t ing the to ta l  bid was taking some time, and that respondents
g
were becoming rest less.  At the end of the second i te ra t io n  one
respondent stood up, explained that he was very t i re d  and hadn't
expected to be "playing games a l l  n igh t " ,  and walked out. Fortunately,
no other respondents followed,and i t  was not un t i l  the sixth
9i te ra t ion  than another respondent threatened to leave. I t  was then 
concluded that the i te ra t ions  should cease,and respondents were to ld
8 Unfortunately many respondents, by coincidence, knew, each other, 
and began conversations centring on the experiment between 
rounds - the ef fects  of these interact ions between respondents 
cannot be determined.
9 Both respondents who l e f t ,  had provided s u f f ic ie n t  information 
before leaving to al low th e i r  continued inclusion in the analysis 
of resul ts .
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that the seventh interation would be the last. The iterations had 
continued because the total bid from each round had not exceeded 
the original total bid from the no-payment process. However this 
was primarily the result of the method used to calculate the total 
bid. I t  became evident in early rounds that under-stating strategic 
behaviour was present in the in i t ia l  no-payment bids, in addition to 
the expected over-stating behaviour. Hence, during the payment required 
iterations, the under-staters bid in excess of the ir in i t ia l  bids, 
thus compensating for the over-staters' lower bids. Therefore, to 
make sure that the over-staters were forced to reveal the ir true 
preferences by the prospect of exclusion in Smiths Auction Process, 
only the no-payment bids of the under-staters were included in the 
calculation of the adjusted total bid which was used as the basis 
for the calculation of the de f ic it  reported to the respondents.^
Following the showing of the films, respondents were provided 
with refreshments and given a brie f explanation of the purpose of 
the experiment. In addition, a short report of the results gained 
from the experiment was prepared and circulated by post to a ll 
respondents. The refreshment interval in the experiment was used 
to approach several respondents who had provided unusual responses,to 
establish the causes behind the ir behaviour,and this task was pursued 
in the days following the experiment when several personal interviews 
were carried out, largely on an informal basis.
10 As Table 10.9 indicates, total actual bids exceeded the "cost 
of provision" - the no-payment to ta l bid - in the 5th 
iteration.
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10.3.4 The Results
10.3.4.1 Bids and Beiiaviour Types
A full set of the respondents' bids is provided in Table 10.9 
and the same information is presented graphically in Figure 10.1.
Two points concerning the general nature of the bids must be made 
ini t ial ly.  First,  Respondents 8 and 18 left  the experiment 
before i ts conclusion ,and i t  has been assumed that the last  bid 
made before departing was the maximum amount that these respondents 
would have been willing to pay if  they had remained. Secondly, 
an observation of the distribution of ini t ial  bids seems to indicate 
that the $15 wage paid to respondents had some influence over the 
magnitude of bids made by a number of the respondents. This may 
indicate that respondents biased their willingness to pay for the 
films according to their  estimation of the cost of the film 
showing - the wage payment being regarded as a significant portion of 
the costs - despite the request for respondents not to try to 
estimate the cost of the evening,but to concentrate on their own 
valuation.^ The problem of respondents endeavouring to estimate 
the cost of provision of the good - the film evening - is not 
considered to be a vital failure of the experiment because the same 
problem is evident in the main questionnaire willingness to pay 
estimates, although i t  is probably more diff icult  for respondents in
11 Another possible explanation of the relatively large number of 
bids around $15 is that respondents regarded the payment of a 
wage for attendance as a windfall gain which was not as valuable 
of any other $15 they had earned. It is ,however»extremely 
difficult  to substantiate this hypothesis.
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Respondent
Number
WTP $, 
No
Payment
WTP $ ,Payment Required: Iterat ion Number
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 20 0 0 0 5 5 10 10
3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
4 15 15 15 . 15 15 15 15 15
5 20 20 25 28 30 30 30 35
6 3 3 3 5 5 6 8 8
7 6 5 7 7 10 10 10 10
8 5 15 20 20 20 20 20 20
9 21 5 9 15 15 20 20 22
10 10 10 15 15 15 15 15 15
11 20 10 14 14 14 14 14 14
12 5 5 8 9 10 11 12 15
13 10 10 10 15 15 15 10 15
14 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
15 20 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
16 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
17 13 13 15 18 20 20 20 23
18 20 1 1 1 1 10 10 10
19 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4
20 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 7
21 20 2 5 5 5 6 6 7
22 20 8 12 15 17 19 20 20
23 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
24 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
25 15 15 15 16 17 18 18 20
26 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10
27 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 10
Total 299 208 245 269 285 305 311 343
Actual Difference -91 -54 -30 -14 + 6 +12 +43
Adjusted Difference -101 -85 -76 -69 -52 -46 -43
Table 10.9: Respondents1 Bids.
384
$ a
$  A
385
I
$  A
386
Key :
I : Iteration Number
$ Willingness To Pay
-------- : No Payment Bid
» ■ : Payment Required Bid
Sequence
Figure 10.1: Respondents' Bids.
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the questionnaire situation to calculate accurately, their cost 
share of preserving Nadgee's existence benefits. In addition, the cost
estimation problem is consistent for a ll respondents,and both 
the with and without payment questions stressed the need to cover 
costs before provision would be carried out. I t  can be concluded 
therefore,that the problem of bias resulting from respondents bidding 
according to the ir perceived cost share is not severe.
Using the final bidsmade by the respondents in the iterative 
sequence of payment-required willingness to pay process as an 
accurate revelation of true valuation, i t  is possible to define 
three behaviour types: over-statement, whereby respondents
exaggerate the ir valuation in the willingness to pay, no-payment 
question; under-statement, whereby respondents' bids,under.the no­
payment regime, are less than the amount they are prepared to pay 
when payment is enforced; and truth-statement, whereby respondents 
accurately reveal their valuation in the no-payment scenario. Table 
10.10 sets out a c lassification of respondents according to their 
revealed behaviour pattern.
Behaviour Type: Respondent Number: Absolute
Frequency
Relative 
Frequency %
Over-stater 2,18,21 3 11.1
Under-stater 5,6,7,8,10,12,13,17,25 9 33.3
Truth-stater 1,3,4,9,11 ,14,15,16,19, 
20,22,23,24,26,27 15 55.6
Total 27 100.0
Table 10.10: Respondents' Behaviour Types .
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A number of respondents and their classifications require 
explanation. The truncation of the experiment at iteration number 
seven»together with a final warning about exclusion occurring if 
bids did not sum to exceed "costs" being given to respondents prior 
to the last  iteration»seems to have led to a "panic" response from 
Respondents 19, 20 and 26, who were otherwise truthful staters of 
their preferences. These respondents, in the final iteration of the 
payment-required process,bid in excess of their no-payment willingness 
to pay valuation. Such minor deviations from truthful revelation can 
not be regarded as conclusive evidence of under-stating behaviour, 
and respondents 19, 20,and 26 were categorized as truth-staters.
Respondents 11 and 15, on init ial  examination, both appear 
to be over-staters»however their behaviour is not typical, with a 
far greater consistency in bids across the seven iterations than 
would be expected. Subsequent to the experiment, these respondents 
were approached,and i t  was revealed that both had no cash on 
hand at the time of the experiment other than the $15 which was paid to 
them on their arrival.  Respondent 11 could not even bid the full 
$15 because of the need to buy a fare to get home. This evidence, 
together with assurances from the respondents that both would have 
actually paid what they had ini t ia l ly offered, i f  the money had been 
available, led to their classification as truth-staters.
Respondents 25 and 27 exhibited behaviour which is not entirely 
consistent with other under-staters: the init ial  no-payment bid
wasmaintained in the payment-required bids for the f i r s t  few iterations, 
and then gradually, and relatively slowly, the bids rose. It  appears 
that these two respondents were being induced to increase their payment- 
required bid over subsequent iterations because of boredom with the
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iterative process: not only were these respondents valuing the
viewing of the film in their bids, but they werealso including a valuation
of the termination of the bidding process i tse lf .  Despite this
evidence which suggests that they are tru th-s ta ters , Respondents 
25 and 27 were classified as under-staters because other under­
staters may also have increased their subsequent bids above their no­
payment bid because of boredom, but in a less noticeable way. Hence, to
exclude Respondents 25 and 27 from the under-staters category without
more substantive evidence, would be a misrepresentation. Rather, the 
under-staters category must be interpreted in the light of the 
possibility that exaggerated payment-required bids were the (partial) 
result of a boredom factor.
A further point of interest on the classification of truth- 
staters is that there are actually two categories of respondents 
who bid,when payment was required, the same amount as when payment 
was not required: respondents who in i t ia l ly  under-stated when payment
was required, but subsequently increased their bids as the threat 
of exclusion became more pressing; and, respondents who maintained 
the same bid throughout all stages of the experiment. The init ial 
under-staters were Respondents 9, 11 and 22, while the constant bidders 
were Respondents 1, 3, 4, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26 and 27.
The overall resultant classification of respondents, displayed 
in Table 10.10, reveals that over 50% of experiment respondents were 
t ru th-s ta ters , one third were under-staters and only 11% were over­
staters. Given the "boredom effect" which may account for some of 
the under-stating behaviour, an even larger proportion of the experiment 
respondents can be regarded as individuals who correctly revealed 
their preferences when asked to value the viewing of the two nature films 
through a direct willingness to pay, no-payment-required type question.
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10.3.4.2 Relationships between Respondents' Behaviour 
Types and their Charaeteristies
The next stage of the analysis aims is aimed at examining the 
socio-economic, atti tudinal,  and preference characteristies of the 
respondents in each behaviour category,in an attempt to determine if  any 
relationships exist between these characteristics and the respondent's 
behaviour type. Because of the small sample size involved in the 
experiment, i t  is not possible to make conclusive statis t ical  
judgements on the relationships between behaviour type and respondent 
characteristics, particularly because i t  is not advisable to 
calculate x2 s ta t is t ics  for tables in which any cell has less than 
five elements. Therefore,only non-statistical observations will be 
made on the crosstabulations of behaviour type against characteristics 
which are included in Appendix XI. The trends evident in the 
crosstabulations are:
(i) Age: The over-staters in the experiment were all aged
more than 30 years,and 40% of truth-staters in the experiment were 
younger than 30 years,whereas only 30% of all experiment respondents 
were aged under 30.
(i i )  Sex: All experiment over-staters were males,and 55%
of under-staters in the experiment were females,whereas the overall 
percentage of females in the experiment was only 44%.
( i i i )  Marital Status: All experiment over-staters were married,
and 33% of truth-staters were not married,whereas the overall
12percentage of non-married respondents in the experiment was 26%.
12 The trends evident between marital status and behaviour,could 
be a reflection of the relationships evident between age and 
behaviour.
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( i v ) Life Cycle Stage: No trends are evident.
(v) Place of Birth: No trends are evident.
(vi) Graduate Status: No trends are evident.
( v i i )  Occupation: All experiment over-staters were white-collar
workers,and 33% of under-staters were blue-collar workers,whereas 
the overall percentage of blue-collar workers in the experiment was 
only 22%.
( v i i i )  Income: Only very weak trends can be observed.
( ix ) Subscription to Conservation Organizations: All experiment
over-staters had subscribed to a conservation organization in the 
12 months prior to the survey,and 73% of truth-staters had not 
subscribed,whereas 63% of the overall experiment sample had not 
subscribed.
(x) Payment Mode Choice: All experiment over-staters chose
the donation to a conservation organization as the ir favoured payment 
mode,and 43% of experiment truth-staters chose the government 
taxation mode whereas overall, in the experiment sample, only 32% chose 
the tax mode.
(x i ) Willingness to Pay for Nadgee's Existence Benefits: All
experiment over-staters bid less than $10 in the direct no-payment- 
required question of the fu l l  survey,and 53% of experiment truth- 
staters bid more than $10,whereas the overall percentage of high 
bidding respondents in the experiment was only 44%.
Some interesting conclusions can be drawn from these results, 
but i t  must be recognized that the small number of respondents taking 
part in the experiment,and particularly the small number of over­
staters detected in the experiment, l im it  considerably the wider 
application of these conclusions. Besides the socio-economic
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classification of respondents' behaviour,which suggests that 
over-staters are typified by a male,over 30 years of age who 
is married and has a white-collar job, under-staters are typified 
by a woman with a blue-collar job,and truth-staters can be 
represented by an unmarried person who is less than 30 years old, 
the most interesting trend evident is that all over-staters detected 
by the experiment had made a contribution to a conservation 
organization in the 12 months prior to the survey. An examination 
of the pattern of bids exhibited by the over-staters in the i terative,  
payment-required sequence of the experiment indicates that all 
over-staters ini t ia l ly attempted to "free-ride",by bidding amounts 
less than their eventually revealed valuations,on the f i r s t  few 
iterations. This would suggest that in an actual donation 
situation ,they would free-ride, possibly to the extent of not donating 
at al l .  Clearly, extreme free-riding behaviour was not exhibited by 
the experiment over-staters in a real situation, however, the small 
size of these respondents' actual donations - $2, 5 and 3 - may be an 
indication that these respondents did not fully reveal their 
preferences in their donations. If the over-staters did not free- 
ride in their donations, then the validity of the experiment is 
cast into some doubt: this conclusion is supported somewhat by the
observation that a larger than average percentage of truth-staters
13in the experiment had not subscribed to conservation organizations.
13 A zero contribution is not necessarily the result of free- 
riding>but could be caused by a low valuation of the benefits 
of subscribing relative to the costs of making a subscription.
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A second point of interest in the relationshipsbetween 
respondents' characteristics and their behaviour type,is the 
predominance of low willingness to pay bids for Nadgee's existence 
benefits provided by the respondents in the experiment who were 
classified as over-staters. It would be expected that over-staters 
would grossly exaggerate their willingness to pay bids when payment 
is not required,given that the respondents had positive preferences 
for the existence benefits. Of course i t  is possible that the 
over-staters' existence benefits bids of $10, 10 and 10,are regarded 
by these respondents as over-statements of actual preferences. 
Interestingly, the truth-staters in the experiment were more heavily 
concentrated than average in the greater than $10 bid category: 
this may be a real indication that high bidders are genuine in 
their  preference revelation.
Finally, the facts that all experiment over-staters chose the 
donation to a conservation organization payment mode,and that a 
greater than average percentage of experiment truth-staters chose 
the taxation mode, tends to refute the hypothesis, advanced in 
Chapter 8, Section 8.5 and again in Section 10.2.3 of this chapter, 
that respondents who chose the government taxation mode were more 
likely to act strategically than those who chose the donation option. 
However, as with all the other conclusions based on the evidence 
from the crosstabulations in Appendix X, the validity of the 
relationship between behaviour type in the experiment and payment mode 
choice is subject to some doubt.
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10.3.5 Conclusions
Before any conclusions can be drawn from the results of the 
experiment, i t  is important to take full account of the limitations 
of the experiment analysis. First ,  use of the experiment results 
to adjust the willingness to pay distribution obtained from the 
main questionnaire,can be made only i f  i t  is assumed that the situation 
created in the experiment is comparable to the questionnaire scenario, 
or i f  the differences in incentive between the questionnaire and the 
experiment are recognized and accounted for. Because of this f i r s t  
limitation, i t  has been recommended in this chapter, that precise 
adjustments to the questionnaire willingness to pay distribution, 
made on the basis of the experiment results,are not advisable, but 
that general trends in the experiment results can be observed and 
used to comment on the accuracy of the questionnaire willingness to 
pay distribution as an estimate of the equivalent surplus distribution 
for the existence benefits of Nadgee Nature Reserve.
Secondly, the non-random method used to select the experiment 
respondents»created a sample which was not representative of the main 
questionnaire sample, particularly in terms of respondents' education 
and occupation status. Therefore, i t  is not advisable to use the 
results of the experiment for the purpose of commenting on the accuracy 
of the questionnaire willingness to pay distribution»without taking 
the biased nature of the experiment sample into full account.
Finally, the analysis of trends between the experiment 
respondents' characteristics and the type of behaviour they exhibit 
in their no-payment-required willingness to pay responses,is limited
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because of the small numbers involved. The trend analysis relies 
on crosstabulations which have less than five elements in some 
categories on all occasions (because only three "over-staters" were 
detected). As a result , x2 s ta t is t ics  could not be considered 
reliable, thus rendering any s ta tis t ical  analysis impractical.
Bearing in mind these three limitations - the comparability 
of the experiment and questionnaire scenario, the unrepresentative 
experiment sample,and the non-statistical nature of the trend analysis - 
the relevance of the experiment results to the conclusions made in 
Chapters 8 and 9 can be assessed. The f i r s t  question which must be 
addressed is the importance of strategic bias in the direct questioning 
willingness to pay bids. The experiment suggests that any over­
statement which is present, is more than compensated for by the 
presence of under-statement, but that the majority of respondents 
state their preferences truthfully when asked directly. This 
suggestion must be considered in the light of the bias present in the 
experiment sample: i t  was found that the sample was biased most
noticeably toward higher education and occupation status respondents,
and that all the experiment over-staters were white-collar workers,
14while blue-collar workers were more likely to be under-staters.
The implication of the sample bias therefore, is to over-emphasise 
the importance of over-statement,and to under-emphasise the 
importance of under-statement. Thus the willingness to pay 
distribution for the existence benefits of Nadgee Nature Reserve 
derived by the main survey can be regarded as a conservative estimate 
of the distribution of true valuations.
14 No trends were evident across educational status.
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The conservative nature of the existence benefit estimation 
is further established by the fact that the incentive to over­
state in the experiment is greater than in the questionnaire.
However, i t  should be recognized that both of these conservative 
adjustments may be lessened to some extent by the boredom factor, 
which was detected,but not estimated empirically, in the experiment: 
respondents may have appeared to under-state in i t ia l l y ,  only because 
the iterative Smith Process forced respondents to bid,not only for 
the film  showing,but also for the release from the boredom of 
participating in the experiment, thus increasing the ir bids beyond 
the ir valuation of the films.
Finally, although the crosstabulation analysis of respondents' 
characteristics and their behaviour types is limited by the small 
sample involved, i t  appears that the hypothesized trend toward over­
staters and under-staters choosing the taxation payment mode,considered 
in Section 8.5 and again in Section 10.2.3, is not substantiated 
by the experiment results. Furthermore,the hypothesis that over­
staters would bid very high amounts in the questionnaire willingness 
to pay s ituation,is  not supported by the experiment results 
although i t  cannot be determined i f  the bids given by the over­
staters are large»relative exaggerations of the ir true preferences.
The overall conclusion which can be drawn from the 
experiment is that strategic bias, in the form of over-stating true 
preferences in a direct questioning no-payment-required scenario, 
is of minor importance and is outweighed by under-stating behaviour: 
this conclusion is supported by the experiments conducted by Smith and 
reviewed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Of course, i t  can be argued 
that this conclusion could not be made i f  the same experiment and
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questionnaire were conducted using individuals who were experienced 
respondents. It is interesting to note however, that one of the over­
staters detected in the experiment was an economist who was well 
aware of the opportunities for strategic behaviour in no-payment 
valuation questions,yet bid only $10 in the main questionnaire, 
and chose the conservation organization as his preferred payment 
mode, giving his reason for selecting this mode as ' i t  enables a 
more accurate reflection of the community's preferences' .
10.4' SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has considered the presence of strategic bias 
in no-payment-required direct questioning of individuals' valuations 
using two sources of information - the questionnaire responses ,and 
the results of an experiment involving a sub-sample of questionnaire 
respondents - in order to test  the validity of the assumption made 
in Chapter 8 and 9 that no strategic bias is evident in the 
distribution of willingness to pay bids for the existence benefits 
of Nadgee Nature Reserve.
Section 10.2 used the information gathered by the questionnaire 
to assess the presence of strategic bias. Sub-Section 10.2.1 
concluded that the wide distribution of willingness to pay bids, 
provided by individuals in response to the direct questioning mathod 
of valuing the existence benefits of Nadgee Nature Reserve in the 
main questionnaire, supported the Brookshire e t  al .  hypothesis that 
a large variance indicates strategic bias»despite the fact that no 
mention was made of any payment. However, i t  was noted that the 
spread test  is not rigorous,in that a valid high bid cannot be
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distinguished from a bid which incorporates a component of 
strategic bias. The relatively high bidding respondents were 
examined in Sub-Section 10.2.2 for evidence of discrepancies 
between the magnitude of their bids and their socio-economic, 
preference,and attitudinal characteristics. It was found that 
contradictions between income, age, attitudes to conservation, 
preference for reading nature books, use of parks and the size of bids 
were evident,but although these findings provide prima-faoie evidence 
of over-stating strategic behaviour, i t  was noted that individuals' 
bids need not reflect the overall (weak) trends of the sample,and so 
the high bids may be true valuations.
Sub-Section 10.2.3 considered the differences in behaviour 
observed in the questionnaire across the two payment mode groups.
Both under-statement and over-statement of bids were suspected 
from those respondents who gave the "equality of payment across the 
community" reason for choosing the government taxation mode, 
while truth-stating was suspected from those respondents who gave 
the "reflection of the community's preferences" reason for choosing 
the conservation organization donated mode. However i t  was found 
that these hypotheses could not be tested with sufficient rigour 
to enable complete acceptance or rejection.
The final analysis of strategic bias using data from the 
questionnaire involved a comparison of respondents' stated 
attitudes toward conservation and their actual donations to 
conservation organizations, in an attempt to predict the likely 
distribution of donations i f  the existence benefits described by the
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questionnaire were the subject of a fund-raising campaign. It was 
found that the distribution of attitudes to conservation and 
attitudes to the existence benefits of Nadgee were similar. It 
was assumed, therefore, that i f  the preservation proposal detailed 
in the questionnaire was the subject of a fund-raising campaign, 
the distribution of donations would be similar to the distribution 
of donations actually made by respondents over the 12 months prior 
to the questionnaire. However, a comparison of the predicted 
dist r ibut ion,and the distribution of willingness to pay bids,showed 
a large divergence - actual donations were considerably smaller than 
willingness to pay bids. While this result seems to indicate that 
any under-stating behaviour in the questionnaire is not as severe 
as that evident in an actual donation situation, or that over-stating 
behaviour by other respondents overwhelms i ts effects,  there are 
several caveats limiting the rel iabi l i ty of this conclusion. First,  
the rel iabi l i ty of the attitudinal questions is questionable
15because of the possibility of over-stating strategic behaviour.
Secondly, the comparison of general conservation attitudes with 
specific existence benefit attitudes may not be appropriate.
Finally, over-stating strategic behaviour cannot be assessed using 
the comparison technique.
A more useful indication of the presence of strategic 
under-stating behaviour was found to be a comparison of the respondents' 
stated attitudes to the existence benefits of Nadgee and their 
preparedness to pay for the area's preservation. The 115 respondents
15 The limitation imposed by this caveat may not be severe, as
both the specific and general attitudinal questions are subject 
to the same strategic behaviour incentives.
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who had indicated a positive preference for the existence benefits, 
and then refused to pay for their continued provision,were concluded 
to be engaged in under-stating strategic behaviour.
The lack of sufficient rigour in the analyses of strategic 
behaviour involving the analysis of questionnaire responses, which was 
primarily due to the inability of the questionnaire to determine 
true valuations, led to the analysis of strategic bias through the 
use of an experiment, designed to compare no-payment-required 
willingness to pay bids with true valuations, determined using the 
Smith Auction Process adapted for an indivisible good.
However, the results of the experiment were subject to 
some important limitations: f i r s t ,  the need to assume that the
experiment scenario was comparable to the situation confronted by 
respondents in the questionnaire; secondly, the sub-sample 
used in the experiment was not randomly selected and consequently 
exhibited significant differences from the overall questionnaire 
sample; and finally,  the small numbers involved in the sub-sample 
created problems in the stat ist ical  analysis of trends evident 
between experiment respondents' behaviour and their socio-economic 
and preference characteristics. By classifying respondents' 
behaviour types on the basis of the relative magnitude of their 
no-payment bid and their Smith Auction final bid, i t  was observed 
that over-statement was only a small problerruand was more than 
compensated by the presence of under-stating strategic behaviour.
The consideration of this result ,  in the light of the three limitations 
to the analysis, revealed that the distribution of willingness to 
pay bids for the existence benefits of Nadgee was a conservative 
estimation of the true distribution of equivalent surpluses.
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Finally, non-statistical observations of trends evident 
between respondent's characteristics and their  behaviour patterns, 
revealed that the earl ier conclusions regarding the presence of 
strategic bias drawn from the analyses of the overall magnitude 
of bids and payment mode choice, which used the questionnaire 
data, were not substantiated. In addition, i t  was possible to 
observe that over-staters were typified by a male over 30 years of 
age,who is married with a white-collar job; that the typical under­
stater was a woman with a blue-collar job;and,that truth-staters 
could be represented by an unmarried person who is less than 30 
years old. However, these trends must be treated with some scepticism 
because of the small numbers of respondents in the experiment 
sub-sample. This is also true for the observation that all the 
over-staters had contributed to conservation organizations in the 
12 months prior to the questionnaire, a result which appears to 
contradict the experiment's findings. However, i t  was noted that 
the over-staters ' donations were relatively small,and may have 
been misrepresentations of their true preferences.
Overall, i t  can be concluded,on the evidence of both the 
questionnaire analysis and the experiment results, that  strategic 
bias is likely to be present in the willingness to pay distribution 
derived from the questionnaire data. However, i t  has been shown 
that both over-stating and under-stating behaviour were evident 
in no-payment-required direct question responses,but that i t  was 
likely that any over-statement was compensated for by other 
respondents under-stating their preferences. The distribution of 
willingness to pay bids detailed in Chapter 8 can be regarded
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therefore, as a conservative estimation of the distribution of 
equivalent surpluses, gained by the respondents' involved in the 
survey of Canberra residents, from the continued provision of the 
existence benefits supplied by Nadgee Nature Reserve.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS : PART I I
Part  I o f  t h i s  thes is  concluded t h a t  the asse r t ion  o f  
ex is tence  values was a most press ing problem to be faced by the 
b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s t  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  any proposal in v o lv i n g  preserved 
n a tu ra l  ecosystems. Hence, i t  has been the aim o f  Part  I I  to  apply 
the re le v a n t  t h e o ry ,  es tab l ished  in  Part  I ,  to  the measurement o f  
the ex is tence  b e n e f i t s  held by a p a r t i c u l a r  group o f  people,  Canberra 
r e s id e n t s ,  f o r  a s p e c i f i c  na tu ra l  area,  Nadgee Nature Reserve. In 
accordance w i th  the theory  o f  measurement, the va lu a t io n  process was 
undertaken in  two stages: f i r s t ,  d i r e c t  ques t ion ing  was used to
es t im ate  i n d i v i d u a l  respondent 's w i l l i n g n e s s  to pay f o r  the s p e c i f i e d  
ex is tence  b e n e f i t s ;  and secondly,  a Smith Auct ion Process was used 
on a sub-sample o f  respondents to e s ta b l i s h  the r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  these 
bids  as measures o f  ac tual  pre fe rences.  W ith in  these two stages, 
two issues were considered:  f i r s t ,  is  the measurement technique
success fu l ;  and secondly,  what is  the magnitude o f  the Canberra res iden ts  
v a lu a t io n  o f  the ex is tence b e n e f i t s  o f  Nadgee? C le a r l y ,  w i th o u t  an 
a f f i r m a t i v e  response to the f i r s t  q u e s t i o n , i t  would have been impossible 
to  address,  r e a l i s t i c a l l y ,  the second issue.
Chapter 5 d e ta i le d  the b e n e f i t  which was measured - the 
ex is tence  value o f  Nadgee - and to  place these b e n e f i t s  in con tex t ,  
and to  e s t a b l i s h  a basis f o r  the separa t ion  o f  ex is tence  b e n e f i t s  
from the o th e r  b e n e f i t s  provided by Nadgee requ i red  by the aims o f  
the s tudy ,  these o the r  b e n e f i t s  were also  descr ibed.
( i )  Nadgee was se lec ted f o r  the case study because i t  o f fe red
a r e a l i s t i c  base on which to b u i l d  the " h y p o th e t i c a l "  area,used to
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isolate existence benefits in the direct questioning process. In 
addition, because the reserve is managed with emphasis on the supply 
of existence values, i t  is likely that i f  these benefits are ever 
significantly positive, then they will be detected in Nadgee.
(i i)  Production B e n e f i t s  of Nadgee are limited to the possible 
provision of breeding areas for abalone, and given less than full 
employment, the employment of resources in the Eden area.
( i i i )  Recrea tion  B e n e f i t s  are also limited, but the restriction 
is a result of management constraints. Wilderness oriented recreation 
is the primary activity allowed by park officers.
(iv) Health B e n e f i t s  flow directly from recreation activities 
and involve both mental and physical aspects.
(v) Educational B e n e f i ts  are primarily limited to visi tors,  
as publications concerning Nadgee are s t r ic t ly controlled. Both secondary 
and tert iary students have enjoyed Nadgee as a "classroom".
(vi) A e s th e t ic  B e n e f i ts  are also predominantly participatory.
(vii) S c i e n t i f i c  Research B e n e f i t s  have been provided by 
Nadgee through a number of study projects, primarily because of the 
area's unique position on the coast of N.S.W. and its relative freedom 
from the influences of people.
(vi i i )  Gene-Pool Maintenance B e n e f i t s  are supplied by Nadgee 
because of the large range of species evident in the area, and the 
size and relative isolation of the reserve.
( i x ) E xis tence  B e n e f i t s  are supplied by Nadgee in respect to 
a number of endangered species which inhabit the area - specifically 
the Ground Parrot, the Eastern Bristle Bird, and the Glossy Black 
Cockatoo - and the area can, in i t se l f ,  be regarded as an ecosystem from 
which individuals gain existence values.
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Chapter 6 described the questionnaire which was designed to 
evaluate the existence values gained by a sample of Canberra residents 
from the continued preservation of Nadgee Nature Reserve.
(i) The personal interview approach was chosen so that mis­
representation of preferences would be minimized.
( i i )  Existence benefits were isolated, in the questionnaire, 
from the other benefits supplied by Nadgee Nature Reserve, by the 
creation of an "hypothetical" area of natural ecosystem which involved 
a r t i f ic ia l  restrictions designed to eliminate all but the non- 
participatory benefits, and by a funding arrangement under which 
respondents were excluded from any commitment to pay for scientific/ 
gene-pool maintenance benefits.
( i i i )  The trade-off between questioning complexity and the 
abili ty of the questionnaire to isolate completely the existence benefits, 
prevented the specification of the reserve to exclude non-participatory 
educational and aesthetic benefits.
(iv) Context reality in the questionnaire was provided by 
the use of a"wi11ingness to pay to prevent the loss of existence benefits" 
question rather than a "willingness to accept compensation if  
existence benefits are lost" question. Any bias created by this 
approach was considered to be conservative.
(v) The questionnaire was designed to reduce hypothetical 
bias through its  provision of low cost information concerning the 
proposal to be considered by respondents.
(iv) The questionnaire was designed to reduce payment mode 
bias through its  provision of alternative payment modes from which 
respondents could choose: an increase in tax paid to government or a
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donation made to a conservation organization.
( v i i )  Although the questionnaire could not be designed to 
el iminate stra teg ic  behaviour, some questions were incorporated to 
tes t  fo r  the presence of such behaviour. These questions involved 
the socio-economic character is t ics  and stated preferences/actual 
behaviour of respondents.
( v i i i )  The questionnaire was also designed to probe the e f fec t  
on wil l ingness to pay of varying levels of information supplied and 
the degree of  r a r i t y  exhibited by the species inhabit ing the area.
( ix )  Information regarding respondents' preferences and 
a t t i tude s ,  and th e i r  socio-economic characte r is t ies was sought by the 
questionnaire to provide a basis fo r  establ ishing sample respresentativeness, 
to introduce the topic of the questioning ,and fo r  use in analyses aimed at 
explaining any patterns in wi l l ingness to pay which may occur.
Chapter 7 set out the deta i ls  o f  the lo g is t ic s  involved in 
sampling and surveying the Canberra populat ion, provided an i n i t i a l  
descript ion of the sample, and establ ished the sample's representativeness 
of the Canberra and Austral ian populations.
( i )  Sampling and surveying were carr ied out by the Survey 
Research Centre, A.N.U., in September and October 1979.
( i i )  Systematic random sampling of  households from the A.C.T.
Rates Fi le was used to select 544 respondents.
( i i i )  Sub-sampling fo r  the group structure ,required by the 
questionnaire, was based on the number of  a resident 's  dwelling.
( i v ) Computing of resul ts  was undertaken using the programmes 
SPSS, OLS and AUTREGAL, and analysis was begun in January 1980.
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(v) The sample of Canberra residents was found to consist 
of a large proport ion of 20-44 year olds with high household incomes.
(v i )  While the sample was shown to be representative of the 
overal l  Canberra populat ion, s ign i f ica n t  differences were found to 
e x is t  between the Canberra and Austral ian population. Hence any 
resul ts derived from the questionnaire data cannot be extrapolated, 
beyond appl icat ion to the Canberra populat ion,without extreme caution 
being exercised.
( v i i )  An introduct ion to the character is t ics  of  the sampled 
respondents, indicated strong support fo r  conservation in general, 
and the preservation of  natural areas s p e c i f i c a l l y , in  terms of stated 
opinions.
( v i i i )  Actual pa r t ic ipa to ry  use of preserved areas was less 
than would be expected, given the a t t i t u d in a l  resu l ts .
( ix )  Non-part icipatory use, re f lected by respondents' use 
of te lev is ion  programmes and printed material based on nature, was 
observed to be re la t i v e ly  high.
Chapter 8 began the analysis of  the survey data re la t ing  to 
the existence values of Nadgee by presenting the d is t r ib u t io n  of 
respondents' w i l l ingness to pay bids. In addition the chapter detai led 
the ef fec ts  on existence values of varying levels of information and 
species r a r i t y ,  and the re la t ionship between respondents' payment mode 
choice and th e i r  wi l l ingness to pay bids.
( i )  Five assumptions were made under which wil l ingness to 
pay bids represented accurate measurements of existence benefi ts : every
respondent is f u l l y  aware that he is bidding s p e c i f i ca l l y  fo r  the 
existence benef i ts  of the "hypothetical" reserve; existence values 
are always a "good"; there is no hypothetical bias present in bids;
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payment mode bids  does not occur ;  and, respondents do not behave 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y .
( i i )  The base group o f  respondents,  Group 1, was used to  
p rov ide  an i n i t i a l  est imate o f  the ex is tence values suppl ied  by Nadgee.
( i i i )  One qua r te r  o f  the Group 1 respondents repor ted a zero 
v a l u a t i o n .
( i v ) 80% o f  zero bidders  provided reasons f o r  t h e i r
zero c o n t r i b u t i o n  which could be regarded as in d i c a t i n g  t h a t  t h e i r  
w i l l i n g n e s s  to  pay bid was a " p r o t e s t "  r a th e r  than a v a l i d  i n d ic a t i o n  
o f  p re ference.
(v)  Approx imately  14% o f  Group 1 respondents provided non­
responses.
( v i )  Non-zero bids d isp layed a la rge range and were d i s c r e t e l y  
d i s t r i b u t e d .
( v i i )  The d i s c re te  nature o f  the w i l l i n g n e s s  to pay bids was 
considered to  in d ic a te  t h a t  many o f  the 98 respondents who b id  zero,  
may have small p o s i t i v e  v a lu a t io n s .
( v i i i )  The la rge range o f  b ids provided evidence to  support  
e i t h e r  the hyp o th e t i c a l  or  s t r a t e g i c  bias hypo thes is .
( i x ) The summary s t a t i s t i c s  f o r  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  Group 1 
bids  are:
Mode $ 0.00
Median $ 5.18
Mean $28.57
Standard Dev ia t ion  : $67.89
(x) To gain a more e f f e c t i v e  working knowledge o f  respondents
b i ds ,  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  was t ransformed by grouping around the d is c re te
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points, taking the natural 1ogarithm,and eliminating "outliers".
(x i ) The non-zero bids»transformed in this fashion,appear 
to form a "normal" distribution, as reflected in the summary stat is t ics :
Mode = 2.30
Median = 2.51
Mean = 2.48
Standard Deviation =1.37
(xii) Although i t  is meaningless to use the survey mean to 
test  i f  the population mean bid is significantly different from zero, 
the confidence interval on the survey mean ($21.22 to $35.92) is 
indicative that the population mean bid is not zero.
(xiii)  A more correct way of interpreting the data is to use 
the transformed data confidence interval (2.30 to 2.66) in conjunction 
with the information on zero and non-response bids.
(ix) No significant differences in willingness to pay 
distributions across the four groups of varying information and species 
rari ty,  could be detected.
(x) The lack of a significant relationship between information 
provision/species rarity and willingness to pay can be explained by 
a number of hypotheses: the size of the change in information/rarity
was insufficient to produce significant differences across groups; 
respondents value existence benefits in general terms rather than for 
specific species or rarity levels; the complexity of the descriptions 
prevented the revelation of true preferences; or hypothetical bias.
None of these explanations could be proved or disproved given available data.
(x i ) On the basis of the insignificance of the differences across 
the distributions of willingness to pay bids observed for each group,
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the analysis of the d is t r ib u t io n  of existence values,undertaken in 
Section 8 .2 ,was repeated on the basis of  a l l  respondent1s-bids.
( x i i )  The summary s ta t is t i c s  fo r  the raw overal l  d i s t r ib u t io n
were:
Mode = $0.00
Median = $5.21
Mean =$27.08
Standard Deviation =$68.82 
Confidence Interval (95%) = $20.84 to $33.32 
The s im i la r i t ie s  between the overal l  and Group 1 d is t r ib u t io n  were such 
that the same comments apply to both.
( x i i i )  The same s im i la r i t y  appl ies to the transformed d is t r ib u t io n ,  
whose summary s ta t is t i c s  were:
Mode = 2.30 
Median = 2.43 
Mean = 2.45 
Standard Deviation =1 . 33
Confidence Interval (95%) = 2.30 to 2.60 
Note again,that  these s ta t i s t i c s  re late only to the non-zero bids, 
with approximately 25% of a l l  respondents submitting a zero bid.
(x i v ) S ign i f icant  dif ferences were observed between the 
d is t r ib u t io n  of bids made to the taxation option,and that which was 
made to the donation payment mode. However, the dif ferences were not . 
s u f f ic ie n t  to assert that respondents choosing the tax mode would 
bid more than those wishing to make a donation, p r im ar i ly  because the 
re la t ionship between payment mode choice and wil l ingness to pay appeared 
to suggest that extreme bidders favoured the tax mode, whi le intermediate
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bidders chose the donation option.
(xv) The comparatively " f l a t "  d is t r ib u t io n  of bids made by 
respondents chosing the tax option may be explained by the presence 
of  hypothetical bias: the tax option was considered un rea l is t ic  in
comparison to the donation mode.
(x v i ) A l te rna t ive ly  the " f l a t "  tax-option d is t r ib u t io n  may
be the re su l t  of s tra teg ic  bias: th is  explanation requires respondents
to assume that th e i r  choice of  payment mode w i l l  be enacted, and that 
payment w i l l  be made on the basis of  the average bid. Some support for  
th is  hypothesis came from one reason given by respondents fo r  chosing the 
tax mode: each taxpayer should share the burden of the cost of
preserving the area.
( x v i i )  I t  was also possible that the re la t ionship  between 
wil l ingness to pay and payment mode was caused by an underlying 
relat ionship, however tests fo r  such a spurious re la t ionship proved 
inconelusive.
( x v i i i ) No conclusive explanation of the payment mode/will ingness 
to pay re la t ionship  could therefore be establ ished.
Chapter 9 carr ied out two sets of analyses designed to 
explain the d is t r ibu t ions  of bids which were described in Chapter 8: 
the choice between biddingand not bidding fo r  the continued supply of 
Nadgee's existence benefits was considered using crosstabulation and 
discriminant analyses;and the decision, made by those who did choose 
to bid, of how much to bid was examined using, crosstabulat ion and 
mult ip le regression analyses.
( i )  The assumption set out in Chapter 8 are also made in 
Chapter 9.
( i i )  Four variables emerged from the crosstabulat ion and
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and discriminant analyses as being important in dist inguish ing 
between those who are and those who are not prepared to pay: age,
household. income, a t t i tude  to conservation, and preference for  
reading material on nature.
( i i i )  As age increases, i t  was found that preparedness to pay 
decreases.
( iv )  As household income increases so does preparedness to 
pay, but the re la t ionship is re la t i v e ly  weak.
(v) As preference fo r  nature reading increase so does 
preparedness to pay. This re la t ionship was found e i ther  to be non-spurious, 
or that the reading variable was representing some unmeasured combination 
of educational standard variables.
(v i ) The strongest discriminator of respondents' preparedness 
to pay was found to be th e i r  a t t i tude  to conservation. No evidence of 
a spurious re la t ionship could be detected.
( v i i )  The overall  strength of the discr iminating function was 
thought to be re la t i v e ly  weak,but the high levels o f  x2 s ign if icance, 
calculated in the crosstabulat ion analysis, support the conclusions 
drawn from the discriminant analysis.
( v i i i )  The most successful explanation of the re la t ionship 
between respondents' characte r is t ies and th e i r  non-zero wil l ingness 
to pay fo r  the existence values of Nadgee,was gained from a per- 
household-member analysis. Other analyses displayed the problems of 
grouped and heteroskedastic residuals.
( ix )  Household Income, payment mode choice, preference fo r  
reading about nature, and age were found to be s ig n i f ica n t  in the 
explanation of  respondents' wi l l ingness to pay.
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(x) The income e la s t i c i t y  of wi l l ingness to pay was estimated 
to range from 0.5 in the individual case,to 0.8 in the per-household- 
member case.
(x i ) Respondents who bid high tended to choose the taxation 
mode over the donation payment option. The regression analysis was 
unable to recognize the essent ia l ly  parabol ic re lat ionship between 
bid and payment mode»which was establ ished in Chapter 8.
( x i i )  Preference for  reading about nature was pos i t ive ly  related 
to wi l l ingness to pay,but conclusive evidence to suggest that the 
re la t ionship  was not spurious could not be establ ished.
( x i i i )  Age displayed a parabol ic re la t ionsh ip  with wi l l ingness 
to pay,with young and old respondents being prepared to pay more than 
middle aged respondents.
(x iv )  The most successful explanation of  respondents' wi l l ingness 
to pay was able to account for  less than 20% of the to ta l  variance 
exhibited by the bids. While th is  was concluded to be s u f f ic ie n t  for  
explanatory purposes over cross-sectional data, i t  was stressed that 
the estimated re la t ionship could not be used fo r  predict ive purposes.
(xv) The low explanation of variance can be regarded as 
evidence fo r  the existence of  e i the r  s t ra teg ic  or hypothetical bias.
Chapter 10 detailed the second stage in the process designed 
to value the existence benefi ts of Nadgee: the implementation of  a
Smith Auction Process "experiment" over a sub-sample of the respondents 
who took part in the d i rec t  questioning valuation process,to determine 
the v a l i d i t y  o f  the no-strategic-behaviour assumption made fo r  Chapters 
8 and 9. In addi t ion, the presence of s t ra teg ic  bias in the 
wil l ingness to pay bids of respondents was checked using data col lected 
during the main survey.
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( i )  The presence of  s t ra teg ic  bias was regarded to be the 
most crucial fac tor  in the successful use of wi l l ingness to pay bids 
as accurate measures of existence values.
( i i )  The large range of  bids given by respondents in the 
main survey, was regarded as evidence in support of the strategic 
behaviour hypothesis, but i t  was explained that such evidence was not 
conclusive.
( i i i )  Some contradict ions between the magnitude of respondents' 
bids and th e i r  character is t ics  were detected amongst respondents 
with re la t i v e ly  high wil l ingness to pay bids. While i t  was argued that 
these contradict ions could be used as evidence to support the over­
stat ing s t ra teg ic  bias hypothesis, no f i rm conclusions could be 
establ ished.
( i v)  The hypothesis, examined in Chapter 8, that respondents 
who chose the taxation payment mode option, tended to over - or under-state 
the i r  wi l l ingness to pay»depending on the magnitude of th e i r  preferences 
re la t ive  to th e i r  estimate of  the payment which they assume wi l l  resu l t  from 
the questioning process, was re itera ted.  Again, no f irm conclusions 
could be drawn.
(v) An ind ication of under-stat ing s tra teg ic  behaviour was 
found in a comparison of  respondents' stated at t i tudes to the existence 
benefits of Nadgee and th e i r  actual preparedness to pay: 115 respondents
indicated a posi t ive preference fo r  the existence benefi ts but 
were not prepared to pay anything fo r  the proposal to preserve the 
area in a natural state.
(v i )  A comparison of the d is t r ib u t io n  of wi l l ingness to pay 
bids,with a d is t r ib u t io n  of l i k e l y  donations calculated on the basis of 
the amounts of money respondents had actua l ly  contributed to conservation 
organizations, placed the importance of  under-stat ing s tra teg ic
415
behaviour in perspective. Because the implied d is t r ib u t io n  had a 
s ig n i f i c a n t l y  lower mean than the d is t r ib u t io n  obtained in the survey, i t  
was concluded, somewhat te n ta t iv e ly ,  that under-stat ing stra teg ic  
behaviour is un l ike ly  to be as severe in the questionnaire responses 
as i t  is in an actual payment s i tua t ion .
( v i i )  The i n a b i l i t y  to use the questionnaire data to examine 
r igorously the severi ty of s t ra teg ic  bias,exempli t ies the need for 
a Smith Auction Process sub-sample experiment to be carr ied out in 
conjunction with the direct  questioning mathod.
( v i i i )  The experiment was not able to use the context created 
in the main survey,but rather used a sett ing s im i la r  to the Bohm 
experiment described in Chapter 3: a sub-sample of survey respondents
were paid to attend the experiment and asked to value th e i r  viewing 
of two nature-oriented f i lms using the direct questioning method, 
followed by the Smith Auction Process. However,because the context 
of the experiment was d i f fe re n t  to that of the questionnaire, only 
general comments on the accuracy of the questionnaire bids could be made.
( i x)  The incentive to behave s t ra teg ica l ly  was shown to be 
greater in the experiment than in the main survey, largely because of 
the numbers involved.
(x) Because pa r t ic ipa t ion  in the experiment was essent ia l ly  
voluntary, the sub-sample which responded was not representative of 
the overal l  sample. The major dif ferences between the two groups were 
in terms of age, respondents' education and occupation. Hence, before the 
results of the experiment can be used as a basis on which to comment on 
the accuracy of the questionnaire bids, the biased nature of the sub-sample 
must be taken in to  account.
(x i ) On a r r iva l  at the experiment, the 27 respondents were 
given a descript ion of the good fo r  which they would be bidding: the
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two films.
(xii) Direct questioning bids were sought given the understanding 
that they would be used to determine whether costs would have been met if  
the money were actually to have been collected. Respondents were informed 
that i f  these costs were not (hypothetically) covered, the films could 
not be shown and they would be required to spend the evening essentially 
doing nothing. Hence the situation established in the main survey 
direct questioning process was paralleled.
(xii i)  The sum of these direct questioning bids was used as the
"cost" which had to be met under the Smith Auction Process which followed.
(xiv) Seven iterations of the Smith Auction were performed 
before the process was halted, even though the total bid exceeded the 
cost after five iterations,  because the effect on the total bid of 
under-stating strategic behaviour was ar t i f ical ly excluded.
(xv) On the basis of the bids made by respondents in the 
Smith Auction Process, respondents direct questioning bids were 
classified as over-statements, under-statements or truth-statements.
(xvi) 50% of the experiment respondents were t ruth-s taters ,
33% were under-staters and 11% were over-staters. Hence any over­
stating strategic bias is more than compensated for by the presence 
of under-stating respondents. The socio-economic bias evident in the sub­
sample was shown to act as a mask to an even stronger tre/id toward 
willingness to pay bids being conservative estimates of true preferences.
(xvii) Although limited by the small numbers involved in the 
experiment, an analysis of the relationships between respondents' 
characteristies and their behaviour type was undertaken.
(xviii) The "typical" over-stater was observed to be a male, 
over 30 years old who is married and has a white-collar job.
(xix) The "typical" under-stater was a woman with a blue-
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co l la r  job.
(xx) The " typ ica l "  t ru th -s ta te r  was an unmarried person who 
is less than 30 years old.
(xx i )  Over-staters and under-staters in the experiment had 
tended to bid amounts fo r  the existence benefi ts of Nadgee which 
contradicted th e i r  behavioural c la s s i f i c a t io n .  However i t  was not 
possible to use th is  resu l t  to draw any f i rm conclusions on the success 
of  the experiment or the questionnaire.
(x x i i ) The hypothesized trend toward respondents who chose 
the taxation mode in the questionnaire being over- or under-staters, 
which was formulated in Chapter 8 and re itera ted in Chapter 10, was 
not substantiated by the experiment: a l l  over-staters had chosen the
donation mode, and more than the expected percentage of t ru th -s ta te rs  had 
chosen the tax mode.
( x x i i i )  On the basis of the investigation of s t ra teg ic  bias under­
taken, i t  was concluded that the wil l ingness to pay bids detai led in 
Chapter 8 can be regarded as a conservative estimate of  the actual
preferences of Canberra residents fo r  the existence benefi ts of Nadgee 
Nature Reserve.
From the resul ts  and conclusions establ ished in Part I I  of 
th is  thesis i t  is clear that the a b i l i t y  of  the direct questioning 
method, used in conjunction with a Smith Auction Process sub-sample 
experiment, to provide useful measurements of  the Canberra popualt ion's 
valuation of the existence benefi ts supplied by Nadgee Nature Reserve, 
depends c ru c ia l ly  on the v a l i d i t y  of the f ive  assumptions>under which 
respondents' wi l l ingness to pay bids were used as accurate representations 
of th e i r  equivalent surpluses. The assumptions were:
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1. Respondents were f u l l y  aware of  the benef i t  fo r  which
they were bidding;
2. This benef i t ,  the existence values of Nadgee was regarded
by a l 1 to be a "good";
3. Hypothetical bias was not exh ib i ted;
4. Payment mode bias did not occur; and,
5. Respondents did not behave s t ra te g ica l ly .
I t  was concluded that the f i r s t  assumption was l i k e l y  to be 
va l id .  Many respondents who indicated a zero preference fo r  the proposal 
set out in the questionnaire, did so because of the re s t r i c t io n  on 
v is i t i n g  the area, and th is  can be regarded as evidence to support 
the hypothesis that the non-par t ic ipatory benefi ts had been c lear ly  
separated from the par t ic ipa to ry  benefi ts in most respondents' minds.
The careful wording used in the questionnaire to separate the 
s c ie n t i f i c  (and gene-pool maintenance) benefits from the existence 
benefi ts was regarded as being s u f f ic ie n t  to the task, but i t  remains 
possible that respondents did include expected non-v is i t  educational 
and aesthetic benefi ts in th e i r  wi l l ingness to pay valuations. While 
i f  th is  is true - and i t  is not possible to prove that i t  is not true 
given the data avai lable - the value of the study in terms of asserting 
existence values alone, is depreciated: but in terms of a more pragmatic 
analysis involving those non-part ic ipatory benefi ts which are most 
easi ly  appreciated by respondents,^ the study s t i l l  provides useful - 
information (assuming the v a l i d i t y  of the remaining four'assumptions).
1 I t  was noted in Chapter 4 that i t  would be un l ike ly  fo r  respondents 
to have an accurate perception of the s c ie n t i f i c  and gene-pool 
maintenance benefi ts of  preservat ion,and hence that valuation of 
these benefits would re ly  on the use of  market data and the assessments 
of sc ien t is ts ,  technologists etc.
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The assumption that existence benefits are always a "good" 
was also not.proven to be valid. However, only 3% of respondents stated 
that they were "not interested at a l l"  in the existence benefits supplied 
by Nadgee, thus indicating a strong compliance with the assumption.
Considerable evidence regarding the va l id i ty  of the assumption 
concerning the presence of hypothetical bias has been advanced, 
however no firm conclusion could be drawn. Certainly the concept of 
existence benefits was d i f f i c u l t  for many respondents to understand, 
and the spread of bids, the low percentage of bid variance explained 
by both the discriminant and multiple regression analyses, and the 
analyses of the effect  of d i f fer ing information levels and payment 
modes a l l  indicate the presence of hypothetical bias. However, i t  
is equally clear that unless the majority of the sample engaged in 
hypothetical behaviour, the consequences are not important: the
variance of the distr ibut ion is l ik e ly  to increase, but i t  is doubtful 
i f  the mean would change s ignif icant ly  ,given the assumption that respondents 
who don't think carefully about the ir  willingness to pay bid at random.
The va l id i ty  of the payment mode bias assumption was also 
d i f f i c u l t  to assess. Clearly, the incidence of this type of bias 
was reduced by the provision of a lternative payment modes. However, 
the question of whether the modes, once chosen, created di f ferent  
opportunities for other types of bias, notably strategic and hypothetical, 
remained unanswered. Because of th is ,  the va l id i ty  of the payment 
mode assumption cannot be rejected.
The va l id i ty  of the strategic bias assumption was the subject 
of the most comprehensive analysis,because i t  was considered to be 
potentia lly  the most serious cause of distortion in the willingness to
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pay bids. Both over- and under-stating strategic bias were detected
in direct questioning responses»however i t  was concluded that truth-
stating is predominant and the under-statements w i l l  more than
compensate for any over-statement which is present. Hence, the
conclusion that the direct questioning method resulted in a conservative
estimate of respondents' equivalent surpluses was drawn ,despite the
in tu i t ive  notion that over-statement wi l l  prevail in direct questioning
where no payment is required. Of course, in the questionnaire, the
no-payment context was not stressed and this may have introduced
some uncertainty as to the actual outcome of the questioning in the
2
minds of respondents, somewhat reminiscent of the Bohm analysis, 
and this may have acted to reduce the overall strength of the incentive 
to over-state.
The problems associated with validating the five assumptions 
clearly  indicate that the direct questining method/Smith Auction Process 
combination, applied to the case of asserting existence values, is 
far from being perfect. However these l imitat ions cannot be regarded 
as suff ic ient ly  severe to render the information provided useless.
Rather the measurement methodology has been shown to be capable of 
yielding the analyst a reasonable estimate of the bounds within which 
existence values are l ike ly  to f a l l .  Hence the f i r s t  issue addressed 
by this part of the thesis can be answered with a qual if ied aff irmative.
2 Payment uncertainty is more l ike ly  in the case of respondents who 
chose the taxation payment mode. While respondents could consider 
i t  possible for governments to levy a tax over the whole population 
based on their  responses, i t  would be unlikely for them to believe 
that a conservation organization would be able to use the information 
for any specific action regarding collection of payments, because of 
the confidential nature of the individual bids.
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Given the caveats associated with the results derived from 
the Direct Questioning /Smith Auction Process measurement 
methodology, the second issue - the primary aim of this part - can 
be addressed in conclusion. The existence benefits derived by 
Canberra residents from the continued preservation of Nadgee Nature 
Reserve are clearly non-zero: i t  would seem likely  that the average
existence value per adult is at least $20. However up to 25% of 
Canberra adults do not gain any value from the existence benefits of Nadgee. 
Even so, i t  can be concluded that the existence benefits supplied by 
Nadgee are substantial and form a significant proportion of the 
area's total contribution to the welfare of society.
The limitations involved in extrapolating these results to 
a wider population than Canberra, and to involve the existence benefits 
generated by other preserved natural areas, have been noted,but in 
general i t  can be stated that existence benefits must be recognized 
by decision makers as valid contributions to individuals' well-being.
Even i f  Assumption 1, the effective separation of existence values, 
is not valid, the study s t i l l  demonstrates that non-participatory 
benefits, other than the scientif ic research and gene-pool maintenance 
benefits, play an important role. This is particularly true, in a 
relative sense, when the provision of wilderness areas is under 
scrutiny.
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APPENDIX I
COMPLETE QUESTIONNAIRE
4
SURVEY RESEARCH CENTRE 
BERRA POPULATION SURVEY 
ICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Quest lonnaire Type 
Add rcss 
Household 
Person Number
Relationship to Head of Household
Head '
Spouse of Head 
Child of Head 
Other Child
Other Relative of Head 
Friend or Boarder
Sex
Male 
Fern a 1 e
(a) Country of Birth
Australia 
UK & Ireland
Other
Western Europe
Southern Europe
Eastern Europe
NZ, New Guinea, Fiji
Asia
Africa
America
(b) Is (he) a resident of Australia or here on a visit?
Res ident 
Visitor
(c) When did (he)
come to Australia to live? 
arrive in Australia on this visit?
Month
Year
\Age last Birthday
--fl
GO TO Q4
2
/3
IS
>7
Is (he) att.endinq school, college or university 
full-time student?
No
Yes, full-time' tertiary student at:
Yes, full-time secondary student at
Yes, full-time primary student at
Under school age
as a
_Govt. 
non-Govt.
Govt. 
non-Govt.
(8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
GO TO Q7
IF AGE UNDER 15 YEARS, NO MORE QUESTIONS.
Q7. Ma,rital status
Never married 
Married now 
Separated 
Divorced 
Widowed
Now I would like to ask you about work in the week starting 
Monday the_ _ and ending Sunday the , that is
last week.
Q8. bast week, did (he) do any work at all in a job, business
or farm? Yes
No
Permanently unable to work 
Retired
r)9. bast week, did (lie) work without pay in a family business?
j Yes
No
CIO.How many hours did (he) work last week at all jobs, 
including overtime, but excluding time off?
Number of hours
211. Was (he) away from work last week at all because of
holidays, sickness, strikes, or any other reason?
No, and no hours worked 
No, and some hours worked 
Yes
^12.How many hours a week does (he) usually work at all (his) 
jobs, including overtime but excluding time off?
Number of hours
\
ill.Would (he) prefer a job in which (he) could work more 
hours a week?
Yes
No
]
2
3
4
5
XO1 GO TO Q10
2
3 NO MORE QUESTIONS
4 GO TO Q20
3Ü
1
2 GO TO Qll
XI
1
2
3
XG
IF 35 OR MORE 
GO TO Q20
___  44 ^xi\- ---
GO TO Q14
\lM
x f ~
1
2 GO TO Q20
114-At any time during the last four weeks, has (he) been 
looking for full-time work?
Yes
No
15.Has (he) been looking for part-time work at any time 
during the last four weeks?
Yes
No
H Z3
1 GO TO Q16
2
T<f
1
2 GO TO Q19
216. At any time during the last four weeks, has (he)
Checked or registered with the Commonwealth 
Employment Service?
Checked or registered with a private employment service?
Written, phoned or applied in person to an employer 
for work?
Answered an advertisement for a job?
Looked in newspapers for a job? Yes
No
Done anything else' to find a job?
Advertised or tendered for work 
Contacted friends/relatives about work 
Looked on works notice boards 
None of these
4
5
6 
7
217. If (he) had found a job, were there any reasons why (he) 
could not have started that job last week? 31
Don't know 
No, none
Yes, illness or injury 
Yes, other reasons
1
2
3
4
)18. When did (lie) begin looking for work?
Number of weeks
How long ago is it since (he) last worked full-time for 
two weeks or more?
_ _ _ _ _  Number of weeks
21
SEQUENCE GUIDE
If not employed last week (CODE 1 IN Qll) AND 
a) pl9 is b la n k or 104 or 999
\
OR b) Q19 is between 001 and 103 
If 'retired' (Q3 CODED 4)
Otherwise, person had a job last week
What kind of work did (lie) do (last week)/(in (his) last job)?
LESS THAN
2 WEEKS , CODE 001
3r
2 YRS OR MORE CODE 104 
NEVER WORKED FT CODE 999
1 NO MORE QUESTIONS
2 ASK Q21-Q23 ABOUT
'LAST JOB'
3 ASK Q21-Q23 ABOUT
'LAST JOB'
4 ASK Q21-Q23 ABOUT
'LAST WEEK'
Q22. What kind of industry, business or service is carried out at 
(his) (last) place of work?
Q23. Did he work
Q24.
for an employer for wages or salary?
In (his) own business ...
with employees? 
with no employees?
Without pay in a family business?
GIVE INCOME CARD
Would you please look at this card, which shows grouped ranges 
of gross income per fortnight and also per year? Would you 
tell me in which group (his) gross income falls, that is,
(his) income from all sources before any deductions for tax or 
superannuation or anything else have been taken out?
RECORD GROUP NUMBER AS ON CARD 1
NO MORE QUESTIONS 
OFFICE CODES
NONE - CODE 00 
DON'T KNOW - CODE 98 
REFUSAL - CODE 99
NO MORE QUESTIONS
Q25. In Individuals sample? Yes, schedule completed
Yes, refusal
Yes, non-contact
< ^o
Q26. In Disability sample? Yes, schedule completed
Yes, refusal
No
Q27 . Interviewer Number
Q28. Suburb
Q29. Life-cycle stage
insufficient data 
age < 30, not married now 
age < 30, married, no children 
family person, youngest child < age 5 
youngest child age 5-14 
youngest child > age 14 
age 30-44, married, no children 
not married now 
age > 44, married, no children 
not married now
J
ANU SURVEY RESEARCH CENTRE 
CANBERRA POPULATION SURVEY 
INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONNAIRE
Questionnaire Type 
Address Number 
Household
Person Number
The survey is sponsored by a number of different groups, so 
that the range and types of questions that I will be asking 
you vary a great deal rather than just being on one topic as
is usually the case. It should take about _________________
to cover all the topics.
The first set of questions are sponsored by the Centre for 
Resource and Environmental Studies at the University and 
the Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service.
3 1
5
1 9
Q1. On this card is a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 means 
'very important' and 4 means 'not important at 
all1. A number of the questions in this section use 
this scale. Firstly:
How important is conservation to you?
HAND CARD
DK = 8
<7 REFUSAL = 9
Q2. Why do you think conservation is
U
Q3. Have you visited any national parks, nature reserves or 
other reserved natural areas anywhere in Australia in 
the last twelve months?
Yes 1
No 2 TURN OVER
YES: Which areas did you visit? LIST ALL MENTIONED.
What was your main reason for going to (each area)? 
How long did you spend at (each area)?
Area Reason Time
17
IX
*7
NO: Some of the reserves near Canberra are Tidbinbilla 
Nature Reserve, Kosciusko National Park, Moreton 
National Park and various state forest reserves, and 
we're including these. Did you visit any of these in 
the last twelve months?
IF YES, TURN BACK AND ASK ABOUT AREAS VISITED.
NO: Is there any particular reason why you didn't visit
any national parks or nature reserves in the last 
twelve months?
Q4. Using the scale on the card again:
In your opinion, how important is it to have national 
parks and nature reserves as areas for recreation 
activities such as picnicing, bushwalking, canoeing, 
fishing and so on?
Q5. In your opinion, how important is it to have national
parks and nature reserves as areas where the public can 
go to learn about nature; for example, where children 
can be taken for nature study?
Q6. And how important is it to have these areas as places 
where people can go to experience natural scenery, 
wildlife and vegetation?
Q7. How important is it to have these areas as places
where scientific research into nature can be carried 
out?
Q8. And how important is it to have these areas as places 
within which the wildlife and vegetation is preserved 
even though people may never go there to actually see 
it?
Now I want to tell you about an area of 14,000 hectares of 
land located on the South Coast of New South Wales. Access 
to this area is extremely difficult and it cannot be seen 
from any major roads because it is surrounded by mountain 
ridges and the sea, so that the area is only rarely visited. 
I've got some photographs of the area here that I'd like you 
to look at so that you get some idea of what it contains.
REFUSAL 9
The first picture shows one of the large beaches in the 
area (PI). Behind many of these there are areas of sand- 
dunes (P2). There is a large salt water lake (P3) and three 
river estuaries in the area (P4). Two of the rivers have 
all of their water catchments in the area and are completely 
unpolluted which is quite unusual. There are large areas of 
coastal heathland (P5) and also some undisturbed stands of 
dry and wet eucalypt forest (P6), all of which are becoming 
rare. Higher up in the ranges is upland heath (P7) which is 
also rather unusual.
GROUP 1. ADDRESS NUMBERS ENDING IN
00 01 03 04 06 07 09 10 12 13 15 16 18 19 
If development were to be allowed in the area, vir­
tually all of these special features would be lost.
GROUP 2. ADDRESS NUMBERS ENDING IN 02 or 11
The area contains a rich array of bird life which 
includes the Ground Parrot (P8) and the Glossy Black 
Cockatoo (P9). If development were to be allowed in the 
area, virtually all of these special features would be 
lost.
GROUP 3. ADDRESS NUMBERS ENDING IN 05 or 14
The area contains a rich array of bird life which 
includes the Ground Parrot (P8) and the Glossy Black 
Cockatoo (P9). If development were to be allowed in 
the area, virtually all of these special features would 
be lost. In particular, some of the species of bird 
life living in the area might be threatened.
GROUP 4 . ADDRESS NUMBERS ENDING IN 08 or 17
The area contains a rich array of bird life which 
includes the Ground Parrot (P8) and the Glossy Black 
Cockatoo (P9). If development were to be allowed in 
the area, virtually all of these special features would 
be lost. Some of the species of bird life living in the 
area might be threatened and the Ground Parrot in parti­
cular could become extinct.
N.B: YOU MUST KNOW WHICH GROUP THE RESPONDENT BELONGS TO
BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEW. KEEP PHOTOS P8 AND P9 
SEPARATELY AND ONLY INCLUDE THEM FOR GROUPS 2, 3 AND 
4. CIRCLE GROUP DESCRIPTION USED.
If the area is to be preserved in this completely natural 
state, visits by the public, even for educational purposes, 
will have to be very limited. In the main, only scientists 
doing research and rangers would be allowed into the area.
Q9. In your opinion, how important is it to have this
particular area as a place where scientific research 
into nature can be carried out?
Even if the scientific research alone produced no benefits, 
preservation would ensure that the area would be kept in a 
natural state and that the wildlife living there would 
remain.
Q10. How important is it to have this particular area as a 
place within which the wildlife and vegetation is pre­
served even though people may never go there to actually 
see it?
NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL: Why is that?
To ensure the preservation of this area, funds would have to 
be raised to buy the land. The government may contribute an 
amount for the possible scientific value of the area. How­
ever, the rest of the cost would have to be raised either by 
an additional government tax or by a conservation organisa­
tion calling for donations specifically for this purpose.
Qll. Would you be prepared to pay an extra tax or give a
donation just to ensure that the wildlife and vegeta­
tion in this particular area is preserved, even though 
you may never go to see it?
Yes
No
NO: Why is that?
Q12. Would you prefer the government or the conservation 
organisation to raise the money?
Government 
Conservation Organisation
Either
Both
Why is that?
REFUSAL
GO TO Q15
TO Q15
Q13. What is the maximum amount that you would be prepared
to pay? $
Q14. If you had $1000 a year more to spend than you do now, 
would you be prepared to pay more?
Yes
No
YES: How much would you be prepared to pay then? $
Q15. Have you subscribed to any conservation organisations 
in the last twelve months?
Yes
No
YES: Could you say how much, in total, your subscriptions
$were in the last twelve months?
NO: Is there any particular reason why you didn't sub­
scribe to any conservation organisations in the last 
twelve months?
Q16. Have you ever done any courses in Biology, Botany,
Zoology, Ecology or a related subject?
Yes 1
No 2
Q17. Do you usually watch TV programmes which feature the 
study of nature when they are shown?
Yes 1
No 2
Q18. Do you often read books, magazines or articles which 
feature the study of nature?
Yes 1
No 2
The Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies hopes to conduct a small 
follow-up study some time in November. It will involve a few people going to 
the University one evening and taking part in an experiment. All those who 
participate will be paid $10.00 for their time, about two hours.
Would you be interested in going along?
YES: If you fill this form in and post it in the stamped-addressed envelope, 
you'll receive more information about the follow-up study.
The next few questions are sponsored by the ACT Schools 
Authority. You may have read a report in the Canberra Times 
in mid-August on the results of some questions they included 
in our last survey.
I'm going to read out a few statements on some aspects of 
schools and education in Canberra, and I'd like you to say 
whether you strongly agree, mildly agree, mildly disagree, 
strongly disagree, or if you neither agree nor disagree.
The first statement is: HAND CARD
Q19. (a) Schools should involve the parents in making
decisions.
(b) These days children are not made to work hard 
enough at school.
(c) The major responsibility for schools is to train 
young people for the jobs that are available.
(d) It is the school's job to teach children to behave 
properly.
(e) Examinations are the best way of assessing a 
child's abilities.
As you may know, 1979 was designated by the United Nations 
as the International Year of the Child.
Q20. Have you taken part in any of the, activities that have 
been arranged locally for the International Year of 
the Child?
Yes
No
YES: What sorts of activities were they?
Q21. Has the International Year of the Child had any 
influence on the ways you think about or behave 
with children?
Yes
No
CODE AS ON CARD67DK = 8 
REFUSAL = 9
7o
72-
1
2
7*-
75
1
2
YES: How has it influenced you?
Questionnaire Type
Address Number 
Household 
Person Number
This set of questions is being asked on behalf of the 
Department of Health and is about the use of medicines and 
drugs, alcohol and tobacco. Each group is covered by three 
questions which are set out on one of these cards. If you 
look at the top card you'll see that the first question 
asks about whether you have ever used Pain Killers, and 
there is a list of some of the different types that are 
available. The second question asks on how many days, if 
at all, you have taken them in the last week, and the third 
question asks about use in the last four weeks. I want you 
to just go through the questions on each card in turn, 
giving the answers as you go.
3 1
5
2
8
HAND CARDS
Q 22. So for the first card, would you give 
to question 1? Just yes or no.
And the second question? 
And the third?
me your answer
Yes
No
Not sure 
Refusal
Q2.
Q3.
2 )
3 I GO TO Q23
4 )
I o
Q23. Now on the next card. Have you ever taken vitamin 
pills or other vitamin supplements? 13
Q24. And the next card. (Sedatives).
Yes
No
Not sure 
Refusal
1
2 )
3 j GO TO Q24
4 )
Q 2. 
Q3.
Yes
No
Not sure 
Refusal
Q2.
Q3.
»4*
_ _ _ | r &
1 '7
2 )
3 I GO TO Q25
4 )
Q25. Now the next card. (Tranquilizers). Yes
No
Not sure 
Refusal
Q2.
Q3.
Q26. And the next (Tobacco) Yes
No
Refusal
Q2.
Q3.
Q27. And the next (Alcohol) Yes
No
Refusal
Q2.
Q3.
Q28. IF AGE 40 AND OVER, GO TO Q29. HOWEVER, IF THE
CARD HAS BEEN LEFT IN BY MISTAKE, LET THEM ANSWER 
AND MAKE A NOTE.
And the last card (Marijuana) Yes
No
Refusal
Q2.
Q3.
TO BE COMPLETED AFTER THE INTERVIEW.
How many members of the household, including the respondent, 
were present during the interview?
List relationship to respondent of all other people present, 
if any?
Do you feel that the respondent gave truthful answers to 
all the questions? Yes=l, Some=2, None=3.
SOME: List question numbers of doubtful responses.
GO TO Q26
GO TO Q27
GO TO Q28
GO TO Q29
Q29. Thermometer Ratings
We would now like you to tell us how you feel about some of
the people involved in Australian public life, using what we 
call a feeling thermometer. I'm going to read out a name, 
and you tell me how you rate that person. Of course, if you 
don't know much about a particular person, just tell me and 
I'll go on to the next name. A rating between 50 and 100 
degrees means that you like or feel warm towards a person; 
ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel 
favourably towards a person. If you don't have particular 
feelings either way towards a person, then rate them in the 
middle.
The first person i s _________________________. Where would
you rate your feelings about him on the thermometer?
ROTATE ORDER OF PRESENTATION OF NAMES.
Doug Anthony 
Lionel Bowen 
John Haslem 
Bob Hawke 
Ken Fry
Andrew Peacock 
Sue Ryan 
Bob Ellicott 
Bill Hayden 
John Knight 
Malcolm Fraser 
Neville Wran
WRITE IN THE FIRST NAME PRESENTED.
HAND
THERMOMETER
99 or 100 
00 =  01 
jDK = 00
REFUSAL =
= 98
99
Questionnaire Type 
Address Number 
Household 
Person Number
Q30. Would you say that you (and your family living here) 
are better off or worse off financially than you were 
a year ago?
Better off 
About the same 
Worse off
Q31. And looking ahead, do you think that a year from now 
you will be better off financially or worse off?
Better off 
About the same 
Worse off
Q32. Would you say that at the present time economic condi­
tions in Australia are better or worse than they were 
a year ago?
Better
About the same 
Worse
No opinion
Q33. And how about a year from now, do you expect that 
economic conditions in Australia will be better or 
worse than they are now?
Better
About the same 
Worse
No opinion
Q34. Do you approve - or disapprove - the way Mr Fraser 
is handling his job as Prime Minister?
Approve 
Mixed 
Disapprove 
No opinion
Q35. Do you approve - or disapprove - the way Mr Hayden 
is handling his job as Leader of the Opposition?
Q36.
Q37.
Q38.
Q39.
Approve
Mixed
Disapprove 
No opinion
Do you approve - or disapprove - the way Mr Haslem 
is handling his job as Member of the House of 
Representatives for (the Canberra/this) Electorate?
Approve
Mixed
Disapprove 
No opinion
Do you approve - or disapprove - the way Mr Ellicott 
is handling his job as Minister for the Capital 
Territory?
Approve 
Mixed 
Disapprove 
No opinion
Do you approve - or disapprove - the way Mr Hawke 
is handling his job as President of the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions - the ACTU?
Approve
Mixed
Disapprove 
No opinion
Do you approve - or disapprove - the way Mr Fry 
is handling his job as Member of the House of 
Representatives for (the Fraser/this) Electorate?
Approve 
Mixed 
Disapprove 
No opinion
Q40. Do you cypprove - or disapprove - the way Mr Peacock 
is handling his job as Minister for Foreign Affairs?
Approve
Mixed
Disapprove 
No opinion
Q41. Suppose that a Federal election for the House of
Representatives were being held today, which party 
would receive your first preference?
Labor
Liberal/NCP 
Democrats 
Others 
Undecided 
Not eligible
And if the only other candidates were Labor and 
Liberal, which party would receive your second 
preference?
Labor
Liberal/NCP
Undecided
CONTINUE
Address Number 
Household 
Person Number
The last set of questions are being asked on behalf of the 
Demography Department at the University and are about family 
planning and birth control. The results will be used to 
provide comparisons between people in Canberra and in other 
areas of Australia.
CODE SEX OF RESPONDENT: Male
Female
On this card is a list of the most common methods of con­
traception that people use.
Q42. Suppose you were talking about methods of contraception 
with a young unmarried (SAME SEX) friend. What methods 
would you advise your friend to use?
CODE FIRST TWO MENTIONED. First Method
Second Method
Why would you recommend that?
Q43• What about a couple who have just got married and want 
to put off having children for a few years while they 
get settled. What methods would you advise them to use?
, First Method
Second Method
Why would you recommend that?
7
1
2
HAND CARD
CODE AS 
ON CARD
NONE = 00 
II REFUSAL = 99
NONE = 00 
REFUSAL = 99
Q44. Suppose that a couple have decided that they want to 
have children but don't want to have them too close 
together. What methods would you advise them to use, 
to plan their family in this way?
First Method 
Second Method
Why would you recommend that?
NONE = 00
REFUSAL = 99
Q45. And suppose that a couple have had all the children 
they want, and don't intend having any more. What 
methods would you advise them to use?
First Method 
Second Method
NONE = 00
REFUSAL = 99
35
Why would you recommend that?
Q46. Have you (or your partner) ever used any of these
methods of birth control? Would you please tell me 
which methods you have ever used?
01 The pill
02 Diaphragm
03 Condoms
04 I.U.D.
READ EACH 05 Rhythm
METHOD AND 06 Withdrawal
CIRCLE 07 Jellies, Creams
RESPONSE 08 Foams
09 Abstinence
10 Vasectomy
11 Tubal ligation
12 Any other
13 Any other
Q47. Are there any methods that you would definitely not 
want to use?
1 2
1 2
1
Zs
l
a
RING 1 IN SECOND COLUMN FOR ANY MENTIONED
Q48. ASK ONLY IF RESPONDENT IS STERILISED:
I.E. VASECTOMY, TUBAL LIGATION OR HYSTERECTOMY.
(a) How old were you when you had the (OPERATION) done?
Age in years
(b) Why did you decide to have the operation?
Q49. Would you ever consider having a sterilisation 
operation?
Yes
Perhaps
No
Don't need to/Too old 
Never thought about it
(a) Why is that?
(b) YES OR PERHAPS: At what age would you expect to
have the operation?
Age in years
Q50. In general, do you approve - or disapprove - of 
sterilisation as a method of contraception for 
(OPPOSITE SEX)?
Approve 
Disapprove 
Approve - in some cases
GO TO
GO TO Q50
Q51. To finish off, you may have seen in the Canberra Times
a series of articles called 'Memo to the Prime Minister' 
in which people have been writing about what should be 
done with reference to the future of Canberra.
What would you say the Federal Government should be 
doing with reference to the future of Canberra?
Q52. Now just a couple of final things about yourself.
(a) How old were you when you left school?
Under 14 years
14 years
15 years
16 years
17 years 
18 years and over
Never attended
(b) Where did you spend most of your years of 
schooling?
Was it
In the country or a small country town
In a large town 
In a city
(c) Since leaving school have you obtained a trade or 
other qualification?
Yes
No
YES: What is the full name of the highest qualification 
you have obtained?
Q53. GIVE INCOME CARD.
Would you please look at this card which shows grouped 
ranges of gross income per fortnight, that is, income 
from all sources before any deductions are made.
Yearly gross income groups are written on the other 
side of the card. Would you please tell me which 
range covers your gross income?
GO TO Q53
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GROSS YEARLY INCOME
1 .
2 .
1 - 1039 
1040 - 2079
3 . 2080 - 3119
4 . 3120 - 4159
5 . 4160 - 5199
6 . 5 2 0 0 - 5719
7 . 5720 - 6239
8 . 6240 - 6759
9 . 6760 - 7279
10 . 7280 - 7799
11 . 7800 - 8319
12 . 8320 - 8839
13 . 8840 - 9359
14 . 9360 - 9879
15 . 9880-10399
16 . 10400-11439
17 . 11440-12479
18 . 12480-13519
19 . 13520-14559
20 . 14560-15599
21 . 15600-18199
22 . 18200-20799
23 . 20800-23399
24 . 23400-25999
25 . 26000+
APPENDIX II
RESPONDENTS' CHARACTERISTICS
5 X R . * S S J
CATEGORY LAL3EL CODE
M " L t 1 .
F> . ' .ALL L- •
TOTAL
RE LAT I VE ADJ USTE D C UM
ABS OLUTE FR EG FREG F REG
FREG ( PCT ) ( P C T ) ( P C T )
2 5 6 4 7 . 1 4 7 .  1 4 7 . 1  '
2 8  8 5 2 . 9 ... 5 2 . 9 . . 1 0 C . 0
5 4 4 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
M P A N
C.  JÖÖ
S T D  E R R M l M E D I  A NM 0 p E S T D  D E V V A R I A N C E
K U R T 0  S  1 S - 1 . 9 9 : S K E W N E S S - . 1 1 8 R A N G E
M I N I M U M 1 . , - 00 M A X I M  U  M 2  . 0 0 0
V A L I D  C A S E S 5 4 4 M I S S I N G  C A S E S 0
TADLE A. I I .  1 Respondent ' s  Sex
mode
KUR t j S i s
M T N IMJ k
7 • 9 2 1  
7. jfld 
-  . t  2 4 
4 . J 0 0
A ' t G P R . ‘ S AGE GROUP
R E L A T I V E ADJ US T E D C UM
ABS OLUTE FREG FREG FREGL - 1 t  G U R Y LABEL CODE F R E G ( PCT ) ( P C T ) ( P C T )
1 = -  1 y YEARS 4 . 2 8 5 . 1 5 . 2 5 . 2
2 C -  2 * YEARS r 7 0 1 2 . 9 1 2 . 9 1 8 . 0
2 5 - 2 / YEARS 6 . 77 1 4 , 2 1 4 . 2 3 2 . 2
.j  *■> j  4 YEARS 7 . 1 0 5 1 9 . 3 -  1 9 . 3 5 1 . 6
ro1ir, YEARS 8 . 7 4 1 3 , 6 1 3 . 6 6 5 . 2
4 0 -  4 A YEARS 9 . 55 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 7 5 . 3
4 5 - 4  9 YEARS 1 0 . 4 1 7 . 5 7 . 6 8 2 . 9
5 o -  5 4 YEARS 1 1 . 32 5 . 9 5 . 9 8 8 . 8
5 5 - 5 / y e a  p s 1 2 . 25 4 . 6 4 . 6 0 3 . 4
• '' -  6 4 YEARS 1 3 . 1 1 2 . 0 2 . 0 9 5 . 4
6 A.xD O V E R 1 4 . 25 4 . 6 4 . 6 1 0 G . 0
G . 1 2 M I S S I N G 1 0 0 . 0
T O T A L 5 4 4 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
ERR 
STD DEV 
SKEWNESS 
M 4 Y I M U M
n . 1 10 
2 . 5 6 6  
. 6 6  5 
1 A . 000
MEDIA N 
VARIANCE 
R A N G E
7 . 4 1 9
6 . 5 8 6
1 0 . 0 0 0
V H I D  C A S p S 54 I S S I N G CASES
TABLf A, I I .  2 Respondent ' s  Age Group.
L r  J R .  ' s L
C A T E G O R Y  L A S E L  
A r E < 3 C , S I N G L E
.1 F E C Y C L E  S T A G E  
C O D E
A B S O L U T E  
F F EC
K F L A T I V E  
F R E C  
( P  C T  )
A D J U S T E D  
F REG 
( P C T )
C U M "
F R E Q
( P C T )
1 . 8 7 1 6 . 0 1 6 . 0 1 6 . 0
A r L  < 0 , M , 0 K I D S £  . 3 ? 5 . Q 5 . 9 2 1  . 9
F A M I I  Y ,  0  A p  Y <  5 5 . 1 3 1 2 4 . 1 2 4 . 1 4 6 . 0
F •' M I  L Y , B A P Y 5 -  1 4
F * M I  L Y t P A ! Y > 1 4
4 . 1 2 6 2 3 . 2 2 3 . 2 6 9 . 2
5 • 5 4 0 . 9 0 . 9 7 9 . 2
A ~ E G 0 -  4 4  ,  N » U K I D S 6 . 1 8 3 . 3 3 . 3 8 2 . 5
A C E  j 0 ~ 4 4 , S I N G L E 7 . 2 2 4 . 0 4 . 1 “  8 6 . 6
A : L > h  4 , M , 0 K I D S  
A ' E > * 4 , S I E G L E
S . 4 5  
2 8
8 . 3 8 . 3 9 4 . 8
9  . 5 . 1 5 . 2 1 0 0 . 0
0 . 1 . ? M I S S I N G 1 C C  . 0
t o t a l 5 4 4 1 0 0 . 0 ~ i  oo re r
m r A  f * 4 ,
v: p e l  1 ,
M  R T . S i S
M I N I  i U 0  1 .
o n
j 0 C 
3 1 c  
0 0 0
S T D  E R R  
S TD DE  V 
S K t w N E S S 
M A Y I  M L M
• 0 9 7  
7 .  2 c  7 
. 6 5 6  
9  • 0 C 0
. M E D I A N  
V A R I A N C E  
R A N G E 8 . 0 0 0
V A L I D  c a s t s 3 4 3 H I S S I N G C A S E S  1
T , f - - - - - -  ■
lAgLE A. II. 3 Respondent's Life Cycle Stage
L: " N R . ' S P L A C E OF B I R T H
ABSOLUTE
FREQ
REL A T I V E ADJUSTED CUM
CAT:- g o r y  l a b e l CODE
FR EG 
( PCT)
FREQ
( PCT )
FREQ
( P C T )
A U S T R A L I A 1 . 68. . 22 7 1 6 8 . 3 6 8 . 3
UK -  I R E L A N D 2 . 6 9 1 2 . 7 ___ ------ -1 2 . 7 _____— 8 1 * 0
w EUROPE 3. . 3? 5 . 9 5 . 9 8 6 . 9
_> L U ft 0 P E 4 • 20 3 . 7 3 . 7 9 0 . 6
E EUROPE cJ • 4 . 6 4 . 6 9 5 . 2
N 7 , N o ,  F I J I 6 • 9 1 . 7 1 . 7 9 6 . 9
AS I A 7 . 13 2 . 4 2 . 4 9 9 . 3
AFRI CA 8 . 1 . 2 . 2 9 9 . 4
AM I R I c M 0 . 6 • 6 1 0 0 . 0
G. 1 . 2 M I S S I N G. . 1 0 0 . 0
t o t a l 544 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
MEAN 1 , . p 3
m o d .  i :  5 b 0
KURT USI S  4 . 4 0 3
M TN I ;v U -i 1 , ' j Q Q
STD ERR 
STD DEV 
SKEWNESS 
MAXIMUM
1 - m
2 . 2 1 1
9 . c oo
MEDI AN
VARI ANCE
r a n g e
k m
8 . 0 0 0
V A L I D  CASES 543 M I S S I N G CASES 1
table a . I I ’ 4 Respondent's Place of Bir th
O P i  N D R . ' r> I N D U S T R Y G R O U P
R E L A T I V E A D J U S T E D C UM
A B S O L U T E F R E Q F R E Q FR EG
C ' T E G O R Y  L A B E L C O D E F  R L Q ( P C T ) ( P C T ) ( P C T )
M I N I N C 1 . X . 6 . 7 . 7
M A N U F A C T U R I N G 2 . 1 5 2 . 3 3 . 5 -  - 4 . 2
E L E C , G A S S U P P L Y 3 . 5 . 9 1 . 2 5 . 4
C O N S T R U C T I O N 4 . 3 2 5 . 9 7 . 5 1 2 . 9
W ' S A L E - R E T A I L T R A D E 5 . 5 4 9 . 9 1 2 . 6 2 5 . 5
T P A N  S P l RT . S T O R A G E 6  . 1 C 1 .  £ ......... 2 . 3 ...... - 2 7 . 9
COMM UN 1 C A T I  ON 7 . 1 3 2 . 4 3 . 0 3 0 . 9
M N  A N C  L t E T C 3 . 7 R 7 . 0 8 . 9 3 9 . 8
P I T  L I C  A D M I N 9 . 1 3 1 2 4 . 1 3 0 . 7 7 0 . 5
C 0  M M * T Y S E R V I C E S 1 0 . 9 3 1 7 . 1 ___ 2 1 . S ______ . 9 2 . 3
E N T E R T /  I N  M E N T 1 1 . 3 3 6 . 1 7 . 7 1 C 0 . 0
N 0  T S T a T E D 1 3 . 6 1 . 1 M I S S I N G 1 0 C . 0
N 0 T a  S K E D 1 4 . 1 1 1 2 0 . 4 m i s s i n g 1 0 0 . 0
t o t a l 5 4 4 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . c ------- ------------
M c A N 7 . o ° 9 G T r  E R R . 1 2  1 M E D I  A M 8 . 8 3 2
M O D E 9 .  U 6 0 S T D  D E V 2 . 4 9  8 V A R I A N C E 6 . 2 4 1
K ' A  TO S I S - . 5 1 7 S k E W N E S S -  . 0 9 6 R A N G E 1 0 . 0 0 0
M ■ N I .; U N 1 . 0 0 0 M A X I M U M 1 1 . 0 0 0
V ' ' L I D  C A S E S 9 2 7 M I S S I N G C A S E S  1 1 7
TABLE A. I I .  5 Respondent's Industry Group
GPOCC P . ' S  OC C UP AT I ON GROUP
C A T E G O R Y  L A B E L C O D E
A B S O L U T E
F R E Q
r e l a t i v e
F R E Q  
( p  C T  )
A D J U S T E D  
F P E G  
( P C T )
C U M
F R E Q
( P C T )
p R O F f T L C H , R E L A T E D 0  . 8  3 1 5 . 3 1 9 . 3 1 9 . 3
A V  M 1 N ,  L X  E C ,  M A N A G E  R S 1 . 3 2 5 . 9 .....................  7 . 4 2 6 . 7
C L i  ft 1 C A L 2 . 1 2 3 2 3 . 5 2 9 . 8 5 6 . 5
S A L E  3 3 . 3  1 5 . 7 7 . 2 6 3 . 7
F < h  ' 1 R 3 , E T C 4 . 8 1 .  5 1 . 9 6 5 . 6
M r r, E K S , E T C 5 . 1 t  p  ^ p 6 5 . 8
T R A N S P O R T ,  C O M M ’ N 6 . 2 6 4 . 8 6 . 0 7 1 . 9
T R A D E S , L A B O U R E R S 7 . 6 6 1 2 . 1 1 5 . 3 8 7 . 2
S r  R V I  C L ,  R F. C 1 N 9  . 3  8 7 . 0 8 . 8 9 6 . 0
' L j  F O R C E S 1 0 . 1 7 3 . 1 4 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
i • 0  T S T  T E D 1 1 . 3 . 6 M I S S I N G 1 0 0 . 0
N O T  \  S K E D 1 4 . 1 1 1 2 0 . 4 M I S S I N G 1 0 0 . 0
t o t a l 5 44 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
U F A  i 3  .  j  Q Q
M n  D E 2 . 0 0 0
K ' ’P T O S I S  - 1 . u 2 7
0  I N  I P U P ,  . 0  0 0
R TO E R R  
$ T D D E V  
S K E W N E S S  
m A X I  M Ll M
3 :  111 
. 6  1 1 
1 0 . C 0 C
M E D I  AN 
V A R I A N C E  
R A N G E 1 0 . 0 0 0
V * l  I D C A S E S  4 3 0 H I S S I N G C A S E S  1 1 4
TABLE A. II .  6 Respondent's Occupation Group.
G c 3 C /  E S R . ' s  Q U A L I F I C A T I O N S
C T E J  o  R Y L A B E L C O D E
A B S O L U T E
F R E Q
R F  L A T  I V E  
F R E Q  
( P C T  )
A D J U S T E D 
F R E Q  
( P C T )
C U M
F R E Q
( P C T )
N O N E 0 . 2 5  9 4 7 . 6 4 7 . 6 4 7 . 6
P n D O R  M A S T E R S 1 . 1 3 2 . 4 2 . 4 5 0 . 0
g r a d u a t e  d i p l o m a 2  . 1 0 1 .  8 1 . 8 5 1 . 5
0  C M .  l E G R E J  • 6 2 1 1 . 4 1 1 . 4 6 3 . 2
6 9 . 7
:: 1 P I . O M A 4 . 3 5 6 . 4 6 . 4
T C H ’ M S C E R T 5 . 4 6 8 . 5 8 . 5 7 8  . 1
T R A D l  C E R T , A P P K E N T I C 6  . 6 0  • 1 1 . 0 1 1 . 0 8 9 . 2
o t h e r  . 7 . 5 9 1 0 . 8 1 0 . 8 1 0 0 . 0
M f AN 2 . R P 4
M O V E  . 3 0 0
K U R T J S i S  - 1 . 4 3 3
M I N I  i U  •’ .  j  QO
T O T A L 5 4 4 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
S T D  E R R  
S T D  D f V 
S K E W N  E S S  
M A X I  M U M
2  : ) J i
. 4 3 7
7 . 0 0 0
M F D I A N 
V AR I AN C F 
R A N G E
k m
7 . C O O
y' f  L l D C A S E S  J  4  4 M I S S I N C A S E S  0
TABLE A. I I .  7 Respondent's Qual if icat ions.
H H I  N LG P H ' H O L D  G R U S S
C A T E G O R Y  L A b - t L
y e a r l y  i n c o m e  g r o u p  r f l a t i v e  a d j u s t e o
A B S O L U T  £ F REQ F RE Q
C O D E  F R E Q  ( P C T  ) C P C T )
CUM 
F R EQ 
( P C T )
N 0 N E 0 . 1 6 2 . 9
2 . 9 2 . 9
r  - 1  j  3 i 1 .
2 . 4 . 4 3 . 3
:■ 1 k 4 0 -  2 0 7 0 2 . 4 . 7
. 7 4 . 0
1 2 0 3 0 - 3 1 1 9 3 . 10 1 . 6
1 . 8 5 . 9
t ’’ 1 2 0 - 4 1 5 9 A . 5 . 9
. 9 6 . 8
t  ' 1 , 1 - C I  GO 5 . 5 . 9 . _________ • 9 .... ........ 7 . 7a I _ U )  1 - 7 1
■ * > 5 2 0 0 - 3 7 1  o 6 . S 1 . 5 1 . 5
9 . 2
% 3 7 2 0 - 6 2 3 ° 7 . 1 . 2
. 2 9 . 4
1 6 3 3 0 -  7 5 ° 8 . 3 . 6
. 6 9 . 9
i 7 6  J -  7 2 7  9 G .
-> . 4  ........ 1 0 . 3
5. 7 2 3 0 -  7 7 9 9 1 0 . 2 . 4
. 4 1 0 . 7
f ^ 8  0 0 — ^ 3 1 0 1 1 . 2 . 4
. 4 1 1 . 0
I  c 3 0 -  3 8 3 9 1 2 . 2 . 4
. 4 1 1 . 4
1 r S 4 U - > 3  5 9 1 3 . 7 1 . 3 ....... 1 . 3 _____
1 2 . 7
r 8 - 0 - 9 5 7 9 1 A . 1 1 2 . 0 2 . 0
1 4 . 7
i  9 8 3 0 - 1  0 3 9 9 1 5 . 9 1 . 7 1 . 7
1 6 . 4
1 o v  J 0 - 1  1 A 3 9 1 6 . 1 6 2 . 9
2 . 9 1 9 . 3
i 1 1 3 9 0 - 1 2 3 7 9 1 7  . 1 5 2 . 8 .......  2 . 8 ______ . 2 2 . 1
1 1 2  4 6 0 - 1 3 5 1 9 1 8  . 2 4 4 . 4 4 . 4 2 6 . 5
3 5 2 0 - 1 4 5 5 9 1 9  . 1 4 2 . 6 2 . 6
2 9 . 0
> 1 4 5 6 0 - 1 5 5 9 9 2 0  . 2 1 3 . 9 . 3 . 9
3 2 . 9
. 1  i t  J O - 1 5 1 9 9 21  . 4 5
0 T 8 . 3 4 1  . 2
1.1 8 2 0 0 - 2 0  7 9 9 2 2 . 6 6 1 2 . 1 1 2 . 1
5 3 . 3
6 2 0 8 0 0 - 2 3 3 9 9 2 3  . 6 1 1 1 . 2 1 1 . 2
6 4 . 5
* 2 3 4 0 0 - 2 5 0 9 9 2 4 . 4 7 6 8 . 6 7 3 . 2
3 c ■1 0 0 A N D ü  V E R 2 5 . 1 4 6 2 6 . 8 2 6 . 8 1 0 C . 0
T O T A L 5 4 4 1 0  0 . 0 1 0 0  . 0
h AN 1 9 . 9 1 7
M 0 d L 2 6 . 0 Ö 0
K U R T ü S I  S c # u 1 4
M I N I M U M  . 0  0 0
S T D  F R R . 2 8 1 M E D I A N  
V AR I  AN C E 
R A NGE
ii-.m
2 5 . 0 0 0
S T D D E V  6 . 5 5 6
s k e w n e s s  - 1 . 7 4 7
m a x i m u m  2 5 . COO
v M L I D '  C A S T S  3 4 4 m i s s i n g C A S E S  0
TABLE A. I I .  8 Respondent's Household Gross Annual Income Group.
H 0 V, ' f l ? o R T A N T< 1
c ■ T 2 30 R Y l A3 LL 
V r ( ■; y I  i . PORT A N T 
S r ' M  L «mH  A. T I MP ORT  AMT 
A. L i  T T l  E I MPORT  A M T 
< (- T I MP ORT A NT  AT ALL  
d o n 1 r K POL 
M - P J ,  A L
i ^ P -  1:381
K "  R T o S I S 1 , . 9 0 6
M I N I  “IUP 1 * 0 0 0
9 e L I  D C A S F S 5 4 4
18 C 0 N S t R V A T I 0 N TO YOU?
CODE
ABSOL UTE 
FREQ
R F L A T I  V E 
FREQ 
( PCT )
A DJ UST E D
FREQ
( P C T )
CUM 
F REG 
( P C T )
1 . 7 15 - 5 7 . Q 5 7 . 9 5 7 . 9
2 . 1 69 7 1 . 1 31 . 1 8 9 . 0
J  • 47 P . 6 P . 6 9 7 . 6
^ » 7 1 . 3 1 . 3 9 8 . 9
0. • c • 9 . 9 9 9 . 6
V . 1 . 2 . 2 1 CO . 0
t o t a l 5 A4 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
STD ERR 
STD DEV 
S KFWNESS 
MAXI MUM
M l
7 . 5 1 4
9 . 0 0 0
MEDI  AN 
VAR I AN C E 
R A N G E o . 0 0 G
M I S S I N G C A 3 i  S 0
TABLE A. I I .  9 Respondent's A tt i tude to Conservation.
u 4 I V P 0 R T.  v N C fc OF f: f  s e  r v e  s FOP R E C R E A T I O N
A B S O L U T E
F P E C
R E L A T I V E A D J U S T E D C U M
C * T L 3 0  R Y L A Ei E L CODE
FREQ 
( p CT )
F r  bQ 
( P C T )
F RE Q
( P C T )
V c K Y  1 P OR T  AN T 1 . 4 5 0 6 2  . 7 6 2 . 7 5 2 . 7
S OM L MH . \ T I M P O R T A N T 2 . 7 £ 1 4 . 3 1 4 . 3 9 7 . 1
*  L I T T L E I M P O R T  A NT 3 . 1 ? 2 . 2 2 . 2 9 9 . 3
f . OT  I M P O R T A N T  AT A L L
< 4 ♦ 3 . 6 . 6 9 9 . 6
'■ ■ F U v A L 9  . 1 • — . 2 1 0  0 . 0
T O T A L 5 4 6 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0  . 0
M ! A M 
M 0 b  L
f 3  3  T 0 S I S 
<v ’ N l U
1 . 2 1 9  
1 . 0 0 0  
5 7 . 1 4 v
1 . -■ 0 0
STD ERR 
STD DE V  
S X, E W N E S S
VI A Y 1 v  !J •.<
: ? £ ?  
5 . 6 3  6
9 . C 0
r E D I  A N 
V A R I A N C E  
R A N G E
u . m
6 . 0 0 0
V r L I  D C A S E S  3 4 4 M I  S S I  N Ü C A S E S  0
TABLE A. I I .  10 Respondent's Att i tude to Recreation in Preserved Natural Areas.
I M P O R T A N C E  OF R E S E R V E S  FOR E D U C A T I O N ^  ^
CATEGORY LABEL 
V r R Y 1 I P 0 R T A N T 
SOMLWH. i T I MPORTANT 
m L I T T L E  I MPORTANT  
NOT I MPORTANT AT ALL  
0 ON* T KNOW
CODE
ABSOLUTE
FREQ
FREQ 
CP CT )
1 . 44 8 8 2 . 4
’ ) 83 1 5 . 3
3 . 1 1 2 . 0
4 . 1 . 2
8 . 1 .2
A D J U S T E D  CUM
F R EQ F R E Q
( P C T )  ( P C T )
3 2 . 4  8 2 . 4
.1 5 . 3  _____ 9 7 . 6
2 . 0  9 9 . 6
. 2  9 9 . 8
.2 1 0 0 . 0
TOTAL 544  1 0 0 . 0 ...... .......1 0 0 . 0
M •' A N
M 0 U E
K U R T 0 S I S 
r  TNI TUM
4 6 .  D 2 4 
1 . U 0 0
STD ERR 
STD DEV 
SKEWNESS
maxi mum
: U l
4 . 9 8 38.000
MEDIAN
VARI ANCE
RANGE
' • M
7 . 0 0 0
VALI D CASES 544 M I S S I N G  CASES C
TABLE A. I I .  11 Respondent's A t t i tu de  to Education in Preserved Natural Areas.
U / I MPORTANCE of R F S E R V E S F O R  A E S T H E T I C S
R E L A T I V E A D J  U S T E D C U M
ABSOLUTE F R E Q FREQ FREQ
C f T£GORY LABEL CODE FREQ ( P C T  ) ( P C T ) ( F C  T )
VERY I MPORTANT 1 . 433 7 9 . 6 7 9 . 6 7 9 . 6
SOMEWHAT I MPORTANT L. • 32 1 5 . 1 . 1 5 . 1 .  - 9 4 . 7
A L I T T L E  I M P 0 R T A N T 7- • 25 4 . 6 4 . 6 9 9 . 3
NOT I MPORTANT AT ALL 4 . 2 . 4 . 4 9 9 . 6
DON' T  KNOW 8 . . 4 . 4 1 0 0 . 0
T O T A L 544  _ 1 0 0 . 0 __100.0 -
M FAN 1 . 2  79
MODE 1 . J 0 0
KURTOSIS 34.262
m i n i  m u m 1 . 0 0 0
STD ERR . 0 2 9  , MEDI AN
STD DEV . 6 8 6  VARI ANCE
SKEWNESS 4 . 5 5 7  RANGE
MAXIMUM 8 . 000
1.128
7 *. 0 5 J
V sL I  D CASES 544 M I S S I N G  CASES 0
TABLE A. I I 12 Respondent's A t t i t u d e  to Aesthet ic  Use o f  Preserved Natural 
Areas.
N 1
C ■ T E J 0  R V
I ' 1 P 0 K T A w C E OF 
L A B E L
R E S E R V E S
C O D E
T OP  R E S E A R C H
R E L A T I V E
At ? S O L U T E  F R E 0
F R E Q  ( P C T )
A D J U S T E D  
F & EG 
( P C T )
C U M
F R E Q
( P C T )
V ‘ r\ r  I M P O R T A N T 1 . T- 7 A 6 8 . 3 6 p . 8 6 8  . S
S P M £ » H T I M P O R T A N T 2 . 1 1 9 2 1 . 9 2 1  . 9 9 0 . 6
A L I T T L E I T.  P O R T  A N T 3 . 3 3 6 .  1 6 . 1 9 6 . 7
■CT I M P O R T A N T  m T A L L A . 1 1 2 . 0 2 . 0 9 6 . 7
i O N ' T  K A O  2 £ . 6 1 . 1 1 . 1 9 9 . 8
n r r  u j  a 9 . 1 2 . 2 1 0 C . 0
t o t a l 5 A A 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
p r a n
M o i  r
K OR T o S  I  S 
i'i I N I  ‘ U •!
1 .  < *9 3 
1 . J 0 0 
2 1 . 0 9 /  
1 . j  0 0
S T D  E R R  
S I D  D E V  
S K E W N E S S  
v  A X I  M U M
. 0 A 4
1 . 0 3  0 
3 .  9  A 9  
0 . 0  0 G
M E D I A  N 
V A R I  A N C F 
R A N G E
1 . 2 2 7
1 . 0 6 1
3 . 0 0 0
v ' L I D  C A S ES 5 A A V I S S I N G C A S E S  0
TABLE A. I I .  13 Respondent's Att i tude to Research in Preserved Natural Areas.
W I MPORT  ANC E OF
C ' T c j OKY LAE LL 
V * RY I P ORT A N T 
S \ 2 L H  T I MPORT AMT 
’ L I T T L E  I f  P 0 R T A ■ < T 
:< 0 T I K PORTANT AT ALL  
L-Or , ' T k t  oa
K ' t U j  A L
i., r  ;  r; 1 . 4 1 9
M A [' : 1 . J  0  0
k  ! 'R  T J S  1 S 2 2 . 7  P 0
i’i TN I  ■ t UM 1 . J 0  0
v ' L 1 u C A S f S n A A
RESERVES 
■ C 0 D E
FOR P R E S E R V A T I O N
R E L A T I V E
A B S OL UT E  EPEQ
FREQ ( P C T )
A DJ UST E D 
F PEG 
( P C T )
CUM 
F F F G 
( P C T )
1 . 4 15 7 6 . 3 7 6 . 3 7 6 . 3
p # 74 1 3 . 6 1 3 . 6 8 9 . 9
2 4 0 7 . 4 7 . 4 9 7 . 2
4 » 6 1 . 5 1 . 5 9 8 . 7
c . 6 1 . 1 1 .1 9 9 . 6
9 . 1 . 2 . 2 1 0 0 . 0
TOTAL 5 A4 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
STD ERR 
' STD DEV 
? K F ■% f) L S S 
M A X I M U M
. 04 A 
1 . 0 2  3 
4 . 1 5  5 
9 . 0 0 0
MEDI AN 
V A R I A N C E  
R A N G t 3 . 0 0 0
M i N S 1 NG CASE 5 C
TABLE A. I I .  14 Respondent's A t t i tude to Preservation Use of Preserved 
Natural Areas.
a 1 7 DOES R.  WATCH NATURE ST UDY ON T V ?
C ' T E G O R Y  L A B E L CODE
A B S O L U T E
F REQ
R E L A T I V E  
FREQ 
( P CT )
A D J U S T E D  
FREQ 
( P C T )
CUM
F REQ
( P C T )
Y F S 1 . 4 4 2 31 . 3 81 . 7 8 1 . 7
NO 2 . 9 9 1 S . 2 1 8 . 3 1 0 0 . 0
NO R E S P O N S E C . 7 . 6 M I S S I N G 1 0 0 . 0
T O T A L 5 4 4 1 OC . 0 1 CO . 0
ME A N  1 . 1  A3
M O L L  1 . j 0 0
STD ERR 
STD DE V
. 0 1 7
. 3 6 7
v M E D I A N  
V A R I A N C E
1 . 1 1 2
. 1 5 0
K U R T u S i S  . 7 0 6
M I N I M U M  1 . 0 0 0
S K E W N E S S 
M A X I M U M
1 . 6 4 4
2 . 0 C 0
R A N G E 1 . 0 0 0
V A L I D  C A S E S  3 4 1 M I S S I N G C A S E S  3 ----- . . . . . .------
TABLE A .  I I .  15  R e s p o n d e n t ' s  P r e f e r e n c e  f o r  N a t u r e  B a s e d  T . V .
Programmes.
0 1 t
C ' T E b O R Y
DOES R . 
L A B E L
READ A E OUT  NAT UR 
CODE
E S T U D Y ?
A B S O L U T  E 
FREQ
R E L A T I V E  
FR EQ 
( PCT  )
ADJ USTE D 
F REQ 
( P C T )
CUM
FREQ
( P C T )
Y t 5 1 . 2 6 2 4 8 . 2 4 8 . 2 4 8 . 2
NO .. 2 3 2 5 1 . 8 . 5 1 . 8  ..... 1 CO .  0
T 0 T A L 5 4 4 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
M F A N 1 . 5 1 b
: .  u o o
STD ERR . 0 2 1 M E D I A N 1 . 5 3 5
. 2  50M 0 D L STD DEV . 5 0 0 V A R I A N C E
K ' /  R T 0 S 1 S “ 2 . 0 0 2 SKEWNESS - . 0 7 4 RANGE 1 . 0 0 0
M I N I  v; U M 1 . 0 0 0 MA X I MU M 2 . 0 0 0
j  * L I D CASES 5 4 4 M I S S I N G  CASES 0
TABLE A. I I .  16 Respondent's Preference fo r  Nature Based Reading Mate r ia l .
a V I S I T E D  ANY RE S E R V E S  I N  L A S T  1 c m o n t h s ?
R E L A T I V E A D J U S T E D C U M
A B S O L U T E F R E Q F R E Q F R E Q
C A T E G O R Y  L A B E L C O D E F R E Q ( P C T  ) (  F C T ) ( P C T )
Y r S 1 . 4  2 2 7 7 . 6 7 7 . 6 7 7 . 6
N 0 2 . 1 2  2 2 2 . 4 2 2 . 4 1 0 0 . 0
T O T A L 5 4 4 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
M E A N 1 . < 2 4 S T D  E R R . 0 1 8 M E D I A N 1 . 1 4 5
M O D E 1 * 0 0  0 S T D  D E V . 4  1 7 V A R I  A N C F .  1 7 4
K UR Tü- S I S - . 2 4  3 S K E W N E S S 1 . 3 2 6 R A N G E 1 . 0 0 0
M I N I  . U 1 . 0 0  0 M A X I M U M 2 . 0 0 0 ............... — ................ ......... .........
V A L I D  C A S E S d 4 4 M I S S I N G C A S E S  0
TA3LE A. I I .  17 Respondent's Preference fo r  P a r t i c ip a to ry  Use o f
Preserved Nature Areas.
u r  T o r  USE GROUPED TOTAL USE OF N P NR
c a t e g o r y  l a b e l CODt
ABSOLUTE 
F R LQ
R EL AT I VE 
FR EQ 
( PCT)
ADJ UST ED 
FREQ 
( PCT)
CUM
FREQ
( P CT )
D A Y 3 L T 1 1 . 153 2 9 . 0 3 7 . 4 3 7 . 4
D ’ Y 3 1 TO 7 2 . 1 12 2 0 . 6 2 6 . 5 6 4 . 0
8 1 . 5o n  s 3 TO 7 3 . 74 1 3 . 6 1 7 . 5
DAYS 7 TO 1 4 4 . 40 7 . 4 9 . 5 91 . 0
DAYS 14 TO 21 5 . 19 3 . 5 4 . 5 9 5 . 5
DAYS GK 21 6 . 19 3 . 5 4 . 5 1 on o
DAYS 0 0 . 122 2 2 . 4 MI S S I N G 1 0 0 . 0
t o t a l 5 44 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
fi F A u 
MODE
2 . 3 0 6
1 . 0 0 0
STD ERR 
STD DEV
. 06 3
1 . 4 0 2
m e d i a n
VARI ANCE
1 . 9 7 3  
1 . 9 6 6r\ ' K 1 U b i  b
j N I 1\ U M
» A 1 3 
1 . oOO
SKEWNESS
MAXI MUM
1 . 0 3 4  
6 . 0 0 0
RANGE 5 . 0 0 0  '
V A L I D CASES 422 m i s s i n g CASES 122
TABLE A. I I .  18 Respondent's Total Part ic ipatory Use of  Preserved
Natural Areas.
•V TO T R L C GROUPED TOTAL 
CATEGORY LABEL
RECREATI ON
CODE
RE L A T I V E  ADJUSTED
ABSOLUTE FREQ FREQ
FREQ ( PCT)  ( PCT)
CUM
FREQ
( PCT)
D • Y S L T 1 1 . 4 5 8 . 3 3 9 . 1 3 9 .  1
D ' YE  1 TO 3 20 3 . 7 1 7 . 4 5 6 . 5
D 1 Y S T TO' 7 3 . 24 4 . 4 2 0 . 9 7 7 . 4
D a Y j 7 TO 1 4 4 . 16 2 . 9 1 3 . 9 9 1 . 3
DAYS 14  TO 21 5 . 7 1 . 3 6 . 1 9 7 . 4
D ' YE G T 21 6 .
7 . 6 2 . 6 1 Q 0 . 0
D a. Y S 0 ^ • 4 2 9 7 * . 0 MI S S I NG 1 0 0 . 0
TOTAL 544 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
M FAN 
M 0 D L
K UR TOSi S  
M f N 1 GUM
2 . 3 8 3  
1 . 0 0 0  
- . 4 7 2  
1 . 0 0 0
STD ERR 
STD DEV 
SKEWNESS 
M A X I M U M
. 1 3 2  
1 . 4 1 2  
. 7 0 1  
6 . 0 0 0
MEDI  AN 
VARI ANCE
2 . 1 2 5
HURANGE
v ' ALI D CASES 115 MI S S I N G CASES 4 2 9
1
TABLE A. I I .  19 Resoondent's Use of Preserved Natural Areas for  
Recreation.
i. TO T E D U
c a t e g o r y
G R O U P E D  T O T A L  
L A B E L
e d u c a t i o n
C O D E
U S E
I
A B S O L U T E
F R E Q
R E L A T  I V E  
F R E Q  
C P C T  )
A D J U S T E D
F R E Q
C P C T )
C U M  
F R E Q  
( P C  T  )
D • Y $ L T  1 1 . 6 1 . 1 6 6 . 7 6 6 . 7
o r y  s
D '  Y j
1 T O  
3 TO 7
"0 1 . 2 1 1 . 1 7 7 . 6
3 . c .  4 2 2 . 2 1 0 0 . 0
t) '  Y S g 0 . 5 3 5 9 8 . 3 M I S  S I N  G 1 0 0 . 0
T O T A L 5 4 4 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
fi r  A N 
M 0  D t
K ' '  R T 0  S I  S 
M I N 1-1 Ur*
\ :W
-  • ^  A 6  
1 .  J  0  0
S T D  E R R  
$ T D D E V  
S K E W N E S S  
M A X I M U M
1 . 1 9 2
3 . 0 0 0
N F  D I A N
v a r i a n c e
R A N G E
u . m
2 . C O O
V r L  I  D C A S T S 9 M I S S I N G C A S E S  5 3 5
TABLE A. II.  20 Respondent's Use of Preserved Natural Areas for Education.
G P T O T A C S G R O U P E D  T O T A L A E S T H E T I C U S E
R E  L  a  T  I  V E A D J U S T E D C U M
A P S  G L U T  E F R E Q F R E Q F R E Q
C A T  E GO R Y l a b e l C O D E F R E Q C P  C T  ) C P C T ) C P C T )
D * Y S L T 1 1 . 1 3 3 2 4 . 4 6 6 . 2 6 6 . 2
D A Y S  1 T O 7 2 . 5 3 9 . 7 - 2 6 . 4 9 2 . 5
D A Y S  3 T O 7 3 . 1 2 2 . 2 6 . 0 9 8 .  5
D A Y S  7 T O 1 4 4 . 3 . 6 1 . 5 1 0 0 . 0
0 f Y S C C . 3 4 3 6 3  .  1 M I S S I N G 1 0 0 . 0
T O T A L 5  4 4 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
*  F A \ 1 . 4 7 8 S T D  F R R . 0 4  8 M F D I  A N 1 . 2 5 6
M (' D E 1 .  0 0 0 S T D  D E V . 6  7 5 V A R I A N C E . 4 5 6
K U P  T U S  i  S r i . 2 7 5 S K E W N E S S 1 . 5 9 4 R A N G E 3 . 0 0 0
M I N I  T U M 1 . 0 0 0 M A X 1 M U M 4 . 0 0 0
V A L I D  C A  S E S 2 0 1 M I S S I N G C A S E S  3 4 3
TABLE A. II.  21 Respondent's Use of Preserved Natural Areas for
Sight Seeing (Aesthetic Use).
[, p T 0  T H P G R O U P E D  T O T A L H O L I D A Y S r  P I C N I C S  U S E
R E L A T I V E  A D J U S T E D C UM
A B S O L U T E F R E Q  F R E Q F R E Q
C A T E G O R Y  L A B E L C O D E F R E Q ( P C T )  ( P C T ) ( P C T )
D r Y S L T  1 1 . 9  8 1 8 . 0  5 0 . 0 5 C  . 0
0 f y S 1 T O 7 2 4 6 8 .  5 ................ 2  2 . 5  7 2 . 5
D ' Y S 3 T O 7 3 . 2 4 4 . 4  1 2 . 2 8 5 . 7
D A Y 3 7  T O 1 4 4 . 1 5 2 .  £  —  7 . 7 9 2 . 4
D A Y S 1 4  T O 2 1
c Q 1 . 5  4 . 1 9 7 . 4
D A Y S GT  2 1 ---------- ------- :-------- 6  . 5 . 9  _______  2 . 6 _____ 1 0 0 . 0
D A Y S 0 0 . 3 4  8 6 4 . 0  M I S S I N G 1 0 0 . 0
T O T A L 5 4 6 1 0 0 . 0  1 0 0 . 0
U f A N| 2 . 0  0  Ü S T D  E R R . 0 9 3 M r  D I A N 1 . 5 0 0
M O D E 1 .  O 0 0 S T D  D E V 1 * 3 0 9 V A R I A N C E  _______ 1 . 7 1 3 . .
K  1' R T 0  S I  S 1 . u 3 1 S K E W N E S S 1 . 3 4 $ R A N G E 5 . 0 0 0
M I N I UM 1 .  0 0 0 M A X I M U M 6 . 0 0 0
V A L I D  C A S E S 1 9 6 M I S S I N G C A S E S  2 4 8
TABLE A. II.  22 Respondent's Use of Preserved Natural Areas for
Holidays and Picnics (Recreation and Aesthetic  1).
G r T 0 T F . C  G R O U P E D  T O T A L  B U S H W A L K I N G  'i C A M P I N G  U S E
C A T E G O R Y  L A B E L C O D E
A B S O L U T E
F R E Q
R E L A T  I V E  
F R E Q 
( P C T )
A D J U S T E D
F R E Q
( P C T )
C UM 
F R E Q  
( P C T )
D A Y S  L T  1 1 . 1 4 2 . 6 2  4 . 6 2 4 . 6
D A Y- S 1 T O c  • 1 4 2 . 6 - 2 4 . 6 4 9 . 1
I ' Y j  7 T O 7 J % 1 5 2  . 8 2 6 . 3 7 5 . 4
■D A Y S  ?  T O 1 4 4 . 1 0 1 . 3 1 7 . 5 9 3 . 0
D A Y S  1 4  T O 2 1 5 . 1 . 2 1 .  8 9 4 . 7
D 6 Y S G T 2 1 6  . 2 .  6 5 . 3 1 0  0 . 0
D * Y S C 0  . 4 8 7 3 9 . 5 M I S S I N G 1 0 0 . 0
T O T A L 5 4 4 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
M. r  A N
M 0  D E
K U R T O S I S  
M I N I  MU  M
; . s  T 2
2 . Ö Ö Ö
S T D  E R R  
S T D  D E V 1 -M M E D I A NV A R I A N C E f : i \ll
. 0 7 4  
1 .  0 0 0
S K E W N E S S  
M A X I  M u  M
. 6 6 5  
6 . 0  C 0
R A N G E 5 . 0 0 0
V ' L I D  C A S E S  5  7 M I S S I N G C A S E S  4  £  7
TABLE A. II.  Respondent's Use of Dreserved Natural Areas for
Bushwalking and Camping (Recreation and Aesthetic 2).
APPENDIX III
ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ATTITUDES 
TO THE FIVE PURPOSES OF NATIONAL PARKS AND NATURE RESERVES
Tables A . I I I . l  to 6 present an analysis of the differences in 
respondents' attitudes to the five primary purposes of National Parks 
and Nature Reserves. Table A . I I I . l  presents a Chi squared analysis 
comparing all attitudes to all  purposes,whereas the other tables examine 
the stat ist ic  significance of the differences between attitudes to 
pairs of purposes.
The expected response is calculated by:
..r f jii _ row total x column total 
txpectea absolute total
and the Chi-squared formula for each item is
2 _ (Actual - Expected)  ^
x ~ Expected
2 *  2 The break-even Chi squared, x » i s  presented for each table, x
values below this value indicate that the difference between attitudes to
the purposes under consideration could be explained by statistical chance.
2 2 *Alternatively, x values above x mean that the difference observed is 
due not to statistical chance,but to other underlying factors. For 
example, i t  can be concluded that attitudes to recreational and educational 
uses (Table A . I I I . 2) are basically the same,but attitudes to preservation 
and research uses (Table A . I I I . 5) are fundamentally different.
Question 4 5 6 7 8
Response Act., ( Exp.) Act. (Exp.) Act. (Exp.) Act. (Exp.) Act. (Exp.) l
Very
Important 450 (426) 448 (426) 433 (426) 374 (421) 415 (421) 2120
Somewhat
Important 78 ( 88) 83 ( 88) 82 ( 88) 119 ( 86) 74 ( 86) 436
Others 15 ( 29) 12 ( 29) 27 ( 29) 44 ( 29) 48 ( 29) 146
Total 543 543 542 537 537 2702
X 2 = 61.18
X2* = 15.51 (a = 0.05) (8 degrees of freedom) 
Table A . I I I . I :  Dif ferences Between A l l  A t t i tudes
Question
Response
4
Act. (Exp.)
5
A c t . )  (Exp.) z
Very Important 450 (449) 448 (449) 898
Somewhat Important 78 ( 80) 83 ( 80) 161
Others 15 ( 13) 12 ( 13) 27
Total 543 543 1086
x2 = 0.54
x -  5.99 (o = 0.05) (2 degrees o f  freedom) 
Table A . I I I . 2: Dif ference Between A t t i tudes  to Recreational and
Educational Uses.
Question 5 6
Response A c t . (Exp .) Act. (Exp.) £
Very Important 448 (441) 433 (441) 881
Somewhat Important 83 ( 83) 82 ( 83) 165
Others 12 ( 20) 27 ( 20) 39
TOTAL 543 542 1085
2
x  = 5.91
2*
X = 5.99 ( a  = 0.05) (2 degrees o f  freedom)
Table A . I I I . 3: Dif ference Between A t t i tu de s to Educational and
Aesthet ic Uses
Question
Response
6
A c t . (Exp.)
8
Act. (Exp.) £
Very Important 433 (426) 415 (422) 848
Somewhat Important 82 ( 78) 74 ( 78) 156
Others 27 ( 38) 48 (37) 75
TOTAL 542 537 1079
X 2 = 7.12
9 *
x = 5.99 ( a  = 0.05) (2 degrees o f  freedom)
Table A . I I I . 4: Dif ference Between A t t i tu de s  to Aesthet ic and
Preservation Uses.
Question 4 6
Response Act. (Exp.) Act. (Exp . ) E
Very Important 450 (442) 433 (442) 883
Somewhat Important 78 ( 80) 82 ( 80) 160
Others 15 ( 21) 27 ( 21) . 42
Total 543 542 1085
X2 = 3.82
X2 *  = 5.99 ( a  = 0.05) (2 degrees o f  freedom)
Table A. 111.5: Dif ference Between A t t i tudes  to Recreational and
Aesthet ic Uses.
Question
Response
7
Act. (Exp.)
8
Act. (Exp.) E
Very Important 374 (394) 415 (394) 789
Somewhat Important 119 ( 96) 74 ( 96) 193
Others 44 ( 46) 48 ( 46) 92
Total 537 537 1074
X2 = 12.84
x = 5.99 (a = 0.05) (2 degrees o f freedom)
Table A . I I I . 6: Dif ference Between A t t i tudes  to Research and
Preservat ion Uses.
APPENDIX IV
CROSSTABULATION ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS1 
CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS GROUP ALLOCATION
This appendix presents the details of an analysis designed 
to detect if the group sub-samples are representative of the total 
survey population. Crosstabulations of respondents' characteristics 
against the four groups are presented,and the relationships existing 
between each pair of variables is summarized,using the x2 statistic 
to test the significance of the association and the uncertainty 
co-efficient to test the strength of the association. The uncertainty 
co-efficient can range from zero to one,with one indicating the 
maximum strength of association. Where appropriate, other statistics 
indicating the strength of association are also presented.
r c r p
c i  * j r
R 0 W ^ P t  T 1 1 '■ -  7 ■!' Y r 3 0 - 4 0  YE 4 0 YEARS P 0 W 
COL PET IA P S ARC AND OVf TOTAL
T ü l  ° LT I 1 . I 2 . 1  3 . 1
... P 0 J P -----------------I ------------------ I ------------------ I ------------------ 1
1 . 1 2  6 1 2 1 I 1 3  2. 1 3 7  9
3 4 . 6  I 6 9 . 8r 2 7 . 2 I 3 1 .  9 I
i 7  3 . ° 6 7  . 6 I 6 9 .  £
i 2 7 . 2 I 2 2 . 3 I 2 4 . 3  I
- 1 - -  I - -  I - ---------------------------- 2
* 9 T 1 4 I 2 1 I 1 9  I 5 4
i 2 c .  4 I 3 £  . 9 T 3 5 . 2  I 9 . 9
1 •• .  0 T 1 1 . 7
▼ 1 0 . 1  I
I 2 .  6 i 7 . 9 I 7 . 5  I
1 - i - ---------------------------- 2
4 I 1 4 j 1 9 I 1 8  I 5 1
I 2 7 . 5 I 3 7 .  3 T 3 5 . 3  I 9 . 4
I f  .  C I 1 0 . 6 I 9 . 5  I
i .  6 I 3 . 5 3 . 3  I
i -  I  - -  I " ---------------------------- i
4  • I n 1 I 1 3 T 2 0  1 r  9
I 3 5.6 1 3 0 . 5 i 3 7 . °  I 1 0 . 9
I 1 2 . 0 T 1 C .  1 1 1 0  . t  I
3 . c I 3 •  j i 3 . 7  I
c o l  u n o  
t o t a l
-  I -
1 7 r  
3 7 . 2
-  I ~
1 7 9
3 3 . 0
---------------------------- T
1 6 9  5 4 3
3 4  .  8  1 0 0  . C
x? = 2.47 with G d/f:  Significance = 0.87 Uncertainty Coefficient =
0.002, Sonor1s D = .009.
TABLE A. IV. 1 Group vs Respondent's Age Group.'
uROUP
f v
c 0  _ N T 1
R 0  *’ P C T 1 n  a l  r’ F E M A L E k  Otv
V. v> L
T 'J T
P C T 
P C T
1
I 1 . I 2’ . I
T O T  A L
1 . I 1 •' 1 I 1 9 9 T 7 c  0
I 4  / .  6 I 5 2 . ' . I 6 9 . 9
1 7 r' .  7 1 6 9  . 1 I
I • 7 7• ~ X 3 6 . 6 I~ I
• i
4 4
4 I 3 0 J 5 L
.  4 I 5 5 . 0 I 9 . 9
i .  4 T 1 0 . 4 I
1 L .  4 1 5 . 5 I
— I-
-  . I
5 1
2 7 I 2 5 I 5 1
I .  0 I 4 9  .  C I 9  . 4
1 1 C . 2 T t  .  7 T
I 4 Q• I 4 . 6 I
— I ■
' 4 * I -  t; I 7 4 I r c
I 4 2 . 4 I 5 7 . 6 I 1 o . -
I .  e I 1 1 . 8 I
I 4 • V 1 ' 6 . 3 I
- I ■
L U L U  Y!.‘J 
T 0  T 4 L L 7
■: f-
\ 1
2 7  3 
5 2 . 9
5 4 4
1 C C .  0
X? = 1 . 0 3  w i t h  3 r l / f :
TABLE A. IV. 2 Group
Significance = 0.79. 
vs Respondent's Sex.
Uncertainty Coefficient 0 . 001 .
GROUP
1; CRN
C 0 U N T I
ROW P J  1AUSTRALI  0 T H C R 
COL P C T I A
' 1 2 . I
I ;■ a 7 132 I
I 65 . 7 I 3A . o I
6 6 . 6 1 7 6 . 7 I
i A  ^ ^ 1 2 A . 3 I
T A4 I 1 0 I
i 6 1 .  r I 1 8 . 5 I
i 1 1 . 9 1 5 . 3 T
T c  .  1 I 1 . 2 I
k OW
TOTAL
379
6 9 . 8
3 . I 56 I 1 5 I
I 7 0.6- I 29 .A I
I 9 . 7 I 8 . 7 I
(  .6 I 2 . 3 1
-  I -
A . I 4 A I 15
T
i 7 4 . 6 I 2 5 . A 1
1 1 . 9 I S . 7 I
I 8 .  1 I 2 . 3 I
COL UM « 
TOTAl
- I  -
371 
6? . 7
i1 
'X
jfv
-
1 r- •
1 
K
't
1
5 A 
9 . 9
5 1 
9.  A
5 9 
1 0 . 9
5 A 3 
1 0 C. 0
X2 * 7 . 9F with 3 d/ f :  Signi f icance = 0.064.  Uncertainty Coef f ic ient  = 0.007.
TABLE A. IV. 3 Group vs Respondent's Place of  Birth.
GROUP
G P 0 C C
COUNT :
R 0 W PCT I N 0 N ¥ To n WHIT LOWER W H BLUE COL ROW
COL PCT I L COLLAR I T t  COLL L AR TOTAL
TOT P i T T 0 • 1 1 . I L. • I 5 . I
1 . T 3 4 7 3 I 1 02 T 1 1 3  I 3 7 7
I 2 2 . 3 X 2 0 . 7  I 2 7 .  1 I 3 0 . 0  I 6 9 . 7
I 7 6 . 7 r 6 7 . ö I ö A . 2 I 72 . A I
I 1 5 . 5 1 4 .A I 1 8 . 9 I 2 0 . 9  I
-  I -
5 A2 . T 1 n T 1 5 I 1 S j 1 1 I
T 1 r. . 5 i 2 7 . 3  J 3 7 . 3 I PC . A I , 1 0 . 0
1 9 . 9 i 1 3 . 0  1 1 1 . 3 I 7 . 1  I
i 1 . p i 2 . 3  I 3 . 3 I 2 . 0  I
X
X 2 P 10 ][ 1 3 I 1 5 I 51
1 5 . 7 1 9 . 6  I 3 5 . 3 I 2 ° .  A I 9 .  A
i 7  .  7 i 8 . 7  :[ 1 1 . 3 I 9 . 6  I
i 1 . c' i 1 . 3 L 3 . 3 I 2 . 6  I
- i -
A . T 0 T 1 2 [ 21 I 17  1 59
1 1 5 . 7 T 2 0 . 3 I 3 5 . 6 I 28  . 8  I 1 0 . 9
T •c .  1 i 1 0 .A I 1 3 . 2 I 1 0 . 9  I
i 1 . 7 i 2 . 2  .I 3 . 9 I 3 . 1  I
COLUMN 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 5 9 1 56 5 A 1
TOTAL 2 0 .'5 21 . 3 2 9 .  A 2 8 . 8 1 0 0 . 0
x2 = 7.16 with 9 d/ f :  Signi f icance = 0.62.  Uncertainty Coef f i c i ent  = 0.007.
TABLE A. IV. 4 Group vs Respondent's Occupation Group
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x2 = 2.09 with 3 d/f:  Significance = 0.55. Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.002.
TABLE A. IV. 6 Group vs Respondent's Qualif icat ion.
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x2 = 5.19 with 6 d/f:  Significance = 0.52. Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.006
TABLE A. IV. 7 Group vs Respondent's Marital Status.
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APPENDIX V
PAYMENT MODE RELATIONSHIPS
TablesA. V. 1 to A. V. 8 of th is  appendix present the 
crosstabulations of respondent's choice of payment mode with th e i r  
socio-economic character is t ics .  Of the character is t ics  considered, 
respondent's age and sex have s ign i f ica n t  re lat ionships with 
payment mode choice. To establ ish i f  these re lat ionships cause 
the re la t ionship between payment mode and wil l ingness to pay - fo r  
instance, i f  sex is a strong determinant of wi l l ingness to pay and 
payment mode choice, the re la t ionship between payment mode choice 
and wil l ingness to pay is said to be spurious,and the re la t ionship 
between payment mode and wil l ingness to pay would not be sustained 
when contro l led fo r  sex - crosstabulat ions con tro l l ing  fo r  age and 
sex are presented.
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x2 = 7.23 with  2 d / f :  S igni f icance = 0.03. Uncertain ty C oe f f ic ie n t  = 0.
TABLE A. V. 1 Payment Mode vs Respondent's Age Group.
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X2 = 7.63 (corrected) with 1 d / f :  S igni f icance = 0.006.
Uncertainty  C oe f f ic ien t  = 0.02.
TABLE A. V. 2 Payment Mode vs Respondent's Sex.
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COUNT r
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C ü L PCT 1 A
TOT PCT
GOVERN f-‘ f  N T
-  I
2 . I
CONSERVATI ON ORG I
. i.
1
_  T
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1 1 . 1  2 . 1
11 p I 54 I
6?- . 6 X 3 1 . 4 I
4 6 . 1 T 5 0 . 0 I
3 2 . 4 i 1 4 . 5 I
138 i 54 I
7 1 . 9 i 28 . 1 I
57 . 9 i 5 0 . 0 I
3 7 . 9 1 4 . 8 T1
256
7 0 . 7
1 C 3 
2 9 . 7
K rt
TOTAL
17 2 
47.3
192
$ 2 . 7
36 4
10 0 . 0
X 2 = 0.32 (corrected) with 1 d / f :  -Signif icance = 0.57.
Uncertainty Coeff ic ient = 0.001.
TABLE A. V. 4 Payment Mode vs Respondent's Place o f  B i r th .
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X 2 = 4.35 with 2 d / f :  Signif icance = 0.11. Uncertainty Coeff ic ient = 0.009.
TA3LE A. V._5 Payment Mode vs Respondent's Marital  Status.
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X 2 = 1.42 (corrected) with 1 d/f :  Significance = 0.23
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.003.
TABLE A. V. 6 Payment Mode vs Respondent's Qualif icat ions.
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TABLE A. V. 7 Payment Mode vs Respondent's Occupation.
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x2 = 5.78 with 6 d/ f :  Significance = 0.45. Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.02.
TABLE A. V. 9 Grouped Willingness to Pay vs Payment Mode: 
for 18-30 Year Old Respondents.
' .1 2
C 0  LJ N  7 1
R 0 W r> r y I b O V E R N M F C O U S E R V A K 04
C 0 L > L T L U  T T I O M  ORu T OTA L
T j T P . T I 1 . 1 3 . I
-  I - I
0 . T 7 I j
I 1 C 0 . 0 I * V.1 I 4 . 7
A 7 . 7 i. • i I
L . 7 i . j I
-  J - I I
1 . 1 I 0 I
I 2 c . r' I 7 5 . 0 I 1 2 . 5
T r . 1 1 3 4 . 0 1
I 7 . 1 I 9 . 4 T
-  I - I T
? t I L 1 J, I C'
x L 4 i 4 I 5 5 . 6 I 1 4 . 1
I 1 0 . 7 I 2 C . 0 1
I 6 .  7
-7 T
l » > I
- 1 - I 1
• I 7 I ■< T 1 5
I U ' , 7 I 5 3 . 3 i 2 3 . 4
I 1 7 . ° 3 2 . 0 i
I 1 "  . 9 I 1 2 . 5 i
- 1 - I l
t I 1 1 T * i , „ 14 ...
I 7 v , ' : 1 . 4 i 2 1 . '
I c f' . ? i 1 2 . T
I I 7 .  - 4 . / 2
- 1 i
•
C i i
I 7 1 . 4 2 22 .  4 i 1 ; . 0
1 1 . ‘ . F £ . 0 i
I 7 P i 3 . 1 i
T i ir. I 7 1 i V'
i 2 7 . r x 1 2 .  3 i 1 2 . 5
x 1 7 . 7 I 4  .  t„ i
I 1« . r 1 1 .  4 i
— T - 1 i
C 0  L U M -i • r 7 5 l_ 4
T O T A l 6  0 . 9 39  .  1 1 C 0 .  0
X2 = 13.1 with 6 d / f :  Signif icance = 0.04.
Uncertainty Coeff ic ient = 0.06.
TABLE A. V. 10 Grouped Will ingness to Pay vs Payment Mode: 
fo r  30-40 Year Old Respondents.
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X2 = 9.4 with 6 d/f : Significance = 0.15.
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.04.
TABLE A. V. 11 Grouped Willingness to Pay vs Payment Mode: 
For 40 Year Old and Over Respondents.
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X2 = 5.43 with 6 d/f :  Signi f icance = 0.49.
Uncertainty Coeff ic ient  = 0.02.
TABLE A. V. 12 Grouped Will ingness to Pay vs Payment Mode: 
Male Respondents.
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X 2 = 16.48 with 6 d/ f :  Significance = 0.01.
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.04.
TABLE A. V. 13 Grouped Willingness to Pay vs Payment Mode: 
For Female Respondents.
APPENDIX VI
CROSSTABULATION ANALYSIS OF PREPAREDNESS
TO PAY
tThe tables presented in this appendix are corsstabulations 
of respondent's preparedness to pay for the plan to maintain the 
Nadgee-based hypothetical Nature Reserve in a preserved state (Q.ll),  
against their socio-economic characteristics,  attitudes and preferences. 
x2 s ta t is t ics  are presented to indicate the significance of the 
relationship il lustrated by each table. In addition the uncertainty 
coefficient and eta s tat is t ics  are provided, where appropriate, to 
indicate the relationship strength.
Q 1 1
YES
NO
AG EG PCOUNT I
ROW PCT 11 8 i O -c m 30 -40 YE 4 C YEARS
COL PCT I ARS ARS AND OVETOT PCT I 1 .X 2. I 3 .II
1 . I 142 I 1 28 I 137 I
I 34.9 1 31.4 I 33.7 I
I 81.6 I 72.3 I 73.7 I
I 26.4 I 23.8 I 25.5 I
-I -- I
2. I 32 I 49 I 49 I
1 24.6 I 37.7 I 37.7 I
1 18.4 I 27.7 I 2 6.3 I
I 6.0 I 9 . 1 I 9. 1 I
- I-- I
COLUMN 174 177 186
TOTAL 32.4 33.0 3 4,6
ROW
TOTAL
A 0 7 
75.8
130 
2 4.2
537100.0
X 2= 4.84 with 2 d / f :  Significance = 0.09.
Uncertainty Coeff ic ient = 0.008.
n = 0.09.
TABLE A. VI. 1 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's Age Group.
SEXCOUNT IROW PCT IMALE FEMALE R OW
COL PCT I TOTAL
TOT PCT I 1. I 2. I
1 . I 1 86 I 221 I 407
I 45.7 I 54.3 I 75.7
I 7 3.2 1 77.8 I
I 34.6 I 41.1 I
- I-
2 . I 68 I 63 I 131
I 51.9 I 48. 1 I 24.3
1 26.8 I 22.2 I
I 12.6 1 11.7 I
-I -
c o l u m n 254 284 538
TOTAL 47.2 52.8 100.0
X 2 = 1.29 (corrected) with 1 d / f :  Signif icance = 0.25.
Uncertainty Coeff ic ient = 0.003.
TABLE A. VI. 2 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's Sex.
N-CXj ON 1^0
.* < o  • HO • KO •
OH -J IT* 1- <f inO
fJC O N- Ovi O
H H H H H H H H H H H H
KO UJ • 1
_jr- 1 1
H- lD • 1-OOIO 0 0 0 1 0 I oro
O Z 1 HD • • • r- • • • 1 lO •
>—t 1 N- f\llO 'j-coro 1 o
UJ oo 1 o T-tO »
t—« « *—« •—< •—« *—4 *—• t—«»—« t—<
O ►
<0
►“«fO Q 
h O 
H- V
o
o
LU 2
o  -
< o
HHHMMMHMM
CD •
- to
> - < r
* -* A 
S >-< 03
Li. «C
m h h h m h m m m h m m
CC<T 
- r ~  -J
<r CD 
u .  < t
<f CD 
u- <
»— »— »—, y— o  o  o
2 ” CL CL CL
ro
o o o o
Ct O h-
OKI CvJO
vt • • •
1—
r-f^ -
K K ) N O  
■%}•••• 
O  fNJUJ 
* “ 0°
>- i 1 OOfNlO 1 O r-«  JO 1 OlO
_Jo 1 o  • • • 1 ro • • • 1 < \ i  •
►—I 1 ro o n 1 KlKUCl 1 «— K>
£  v- 1 r\iN-i- 1 (Xi'NJ 1 (Xi
OQ • 1 1 1
*• rO | |
>- | f\| OKlr- | N-ION-O 1 o o
_1 LO IO  • • • 1 KO • • • | (\i •
*-• V | N r -N  | OOOOO 1 ------f
I  >- | N N r-  » f\l<NJ 1 rvj
kh »—« >-h ►-« h h h h h h h h
*—j
l/) LÜ 
LJ O-J < o
H H H H H H H H H H H M H H H
I I
'ÜK1UJO
I— * • •
O JIO K )
T-<\J
* ~ i I
O &-KIN
•  •  •
O N r -
*—
O K lO " J o  o * —to COO
o  • • • t— • • • T— •
N lOO ' j  o r o T— CNJ
( \J0kJr— r - j r - CM
CvJLTl
O •
o j r -  
t o  • 
o
z  _j 
£.< 
D h -  
J O  
OH
L_>
O)
cn03
+->
CO
o
>>
<_>
O)
d
4->
c
O)
-U
cr
o
'wO
t u
>-
o
X2
 
- 
12
.2
6 
w
it
h 
5 
d/
f:
 
S
ig
ni
fi
ca
nc
e 
= 
0.
03
.
U
nc
er
ta
in
ty
 C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
= 
0.
02
.
MSTA TCOUNT 1ROW PCT I N E V E R M A MARRIED OTHER ROW
COL PCT IRRIED NOW TOTALTOT PCT I 1 .I 2. I 3 .IG 1 1 -I I I I1 . I 89 I 283 I 35 I 407YES I 21 .9 I 69.5 I 8.6 I 75.7
I 82.4 I 74.3 I 71 .4 II 16.5 I 52.6 I 6.5 I- I I I I
2 . I 19 I 98 I 14 I 131NO I 14.5 I 74.8 I 10.7 I 24.3I 17.6 I 25 .7 I 2 8.6 I
I 3.5 I 16.2 I 2.6 I-I I ■I ICOLUMN 1 08 381 49 538TOTAL 20.1 70.8 9. 1 1 00.0
X2 = 3.54 with 2 d/f: Significance = 0.17.
Uncertainty Coefficients = 0.006.
TABLE A. VI. 4 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's Marital Status.
Q 11
YES
NO
„Ä HHINCCPCOUNT I
ROW PCT INONE-S9P $9880-15 $15600-2 $20800-2 $26000+COL PCT 179 599 0799 5999TOT PCT I 1. I 2. I 3. I ' 4. I 5 .
1 . I 50 I 73 I 65 I 8 3 I 1 1 6I 12.3 I 17.9 I 20.9 I 20.4 I 28.5I 6 3.3 I 73.7 I 79.4 I 76.9 I 60.0I 9.3 I 13.6 I 15.8 I 15.4 I 21.6
2 • I 29 I 26 I 22 I 25 I 29I 22.1 I 19.8 I 16.8 I 19.1 I 22.1I 3 6.7 I 26.3 I 20.6 I 23.1 I 20.0I 5 • 4 I 4.8 I 4.1 I 4.6 I 5.4
COLUMNTOTAL
79
14.7 9918.4 1 C 7 19.9 10820.1 14527.0
X2= 9.16 with 4 d/f: Significance = 0.057.
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.01. 
n = 0.13.
TABLE A. VI. 5 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's Gross Annual 
Household Income.
ROW
TOTAL
40775.7
13124.3
538100.0
Q 1 6
COUNT I
ROW PCT I YES NO ROW
COL PCT I TOTALTOT PCT I 1 . I 2. I
I
1 . I 82 I 323 I 405
I 2 0 . 2 I 7 9 . 8 I 7 5 . 6
I 7 8 . 8 I 7 4 . 8 I
I 1 5 . 3 I 6 0 . 3 I
I - I
2. I 22 I 109 I 131
I 1 6 . 8 I 8 3 . 2 I 2 4 . 4
1 2 1 . 2 I 2 5 . 2 I
I 4. 1 I 2 0 . 3 I
— I - I
COLUMN 1 04 432 536
TOTAL 1 9 . 4 8 0 . 6 1 0 0 . 0
X 2 = 0.55 (corrected) with 1 d/f :  Significance = 0.45.
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.001.
TABLE A. VI. 6 Preparedness to Pay vs Has Respondent done 
Natural Science Courses?
COUNT i
Q52C
Q 11
Y E S
NO
ROW PCT 1 YES NO
COL PCT I
TOT PCT I 1 . I 2 . I
1 . I 216 I 182 I
I 5 4 . 3 I 4 5 . 7 I
I 7 6 . 9 I 7 4 . 0 I
I 4 1 . 0 1 34 . 5 I—I -
2 • I 65 I 64 I
I 5 0 . 4 I 4 9 . 6 I
I 23 . 1 I 2 6 . 0 I
I 1 2 . 3 I 12. 1 I—I -
COLUMN 281 246
total 5 3 . 3 4 6 . 7
ROW
TOTAL
398
7 5 . 5
129
2 4 . 5
527
1 0 0 . 0
X 2 = 0.44 (corrected) with 1 d/f :  Significance = 0.50.
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.001.
TABLE A. VI. 7 Preparedness to Pay vs Has Respondent Obtained 
Qualif icat ions since Leaving School?
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Q52C YESC O U N T IROW PCT IG RAD UA TE O T H E R ROWCOL PCT I T O T A LTOT PCT I 1 .I 2. I
1 . I 90 I 317 I 407
I 22.1 I 77.9 I 75.7I 76.3 I 75.5 II 16.7 I 58.9 I
-1 ~
2. I 28 I 103 I 131
I 21.4 I 78.6 I 24.3I 23.7 I 24.5 II 5.2 I 19.1 1
- I- I -IC O L U M N 118 420 538T O T A l 21 .9 78. 1 100.0
X2 = 0.003 (corrected) with 1 d/f: Significance = 0.955.
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.0.
TABLE A. VI. 9 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's Qualifications.
_  G52EC O U N T  I
ROW PCT INON C I T Y  C I T Y  ROWCOL PCT I T O T ATOT PCT 1 1• I 3 . I L
1 . I 162 I 244 I 406I 39.9 I 60. 1 I 75.6I 72.3 I 78.0 II 3 0.2 I 45.4 I—I -
2. I 62 I 69 I 131I 47.3 I 52.7 I 24.4I 27.7 I 22.0 1I 11.5 I 12.8 I— I-
COLUMN 224 313 537TOTAL 41.7 58.3 100.0
X2 = 1.95 (corrected) with 1 d/f: Significance = 0.16.
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.004.
TABLE A. V I . 10 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's Place of Schooling.
Q 1 1 
Y E S
NO
B O R NCOUNT 1
ROW PCT I A U S T R A L I OTHER R OWCOL PCT I A TOTALTOT PCT I 1 .I 2 . II-* I - 11 . I 284 I 123 I 407
I e 9.8 I 30.2 I 75.8I 76.8 I 73.7 II 52.9 I 22.9 I- I -■ I -I
2. I 86 I 44 I 13 0
I 66.2 I 33.8 I 24.2I 23.2 I 26.3 1
I 16.C I 8.2 I- I-- I -I
c o l u m n 370 167 537
t o t a l 68.9 31.1 100.0
x 2 = 0.45 (corrected) with 1 d/f: Significance = 0.50.
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.001.
TABLE A. VI. 11 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's Place of Birth
q 11
Y E S
NO
COUNT 
ROW P C T
A C T I V I T YII W O R K  ED O T H E R R OWCOL PCT 
TOT PCT II 1. I 2. I
TOTAL
1 . I 264 I 143 I 407I 64.9 I 35 . 1 I 75.8I 77.6 I 72.6 II 49.2 I 26.6 I- 1 -
2. I 7 6 I 54 I 1301 58.5 1 41.5 I 24.2I 22.4 I 27.4 II 14.2 I 10.1 I-I-COLUMN 340 197 537TOTAL 63.3 36.7 100.0
X2 = 1.47 (corrected.) with 1 d/f: Significance = 0.22.
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.001.
TABLE A. V I . 12 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's Major Activity
Q 1 1 
YES
NO
GPOCC
COUNT I
ROW PCT INONE TOP WHIT LOWER WH BLUE COL ROW
COL PCT I E COLLAR I TE COLL L AR TOTAL
TOT PCT I ü . I 1 . I 2 . I 3 .1
1 . I 80 I 8 7 I 1 2 8 I 1 1 0 I 4 0 5
I 1 9 . 8 I 2 1 . 5 I 3 1 . 6 I 2 7 . 2 I 7 5 . 7
I 7 3 . 4 I 7 6 . 5 I 8 1 . 5 I 71 . 0 I
I 1 5 . 0 I 1 6 . 3 I 2 3 . 9 I 2 0 . 6 I— i-
2 . i 29 I 27 I 2 9 I 45 I 1 3 0
i 2 2 . 3 I 2 0 . 8 I 2 2 . 3 I 3 4 . 6 I 2 4 . 3
i 2 6 . 6 I 2 3 . 7 I 1 8 . 5 I 2 9 . 0 I
i 5 . 4 I 5 . 0 I 5 . 4 I 8 . 4 I
■ i
COLUMN 1 09 11 4 1 5 7 1 5 5 535
TOTAL 2 0 . 4 2 1 . 3 2 9 . 3 2 9 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
x2 = 5.13 with 3 d/f: Significance = 0.16.
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.008.
TABLE A. VI. 13. Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's Occupation.
COUNT
Q 1 7 
I
ROW PCT 
COL PCT
I YE S 
I
NO ROW 
T OT AL
TOT PCT I 1 . I 2 . I
I
1 . I 3 4 8 I 57 I 4 0 5
I 6 5 . 9 I 1 4 . 1 I 7 5 . 7
I 7 9 . 3 I 5 9 . 4 I
I 6 5 . 0 I 1 0 . 7 I
- I - I  — I
2 . I 91 I 39 I 1 3 0
I 7 0 . 0 I 3 0 . 0 I 2 4 . 3
I 2 0 . 7 I 4 C . 6 I
I 1 7 . 0 I 7 . 3 I
COLUMN
TOTAL
- I
4 39
8 2 . 1
9 6
1 7 . 9
■I
5 3 5
1 0 0 . 0
x2 = 15.89 (corrected)with 1 d/f: Significance = 0.000
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.026.
TABLE A. VI. 14 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's Preference
for Watching Nature-Based Television Programmes.
018
COUNT I
ROW PCT I YES 
COL PCT I
NO R OW 
TOTAL
TOT PCT I 1 . I 2. I----------------- j ---------------- - I I
1 . I 2 1 4 1 1 9 3 I 4 0 7
I 5 2 . 6 I 47 . 4 I 75 . 7
I 8 2 . 0 I 6 9 . 7 I
I 3 9 . 8 I 35 . 9 I
-  I --------------- -  I I
2 . 1  47 I 84 I 131
I 3 5 . 9 I 6 4 . 1 1 2 4 . 3
I 1 8 . 0 I 3 0 . 3 I
1 8 . 7 I 15 . 6 I
-  I ---------------
COLUMN 261
TOTAL 4 8 . 5
-  I
2 7 7
5 1 . 5
I
5 3 8
1 0 0 . 0
X 2 = 10.41 (corrected) with 1 d/f: Significance = 0.001.
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.019.
TABLE A. VI. 15 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's Preferences
for Reading Nature-Based Literature.
a 1 1
YES
NO
Q 1
COUNT I
ROW PCT I VE R Y IMP OTHER R OW
COL PCT I ORTANT TOTAL
TOT PCT I 1 . I 2 . I
- I - I I
1 . I 2 5 8 I 146 I 4 04
I 6 3 . 9 I 36 . 1 I 7 5 . 8
I 8 3 . 0 1 6 5 . 8 I
I 48 . 4 I 2 7 . 4 I
- I - I I
2 . I C. 7 I 76 I 1 2 9
I 4 1 . 1 I 5 8 . 9 I 2 4 . ?
1 1 7 . 0 I 3 4 . 2 I
I 9 . 9 I 1 4 . 3 I
- I  ~ I I
C O L U M N 311 2 2 2 5 3 3
TOTAL 5 8 . 3 4 1 . 7 10 0 . 0
X 2 = 19.94 (corrected) with 1 d/f: Significance = 0.00
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.035.
TABLE AVI.  16 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's attitude 
to Conservation.
a 11
YES
N O
Q4
COUNT 
ROW PCT
I
IVERY IMP OTHE R R OW
COL PCT IORTANT TOTAL
TOT PCT I 1 . I 2. I
I
1 . I 34 A I 62 I 4C6
1 8 4 . 7 I 1 5 . 3 I 7 5 . 6
I 7 7 . 1 I 6 8 . 1 I
1 6 4 . 1 1 1 1 . 5 I
- I - I ---------------- I
2 . I 1 02 I 29 I 131
I 7 7 . 9 I 2 2 . 1 I 2 4 . 4
I 2 2 . 9 I 3 1 . 9 I
1 1 9 . 0 I 5 . 4 1
- I  - • I --------------- ■I
COLUMN 446 91 537
TOTAL 8 3 . 1 1 6 . 9 1 C0 . 0
x2 = 2.85 (corrected)with 1 d/f: Significance = 0.091.
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.005.
TABLE A. VI. 17 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's attitude to
Recreation in Preserved Natural Areas.
C O U N T  I
R O W P C T  I V E R Y  I M P  O T H E R  R O W
COL PCT IORTANT TOTALTOT PCT I 1 . I 2. I
I
1 . I 345 I 62 I 407
I 8 4 . 8 I 1 5 . 2 I 7 5 . 8
I 7 7 . 7 1 6 6 . 7 I
I 6 4 . 2 I 1 1 . 5 I
— I - - I
2 . I 99 I 31 I 130
I 7 6 . 2 I 2 3 . 8 I 2 4 . 2
I 2 2 . 3 I 3 3 . 3 I
I 1 8 . 4 I 5 . 8 I
- I I
C O L U M N 444 93 537
TOTAL 8 2 . 7 1 7 . 3 10 0 . 0
X 2 = 4.52 (corrected) with 1 d/f: Signif icances 0.033.
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.008.
TABLE A. VI. 18 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's attitude
to Education in Preserved Natural Areas.
Q 1 1
YES
COUNT I
ROW PCT IVERY IMP OTHER 
COL PCT 10RTANT 
TOT PCT I 1 . 1  2 . 1
1 .
2 .
I I
- I I
I
I 337 I 69 I
I 8 3 . 0  I 1 7 . 0  I
I 7 8 . 7  I 6 3 . 9  I
I 6 2 . 9  I 1 2 . 9  I
1 91 I 39 I
l  7 0 . 0  I  3 0 . 0  I
I  2 1 . 3  I  3 6 . 1  I
I 1 7 . 0  I  7 . 3  I
COLUMN
TOTAL
- I
A 2 8
7 9 . 9
I
108
20.1
R OW 
TOTAL
406
7 5 . 7
130
2 4 . 3
536
1 0 0 . 0
x2 = 9.56 (corrected) with 1 d / f :  Significance = 0.002
Uncertainty Coeff icient = 0.016.
TABLE A. V I . 19 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's Att i tude 
to Preserved Natural Areas fo r  Aesthetic use.
Q 1 1
YES
NO
Q 7
COUNT I
ROW PCT IVERY IMP 
COL PCT IORTANT 
TOT PCT I 1 . 1
-------- - ! ----------------- l
1. I 293 I
I 7 2 . 7 I
I 7 9 . 2 I
I 5 5 . 2 1
-  I -
2 . I 77 I
I 6 0 . 2 I
I 2 0 . 8 I
I 1 4 . 5 I
- I «
COLUMN 370
TOTAL 6 9 . 7
OTHER
110
2 7 . 3
6 6 . 3  
2 0 . 7
5 1 
3 9 . 8  
31 . 7  
9 . 6
16 1 
3 0 . 3
R OW
t o t a l
403
7 5 . 9
128
2 4 . 1
531
1 0 0 . 0
X2 = 6.66 (corrected) with d / f :  Significance = 0 .010.
Uncertainty Coeff ic ient  = 0.012
TABLE A. VI. 20 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent' s Att i tude
to S c ie n t i f i c  Research in Preserved Natural Areas.
G 1 1
YES
NO
COUNT I
ROW P C T I VERY IMP OTHER ROW
COL PCT 10RTANT TOTAL
TOT PCT I 1 . I 2 . I
I - 1 I
1 . I 3 3 4 I 69 I 4 0 3
I 8 2 . 9 I 1 7 . 1 I 7 5 . 8
I 8 1 . 3 I 5 7 . 0 I
I 6 2 . 8 I 1 3 . 0 I
- I - I I
2 . I 77 I 52 I 1 2 9
I 5 9 . 7 1 4 0 . 3 I 2 4 . 2
I 1 8 . 7 I 4 3 . 0 I
I 1 4 . 5 I 9 . 8 I
I ~ I I
COLUMN 411 121 5 3 2
TOTAL 7 7 . 3 2 2 . 7 1 0 0 . 0
X 2 =28 .60 (corrected) with 1 d/ f :  Significance = 0.000
Uncertainty Coefficient  = 0.05.
TABLE A. VI. 21 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's a t t i tude to 
the Preservation Use of Preserved Natural Areas
COUNT I
GPT0 TUSE
Q 1 1
YES
NO
ROW PCT I ZERO USE LT 7 DAY GT 7 DAY ROW
COL PCT I S S TOTAL
TOT PCT I 0 . I 1 . I 2 . I
I
1 . I 84 I 2 5 9 I 64 I 4 0 7
I 2 0 . 6 I 6 3 . 6 I 1 5 . 7 I 7 5 . 7
I 7 0 . 6 I 7 5 . 7 I 8 3 . 1 I
I 1 5 . 6 I 4 8 . 1 I 1 1 . 9 I
- I - - I
2 . I 35 I 8 3 I 13 I 131
I 2 6 . 7 I 6 3 . 4 I 9 . 9 I 2 4 . 3
I 2 9 . 4 1 2 4 . 3 I 1 6 . 9 I
I 6 . 5 I 1 5 . 4 I 2 . 4 I
- I - - I
COLUMN 1 1 9 3 4 2 77 5 3 8
TOTAL 2 2 . 1 6 3 . 6 1 4 . 3 1 0 0 . 0
X2 = 3.99 with 2 d/f:  Significance = 0.14.
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.012. n = 0.085.
TABLE A. VI. 22 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's Total
Part icipatory Use of Preserved Natural Areas.
GPTOTREC
G 1 1
COUNT IROW PCT IZERO USE IT 3 DAY GT 
COL PCT 1 S - S
TOT PCT I 0 . I 1.1--------j-------- I-------- I
1YES
NO
I
I
I
I
- I • 
I 
I 
I 
I
- 1
COLUMN
TOTAL
317 
77 .9
74.9
55.9
1 06 
80.9 
25.1 19.7
423
78.6
54 
13.3 
83. 1 10.0
1 18.4
16.92.0
65
12. 1
3 DAY
2 . I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
■I 
I 
I 
I 
I
■ I
36
8 . 8
72.06.7
14
10.7
28.02.6
50
9.3
ROW
TOTAL
407
75.7
131
24.3
538
1 0 0 . 0
X 2 = 2.42 with 2 d/f: Significance = 0.298.
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.004.
n = 0.067.
TABLE A. VI. 23 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's Use of 
Preserved Natural Areas for Recreation.
G 1 1
YES
NO
COUNT 1GPTOTAE SROW PCT IZERO DAY LT 1 DAY GT 1 DAY ROWCOL PCT I S TOTALTOT PCT I 0.I 1 . I 2 .I
1 . II 253 I 99 I 55 I 407I 62 .2 I 24.3 I 13 . 5 I 75.7I 7 4 .4 I 75.6 I 82 . 1 II 47 .0 I 18.4 ] 10 .2 I-I-* I2. I 87 1 32 I 12 I 131I 66 .4 I 24.4 ] 9 .2 I 24.3I 25 .6 I 24.4 ] 17 .9 II 16 .2 I 5.9 ]; 2 .2 I- I -■ ICOLUMN 340 131 67 538
t o t a l 63 .2 24.3 12 .5 1 00.0
X2 = 1.79 with 2 d/f: Significance = 0.408.
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.003.
n = 0.058
TABLE A. VI. 24 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's Use of
Preserved Natural Areas for Sight-Seeing (Aesthetic).
Q 1 1
GPTOTPLC
COUNT I
ROW PCT IZERO USE I T 3 DAY 6T 
COL PCT I S S
TOT PCT I 0 • I 1 . 1
---------------- I ----------------- 1 ----------------- 1 - -
1.  I 3 5 7  I 24 I
YES
NO
I
I
I
- I *
I
I
I
I
- I
8 7 . 7  
7 4 . 2  
6 6 . 4
COLUMN
TOTAL
I 
I 
I
------------ r
124  I
9 4 . 7  _I
2 5 . 8 ----- I 
2 3 . 0  I 
------------ 1
481
8 9 . 4
5 . 9
8 5 . 7
4 . 5
4
3.1
14. 3
. 7
28
5 . 2
3 DAY
2 . 1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I
•I 
I 
I 
I 
I
•I
26 
6 . 4  
6 9 . 7  
4 .8
3
2 . 3
10.3
. 6
29
5 . 4
ROW
TOTAL
4 0 7
7 5 . 7
1 31 
2 4 . 3
538
1 0 0 . 0
X2 = 5.16 with 2 d/f: Significance = 0.076.
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.001. 
n = 0.098.
TABLE A. VI. 25 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's Use of Preserved 
Natural Areas for Bushwalking and Camping (Recreation 
and Aesthetic).
GPTOTHS P
COUNT I
ROW PCT IZERO DAY LT 1 DAY GT 1 DAY ROW
COL PCT IS TOTAL
TOT PCT I 0 . I 1 . I 2 . I--------- 1 1 - - I — I
1 . I 258 I 70 I 79 I 4 0 7
I 6 3 . 4 I 1 7 . 2 I 1 9 . 4 I 7 5 . 7
I 7 5 . 4 I 7 1 . 4 I 8 0 . 6 I
I 4 8 . 0 I 1 3 . 0 I 1 4 . 7 1
-  I I — I — I
2 .  I 84 I 28 I 19 I 1 31
I 6 4 . 1 I 2 1 . 4 I 1 4 . 5 I 2 4 . 3
I 2 4 . 6 I 28 . 6 I 1 9 . 4 I
I 1 5 . 6 I 5 . 2 I 3 . 5 I
- 1 ■I — I - - I
COLUMN 342 98 98 538
TOTAL 6 3 . 6 18 . 2 1 8 . 2 1 0 0 . 0
x2 = 2.27 with 2 d/f: Significance = 0.32. •
Uncertainty Coefficient = 0.004. 
n = 0.065.
TABLE A. VI. 26 Preparedness to Pay vs Respondent's Use of Preserved 
Natural Areas for Holiday and Picnic Use (Recreation 
and Aesthetic).
APPENDIX VII
AN ANALYSIS OF WILLINGNESS TO PAY USING
LWTP AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
N
The lead up to explaining LWTP using multiple regression
N
analysis involved a repetition of the process undertaken for the
analyses, involving WTP, LWTP and L(WTP) as the dependent variables,
N
described in detail in Chapter 9 . For LWTP, the t-tests on the means
N
across during variables are provided in Table A .V I I . l ,  and the correlation 
coefficient statist ics for the continuous variables are detailed in
Table A .V I I .2.
Variable (Group) Mean LWTP 
N
SD n DF t
SEX 0. Female 0.90 0.80 189 321 0 4
1. Male 0.93 0.81 134
LCS 0. No Family 1.26 1.03 142
321 7.3 **
1. Family 0.65 0.40 181
MSTAT 0. Not Married 1.18 1.15 102 321 4 02 irk
1. Married 0.80 0.55 221
Q52C 0. No 0.88 .82 157 319 • 0 9
1. Yes 0.96 .79 164
Q52CYES 0. Non-Graduate 0.83 .72 257 321 3.8 irk
1. Graduate 1.25 1.01 66
Q52B 0. Non-City 0.95 0.90 135 320 0.7
1. City 0.89 0.73 187
BORN 0. Other
1. Aust. UK,
0.75 0.51 89 321 2.36 ■k
Ireland 0.98 0.89 234
ACT 0. Not Worked 0.83 0.82 123 321 1.5
1. Worked 0.97 0.80 200
GPOCC 0. Blue-Collar 0.895 .78 82 252 0 7
1. White-Collar 0.97 .76 172
Q17 0. No 1.00 0.98 45 320 0.71
1. Yes 0.90 0.78 277
Q18 0. No 0.87 0.89 156 321 0.96
1. Yes 0.96 0.72 167
Q1 0. Other 0.87 0.86 123 318 0.85
1. Very Important 0.95 0.77 197
Q12 0. C.O. 0.83 0.65 163 288 2.20 *
1. Govt. 1.03 0.92 127
Q' 0. No 0.78 0.78 72 321 1.59
1. Yes 0.95 0.81 251
* Signifcant at the 5% 
** Signifcant at the \%
level) 
1evelj 2 tailed test
Table A. VII.l: t-Tests cn LWTP Means across Dummy Variable roups.
Variable n R R2 Sign i f .
AGESQ 323 0.18 0.03 .00
LHHINC/N 316 0.70 0.48 .00
TOTUSE 323 0.11 0.12 .03
LTOTUSE 323 0.11 0.12 .02
Table A .V I I . 2: Correlat ion S ta t is t ic s  with LWTP - Continuous Variables
The independent variables which have s ign i f ica n t  re lat ionships
with LWTP (using the 10% level) are: LCS, MSTAT, Q52C YES, BORN, Q12,
N
AGESQ, LHHINC, TOTUSE and LTOTUSE. Of these var iables, LCS, MSTAT and 
N
LHHINC must be examined fo r  m u l t ic o l l in e a r i t y :  LCS appears to be 
N
s ig n i f i c a n t l y  co l l inear  with MSTAT (corre la t ion co e f f ic ien t ,  P, of .35),
AGESQ (P=-.22) and LHHINC (P=-.73) and MSTAT is co l l inear  with LHHINC
N 2 N
(P=-.43) and these conclusions are j u s t i f i e d  by the coef f ic ien ts  -
MSTAT ( .19),  LCS (.55) and LHHINC (.56).  Therefore, the variables considered in
N
the fo l lowing regression analysis are: LHHINC, Q12, BORN and AGESQ,as
N
the re la t ionship  between Q12 and LWTP was found to be non spurious.
N
The resul tant equation estimating LWTP is :
N
LWTP = -0.33 + 0.41 LHHINC + 0.18 Q12 + 0.16 BORN + 0.00006 ACESQ ........  (A )
N N
(-3.01) (13.76) (2.44) (1.98) (1.69)
R2 = .49
, *
^  .05 ' 1.96)
F4,238 :- 57.1
*
*F .05 = 2.4)
When the ins ign i fcan t  AGESQ variable is l e f t  out,on the basis 
of the lack of sign if icance of i t s  coe f f ic ien t  at the 5% leve l ,  Equation
B resul ts .
( B )LWTP = -0.25 + 0.42 LHHINC + 0.19 Q12 + 0.15 BORN 
N N
(-2.5) (14.37) (2.47) (1.78)
R2 = .,48
*
^  .05 1.96)
F 3,239 = 74.65
*
(F .05 2.4)
Clearly,  the estimate of LWTP by Equations A and B are 
2 Nsuperior in terms of R and F s t a t i s t i c s  to the estimates of WTP and 
LWTP provided by Equations 1 to 6 in Chapter 9,  however the pattern of 
residents for Equation A (Figure A. VI I . l )  indicates that  heteroskedast ici ty
is a severe problem.
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Figure A.VI1.1: Plot of Standardized Residuals against  Standardized 
Predicted LWTP: DouMe log form
____________________________  “ M
The graphical evidence of heteroskedastici ty is substantiated 
by two s ta t i s t i c a l  tests on Equation A: the "Goldf ie ld and Quandt" te s t ,  
which compares the residual sum of squares of two regressions, one 
based on the high ranges of the dependent var iable and the other based 
on the low ranges, yielded an F s t a t i s t i c  of 5.58 (with 140 and 140
■k
degrees of freedom) which is s ig n i f ica n t  at the 5% level (F ^  = 1.3);
2
and a second te s t ,  which uses the R of the regression of the square of  the 
residuals against the predicted dependent var iab le ,  mu l t ip l ied  
by the number of observations, yielded an F s t a t i s t i c  of  52.2 (with 1 
and 242 degrees of freedom) which is s ig n i f ic a n t  at the 5% level
<F*05 = 6- 78>-
Two basic approaches were used in an attempt to overcome the
problem of heteroskedast ici ty: the f i r s t  involves establ ishing which
var iable causes the increasing variance in the residuals and then el iminat ing
the cause by d iv id ing the whole regression equation by the square root
of that variable - fo r  instance»i f i t  is found that the variance of the
residuals increases proportional to the income var iable, then the
heteroskedastic i ty can be removed by div id ing each regression var iable, both
dependent and independent»except dummies, by the square root of income
and recalcu lat ing the regression using the transformed variables^; and the
second involves the recalculat ion of the standard errors to account fo r  the
lack of e f f ic iency  created by heteroskedastic (noting that the least
squares estimations are unbiased under heteroskedastici ty) using a
o
process developed by White which calculates 'a convariance matrix
1. See Johnston, J. Econometric Methods, N.Y., McGraw H i l l ,  1963;
Maddala, G.S. Econometrics» N-Y. McGraw H i l l ,  1977; 
and Kmenta, J. Ffements of Econometrics, N.Y.,  MacMillan, 1971.
2. White, H. A Heteroshedasticity - Consistent Convariance 
Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test fo r  Heteroshedastici ty 
Econometrica» V.40 No.4, 1980, pp. 817-838.
estimatorwhich is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity1 
(p.817) so that proper inferences can be drawn from the regression 
even though the problem of heteroskedasticity is not removed.
I t  was observed from the graph of residuals against predicted 
willingness to pay (Figure A. V11.1)for Equation A ,that the variance of 
the residuals was increasing proportional to predicted /LUTPx and
h r -'
therefore that the appropriate transformation to remove heteroskedasticity
was to divide by the square root of LWTP The resultant equation was:
N
LWTP/N = -0.58 1 + 0.49 LHHINC/N +0.2Q12
T wtp/ n T wtp/ n ^ LWTP/N
(8.2) (2.86) .......  (C)
+ 0.18 BORN + 0.00007 AGESQ
T wtp/ n
(2.57) (1.8)
R^  = .21 iiLDO
c
-M 1.96)
F4,241 = 15,98
*
.05 2.4)
I t  should be noted that while the problem of heteroskedasticity is 
substantially removed (see Figure A.VI I .2), and that the coefficients, 
which are interpreted in the same way as the coefficients in Equation A,
p
are unbiased, the R , t  and F s ta t is t ics  are not accurate.Kmenta (see 
Footnote 1) suggests that the correct R can be calculated by multiplying the
residuals from the corrected Equation, C, by the inverse of the correction 
factor, 1 / 1 = 7 lwjp/ n ’ scluarG anc* sum these "recorrected”
T wt'p/ n
residuals to form the residual sum of squares, and use the total sum of
in da rdized 
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Figure A.VII.2: Plot of Standardized Residuals against  Standardized
Predicted LWTP/N
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2  d c c
squares from the original Equation, A, to implement the equation; R =1-----
of .51. While i t  is possible to use a correction process to calculate 
the e f f ic ient  t  s ta t is t ics ,  i t  is log is t ica l ly  more simple to use the 
White correction process. Table A .V I I .3 presents the correct t  
s tat is t ics with a comparison of the coefficients of Equations A and C 
as a summary of the corrected results.
Variable Coefficient A Coefficient C • White's t 's
CONSTANT - 0.33 - 0.58 - 2.47
LHHINC/N 0.41 0.49 7.19
Q12 0.18 0.20 2.51
BORN 0.16 0.18 2.03
AGESQ 0.00006 0.00007 1.45
Table A.VI1.3: Equations A and C Summarized with White's
Corrected t ' s :  LWTP/N Dependent.
The s imi lar i ty  of the coefficients of Equations A and C supports 
the theoretical result that least squares estimates are unbiased, with any 
divergences possibly due to an incorrect assumption regarding the cause 
of the heteroskedasticity - in this case, the predicted dependent variable
A
LWTP/N. There seems l i t t l e  to be gained therefore in using the complex 
correction method over the modification of the t -s ta t is t ies  provided by 
White's method. For this reason, only the White correction procedure 
was carried out on Equation B,yielding the t  s ta t is t ics:
CONSTANT: -2.15 (c. f . 2.5)
HHINC/N: 7.39 (c. f . 14.37)
Q12 : 2.51 (c. f . 2.47)
BORN : 1.83 (c. f . 1.78)
However, even with the c o r r e c t i o n s a p p l i e d , the BORN a v a i l ab l e  
has a c o e f f i c i e n t  which i s  not  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from zero and 
when the BORN var i ab le  i s  dropped,  the cons t an t  becomes i n s i g n i f i c a n t ;  
i f  the cons tant  is i m i t t ed ,  Q12's c o e f f i c i e n t  becomes i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  
The f i na l  equat ion,  with Whi te ' s  co r r ec t ed  t ' s  in b r a ck e t s ,  i s :
LWTP = 0.40 LHHINC 
N N
(16.9)
R -46 ^ * . 0 5  = 1.96)
The LHHINC c o e f f i c i e n t  in Equation D is  only 0.01 d i f f e r e n t  
N
from Equation A's LHHINC c o e f f i c i e n t  but  i t s  s t andard e r r o r  i s  cons iderably
N
lower i nd i ca t i ng  t h a t  Q12, BORN and ACESQ may be i r r e l e v a n t  and poss ib ly
col l i n e a r  with LHHINC. However t h i s  i s  not  s u bs t a n t i a t e d  by evidence 
N
presented in Chapters 8 and 9, p a r t i c u l a r l y  for  the Q12 v a r i a b l e ;  t h e r e f o r e ,
some doubt i s  cast  on the v a l i d i t y  of  Equation D, p a r t i c u l a r l y  given the
s t r eng t h  of  the h e t e r o s k e d a s t i c i t y  problem.
A f u r th e r  problem with Equation D, and a l l  the equat ions
using LWTP as t h e i r  dependent v a r i a b l e  i s  the d i f f i c u l t y  of  i n t e r p r e t i n g  
N
the r e l a t i o n s h i p s  which are e xh i b i t ed .  Using LWTP impl ies  t h a t  the
N
response of  an ind iv idua l s  wi l l i ngnes s  to  pay i s  propor t ional  to 
the number of  people in the household,  such t h a t  as household s i ze  i nc r ease s ,  
bid dec l i nes  i r i t i a l l y  a t  a f a s t e r  r a t e  than l i n e a r ,  and then t ape r s  o f f  
as i l l u s t r a t e d  in Figure A . V I I . 3. In o t he r  words,  the e f f e c t  on wi l l i ngness  
to pay of an- ext ra  individual  in the household i s  i n i t i a l l y  g rea t  but
3 The R^  s t a t i s t i c  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  using the t o t a l  sum of  squares
from the  equat ion: LWTP
a  +
3LHHINC
N
WTP
$
-----------------------------------------------------*. N
F igu re  A . V I I . 3: The R e l a t i o n s h i p  between W i l l i n g n e s s  to  Pay
and Household S ize  Im p l ie d  by the Use o f  LWTP 
as the  Dependent V a r i a b l e .  N
p r o g r e s s ! v e l y  d e c l i n e s .
By us ing  LHHINC as the o n l y  independent  v a r i a b l e  (Equa t io n  D) 
N
the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  im p l i e d  can be d e r i v e d  by:
LWTP = ßLHHINC
N N
. \  LWTP = ßLHHINC 
and so WTP = HHINC3
and ß i s  e s t im a ted  by Equat ion  D to  be 0 .4 .  The w i l l i n g n e s s  to  pay
e l a s t i c i t y  o f  income i s  t h e r e f o r e :
e = d WTP HHINC
d HHINC WTP
= 0 .4  HHINC ° ' 4 ' 1 HHINC
WTP
0 4
= 0 .4  HHINC u
WTP
= 0 .4  WTP
WTP
0.4
This is substantially different from the 0.57 willingness 
to pay elasticity estimated by the double-log Equation 6 in Chapter 9 
implying that the use of the transformation by N in Equation D is non­
linear. The elasticity evidence is substantiated by the differences in
2 2 R between the Equations 6 and D: whereas D has an R of 0.46, 4 has an
R^ of only 0.12 even though i t  has variables additional to the LHHINC
variable which is common to both euqations. The essential difference
between Equations 6 and D is the use of N as a transforming vector, and while
?the evidence of an effect of N is clear in the elasticity and R
differences, the form of the effect is not obvious. The use of the
willingness to pay elasticity  derived from Equation D is therefore open
to some question and, this problem together with the severity of the
heteroskedasticity problem leaves the use of the functional form involving
the division of the log of willingness to pay by the number of persons in
the household in some doubt. The analysis set out in Chapter 9 therefore
relies on the use of L(VJTP) , the log of the per-householder willingness to
N
pay, as the appropriate dependent variable for the explanation of 
respondents' willingness to pay bids for the existence valves offered by 
the continued preservation of Nadgee Nature Reserve.
APPENDIX V I I I
EXPERIMENT DOCUMENTS
This appendix includes a l l  correspondence entered into 
regarding the "experiment" sub-sample. The le t t e r  dated 10 September, 
1979 was issued by the interviewers to a l l  the main sample respondents 
who expressed in te res t  in pa r t ic ipa t ing  fu r the r  in the study. On 
the 5th November, 1979 two le t te rs  were posted: the f i r s t ,  which
detai led the experiment, was sent to those respondents who had 
returned the attachment to the f i r s t  l e t t e r  and who had given a 
usable response to the wil l ingness to pay question of  the main 
questionnaire; and the second was sent to the respondents who had 
not given usable bids, expressing thanks fo r  th e i r  in te res t .  The 
response to the second in v i ta t io n  exceeded requirements fo r  the sub­
sample» and those not selected to par t ic ipa te  in a random sample 
were posted the l e t t e r  dated 21 November, 1979. F in a l ly ,  fol lowing 
the experiment, a l e t t e r ,  dated 8th January 1980, which gave some 
b r ie f  deta i ls  of  the resul ts  and purpose of the exercise was sent 
to a l l  part ic ipants.
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Director:
Professor Prank Fenner
Dear Respondent,
CENTRE FOR RESOl RCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
POX 4, P.O., CANBERRA . A.C.T. 2600 
I t Icu tuns and Cables: “Natuniv" Canberra 
Telephone: 49-5111
10 September 1979
Thank you for your interest in our study into 
nature conservation. Please write your name and address 
in the space provided below and mail it to us as soon as 
possible in the stamped, addressed envelope provided.
This will enable us to send you further information on our 
follow-up study. If you need any details now, please call 
me during business hours on 49 4758.
Yours sincerely,
Jeff Bennett 
Project Co-ordinator
NAME :
ADDRESS:
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL. UNIVERSITY
director:
’rnfessor I rank leaner
Dear
CENTRE FOR RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
BOX 4, V.O., CANBERRA, A.C.T. 2600 
I clcgrants and Cables: “Natuniv” Canberra 
Telephone: 49-5111
5th November, 1979.
Let me f i r s t l y  thankyou for cooperating with the ANU 
Survey Research Centre in t he i r  recent survey of Canberra people. The 
information obtained from the responses to the conservation questions will 
enable our research into the provision of National Parks to continue.
I was par t icular ly  pleased to note that  you are wil l ing to 
he Ip us with thefol low-up study which we are planning. The study will 
be aimed at  examining how di f ferent  people answer a series of di f ferent  
questions,  which will be completely non-personal. Those part icipat ing 
will be given the opportunity to have an enjoyable evening and for 
attending they will be paid $15. The study will run for up to two hours 
from 7.30 pm on Wednesday 28th of November in the Seminar Room on the 
top floor of the Life Sciences Building on the ANU Campus (see enclosed
I t / i s  most important to our work that  you come along to 
elp us with this study and your assistance would be sincerely appreciated. 
If  you are unable to at tend,  or have any fur ther  enquiries,  please l e t  
me know by ei ther  s t r iking out the sentence which doesn' t  apply in your 
case on the enclosed form, and returning i t  to us using the stamped, 
addressed envelope provided, or by phoning 494758 during business hours, 
ou are qui te welcome to bring a partner with the understanding that  they 
will not be paid and that  only you will be asked to answer the questions.
Yours f a i t h fu l l y ,
JEFF BENNETT 
Project  Co-Ordinator
D e a r  Jeff,
1. Yesl I will be a b l e  to a t t e n d  the f o l l o w  up s t u d y  on c o n s e r v a t i o n  
to be held on W e d n e s d a y  2 8 th N o v e m b e r .
2. No! Sorry, but I w o n ' t  be a v a i l a b l e  to a t t e n d  the f o l l o w - u p  study.
Y o u r s  f a i t h f u l l y ,
NAME:
AD DR E S S :
PHONE:
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
director:
1rnfcssor Frank Fenner
CENTRE: FOR RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
BOX 4, P.O., CANBERRA, A.C.T. 2600 
Telegrams and Cables: “Naluniv” Canberra 
Telephone: 49-5111
5th November, 1979.
Dear
Let me f i r s t  thank you for cooperating with the ANU 
Survey Research Centre in their recent survey of Canberra people. The 
information obtained from the responses to the conservation questions 
will enable our research into the provision of National Parks to 
continue.
. I was particularly pleased to note that you are willing 
to help us with the follow up study which we are planning. However, 
the response to our appeal for help, was so good that we have been 
forced to limit the number participating. Unfortunately, when we 
selected the group to take part, your name did not come up. Neverthless, 
I would like to thank you for your expression of interest.
Yours faithfully,
JEFF BENNETT 
Project Coordinator
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL. UNIVERSITY
director:
*rofessor F rank Fem u r
JB/mk
U  .M  Hi: I OR RI'SOl 'RCE A N I) E N V IR O N M E N TA L STUDIES
BO X 4, P.O., C A N B E R R A , A .C .T . 2600 
I elepranis and Cables: "N a tu n iv ”  Canberra 
Telephone: 49-5111
21 November, 1979.
Dear
The response to our invitation to attend the 
follow-up study on Conservation has been beyond our 
expectations. As a result of this response, together with 
limitations on our funds, we have been forced to limit 
attendance.
Unfortunately, when we drew our sample at random, 
your name was not chosen, and so we are forced to withdraw 
our invitation. We apologize for any inconvenience this 
may cause you and we would like to express our appreciation 
for your interest.
Yours sincerely,
Jeff Bennett 
Project Co-ordinator.
THE AUSTRAU AN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Director:
Professor Frank Fenner
January 8, 1980
CENTRE I OR RESOURCE AN!) ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
BOX 4. P.O.. CANBERRA, A.C.T. 2600 
Telegrams and Cables: "Natuniv" Canberra 
I fU phone: 49-6 III
Dear
Let me f i r s t  thank you for participating in our follow-up study in 
November. As promised, I am writing to provide you with a more detailed 
explanation of the purpose of the study and a brief summary of the 
results which were obtained.
To refresh your memory, during the study we asked you basically two types 
of questions, relevant to the provision of two nature films:
(i) What would you be prepared to pay to see the films given 
that the films would not be shown unless our costs were 
met by the total of the group's bids. It was made clear
that you would not have to pay the amount you individually
bid.
( i i)  The same question except with the proviso that your bid
would have to be paid. It was added that if  the costs 
were not ini t ial ly met under this question the group 
would be given additional opportunities to change their 
bids to make sure the costs were covered.
The birst question is similar in style to the one which was asked in the 
buryey Research Centre's questionnaire regarding an area of land on the 
bouth Coast of N.S.W. We were concerned that people, when answering this 
type of question may see the opportunity of making sure that the costs 
are met by the total bids by bidding more than the films, or the nature 
reserve, are actually worth to them. To see if  this over-stating of 
preferences is a problem, i t  is not enough to merely ask the second type 
of question where payment is required because people will then tend to 
under-state their preferences. This is because the opportunity arises 
for people to receive the good, be i t  a film or a Nature Reserve at no 
~ost to themselves so long as the others in the group bid sufficient 
to cover the costs. However, by introducing the repetitive process of 
^bidding i t  has been shown that people will tend to eventually bid an 
amount actually equal to their true valuation.
In the evening of our follow-up study, we tried to see if  we could force 
people to actually pay what they originally bid in the f i r s t  "no charqe"
rnc+• "T° thlS’ the total b1d in the f i r s t  round was installed as )ur costs . It was this amount which had to be bid in the consequent
2/ .......
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rounds i f  the f i lms were to be shown.
There were b a s i c a l l y  three  types of  responses to these  ques t i ons .
( i )  " O v e r - s t a t e r s " . These respondents  ove r s t a t ed  the value of 
the f i lms in the "no charge" bid and the repeated bidding
did not manage to br ing t h e i r  f ina l  bid up to t h e i r  o r i g i n a l l y  
s t a t ed  value.
( i i )  " U n d e r - s t a t e r s " . The f i na l  bids of these  respondents  exceeded 
t h e i r  i n i t i a l  "no charge" bid.  This response was i n i t i a l l y  
perp lex ing ,  but has a number of exp lana t ions .  F i r s t  
because people were g e t t i n g  f r u s t r a t e d  by the delay in the 
process ,  t h e i r  value for  seeing the f i lm (and so f i n i sh i ng
the bidding)  increased.  Secondly,  a t  l e a s t  one " un d e r - s t a t e r "  
bel ieved they wouldn' t  have to a c t u a l l y  pay,  and so d e l i b e r a t e l y  
kept on i nc reas ing  t h e i r  bid beyond what they would r e a l l y  pay. 
Thi rd ly ,  the na ture  of  the payment was a l i t t l e  confused.  Some 
respondents  f e l t  t h e i r  bid had an element of  donat ion and so 
were prepared to i ncrease  what they were w i l l i ng  to pay above 
t h e i r  va luat ion  of the f i lm alone.
( i i i )  " T r u t h - s t a t e r s " . These r e sponden t s ’ f i na l  bids were the same
as t h e i r  i n i t i a l  bid.
Out of the 26 respondents ,  3 were " o v e r - s t a t e r s "  ,7 were " un d e r - s t a t e r s "  
and 16 were " t r u t h - s t a t e r s " .
Typical  responses for  the t h ree  "types" can be i l l u s t r a t e d  in the diaqram 
below:
"Under - s t a t e r
Common
Ini t i a l
Bid
" Tr u t h - s t a t e r "
VII 2nd Round 
Bids
APPENDIX IX
EXPERIMENT SAMPLE COMPARISON
This appendix presents the details of an analysis designed 
to detect i f  the experiment sub-sample, which was not selected 
randomly»is representative of the survey population. Crosstabulations 
of respondents' characteristics against the Yes/No participation 
variable are used with the significance of the differences between the sub­
sample and the survey population being determined by the x2 stat is t ic  
provided with each table. The uncertainty coeff icient, and where 
applicable, eta statistics are also shown to indicate the strength
of the differences.
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TABLE A. IX. 2 Experiment Part icipat ion vs Respondent's Sex.
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TABLE A. IX. 4 Experiment Participation vs Respondent's Marital Status
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TABLE A. IX. 5 Experiment Participation vs Respondent's Place of Birth
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TABLE A. IX. 6 Experiment Participation vs Respondent's Qualifications.
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TABLE A. IX. 7 Experiment Participation vs Respondent's Occupation.
APPENDIX X
EXPERIMENT DIALOGUE
THE EXPERIMENT
On a r r iv a l  respondents were:
( i)  Asked th e ir  name 3 
( i i )  Paid $153
( H i )  Asked to  s ig n  the  m aster sh e e t as a r e c e ip t}
( i v)  Given th e ir  own id e n t i f i e d  f o l i o  in c lu d in g :
(a) 1 P la in  sh ee t )
) o f  scrap computer paper
(b) 10 Marked sh ee ts  )
(c ) 1 Pen3
(v) Asked to  take  a s e a t anywhere in  the  room. (Non-
Respondents to  the  back o f  the  room to  se a ts  w ithou t 
ta b le s ) .
Good evening Ladies and Gentlemen,
Thank you a l l  f o r  coming along t on i gh t  to help us with our work. Let 
me f i r s t l y  int roduce  the o the r  people working on t h i s  study ton i gh t  . . .
The $15 you received is  the wage we are paying you fo r  giving 
up your evening and a t t end ing  ton i gh t .  As you know, the aim of  our 
study is  to examine the provi s ion of  Nat ional  Parks and Nature Reserves.
You have a l r eady  p a r t i c i p a t e d  in the main p a r t  of  t h i s  study by being 
involved in the  ANU Survey Research Cen t r e ' s  survey of  Canberra people.
You wil l  remember t h a t  in the  conservat ion sec t i on  of  t h a t  survey,  you 
answered ques t i ons  on the  inportance of  conse rva t i on ,  the reasons for  
conserving na tura l  a reas  as National  Parks and Nature Reserves,and 
s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  some ques t i ons  about an area on the  South Coast of  N.S.W.
What we want to do this evening is to look at the ways in which 
different people answer a couple of different types of questions.
We have two films that we can show you tonight, and we are 
going to ask you to put a value on seeing these films. We will give 
you a full description of the films so you will have a good idea of 
what you are valuing. The alternative to seeing the films tonight is 
that you will remain here for the length of time that the films would 
take, with nothing to do except to talk to one another.
The two films that we can show you tonight are both interesting 
and quite beautiful. The f i r s t  is called "The Right Whale: Endangered
Species" and is based on the experiences of an American scientist  
studying these whales off the coast of South America. The photography 
in the film is superb both above and below the water. It features the 
physical appearance of the whale in some detail ,  including descriptions, 
of their eyes and the way these whales feed. Some of the antics of 
the whales and particularly the playing of young whale calves are 
memorable parts of the film. The quality of the film is in line with 
other National Geographic publications.
The second film is called "Escarpment" and features the c l i f f  
faces and surrounding land which forms part of the new Kakadu National 
Park in Arnhem Land, Northern Territory. It  is a visual description 
of this area, achieved by relating natural features such as the cl iffs 
and lagoons, and the animals and birds of the area to the superb aboriginal 
paintings found in the rock faces of the caves and cl i ffs .  The film 
goes from giving a series of general wide ranging views of the area 
right down to the fine details of flowers and insects. Again, the
photography is superb.
Both films offer  anyone interested in nature lots  of enjoyment.
Now, to decide whether or not to show these f i lms , ’we need to 
know how important i t  is to you to see them. First ,we would l ike you 
to l e t  us know the maximum amount of money you would be prepared to 
pay to have the films shown, on the understanding that  you won't have 
to actual ly pay this  amount.
By adding up al l  your individual bids,we will be able to t e l l  
whether the total  amount you are wil l ing to pay, as a group, would 
cover the costs of showing the films i f  we were actual ly to col lect  
the money.
We don' t  want to know how much each individual "bids",  so please 
make sure that  you write your bid on the piece of scrap computer paper, 
that  you will find in your folder ,  rather  than on one of the sheets 
with your name on i t .  I t  is also important that  your fellow respondents 
do not know what you bid, so please observe a rule of si lence during 
the bidding and fold in half your piece of paper as soon as you've 
writ ten down your bid. I ' l l  come around with a bucket to col lec t  your 
pieces of paper once everyone has f inished.
Before you write down your bid, please note that  the films will 
not be shown unless the total  of the bids covers the cost.  So think 
careful ly about the maximum amount you would be prepared to pay.
Now are there any questions?
Remember that  we want your value of the f i lms,  not what you 
think your share of the cost is.
(i) Collect Bids
(ii) De-Code Responses 
(Hi) Enter on Master Sheet 
(iv) Sum Responses = IBID'^  (•+ Cost)
Well, it looks as if the sum of all your bids does cover the 
costs of showing the films.
Now you will recall that all I said before,was that the films 
would NOT be shown unless the total of your bids covered the costs.
I'm afraid that I have to tell you now,that we will show the 
films only if, when we repeat the process in a few minutes, the total 
of your bids exceeds the costs,but given the understanding this time 
that you will have to pay what you bid. We will be able to 
identify who bids what, because this time you will write your bids on 
the sheets of paper which have your name on them.
However, again we would ask you not to show your neighbour your 
bid and not to talk to anyone during the process. Once you have 
written your bid down on the first sheet, tear it off, fold it in half, 
and I'll come and collect it. When we come to collect the money you 
bid, we will do it so that the amount you pay is completely confidential.
If the total bid does not cover the costs,we are prepared to 
give you another chance to cover the costs by allowing you to change 
your bids. In fact we will repeat the process up to ten times, unless 
of course the costs are met. Before each new round, we will tell you 
by how much the groups total bid is short of the costs. If we find 
that the total bid is the same for three consecutive rounds,and is below 
the cost of showing the films, we will stop the process and begin the 
time of doing nothing. However,once we find the costs are met, the money
will be col lected and the films will be shown.
To pay for the films you can use the money you have been paid 
for coming tonight or any other money you have. Feel free to bid in 
any fract ion of dol lars as we have lots  of change.
I t  is vi tal  for you to real ize  that  i f  you bid zero, you will 
be quite free to take al l  the $15 home and use i t  however you like: 
for Christmas presents,  a night out or j us t  some groceries.  Alternat ively,  
you will be given the opportunity to donate some money toward further  
research into conservation and the environment. However, i f  you do 
bid zero, and everyone else does too, you wont see the films.
Now are there any questions?
Could you write your bid on the f i r s t  sheet of computer paper which 
has your name on i t .
1 . C o lle c t  b ids
2. En ter  onto Master Sheet
3. Check i f  BID11. < BID1, 
i f  NOT use BID^ in  (4)
4. Total. Bids: IBID^  (no ting  excep tio n s  from (3))
5. C alcu la te: D e f i c i t  = IBID1 -  IBID11
IF tv e  D e f i c i t  (Up to  10 i t e r a t io n s )
The total  of all  your bids is $d e f i c i t  below the cost of showing 
the films. If  you would l ike to change your bid,  given that  the film 
will not be shown unless the cost is met, please do so by writing down 
your new bid on the next sheet of paper. I f  you don' t  want to change 
your bid, could you write down the same bid as previously on the next 
sheet of paper.
IF D e f i c i t  <0
F in is h .
The total bid has covered the cost of the film. Thank you for 
participating, thats all the information we need. What we have been 
trying to see is if people are actually prepared to pay as much for 
these films, and indeed any other type of good, for example a National 
Park, as they say they are when they know they don't actually have to 
pay anything.
So now if you want to see the films we will screen them. There 
is not going to be any charge to watch the films. However you will 
understand that we have had to pay some costs to arrange this evening, 
and if you want to make a donation it would be greatly appreciated. The 
donation will be used in further studies into conservation and the 
environment.
Thank you once again.
APPENDIX XI
CROSSTABULATION ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS'
BEHAVIOUR TYPES
This appendix sets out the crosstabulat ions of respondents' 
behaviour types - i n  terms of  s t ra teg ic  behaviour - against some 
basic socio-economic and preference charac te r is t ics .  Because of 
the small numbers of respondents involved in the experiment, the source of  the 
data from which these tables are compiled, x2 s ta t i s t i c s  have not
been calculated.
Count 
Row PCT 
Col PCT Behaviour
O v e r - s ta te r
100.0
U n der -s ta te r
T r u t h - s t a t e r
100.0
TABLE A . X I . l : C ross tabu la t ion  - Age vs Behaviour Type.
fount 
tow PCT 
to! PCT
^ SN\ s Sex
Male Female E
Behaviour
O v e r - s ta te r
3 0
100.0 0 3
20.0 0 11.1
U nder -s ta te r
4 5
44.4 55.6 9
26.7 41.7 33.3
8 7
T r u t h - s t a t e r 53.3 46.6 15
53.3 58.3 55.6
E 15 12 27
55.6 44.4 100.0
TABLE A.X1.2. C ross tabu la t ion  - Sex vs Behaviour Type.
■lint 
w PCT 
1 PCT
Mari ta l
^ \ S t a t u s
Behaviour
Married Other Z
3 0 3
O ver -s ta te r 100.0 0 11.1
15.0 0
7 2
Under-s ta te r 77.8 22.2 9
35.0 28.6 33.3
10 5
T r u th - s ta t e r 66.7 33.3 15
50.0 71.4 55.6
E 20 7 27
74.1 25.9 100.0
Table A .X I . 3: Crosstabulat ion - Mar i ta l  Status vs Behaviour Type
i f e  Cycle
Family Other
Behaviourv PCT
Over - s ta te r
Under - s ta te r
T r u t h - s t a t e r
100.0
Table A ,X I .4: Crosstabulat ion - L i fe  Cycle Stage vs Behaviour Type.
ount  
ow PCT 
ol PCT
^ \ P l a c e  o f
^ \ B i  r t h Aust /UK Other E
B e h a v i o u r ^ .
2 1
O v e r - s t a t e r 66.68 .3
33.3
33.3
3
11.1
14 1
U n d e r - s t a t e r • 93.4
33.3
11.1
33.3
9
33.3
14 1
15T r u t h - s t a t e r 93.4 6.6
58.4 33.4 55.6
£ 24 3 27
88.9 11.1 100.0
Table  A . X I . 5: C r o s s ta b u la t i o n  -  Place o f  B i r t h  vs Behav iour  Type.
>unt 
>w PCT 
>1 PCT
\s < 3 r a d u a te
^ \ S t a t u s
B e h a v i o u r \
— 1 —  ■ -
Non-Graduate Graduate
Z
O v e r - s t a t e r
2
66.6
14.3
1
33.3
7.7
3
'1 1 .1
U n d e r - s t a t e r 5
55.6
4
44.4 9
35.7 30.8 33.3
T r u t h - s t a t e r 7 8 15
46.7 53.3 55.6
50.0 61.5
14 13 27
£ 51 .9 48.1 100.0
Table  A . X I . 6: C r o s s ta b u la t i o n  -  Graduate S ta tus  vs Behav iour  Type.
"ount 
3ow PCT 
:ol  PCT
3ount 
^ow PCT 
:o i  PCT
ccupat ion
Blue-Col 1ar W h i te -C o l la r
Behaviour
O v e r - s ta te r 100.0
U n de r -s ta te r
T r u t h - s t a t e r
100.0
Table A. XI._7j_ Cross tabu la t ion  - Occupation vs Behaviour Type.
Income
Behaviour
Over - s t a t e r
U n d e r -s ta te r
Tru th  - s t a t e r
100.0
Table A. X I . 8: Crosstabu1 a t ion  - Household Income vs Behaviour Type.
)unt 
)w PCT 
)1 PCT
bunt 
ow PCT 
ol PCT
S u b sc r ip t io 1
Behaviour
100.0Over-s ta te r
. 44.4Under-s ta ter
T ru th - s ta te r 73.3
100.0
Table A.X 1.9: Crosstabulat ion - Subscript ion to Conservation 
Organisation vs Behaviour Type.
' 'Nv£ayment Mode 
^ \ C h o i  ce
Behaviour
Govt. C.O. E
O ver -s ta te r
0
0
0
3
100.0
17.6
3
12.9
Under-s ta te r
2
25.0
25.0
6
75.0
35.3
8
32.0
6 8
T r u th - s ta t e r 42.9 57.1 14
75.0 47.1 56.0
z 8 17 25
32.0 68.0 100.0
Table A.X 1.10: Crosstabulat ion - Payment Mode Choice vs 
Behaviour Type.
\  W.T.P. - ----------------
oun t .<$10 > $10 E
ow PCT B e h a v i o u r ' ^
ol PCT 3 0 -
Over-s ta te r 100.0 0 3
20.0 0 11.1
5 4
Under-stater . 55.633.3
44.4
33.3
9
33.3
T ru th -s ta te r 746.7
8
53.3 15
46.7 66.7 bb. 6
E 15 12 27
55.6 44.4 100.0
Table A .X I .  11: Crosstabulat ion - Wil l ingness to Pay fo r
Nadgee's Existence Benefi ts vs Behaviour 
Type.
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